

A Companion to Francisco Suárez

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A Companion to Francisco Suárez

Edited by

Victor M. Salas
Robert L. Fastiggi



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Preface

This present volume is one of several recent collections of scholarly essays concerned with the thought of Suárez. In 2012, both Oxford University Press¹ and Cambridge University Press² came out with volumes containing essays on the philosophy of the *Doctor eximius*. These volumes, however, were almost entirely focused on the philosophical and legal thought of the great Jesuit, and they also reflected a more Anglo-American analytic approach. Also worthy of note here is another volume—edited by Marco Sgarbi—devoted to Suárez’s metaphysical and epistemological influence upon modern philosophy.³ The present volume seeks to situate Suárez clearly within his own scholastic framework and therefore follows an historical and, at times, even contentintal methodology to address topics that are central themes within the thought of the *Doctor eximius*. But, what is more, as Suárez himself makes clear on any number of occasions, his own estimation of his life’s work was as that of a theologian, and, consequently, any study that fails to consider the theological character of Suárez’s intellectual contribution necessarily fails to appreciate the tenor of Suárez’s life project. Accordingly, the present volume includes studies devoted to Suárez’s theology, as well as his influence on Protestant thought. All the recent volumes referenced above, however, have one thing in common: an appreciation of the singular contribution of Francisco Suárez to Baroque scholasticism in particular, and the history of Western thought in general.

The volume opens with an introductory chapter in which the editors offer a view of Suárez’s remarkable life, survey some of his most important works (such as the *Disputationes metaphysicae*, *De legibus*, et al.), and discuss the influence that the scholastic *Doctor eximius* had on succeeding generations of philosophers. Chapter 2, by Jean-Paul Coujou, provides an overview of Suárez’s political and legal thought, as articulated in *De legibus ac Deo legislatore* (1612) and *Defensio Fidei Catholicae* (1613). Here, Coujou demonstrates that by building upon the insights of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Francisco de Vitoria, Suárez rejects the idea of the monarch ruling by ‘divine right’, and instead, locates the authority of the State in the consent of the people (whether implicit or

1 Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund, eds., *The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez* (Oxford University Press, 2012).

2 Daniel Schwartz, ed., *Interpreting Suárez: Critical Essays* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

3 Cf. Marco Sgarbi, ed., *Francisco Suárez and His Legacy: The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2010).

explicit). Suárez argues that although civil law must be distinguished from divine positive law, it nevertheless has a moral orientation because it is informed by the natural law and is directed toward the common good. The political history of humanity manifests both the plurality of States and the moral and temporal unity of the human race as a type of ‘mystical body’.

Next, in Chapter 3, Jean-François Courtine examines Heidegger’s attempt to recapture the importance of metaphysics while moving it beyond its ‘onto-theological’ foundations, whether classical Greek or Christian. Although Heidegger believes philosophy should express a type of ‘Godlessness’, he nevertheless finds much inspiration in Suárez’s epochal attempt to provide metaphysics with a systematic and scientific structure. In Chapter 4, Rolf Darge argues against certain interpretations of Suárez’s metaphysics that maintain the Jesuit’s ontology ultimately glides into a ‘tinology’, which is to say that ‘being’, for Suárez, embraces more than what is real and includes also what is merely ‘thinkable’. However, in Chapter 5, Costantino Esposito offers a contrary (one might even say ‘opposing’) view to Darge, and labels Suárez as the progenitor of (problematic) modern ontologies, including the division of metaphysics into the (in)famous *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis*.

In the following chapter (Chapter 6), Robert Fastiggi focuses on Suárez’s specifically theological contributions. After providing a survey of the Spanish Jesuit’s theological writings, Fastiggi examines the role that the *Doctor eximius* played in the fields of Mariology, Ecclesiology, and the theology of grace. The seventh chapter, Daniel Heider’s contribution, examines Suárez’s teaching on universals, which is largely informed by the moderate realism of thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. In Chapter 8, Simo Knuuttila—in a *tour de force*—examines the entirety of Suárez’s philosophical psychology, which, Knuuttila points out, is largely indebted to the traditional Aristotelian and Thomistic paradigms. Still, Knuuttila adds, the influence of Scotus is readily apparent, and one of Suárez’s original innovations is his theory of ‘non-causal sympathetic connections’ between and among vital acts. Next, in Chapter 9, John Kronen takes up a topic that deserves greater attention, viz., the influence of Suárez on Protestant Scholasticism. He offers an exposition of the scholastic thought of two important theologians: the Lutheran theologian David Hollaz (1648–1713), and the Reform dogmatician Francis Turretín (1623–1687). Kronen shows how these two thinkers—both influenced by Suárez—applied the scholastic method to such topics as natural theology, the divine essence and attributes, and God’s knowledge and will in relation to predestination.

In Chapter 10, Daniel Novotný provides a detailed summary of Suárez’s metaphysical treatment of ‘beings of reason’, the theme of Disputation 54 in the *Disputationes metaphysicae*. This chapter discusses ‘beings of reason’ as

pure objects of the intellect, and also investigates the causality and division of such 'beings'. In Chapter 11, Paul Pace, S.J. provides a thorough overview of Suárez's philosophy of the natural law, taking note of historical influences such as Francisco de Vitoria. Pace provides an illuminating discussion of the precepts of the natural law, as well as the question of the natural law's immutability (and possible dispensations from it). José Pereira takes up the theme of the originality of Suárez in Chapter 12, and highlights the following: the systematization of metaphysics, the creation of a super-system, the concept of a 'unitary dyad', the method of 'conceptual focusing', the confirmation of extramental reality by the intramental, and analogy as the key to understanding being. In Chapter 13, Michael Renemann examines an important aspect of Suárezian epistemology, namely, the formation of concepts. Taking note of how Suárez relates to predecessors such as Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham, Renemann's chapter is especially valuable for understanding how Suárez relates to an epistemology of divine illumination. In the final chapter (the fourteenth), Victor Salas assesses Suárez's doctrine of analogy and, based as it is upon the Jesuit's notion of a 'confused concept', finds therein an original contribution to the medieval-scholastic debates about analogy. Neither reducible to Thomistic analogy (either in terms of proper proportionality, as Cajetan had maintained, or attribution) nor to some form of Scotistic univocity, Suárez's notion of the *analogia entis* is demonstrated to form an original doctrine unto itself.

List of Abbreviations

<i>DA</i>	<i>De anima</i>
<i>DF</i>	<i>Defensio Fidei</i>
<i>DM</i>	<i>Disputationes metaphysicae</i>
<i>De ang.</i>	<i>De angelis</i>
<i>De cen.</i>	<i>De censuris</i>
<i>De div. sub.</i>	<i>De divina substantia</i>
<i>De leg.</i>	<i>De legibus ac Deo legislatore</i>
<i>De rel.</i>	<i>De religione</i>
<i>De ult.</i>	<i>De ultimo fine hominis</i>
<i>De vol. et invo.</i>	<i>De voluntario et involuntario</i>
<i>ST</i>	<i>Summa theologiae</i> (Thomas Aquinas)

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Introduction

Francisco Suárez, the Man and His Work

Victor Salas and Robert Fastiggi

A truly bizarre anomaly within the history of thought occurred in 1564, one which would have rendered this volume entirely otiose. In that year, a sixteen-year old aspirant to the Society of Jesus—then a fledgling religious order founded only a few decades earlier by Iñigo López de Loyola—was rejected for admission to the order.¹ To be sure, there is nothing extraordinary about an aspirant's being declined admission to various religious orders, yet when that aspirant turns out to be Scholasticism's future *Doctor eximius*, Francisco Suárez, and the reason given for his rejection was a lack of intellectual gifts, which were prerequisite for an order whose charism is synonymous with education and the intellectual life, even the most casual observer is likely to be more than a little intrigued. Yet Suárez's rejection from the Jesuits is an indisputable historical fact. In fact, as Joseph Henry Fichter explains in his biography of the Spanish thinker, most of Suárez's youth was rather unremarkable, commonplace, and hardly notable for any academic promise.² Moreover, Fichter's estimate of Suárez's lacklustre intellect appears to be shared by Suárez himself, who, upon eventual probationary admission to the Jesuits after at least one unsuccessful appeal to the provincial of Castile,³ asked to remain a lay brother (instead of being sent on for further studies to be ordained to the priesthood) because he did not have confidence in his own ability to pass his philosophical course of studies⁴—and this from the man who would publish the first systematic account of metaphysics (viz., *Disputationes metaphysicae*) and whose philosophical vision would, in the words of one historian of philosophy, serve “as the main channel by which scholasticism came to be known by modern classical philosophers”!⁵

1 Raoul De Scorraile, *François Suarez de la Compagnie de Jésus* (Paris, 1912), vol. 1, pp. 43–44. A condensed chronological chart of important dates and events in Suárez's life can be found in the opening pages (xix–xxi) of this same work.

2 See Joseph Henry Fichter, *Man of Spain: Francis Suarez* (New York, 1940).

3 *Ibid.*, p. 48.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 52.

5 Armand Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy* (New York, 1962), p. 356.

Suárez's luminous career spent entirely as an academic and as Spain's most celebrated theologian—sought after for important academic positions by no less than the king—makes accounts of his youthful obtuseness unfathomable. Yet so it was. Sixteen years earlier, on 5 January 1548, Suárez was born in Granada (recently reconquered by Spain)⁶ to Antonia Vasquez and Gaspar Suárez, members of a well-to-do family whose service to the king and country was well known.⁷ When he was only thirteen, Francisco went to Salamanca to study canon law for three years, where he barely passed his course of studies.⁸ It was during his time at Salamanca that the young Spaniard fell under the spell of Juan Ramirez, an Andalusian Jesuit whose legendary sermons were unparalleled in rousing the spirits of many to take up the religious life.⁹ Suárez was among those who heard God's call through Ramirez's voice, and set his own mind on joining the Society of Jesus. As already mentioned, Suárez was a little over sixteen when, after much effort, many appeals, and a number of rejections, on 16 June 1564 he was finally granted admission to the Jesuits as an 'indifferent', that is, as someone whose future status in the Society as either a priest or lay brother was left undetermined.¹⁰ Two years later, in August 1566, Suárez professed his first simple vows.¹¹

Despite his rather unremarkable performance in his early studies as a young Jesuit, a radical—almost 'overnight'—shift occurred in Suárez's intellectual ability, which defies easy explanation.¹² Philosophical problems that had seemed intractably twisted in Gordian knots one day were suddenly masterfully unravelled. Fichter is convinced that Suárez's academic blossoming was due to a supernatural intervention brought about through the intercession of Mary, the Mother of God.¹³ Likewise, De Scoraille considers the possibility of divine intervention, citing as examples of such occurrences the legends of Albertus Magnus and Duns Scotus, who were said to have received similar prodigious intellectual gifts after seeking the intercession of the Blessed Virgin.¹⁴ Whatever the explanation, whether natural or supernatural, among his superiors there was no doubt about Suárez's new-found intellectual gifts,

6 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 6. For more on the cultural atmosphere of reconquered Spain, see *ibid.*, c. 2.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 11–12.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 38.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 45; cf. also De Scoraille, *François Suarez*, vol. 1, p. 35, n. 3.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 51.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 53.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 69.

13 *Ibid.*

14 De Scoraille, *François Suarez, de la Compagnie de Jésus*, pp. 60–61.

and with new-found confidence he was sent on to study theology from 1566–1570.¹⁵

So incredible and complete was Suárez's intellectual transformation that in the spring of 1570, only four years after his first profession of simple vows, he performed what was referred to as a 'Grand Act' at the University of Salamanca.¹⁶ Carried out by only the most select and academically gifted students, a Grand Act, similar to the medieval quodlibetal disputes, was a public academic exercise in which a student was examined on a host of topics ranging from philosophy to theology, and answered questions put to him by professors and any visitors present. The Grand Act occurred in two sessions held within a single day.¹⁷ Suárez's own performance was marked with some controversy, as one of the theses he had selected to defend was the Immaculate Conception.¹⁸ Juan Mancio, the Dominican professor overseeing the event, had reluctantly agreed to allow the young Jesuit to proceed with the Grand Act after receiving Suárez's assurance that he would defend the thesis using the Fathers of the Church as his principal sources. Given that by now Suárez was somewhat of a celebrity, the event was attended by a number of dignitaries, including the Jesuit superior general, Francis Borgia. Without surprise, and much to the delight of those assembled, Suárez performed spectacularly.¹⁹

Later that same year, Suárez was called to Salamanca to serve as a philosophy teacher to an incoming group of young religious.²⁰ Among his young pupils was Gregory of Valencia,²¹ who, only two years younger than Suárez,

15 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 74.

16 Ibid., 82.

17 Ibid.

18 Advocated most prominently by the Franciscan John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308) in the fourteenth century, the Immaculate Conception was the subject of controversy for several centuries, with the Dominicans being its main opponents. Due in part to Suárez's defense of the doctrine, the Immaculate Conception came to enjoy papal support. Several weeks before the Jesuit's death, Paul V, with his Bull, *Sanctissimus* of 12 September 1617, forbade any public opposition to the doctrine, although he made it clear "that he was not condemning the opposing view;" see Michael O'Carroll, C.S.Sp., *Theotokos: A Theological Encyclopedia of the Blessed Virgin Mary* (Eugene, OR, 2000), p. 181. Scotus's position in favour of Mary's Immaculate Conception, however, was offered with a tone of tentativeness because it stood in opposition to the majority opinion of his day. This, combined with Scotus's novel position on the primacy of the Incarnation, may very well have been the reason the Franciscan was moved from Paris to Cologne.

19 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, pp. 82–84.

20 De Scoraille, *François Suarez*, vol. 1, pp. 117–118; Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 70.

21 Known as the *Doctor doctorum*, Gregory of Valencia (c. 1549–1603) wrote many polemical writings against the ideas of the Lutherans and the Calvinists, which he collected in his

would himself become a well-renowned professor of philosophy and theology at the Roman College and the University of Ingolstadt.²² A year later, in 1571, Suárez, not yet ordained a priest, was sent to Segovia to help breathe new life into the Jesuit College. Founded in 1559, the school had gradually reduced to only a few dozen students and was forced to close in 1570, but an outcry from the public, which had become fond of the institution, brought about a re-opening of the school the following year. Suárez was charged with the task of teaching the *curso de artes*, which in all actuality, as De Scorraile notes, marked the beginning of his professorial career.²³ It was in Segovia that Suárez made his solemn profession of vows on 14 December 1571,²⁴ and was ordained a priest sometime in March 1572, at the relatively young age of twenty-five,²⁵ the minimum age allowed by canon law.²⁶

Life following Suárez's ordination was spent teaching and writing. He taught philosophy at Valladolid until 1574, when he took up the task of teaching theology, a task he carried out until 1580²⁷ (with only one absence during the 1574–1575 school year, when he had a brief teaching stint at Segovia).²⁸ As was the common practice with most theologians at the time, Suárez's teaching centred upon Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*.²⁹ In fact, Thomas's *Summa* had gradually come to replace Peter the Lombard's *Sentences* as the theological text *par excellence*, upon which all theologians cut their teeth. Nevertheless, despite Suárez's adherence to the traditional doctrines of Catholicism and his careful use of Aquinas's doctrine for their illumination, the Jesuit's own doctrines were considered 'too novel' and therefore, not surprisingly, heterodox. However, after an investigation by the Society's superior general and a letter explaining Suárez's teaching, the young Jesuit seemed to have been

volume, *De rebus fidei hoc tempore controversis* (Lyons 1591; Paris 1610). His major work, *Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quator* (Ingolstadt 1591–1597; revised 1603), is considered the first complete work of systematic theology written by a Jesuit. During the *De auxiliis* controversy, he defended the position of Molina. See G. Van Ackern, "Gregory of Valencia" in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed. Vol. 6 (Detroit, MI, 2003), pp. 523–524.

22 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 70.

23 De Scorraile, *François Suarez*, vol. 1, p. 130.

24 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 132; Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 96.

25 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 133; Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 96.

26 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 131.

27 De Scorraile, *François Suarez*, vol. 1, 149; cf. John P. Doyle, *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548–1617)*, ed. Victor M. Salas (Leuven, 2010), p. 3.

28 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 150.

29 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 110.

exonerated, for shortly thereafter he was called to teach at the Roman College, the premier Jesuit institution of education at the time.³⁰

In Rome, as Fichter suggests, Suárez was truly at the “center of the world,”³¹ that is, in the heart of a remarkably international setting wherein competing theological theories and positions vied against one another as blade sharpening blade. The Roman College, at one time or another, also included among its ranks: Robert Bellarmine, Christopher Clavius, Tomás Sánchez de Ávila, Luis de Molina, and Gabriel Vázquez, to name only a few. Unlike the difficulties he encountered at Valladolid, Suárez’s experience in Rome was much more liberating, as he was able to teach and develop his doctrines without the suspicion that often accompanies novelty. He lectured on the end of man during his first year there, followed by courses on moral theology in his second year.³² During Suárez’s third year at the Roman College he lectured on grace and on the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love.³³ Despite the great success Suárez enjoyed at the Roman College, the effect of the Roman climate on his health—which was never very robust in the first place—began to take its toll. Consequently, the 1584–1585 school year, during which Suárez lectured on the Incarnation, was to be his last in Rome, after which he departed for the college at Alcalá.³⁴

At Alcalá, Suárez had a hand in implementing the new Jesuit pedagogical ground plan, the *Ratio Studiorum*. Initially, Thomas Aquinas’s theological vision was simply set as a model to emulate, but not to follow ‘slavishly’.³⁵ Nevertheless, this position towards Thomas resulted in a backlash against the Society in Spain, led by none other than the Spanish Inquisition, headed then by Cardinal Quiroga. Culminating in the arrest of four Jesuit priests, the matter was finally settled and the priests were eventually released following a flurry of letters from the Jesuit superior general to Pope Sixtus V, after which some compromises were made on the part of the Jesuits.³⁶ The ‘compromise’ here was a revision of the *Ratio Studiorum*, in which Thomas Aquinas was to hold primacy once again, and his theological doctrines were to be taught exclusively.³⁷ Fichter suggests that Suárez’s own diplomatic effort to ameliorate the tension

30 Ibid., pp. 111–119.

31 Ibid., pp. 121–131.

32 Ibid., p. 129.

33 Ibid., p. 130.

34 Ibid., p. 126.

35 Ibid., p. 136.

36 Ibid., pp. 137–138.

37 Ibid., pp. 140–141.

between the Inquisition and the Spanish Jesuits can be found in Suárez's dedication of his first publication, the *De Incarnatione*, to Quiroga.³⁸ After a number of revisions made on the basis of the Alcalá Jesuit professors' experience in the classroom, the general superior, Aquaviva, issued the final version of the *Ratio* in 1591, which, while not immune from further revision and fine-tuning, was nevertheless binding on the whole Order. Eventually, a third edition of the *Ratio*, which integrated two rather divergent educational models—one, a formal and unifying method from the Roman College, and the other favouring a more liberal approach from the Jesuit schools in Spain—was promulgated in 1599.³⁹

Alcalá, as already mentioned, witnessed Suárez's first publication, the *De Incarnatione*,⁴⁰ which, after some delay due to a scarcity of materials (owing to the military conflict between Spain and England at the time), went to print in 1590.⁴¹ This work is actually a commentary on questions 1–26 of the *tertia pars* of Thomas's *Summa theologiae*, though Suárez's treatment of the material is much more extensive than Thomas's. In the Vivès edition, the Jesuit's commentary takes up two volumes (17 and 18) of 675 and 668 pages in length, respectively (excluding indices). Suárez deals with the mystery of the Incarnation in fifty-six disputations. He begins with the affirmation that Christ is the real Messiah, and then shows him to be true God and man. Suárez then discusses numerous Christological questions, with special attention on: what was assumed by the Incarnate Word (disputations 12–17); the graces, virtues, gifts, knowledge, and perfections possessed by Christ (disputations 18–31); and various other issues such as Christ, the High Priest (disputation 46), and the adoration owed to Christ as God (disputation 51). Again, unlike Thomas, Suárez affirms more openly that God would have become incarnate even if man had not sinned (disputation 5). He does so, though, in a very subtle manner by distinguishing between the primary motive for the Incarnation in terms of predestination, and its primary motive and effect in terms of historical reality. The volumes of *De Incarnatione*, because of the rigorous debate they generated and the many questions they raised, underwent three editions, with each successive edition marking Suárez's attempt to respond to his critics.⁴²

In 1592, a few years after the initial appearance of the *De Incarnatione*, Suárez published a continuation of his commentary on the third part of

38 Ibid., p. 139.

39 Ibid., p. 144.

40 This work occupies volumes 17–19 in the Vivès edition.

41 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 149.

42 Ibid., p. 152.

St. Thomas's *Summa theologiae*, expounding on questions 27–59. The result is a massive discussion, which comes to 1,120 pages of text in the Vivès edition (volume 19). Although this volume can be understood as a continuation of *De Incarnatione*, it is usually known under a different title, *De Mysteriis Vitae Christi*. As suggested by the subtitle of *De Mysteriis—ut et Scholasticae Doctrinae studiosis, et Divini Verbi concionatoribus usui esse possit*—Suárez's intention was twofold: one academic and the other pastoral, it was intended for the benefit of scholars and as an aid to those tasked with the responsibility of preaching the Word of God.⁴³ The volume is divided into fifty-eight disputations, of which the first twenty-three deal with systematic questions related to the Blessed Virgin Mary, such as her sanctification, virginity, marriage, purification, merits, graces, death, and glorious assumption. His treatment of Mariological questions takes up 336 pages in the Vivès edition. Suárez's treatment is so thorough that he is often considered “the founder of systematic Mariology.”⁴⁴ While Suárez shows great respect for St. Thomas, he never hesitates to take an opposing position. For example, unlike Aquinas, he affirms Mary's preservation from original sin via her Immaculate Conception (disputation 4).

Illness, once again, would be the cause of Suárez's departure from Alcalá, but this time it was an illness caused by increasing fatigue, brought about by the mental strain he suffered due to the constant rivalry between himself and another Jesuit professor, Gabriel Vázquez. Suárez's junior by only a year or so, Vázquez was everything Suárez wasn't: outgoing, popular with the students, and of a temperamental disposition that did not suffer fools patiently. When Suárez arrived at Alcalá it was to assume Vázquez's old position, which the younger Jesuit had vacated to take a position at the Roman College. As already noted, the Roman College was truly international in scope, but that did not prevent bouts of nationalistic rivalries of patriotic zeal from flaring up. A number of the Italian Jesuits, it seems, were less than approving of the Spanish, so much so that Vázquez found the environment intolerable and asked for another assignment. His request was eventually granted, and after teaching for five years at the Roman College, Vázquez returned to Alcalá in 1591.⁴⁵

Alcalá welcomed Vázquez as a native son returning home, but a home that had no more room because it was occupied by a new tenant: Suárez. It is hardly surprising that a sort of rivalry should form between the two great Jesuit theologians, and, given Vázquez's volatile personality, that he would hound the

43 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 154.

44 O'Carroll, *Theotokos*, p. 334; cf. n. 18 supra.

45 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, pp. 165–166.

older Jesuit mercilessly. In fact, Fichter reports that when Vázquez received his students for the afternoon class he was given to teach (the more enviable class being the morning class, which was taught by Suárez), the irascible Jesuit would ask his students in a sarcastic tone with respect to Suárez, "*Quid dixit vetulus mane?*"/What did the old man say this morning?"⁴⁶ Alcalá, it seems, was not big enough for the two colossal giants of Baroque Scholasticism, and in the struggle for acceptance, Suárez was at a decided disadvantage. Vázquez was lively, boisterous, and popular, in addition to being a brilliant theologian. Suárez, in contrast, though equally brilliant, was of a frail constitution, and, while not exactly melancholic, was hardly a social butterfly. The overbearing presence of Vázquez and the constant barbs of critique thrown Suárez's way, along with the strain of teaching, eventually led to a decline in the latter's health.⁴⁷ At last, Suárez resigned his position at Alcalá and left in the fall of 1593, after which he headed to Salamanca where, at last, he was granted the peace he needed to devote himself to study and writing. (Not surprisingly, Vázquez assumed his old position.)

Salamanca, in contrast to Alcalá, was all too eager to receive its most famous son, Suárez,⁴⁸ though his time there would be short. In May 1596, Philip II wrote to the Jesuits asking that Suárez be given the principal chair of theology (which had recently become vacant) at the University of Coimbra.⁴⁹ Content with his position at Salamanca—which was, for any academic, a dream job, where the Jesuit was free to devote his energies entirely to writing and study without being burdened with the distractions and annoyances that come with teaching—Suárez graciously (and diplomatically) declined the King's appointment. Suárez's reason was that such an appointment might cause a disruption in the delicate relationship between the Dominicans and the Society of Jesus, since for decades the Dominicans had held the position that was now being offered to the Jesuit. Philip, however, was not satisfied with Suárez's excuse, and dismissing the idea that tensions would arise between the two religious orders, on 27 May 1596 he insisted to the Jesuits that Suárez be ordered to take the post. Suárez did take leave of Salamanca, but instead of heading for Coimbra he went to Toledo, where he pleaded his case before the king in person. After witnessing the Jesuit's frail appearance, Philip relented and conceded to Suárez's request to remain in Salamanca.⁵⁰ Suárez's peace was

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 183.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 168–170.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 183.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 205.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 204–207.

short-lived, however, since Antonio Domingo, the Dominican named to the chair, died in late 1596, which left the position vacant once again. This time Philip would have his way, and on 10 February 1597 the king wrote the Jesuits for a third time, ordering that Suárez accept the post. With a sense of the futility that any resistance would meet, Suárez went to Coimbra without protest.⁵¹

At this same time, Suárez was in the midst of planning one of his masterpieces, a text that would shape the future of Western metaphysics well into the eighteenth century: the *Disputationes metaphysicae*. A theologian by profession, Suárez tells us in his preface *ad lectorem* of the *Disputationes* that, for quite some time, he thought it would be profitable for the execution of his professorial task to compose a systematic treatise on the metaphysical principles that his theological work presumed. So crucial did he think such a clarification of the metaphysical basis of his theological vision was that Suárez halted work on his commentary on the *Tertia pars* of Thomas's *Summa theologiae* in order to begin his mammoth metaphysical project.⁵² With remarkable speed, the Jesuit completed the two-thousand-page work by 1597, in one year's time. A two-volume work, the first volume consisted of disputations one through twenty-seven, and the second volume, comprising disputations twenty-eight through fifty-four, begins with the confession that he hoped no one finished with the first volume before the second was available.⁵³

The *Disputationes metaphysicae* straddle two philosophical epochs: medieval Scholasticism and early modern philosophy. As Gilson points out, it is still a very medieval text insofar as it locates itself within the framework of a larger metaphysical tradition, in which the positions of various thinkers are explored and critically evaluated before Suárez offers his own magisterial position.⁵⁴

51 Ibid., pp. 207–208.

52 *DM, praefatio ad lectorem* (ed. Vivès, vol. 25): “Quemadmodum fieri nequit ut quis Theologus perfectus evadat, nisi firma prius metaphysicae jecerit fundamenta, ita intellexi semper, operae pretium fuisse ut, antequam Theologica scriberem Commentaria (quae partim jam in lucem prodire, partim collaboro, ut quam primum, Deo favente, compleantur), opus hoc, quod nunc, Christiane lector, tibi offero, diligenter elaboratum praemitterem. ...Et quamvis in eo opera elaborando [i.e., his commentary on the *Summa*] diutius immoratus fuerim quam initio putaverm, et quam multorum expostulatio, qui commentaria illa in tertiam partem, vel (si sperari potest) in universam D. Thom. Summam, perfecta desiderant, tamen suscepti laboris nunquam me poenitere potuit, confidoque lectorem sententiam meam, vel ipso adductum experiment, comprobaturum.”

53 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25): “...quamvis aliud eo [i.e., volume 1] jam processerit, ut existimem, non prius hanc partem perfectam fore, quam illa fuerit in lucem edita.” Cf. Doyle, *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548–1617)*, pp. 6–7.

54 Cf. Étienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1952), p. 96.

John P. Doyle comments that, in the course of the fifty-four disputations, Suárez cites “[a]lmost every conceivable Greek, Arabic, Patristic, and especially Scholastic writer.”⁵⁵ Among these citations, which refer to 245 different thinkers, Suárez cites Aristotle 1,735 times, Thomas Aquinas 1,008 times, Duns Scotus 363 times, and Cajetan 299 times, to name only a few of the most important figures in the Western philosophical tradition.⁵⁶ Thus, Gilson makes no exaggeration when he remarks that “Suarez enjoys such a knowledge of mediaeval philosophy as to put to shame any modern historian of mediaeval thought.”⁵⁷ What is more, in evaluating the celebrated theses of various thinkers preceding him (both pro and con) before adopting his own nuanced position, Suárez’s *Disputationes* still mirror the medieval literary genre ‘par excellence’, namely, the *quaestio disputata*.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, this metaphysical work remains novel within the history of philosophy. Departing from the medieval tradition, the *Disputationes metaphysicae* are organized according to the inner exigencies of the science of metaphysics itself, and not according to the haphazard organization of the cobbled-together treatises given the title *Metaphysics*. Hence, Suárez’s work stands in contrast to the numerous medieval commentaries that, while attempting to elucidate the teaching of the Stagirite (oftentimes developing certain themes or ideas well beyond what is found in Aristotle), still remained very much indebted to the order and demands of the text(s). Suárez’s departure from this style was deliberate, for, as he tells us:

I had always judged that, in understanding and penetrating into the meaning of things, there was great value in inquiring into and judging them by a suitable method, which I was hardly able to respect or not at all if I were required to treat all the questions [pertinent to metaphysics] incidentally and as though by chance, according as they occur in the text of the Philosopher.⁵⁹

55 John P. Doyle, *Collected Studies*, p. 7.

56 Ibid.; cf. *ibid.*, p. 7, n. 45.

57 Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, p. 99.

58 Cf. Philipp W. Rosemann, *Understanding Scholastic Thought With Foucault* (New York, 1999), pp. 88–95.

59 *DM, ratio et discursus totius operis. Ad lectorem* (ed. Vivès, vol. 25): “Et quoniam iudicavi semper, magnam ad res intelligendas ac penetrandas, in eis convenienti methodo inquirendis et iudicandis, vim positam esse, quam observare vix aut ne vix quidem possem si, expositorum more, quaestiones omnes, prout obiter et veluti casu circa textum Philosophi occurrunt....” Translation from José Pereira, *Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity* (Milwaukee, WI, 2007), 13.

The result of Suárez's efforts was an architectonic masterpiece that covered the entire field of metaphysics. José Pereira observes that, while it is true that earlier Renaissance philosophers such as Agostino Nifo, Crisostomo Javelli, and Diego Mas had themselves authored metaphysical treatises that were hardly commentaries on the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*, their works lacked the same scope and breadth as the *Disputationes metaphysicae*.⁶⁰

A cursory glance through the contents of Suárez's metaphysical treatise confirms Pereira's comment. The opening disputation concerns the nature of metaphysics and its proper object, which Suárez identifies as '*ens in quantum ens reale*'.⁶¹ The second disputation treats the way being is known in terms of formal and objective concepts, with the latter being particularly crucial for the Suárezian metaphysics, inasmuch as real, possible, infinite, finite, substantial, and accidental being can be known through it. Simply following along the Scholastic tradition which had already treated the matter thoroughly,⁶² Suárez tells us that, while formal concepts are "said to be the act [of the intellect] itself, or, what is the same, the word (*verbum*) by which the intellect conceives some thing or common character,"⁶³ the objective concept, in contrast, "is said to be that thing or character (*ratio*) which is properly and immediately represented or known through the formal concept."⁶⁴ Disputation three concerns the general character and principles of being, while the fourth disputation opens a discussion on the transcendental character of unity, which is explored in further detail in the fifth and sixth disputations. After a discussion pertaining to various kinds of distinction (the seventh disputation), Suárez addresses issues related to the transcendentals of truth (disputations eight and nine) and goodness (disputations ten and eleven), before moving onto a consideration of the cause of being in general (disputation twelve) and then the four causes in particular: material (disputations thirteen and fourteen), formal (disputations

60 Pereira, *Suárez*, p. 14.

61 *DM* 1.1.26 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 11): "Dicendum est ergo, ens in quantum ens reale esse obiectum adaequatum hujus scientiae."

62 See, for instance, Pedro da Fonseca, *Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, (Cologne, 1615), vol. 1, lib. 4, c. 2, s. 1: "Atque ut a distinctione conceptus ordiamur: principio ponatur duplicem esse conceptum: formalem unum alterum obiectivum.... *Conceptus formalis nihil est aliud, quam actualis similitudo rei, que intelligitur; ab intellectu ad eam exprimendam producta.... Conceptus obiectivus est res, que intelligitur; secundum eam formam, naturamve que per formalem concipitur*" (emphases in original).

63 *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 64): "...conceptus formalis dicitur actus ipse, seu (quod idem est) verbum quo intellectus rem aliquam seu commune rationem concipit...."

64 *Ibid.* (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "Conceptus obiectivus dicitur res illa, vel ratio, quae proprie et immediate per conceptum formalem cognoscitur seu repraesentatur...."

fifteen and sixteen), efficient (disputations seventeen through twenty-two), and final causes (disputations twenty-three and twenty-four). Suárez concludes the first volume with a discussion of exemplar causality (disputation twenty-five) and additional issues pertaining to the relationship between causes and effects (disputation twenty-six) as well as causes as they relate to one another (disputation twenty-seven).

Suárez opens his second volume with the twenty-eighth disputation, in which he discusses the manner in which the concept of being descends to its 'inferiors', namely, from infinite to finite being. This disputation offers one of Suárez's fullest expositions of his doctrine of analogy. In this disputation, Suárez attempts to negotiate a very delicate balance between the absolute unity of the concept of being, coming close to the univocation theory of John Duns Scotus on the one hand,⁶⁵ while admitting an ordered, unequal relation among being's *inferiora*, on the other hand. Also of note here is Suárez's critique and rejection of Cajetan's analogy of proper proportionality, in favour of an analogy of (intrinsic) attribution.⁶⁶ Moving on to distinction twenty-nine, Suárez, critical of Thomas's dictum that '*omne quod movetur ab alio movetur*', replaces it with '*omne quod fit ab alio fit*' through which he offers his demonstration for God's existence. The thirtieth disputation treats what may be referred to as Suárez's natural theology, as it discusses the various attributes and properties of God. The thirty-first disputation discusses the attributes of finite being before considering the division of being into substantial and accidental being in general (disputation thirty-two). Disputations thirty-three through thirty-six offer additional treatments of substance, shifting gears in disputations thirty-seven through fifty-three wherein a detailed analysis of accidental being in general, and each of the nine Aristotelian categories of accident in particular, is provided, with each category being explored in minute detail. Suárez closes his metaphysical project with the fifty-fourth disputation in which he discusses *entia rationis*. Although 'beings of reasons' were originally set aside as not properly pertaining to the study of metaphysics—for real being and beings of reason do not fall under the common concept of being—in this last disputation Suárez considers the 'shadowy reality'⁶⁷ of

65 Because of Suárez's defence of the unity of the concept of being, he has more often than not been accused simply of advancing an incoherent form of Scotistic univocity. See, e.g., Walter Hoeres "Francis Suarez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus on the *Univocatio Entis*," in *John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965*, eds. J.K. Ryan and B.M. Bonansea (Washington, D.C., 1965), pp. 263–290.

66 Cf. *DM* 28.3.11, 16–17.

67 Cf. *DM* 54.Prol. (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 1015): "Nam imprimis, cum entia rationis non sint vera entia, sed quasi umbrae entium, non sunt per se intelligibilia, sed per aliquam

beings of reason insofar as they relate to real being. Suárez's metaphysical speculations here would be of crucial importance and significance for future thinkers such as Clemens Timpler, Johannes Clauberg, Andreas Semery, Luis de Lossada, Thomas Compton Carleton, and a host of others, for whom *entia rationis* would fall within the scope of metaphysics.⁶⁸ Here, one can correctly view Suárez's thoughts on *entia rationis* as the seedbed from which early modern 'tinologies' would later blossom.⁶⁹

Without doubt, Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae* is comprehensive and exhaustive. Its density of argument and staggering size make most modern metaphysical treatises, such as Descartes's *Meditations* or *Discourse*, seem like nothing more than a floppy pamphlet fit for swatting flies. Suárez's treatise, in contrast, could kill a man—if used with determined violence, that is. Used for less violent purposes, the *Disputationes metaphysicae* was a bestseller both in Suárez's own time and after. With the profits he received from the work, Suárez, with the permission of his superiors, built up the college at Salamanca, founding a new addition now known as the 'Suarezian Quarter'. He also made provisions for the library, establishing a fund that would provide books for the school for years to come.⁷⁰

Nevertheless, ever the obedient Jesuit, Suárez took his leave of Salamanca and headed to Coimbra. Coimbra, however, would not be a source of peace for Suárez since, as had already been brewing for decades, the *De auxiliis* controversy was about to boil over from the squabbles that had irritated the Spanish Dominicans and Jesuits, disrupting the entire Church and requiring Clement VIII's intervention into the matter. Suárez was well aware of the controversies concerning the respective positions of the Jesuit, Molina, and the Dominican, Bañez, regarding the question of how to reconcile predestination and grace with free will. Molina believed that sufficient grace is made efficacious by the free consent of the will, while Bañez held that sufficient grace is made efficacious by its own intrinsic power. Suárez had been lecturing and writing on

analogiam et conjunctionem ad vera entia, et ideo nec etiam sunt per se scibilia, nec datur scientia quae per se primo propter illa solum cognoscenda sit institute."

68 John P. Doyle has perhaps done the most work to track the history and development of *entia rationis* as standing outside of metaphysics to becoming gradually incorporated into this same science by the later Scholastics. See his *On the Borders of Being and Knowing: Some Late Scholastic Thoughts on Supertranscendental Being*, ed. Victor M. Salas (Leuven, 2012).

69 On the relationship between Suárez and early modern tinology, see Jean-François Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris, 1990), pp. 536–538, and Doyle, *On the Borders of Being and Knowing*.

70 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 192.

these issues for some time, and in 1599 he published six treatises, or *Opuscula*, on the issue. Clement VIII established a commission, the *Congregatio de auxiliis*, in November of 1597 to try to resolve the dispute between the Jesuits and the Dominicans. During this time, Suárez sent his *Opuscula* to the Jesuit general, Claudius Aquaviva (1545–1615), and eventually the Pope himself consulted these treatises, once they were published in Rome. The *Congregatio de auxiliis* had not concluded at the time of Clement VIII's death in March of 1605, and it was taken up again by Paul V, who resolved the controversy with a formula issued on 5 September 1607 that essentially allowed the Dominicans and the Jesuits freedom to defend their respective positions, provided they did not label the positions of their opponents as heretical.⁷¹

Suárez and Bellarmine both defended a modification of Molina's position, known as Congruism, which was eventually favoured by the Jesuits and mentioned as a defensible position in a letter by Pope Benedict XIV to the Grand Inquisitor of Spain on 31 July 1748.⁷² The name 'Congruism' derives from the belief that sufficient grace is made efficacious "because it is given in circumstances congruous to its operation."⁷³ It is a modification of Molinism, as it recognizes that efficacious grace differs from sufficient grace in terms of its first movement, which is from God Himself. God, however, seeks the free cooperation of the will with this efficacious grace by means of circumstances that are congruous with that free assent. John Hardon explains that God not only gives "the grace which He knows to be efficacious," but He gives it "*because* He foresees it will be efficacious."⁷⁴

After residing in Coimbra for only two years, in 1599 a plague developing in the region forced Suárez—whose health, as already noted, was never robust to begin with—to seek refuge in Ávila and then in his beloved Salamanca. Eventually the epidemic subsided and Suárez was able to return to Coimbra and resume his responsibilities, which consisted principally in the composition of theological texts.⁷⁵ Between 1601 and 1603 Suárez began lecturing on the questions that would eventually be published as his *De legibus*,⁷⁶ the importance of which simply cannot be overestimated. Much like its metaphysical counterpart, the *Disputationes metaphysicae*, the *De legibus* is an expansive and

71 Denzinger, Heinrich and Peter Hünermann, *Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, 43rd ed. (Freiburg, 2010) no. 1997; henceforth, Denz.-H.

72 Denz.-H., 2564–2565.

73 Fichter, 231.

74 John Hardon, S.J., *History and Theology of Grace* (Ypsilanti, MI, 2002), p. 275.

75 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 237.

76 Ibid., pp. 240–241.

systematic treatment of law in all its instantiations: divine or eternal, natural, international (i.e., *ius gentium*), and positive or human. The work is divided into ten books, and opens with a discussion of law in general: what is signified by the name 'law', how law is related to justice, the necessity for a variety of laws, the character (*ratio*) of law, and a host of other considerations related to the nature of law.⁷⁷ Suárez explains that in its broadest or most general sense, 'law' is the rule and measure of good operations that lead toward the better and away from the less good.⁷⁸ Properly and absolutely speaking, what is called 'law' pertains to customs (*mores*), for it is the measure of moral acts and moral rectitude.⁷⁹ Etymologically, law is taken from the word 'binding' (*ligando*), for, as Suárez tells us, "its proper effect is to bind or oblige."⁸⁰ The second book moves on to treat the specific kinds of law mentioned above. Here, Suárez's contrast with Thomas Aquinas is fairly clear. For Thomas, law (whether divine, natural, or human) is always ultimately a feature of the divine ideas and thus stems from the divine reason.⁸¹ Suárez, however, associates law with the will. According to the Jesuit, the eternal law pertains to the decrees of God's free will, as it ordains all parts of the universe toward the common good.⁸²

Descending to the natural law, Suárez explains that, like every other non-divine law, it participates in the eternal law.⁸³ As Suárez notes, according to some, the natural law is nothing other than rational nature itself, a position he affirms but for which he gives further qualifications.⁸⁴ As a rational nature can be considered in a twofold way, the natural law can also be considered

77 Cf. *De leg.*, 1.

78 *De leg.*, 1.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 1): "...[lex] est quaedam regula et mensura operationis bonae ad meliorem inducens, et a minus bona retrahens..."

79 *Ibid.*, 1.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 2): "Propria ergo et absoluta appellation legis est, quae ad mores pertinet: atque ita restringenda est D. Thomae descriptio, ut scilicet lex sit mensura quaedam actuum moralium, ita ut per conformitatem ad illam, rectitudinem morale habeant, et si ab illa discordant oblique sint."

80 Cf. *ibid.*, 1.1.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 3): "Atque hinc intulit D. Thomas in illo art. 1, quaest. 90, etymologiam legis; putat enim a ligando sumptam esse, quia proprius effectus legis est ligare, se obligare...."

81 See *ST* II-I, q. 93, a. 1; cf. Doyle, *Collected Studies*, p. 14.

82 Cf. *De leg.*, 2.3.6 (ed. Vivès: vol. 5, p. 94): "...legem aeternam esse decretum liberum voluntatis Dei statuentis ordinem servandum, aut generaliter ab omnibus partibus universi, vel saltem ratione singularem specierum ejus, aut specialiter servandum a creaturis intellectualibus quoad liberas operationes earum." Cf. Doyle, *Collected Studies*, p. 14.

83 *Ibid.*, 2.1.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 86): "Denique omnis lex participate supponit legem per essentiam: sed pex per essentiam aeterna est...."

84 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.2.1 (ed. Vivès, 5, p. 100): "Dixerunt ergo aliqui hanc legem nihil aliud esse quam ipsam naturam rationale, ut talis est."

doubly: first, inasmuch as certain things either agree or disagree with that nature, and second, inasmuch as that rational nature has, through the natural light of reason, the power itself to judge what is in accord or discordant with itself.⁸⁵ Also pertaining to the natural law are the self-evident (*per se*) first general moral principles, such as 'do good', 'avoid evil', etc., as well as the conclusions that can be inferred from those principles.⁸⁶ What is more, Suárez agrees with the 'common opinion' of the theologians who hold that the natural law is immutable and cannot be abrogated, not even by the pope, who can no more dispense the natural law than he can the divine law.⁸⁷ Suárez thus disagrees with both Ockham, who holds that God could annul the Decalogue and natural law, and Duns Scotus, who taught that God could dispense with those precepts of the Decalogue that pertain to creatures.⁸⁸ According to the Jesuit, the natural law cannot be abrogated even by the absolute power of God.⁸⁹

Occupying a middle position between natural and positive human law is the *ius gentium*, or law of nations.⁹⁰ Here, Suárez very much drew upon and

85 Ibid., 2.5.1 (ed. Vivès, 5, p. 100): "...adverte oportet rationalem naturam dupliciter spectari posse: uno modo secundum se, id est, quatenus ratione talis essentiae, quam habet, quaedam habet, quaedam sunt illi convenientia, et alia disconvenientia: alio modo quatenus vim habet iudicandi de his quae sibi convenient, vel disconveniunt, mediante lumine naturalis rationis."

86 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.7.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 113): "...quaedam sunt prima principia generalia morum, ut sunt illa, *honestum est faciendum, pravum vitandum; quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*, et similia; de quibus etiam nulla est dubitation, et a fortiori patebit ex dicendis. In tertio ordine ponimus conclusiones quae per evidentem illationem ex principiis naturalibus inferuntur; et non nisi per discursum cognosci possunt..." (emphases in original).

87 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.14.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 137): "Idem sentiunt theologi qui absolute negant Papam posse dispensare in jure divino: nam si in positivo divino non potest, multo minus in naturali quia et divinum etiam est immutabilis..."

88 Cf. Doyle, *Collected Studies*, p. 15.

89 Cf. *De leg.*, 2.15.16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 148): "...ea quae continent intrinsecam rationem justitiae et debiti indispensabilia sunt; sed huiusmodi sunt praecepta Decalogi; ergo. Major patet, quia implicat contradictionem esse debitum et non esse debitum; quod autem dispensator eo ipso fit indebitum; si autem habet debitum inseparabile, necessario illud retinet: ergo repugnant dispensare quod huiusmodi est. Et ideo ait D. Thomas, nec Deum dispensare posse, quia non potest agere contra suam justitiam, quod tamen ageret si licentiam daret faciendi id quod per se et intrinsece injustum est."

90 Yet, because the *ius gentium* has such an affinity with the natural law, Suárez warns that, at times, many tend to conflate the two or make the *ius gentium* a part of the natural law. Cf. *De leg.*, 2.17.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 159): "...quia [ius gentium] magnam habet cum jure naturali affinitatem, ita ut a multis cum illo confundatur, vel pars quaedam ejus esse censeatur."

systematized Francisco de Vitoria's teaching on the *ius gentium*, which would come to serve as the basis for what would become known as 'international law'.⁹¹ While not merely a product of social convention, Suárez tells us that the *ius gentium* nevertheless grows out of the customs of nearly all nations.⁹² Moreover, if it is a feature of all nations, this is because it functions as a product or derivation of the exigencies proper to human nature, which though subject to the particularities and contingent circumstances of various cultures, still remains constant in its essential constitution throughout them.⁹³ The *ius gentium* can thus serve as a basis for the relation of various states with one another. According to Suárez, the law of nations pertains to such matters as ambassadorial privileges, commerce, war, trade, marriage, et cetera.⁹⁴

Book three concerns itself chiefly with civil or positive human law. As the natural law is itself a participation and imitation of the eternal law, so is human law considered an imitation—albeit more remotely—of its divine origin. Humanity, graced with freedom and will, is itself the recipient of a God-given authority to organize itself and form legislation that governs society. Suárez says,

In this matter the common opinion is seen to be that this power [to form political communities and author legislation] is given immediately by God as the author of nature; therefore men quasi-dispose matter and effect a capable subject with this power, God, however, quasi-bestows the form giving this power.⁹⁵

Here, Suárez pursues such topics as the obligatory character of civil law upon the Church, whether civil law only pertains to proscribing good actions or also

91 For more on Vitoria and the *ius gentium*, see Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence, eds., *Vitoria: Political Writings* (Cambridge, 1991); Victor M. Salas, "Francisco de Vitoria on the *Ius Gentium* and the American *Indios*," *Ave Maria Law Review* 10.2 (2012): 331–342.

92 Cf. *De leg.*, 2.19.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 168): "Praecepta juris gentium in hoc differunt a praeceptis juris civilis, quia non scripto, sed moribus non unius vel alterius civitatis aut provinciae, sed omnium vel fere omnium nationum constat..."

93 Cf. Doyle, *Collected Studies*, p. 15. See also idem, "Francisco Suárez on the Law of Nations," in *Religion and International Law*, eds. Mark Janis and Carolyn Evans (Lancaster, UK: Kluwer, 1999), pp. 103–120, reprinted in *Collected Studies*, pp. 315–332.

94 Cf. *De leg.*, 2.19.10; cf. Doyle, *Collected Studies*, p. 15.

95 Cf. *ibid.*, 3.3.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 182): "In hac re communis sententia videtur esse hanc potestatem dari immediate a Deo ut auctore naturae, ita ut homines quasi disponant materiam et efficient subjectum capax hujus potestatis, Deus autem quasi tribuat formam dando hanc potestatem." Cf. Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 244.

prohibiting evil ones, whether promulgation is necessary to constitute a civil law, whether civil law binds in conscience, et cetera. In book four of the *De legibus* Suárez addresses the issue of canon law. Of particular concern here is the extent to which the Church has jurisdiction over its subjects, that is to say, the relationship between Church and state. Suárez accords primacy to the Church, with Christ as its head, since the state is likened to the Church “as the body is subordinate to the soul.”⁹⁶ Like his contemporary Bellarmine, however, he does not believe the Church’s primacy over the state places all temporal affairs under the *direct* jurisdiction of the Church. Rather, the primacy is due to the superiority of the spiritual over the temporal. Book five moves on to consider various kinds of human law, such as written and non-written laws. Here, Suárez considers human law in relation to conscience, penalties, breaking contracts, and the consequences thereof.

Beginning the second division of the *De legibus*, book six further develops Suárez’s jurisprudence in terms of who is the proper interpreter of the law, and what particular situations can bring about exceptions, abrogations, and emendations of the law. Suárez devotes his seventh book to custom as it affects the formation of civil law. Of special concern is the role that custom plays in the codification of law. Here there is a close connection between morality and the formation of law, since custom, as Suárez sees it, always presupposes good moral character as a source of action.⁹⁷ The Jesuit discusses the nature of privilege in his eighth book, before concluding his work with a discussion of the divine law both old and new in the ninth and tenth books, respectively. With respect to the former (book nine), Suárez treats the Mosaic Law and its obligatory character, but, as he notes, this is not a law that ‘saves’.⁹⁸ The new law, the subject of book ten, exceeds the old, since the new is the old law’s completion and end. Following Paul, Suárez explains that the old law was a propaedeutic for the new law.⁹⁹ In fact, Suárez offers the analogy that the new law is compared to the old law as “truth to shadow.”¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, if the old law is to have any salvific nature, it is only through the new law of grace

96 Ibid., 4.9.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 366): “...Christus Dominus Ecclesiam tanquam unum spiritual regnum, in quo unus etiam esset rex, et princeps spiritualis; ergo necesse est ut ei subdatur temporalis potestas, sicut corpus animae.”

97 Cf. *ibid.*, 7.1.4; cf. also Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 246.

98 Cf. *ibid.* 9.7.1–14, (ed. Vivès, vol. 6, pp. 459–465); cf. n. 101 *infra*.

99 *De leg.*, 10.8.18 (ed. Vivès, vol. 6, p. 597): “...excedit lex nova veterem, quia est finis illius, et vetus fuit dispositio seu preparatio ad novam....”

100 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 6, p. 597): “...lex nova comparator ad veterem tanquam veritas ad umbram....”

that Christ effected salvation through his blood, which has “opened the gates of heaven.”¹⁰¹

In the years immediately succeeding his courses on the law, Suárez published two volumes devoted to the sacrament of penance: *De poenitentia* (1602) and *De censuris* (1603).¹⁰² As he was serenely composing his work and arguing for his claims with the exacting methodological detail that had been the hallmark of his works, Suárez could have had no idea that some of the theses contained in these volumes would later cause him a great deal of headache, heartbreak, and, astonishingly for the champion of orthodoxy, even excommunication.

Suárez was dealing here with a matter that had been discussed since the time of Pope St. Leo I (c. 440–461). The initial question was whether absolution should be denied to someone who had testified before others of his sorrow for sin but was unable to confess them verbally when the priest arrived. This question in turn led to questions about whether confessions and absolutions could be carried out by mail. While some believed that both confession and absolution could be done by mail, by Suárez’s time this view had been widely rejected. Suárez and others, however, believed that confessions might be possible by mail from a distance, but absolution could only be given by a priest in the presence of the penitent.

Because there was much controversy over this issue, the Holy Office intervened with a decree on 20 June 1602, which condemned as “false, rash, and scandalous” the proposition that “it is permitted to confess sins sacramentally to an absent confessor by letter or through a messenger and to receive absolution from this same absent confessor (*et ab eodem absente absolutionem obtinere*).”¹⁰³ Suárez accepted this ruling, but interpreted the copulative ‘*et*’ in a conjunctive rather than a disjunctive manner. Thus, he believed the decree condemned only the administration of the sacrament of penance when *both* the confession of sins *and* the absolution occurred in the absence of the priest. This interpretation, however, was rejected by a subsequent decree of the Holy Office dated 7 June 1603, which concluded by saying that

101 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 6, p. 597): “Nam licet suo tempore utilis fuerit, cum tamen slavare homines non potest, nec ad beatitudinem introducere, vana esset, nisi per CHRISTUM compleretur, qui et sanguine suo januas coeli aperuit, et initiavit nobis viam novam, relicta lege gratiae, per quam illam consequi et in Sancta Sanctorum aeternae beatitudinis introire valeamus.” Cf. Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 248.

102 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 249.

103 Denz.-H., 1994.

“the above-mentioned doctrine of Father Suarez openly contradicts the definition of His Holiness.”¹⁰⁴

Many people wrote letters in support of Suárez and his position, and, after several delays, Suárez finally went to Rome in the spring of 1604 to meet with Clement VIII and explain his position, while making clear his absolute submission to the authority of the Pope. Although the decree was never reversed, Suárez’s humility and submission before the Roman Pontiff were duly noted. Clement VIII died on 3 March 1605, and the succeeding pontificate of Leo XI lasted less than a month (1–27 April 1605). After Pope Paul V (c. 1605–1621) assumed the Chair of St. Peter on 16 May 1605, Suárez’s reputation with the Holy See began to be reestablished. Although Paul V told him he could not reverse the decision of Clement VIII, he expressed his admiration for Suárez, and subsequently consulted with him frequently.¹⁰⁵ With the thorny matter finally settled and his reputation restored, Suárez departed Rome and returned to Coimbra in the autumn of 1605.¹⁰⁶

Suárez’s reputation would not remain ambiguous for long. In response to a political crisis that was brewing between the Holy See and Venice, Suárez, together with a number of other theologians (including Bellarmine, Baronius, and Caetani), came to the defense of the Holy See. *In nuce*, the dispute centered upon the extent of papal jurisdiction, in light of Venice’s efforts to confiscate religious property, expel certain religious orders, and stand on the verge of open warfare with Rome.¹⁰⁷ Suárez’s intervention in the controversy consisted in his work *De immunitate ecclesiastica contra Venetos*. As a sign of Pius V’s appreciation for Suárez’s intervention and defense of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, on October 1607 he bestowed upon the Jesuit theologian the title *Doctor eximius ac pius*, which effectively put to an end any question of the Holy See’s great estimation of Suárez, while offering the Jesuit some much-needed balm to help heal the bruising he received from the *De poenitentia* fiasco.¹⁰⁸

Suárez’s time at Coimbra was further taken up with additional extra-academic responsibilities on behalf of the Society of Jesus and the larger Church. In response to attacks against the Society by those within and outside the Church, Suárez composed his *De statu religionis*, in which he deals with religion both as a virtue governing the way an individual relates to God, and as a ‘state’, that is, as a way of life in which the faithful congregate to give worship

104 Ibid., 1995.

105 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, p. 262.

106 Ibid., p. 263.

107 Ibid., pp. 271–272.

108 Ibid., pp. 272–273.

to God.¹⁰⁹ In this work, Suárez offers a reflection on the *raison d'être* of the Society of Jesus, with a detailed exposition of its guiding principles.¹¹⁰ On behalf of the larger Church, in 1609 Philip III asked Suárez to take part in the cause for the canonization of Teresa of Ávila. Suárez, personally acquainted with Teresa, dutifully gave a favourable opinion of her works and character.¹¹¹ At the king's behest once again, in 1611 Suárez was also asked to take part in the beatification of Queen Elizabeth of Aragon.¹¹² Suárez's intervention, however, was less pleasant in the Mary Ward affair. Ward, a young English woman who aimed to found religious institutes for the education of young girls,¹¹³ intended for her religious group to be the female branch of the Society of Jesus, unique among religious orders in that, unlike the Benedictines, Franciscans, Dominicans, etc., it does not have any female congregations or nuns. When asked for his counsel regarding the supposed 'Jesuitesses', Suárez, while acknowledging that their way of life was sincere and praiseworthy, noted that their congregation lacked appropriate ecclesiastical approbation for its founding, as well as a stable form of religious life.¹¹⁴

As controversial and distracting as these issues were for the Jesuit theologian, by far one of the most controversial episodes in Suárez's life was his dispute with James I of England. As is well known, the English monarchy would be a significant thorn in the side of the papacy and for Catholic interests throughout Europe. The oath of allegiance was one of many anti-Catholic laws that James enacted, and it certainly attracted Rome's undivided attention. Paul V was quick to condemn the oath, while others, such as Robert Bellarmine, subjected it to a blistering critique.¹¹⁵ Bellarmine's critique, moreover, unleashed a torrent of controversy between those faithful to Rome and James's theologians. With the approval of Philip III and encouragement from Paul V, Suárez himself entered the fray, and his answer to the English monarch was his weighty volume *Defensio fidei catholicae adversus anglicanae sectae errores*.

109 *De rel.*, tr. 1, 1.2.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 13, p. 8): "...specialiori autem modo *religionis* vox applicata est ad significandum peculiarem vivendi modum et statum, in quo aliqui fideles congregatur ad perfectiori modo colendum Deum, et haec significatio nobis deserviet simul cum alia priori, quae virtutem indicat." Cf. also *ibid.*, tr. 1, 1.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 13, p. 3): "...[religio] non significare solius Dei cultum, sed etiam officium quod hominibus cognatis et affinis, vel alia quacumque ratione nobis conjunctis...."

110 Fichter, *Man of Spain*, pp. 277–278.

111 *Ibid.*, pp. 281–283.

112 *Ibid.*, pp. 283–284.

113 *Ibid.*, p. 285.

114 *Ibid.*, pp. 287–288.

115 *Ibid.*, pp. 292–293.

The work was completed in 1610, but the time it took for final approval and various publishing delays pushed the actual publication of the volume back to 1613.¹¹⁶ The *Defensio* is a detailed examination of the questions raised by James I. It consists of six books, is 735 pages in length, and takes up volume 24 in the Vivès edition. Within the *Defensio* are some outstanding arguments in favour of the primacy and authority of the Roman Pontiff, especially with respect to secular rulers. Like Bellarmine, Suárez argues for an indirect authority of the Pope over temporal matters, while insisting that secular rulers have no authority over the Pope in terms of spiritual matters. Not surprisingly, James was outraged, and ordered an immediate public burning of the volume while commissioning the theologians at Oxford with the task of defending their king in a public disputation in which the *Defensio* would be roundly refuted.¹¹⁷ When James's additional request that all of Europe's monarchs should reject the *Defensio* was not universally conceded, he did his best to destroy the reputation of Suárez and the entire Society of Jesus throughout Europe, having particular success in France.¹¹⁸

While these controversies were raging on, Suárez's tenure as a professor was nearing its end. Having taught at Coimbra for close to twenty years, Suárez could finally look forward to the freedom from his professorial duties that retirement afforded him. This retirement finally arrived in July 1615.¹¹⁹ Fichter reports that Suárez gave his last lecture to a packed audience hall, and at its conclusion there was such an outburst of exuberant adulation that the usually calm and logically-minded theologian, now misty-eyed, found it difficult to conceal his emotions.¹²⁰ Suárez's retirement, however, was hardly unindustrious, for in addition to being sought after continuously as a consulting theologian, he was preoccupied with the revision of several writings for publication: *De gratia*, *De religione*, *De angelis*, *De opera sex dierum*, and *De anima*, among others.¹²¹ To execute the task of completing his literary endeavours, Suárez found it necessary to move to Lisbon, where the climate was more accommodating to the fragile Jesuit's health. Nevertheless, the political atmosphere there was anything but accommodating, and once again Spain's most celebrated theologian, always desperate for the peace his literary labours required, was thrown into the midst of political turmoil and controversy. In fact, Suárez

116 Ibid., p. 295.

117 Ibid., p. 300.

118 Ibid., pp. 300–301.

119 Ibid., pp. 204–208.

120 Ibid., p. 326.

121 Ibid., pp. 326–327.

found himself taking up residence in a city that had been placed under an interdict.

The reason for this interdict stemmed from a dispute, all too common it seems, between ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction, pertaining this time to property rights. A 1610 Portuguese edict mandated that royal approval be obtained before any ecclesiastical property could be acquired.¹²² Paul V, however, protested this legislation, and insisted upon the immunity of the Church from any civil interference. After a number of squabbles between the civil authorities and Attavio Accoramboni, an Italian bishop Paul V had sent to Portugal as a collector, Accoramboni placed Lisbon under interdict, which basically amounts to a city-wide excommunication.¹²³ While under an interdict, all church functions and the administration of the sacraments, with the exception of extreme emergencies, are suspended. Always sought for counsel, Suárez investigated the situation and came to the conclusion that the interdict was in agreement with both canon and civil law.¹²⁴

The hostile political atmosphere was hardly hospitable for a frail and weakening Suárez. By September 1617 much of Suárez's strength had left him, and he succumbed to a high fever and dysentery. Weakened from the illness and no doubt also from the king's physicians, who had unleashed a regiment of blood-letting upon him for a week, Suárez was bed-ridden.¹²⁵ Spain's greatest theologian was dying and the world knew it. Even on his deathbed neither Church nor state would leave the Jesuit in peace, for each wanted to pay its final respects to the brilliant theologian; the Lord Marquis Da Silva, the king's viceroy, the Grand Inquisitor of Portugal, the Archbishop of Lisbon, and Accoramboni, the papal representative, were only a handful of the crowd that pressed on to visit Suárez in his precious few remaining hours.¹²⁶ On 24 September the end was near, and there was no hope of recovery this time. Suárez spent his final moments dictating farewell letters and received his final guests, fellow members of the Society, as he prepared himself for death. Finally, early in the morning of 25 September 1617, Francisco Suárez—arguably one of the most luminous philosophers and theologians that the Iberian Peninsula has ever produced—passed into eternity.¹²⁷ To mark the solemnity of the occasion Accoramboni lifted the interdict for the Jesuit Church in Lisbon so that

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 330.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 330–331.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 334–335.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

proper funeral services, giving full honour to the departed Jesuit, could be celebrated.¹²⁸

The mortal remains of Suárez were placed behind the side altar of the Church of St. Roch in Lisbon, where they remain to this day.¹²⁹ For over a century after his death, there was “an intermittent personal *cultus* practised in his honor in Spain and Portugal,”¹³⁰ as well as reports of healings and apparitions. Nevertheless, the formal process toward the cause of Suárez’s beatification has never been formally introduced, and the title ‘Venerable’ applied to him is “traditional rather than official.”¹³¹ In the twentieth century, some efforts were made to revive his cause,¹³² but these have not yet succeeded in initiating the formal process.

Suárez’s philosophical legacy is, simply put, immeasurable. Certainly, if René Descartes is to be taken as the father of modern thought, as is often thought to be the case, then the philosophical formation he received at La Flèche would play no small role in the shift to modernity, as it was an education largely governed by the *Ratio Studiorum* and the Scholastic philosophy of Jesuit philosophers such as Pedro da Fonseca, Francisco de Toledo, the Coimbraenses, and of course, Francisco Suárez. The exact content and sources of Descartes’s education have long eluded scholars,¹³³ but Descartes himself gives us some sense of his indebtedness to the Jesuits. In a letter to a French Jesuit, Jacques Grandamy, Descartes confesses: “It is there [La Flèche] that the first seeds of everything I have ever learnt were implanted in me, and I am wholly obliged to your Society for this.”¹³⁴ When it comes to mentioning names, however, Descartes admits later in a letter to Marin Mersenne that of the Jesuits he studied he could only remember the Coimbraenses, and among those, only Francisco de Toledo and Antonio Rubio.¹³⁵ Still, Descartes was not entirely unfamiliar with Suárez, and when responding to Arnauld’s criticism

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid., 340.

130 Ibid., 339.

131 Ibid.

132 See E. Elorduy, S.J., “Datos para el proceso de beatificación del P.F. Suárez,” *Archivo teológico granadino* 33(1970): 5–78.

133 Here, a classic text that investigates Descartes’s relationship to Scholastic thought is Étienne Gilson, *Index Scolastico-Cartésien* (New York, 1912); idem, *La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie* (Paris, 1913). A much more recent study is Roger Ariew, *Descartes and the last Scholastics* (Ithaca, NY, 1999).

134 René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume III, The Correspondence* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 236.

135 Ibid., p. 154.

pertaining to the material falsity of ideas, Descartes adverts approvingly to Suárez's sense of 'material falsity' to substantiate his own argument.¹³⁶

In the end, Gilson succinctly sums up Descartes's philosophical relation to Scholasticism's *Doctor eximius*:

Himself a pupil of the Jesuits, [Descartes] had learned metaphysics according to Suarez, and, though I would not bet that he had read the whole *Metaphysicae Disputationes*, there are positive reasons to feel sure that he knew the work, and I even believe that, for a time at least, he personally owned a copy of it. To Descartes, Scholastic philosophy was Suarez....¹³⁷

Beyond the various philosophical threads connecting Suárez to Descartes, one may consider Suárez's role in ushering in the modern era in its own right. The second disputation of the *Disputationes metaphysicae* marks, as Pereira claims, Suárez's true standing as a liminal figure in the history of philosophy, for in treating the relationship between formal and objective concepts, the Jesuit thinker tells us that while the object of metaphysics is the objective concept of being (*conceptus obiectivus entis*), he shall pursue that object by means of the formal concept.¹³⁸ Suárez's reason for doing so, as he tells us, is that the formal concept, inasmuch as it is produced by us, is more knowable.¹³⁹ In effect, Suárez makes the 'subjective' (i.e., the formal concept) the criterion and avenue to the 'objective' (i.e., the objective concept). The distance between Suárez's still-realist metaphysical orientation is, however, not all that far from the idealist-leaning methodical doubt of René Descartes, for whom the *cogito*, a subjective act of consciousness, had been the guarantor of the real, of objectivity.¹⁴⁰

In contrast to Descartes, Leibniz's acknowledgment of his debt to Suárez, as well as the great esteem he held for the Jesuit, was very explicit. In fact, Leibniz

136 See Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Fourth Set of Replies in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume II*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge, 1984), p. 164.

137 Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, p. 109.

138 Pereira, *Suárez*, pp. 137–139.

139 *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "In hac ergo disputatione, praecipue intendimus explicare conceptum objectivum entis ut sic, secundum totam abstractionem suam, secundum quam diximus esse metaphysicae objectum; quia vero est valde difficilis, multumque pendens ex conceptione nostra, initium sumimus a conceptu formali, qui, ut nobis videtur, notior esse potest." Cf. *DM* 2.2.24.

140 Pereira, *Suárez*, p. 27.

tells us that, as a youth, he devoured Suárez as though he were reading a novel.¹⁴¹ No doubt, the Suárezian claim that entity (*entitas*) is the ultimate principle of individuation must have resonated with the future father of monadology. In contrast to the Thomist quantified matter or Scotist *haecietas*, Suárez holds that “every singular substance requires nothing beyond its own entity or intrinsic principle that constitutes its being for its principle of individuation.”¹⁴² Of course, individuation was only one area among many in which Suárez would capture Leibniz’s attention, others including the communication of mind and body,¹⁴³ *cogitabilitas*,¹⁴⁴ substance and modes,¹⁴⁵ and even matters pertaining to whether or not this is an optimal universe.¹⁴⁶

Not surprisingly, Leibniz’s fondness for the Spanish theologian was also shared by his pupil Christian Wolff, for whom Suárez was a practitioner of scholasticism *par excellence*. Whether Wolff’s ontology constitutes in large part a repetition of Suárezian ‘essentialist’ metaphysics that confuses being with possibility, as Gilson maintains,¹⁴⁷ or an ontology of actuality, as Pereira holds contrary to Gilson¹⁴⁸—a dispute we need not enter here—what cannot be denied is that Wolff finds in Suárez, if not exactly an infallible exponent of all truths pertaining to the nature of being, a master whose vocabulary, technical precision, and exhaustive attention to every salient detail are the benchmark of any properly conducted ontological exploration. With frequent references to various scholastic doctrines, Wolff shows himself to be thoroughly familiar with scholasticism, but when it comes to naming names, Suárez is one of the few mentioned.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, in one passage where Wolff discusses the notion of being (*notio entis*) and argues that essence is what is first known and *ratio* for all that are in, can be, or pertain to a being, the German ontologist approvingly and enthusiastically cites Suárez, who advances a doctrine that, if not entirely identical, is too similar to be overlooked:

141 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 183.

142 *DM* 5.6.1 (ed. Vivès, 25, p. 180): “...omnem substantiam singularem, neque alio indigere individuationis principio praeter suam entitatem, vel praeter principia intrinseca quibus eius entitas constat.”

143 See Stuart Brown, “The Seventeenth-Century Intellectual Background,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz*, ed., Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge, 1995), p. 63, n. 45.

144 Pereira, *Suárez*, pp. 259–260.

145 *Ibid.*, pp. 262–265.

146 *Ibid.*, pp. 268–273.

147 See Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, pp. 113–119.

148 Pereira, *Suárez*, pp. 121, 273–276.

149 Wolff mentions Suárez four times throughout his *Prima philosophia*, § 169; *ibid.*, § 502; *ibid.*, § 527; *ibid.*, § 684.

Certainly *Francisco Suarez* of the Society of Jesus, who among the Scholastics, has meditated more profoundly upon metaphysical things, as is agreed upon, [holds] in his *Disputationes metaphysicae*...that the essence of a thing is said to be what is the first, radically and intimate principle of actions and properties that agree with the thing.¹⁵⁰

To arrive at Wolff was, for Suárez, to reach the crossroads and height of Enlightenment rationalist philosophy. In fact, touching Wolff would be only meters away from touching Kant himself. Gilson sardonically wrote that “Suárez begot Wolff,”¹⁵¹ to which one could very well add that Wolff—at least through Baumgarten—begot the pre-critical Kant and made clear the target against which the transcendental idealist would launch his attack in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. What Suárez was to Scholastic metaphysics in Wolff’s eyes, Wolff was to modern ontology for Kant. Citing the ‘famous Wolff’ in more than one place, Kant praises the German thinker as:

[T]he greatest among all dogmatic philosophers, ...[who] gave us the first example (an example by which he became the author of a spirit of well-groundedness in Germany that is still not extinguished) of the way in which the secure course of a science is to be taken, through the regular ascertainment of the principles, the clear determination of concepts, the attempt at strictness of proof and the prevention of audacious leaps in inference....¹⁵²

Concerning the relationship between Suárez and modern ontology, Heidegger makes an observation similar to Gilson’s:

With the peculiar character which the Scholastics gave it, Greek ontology has, in its essentials, travelled the path that leads through the *Disputationes*

150 Cf. Wolff, *Philosophia prima sive ontologia* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1736, Georg Olms reprint), pars I, Section 2, c. 3, § 169: “*Notio entis essentiae, quod sit premium, quod de ente concipitur, & ceterorum, cur insint, vel inesse possint, rationem contineat, est notioni philosophorum conformis. Sane Franciscus Suarez e Societate Jesu, quem inter Scholasticos res metaphysicas profundius meditatatum esse constat, in Disputationibus Metaphysicis Tom. I. disput. 2, Section 4, §. 5 f. 57. essentiam rei id esse dicit, quod est primum & radicale ac intimum principium omnium actionem ac proprietatum, quae rei conveniunt*” (emphases in original).

151 Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, p. 112.

152 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge, 1998), B pp. xxxvi–xxxvii.

metaphysicae of Suárez to the ‘metaphysics’ and transcendental philosophy of modern times, determining even the foundations and the aims of Hegel’s ‘logic.’¹⁵³

Suárez’s influence on modern philosophy, not to mention Catholic and Protestant Scholasticism, is undeniable. Likewise, the Jesuit’s influence beyond the range of modern philosophy is indisputable, as is his effect upon Romantic and post-Romantic philosophers, including Arthur Schopenhauer, who considered the *Disputationes metaphysicae* “an authentic compendium of the whole Scholastic tradition,”¹⁵⁴ and—to the extent that he was influenced by Schopenhauer—even Friedrich Nietzsche.¹⁵⁵ Beyond the Romantic period, Postmodernism, as indicated with the reference to Heidegger above, has contended with Suárez’s metaphysical thought on more than one occasion.¹⁵⁶ In short, we might say without any exaggeration that Spain’s greatest theologian was not merely a national marvel, an irreplaceable asset of the Society of Jesus, or even a brilliant diadem in the crown of the Church, but one of *history’s* greatest thinkers—and to think he was once considered irremediably dull-witted and unworthy to become a Jesuit, let alone Scholasticism’s *Doctor eximius*!

153 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco, CA, 1962), pp. 43–44.

154 Quoted in Doyle, *Collected Studies*, p. 20.

155 On the indirect relation between Suárez and Nietzsche, see Pereira, *Suárez*, p. 293.

156 See, e.g., Jean-Luc Marion, *God Without Being*, trans. Thomas Carlson (Chicago, IL, 1995), p. 82; idem, *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes* (Paris, 1981), esp. pp. 128–139.

Political Thought and Legal Theory in Suárez

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1 Introduction

The political thought of Suárez and his legal theory are principally developed in two works, *De legibus ac Deo legislatore*¹ (1612) and the *Defensio Fidei Catholicae*² (1613), both of which were drawn up at the command of Philip III in response to the famous controversy that took place between Pope Paul V and James I over the conditions and legitimacy of a possible move toward the autonomy of the royal power in relation to spiritual power. From a doctrinal point of view, these two works prove decisive for understanding the establishment of some fundamental concepts of classical political theory in seventeenth-century thought (especially within the school of natural law, and particularly the theories of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui): the state of nature; natural law and its distinction from the law of nations; the natural law and the application of these concepts to the problems of the era, et cetera. These problems correspond to: (1) the institutional crisis of the Church and the Catholic Reformation,³ ushered in by the Council of Trent (1545–1563); (2) the search for a European peace dependent on friendship between England and Spain; (3) the distinction between the spiritual power and the temporal power, linked to the critique of theocracy, namely, the limitation of royal absolutism in its alliance with ecclesial power, and the affirmation of an original democracy, along with the question of tyrannicide and the right to revolt; (4) the social contract and the beginning of international law; and (5) the legacy of the Valladolid controversy (1550) on the status of the Indians of America, set forth by the polemic between

1 Suárez, *De legibus ac Deo legislatore* (Conimbricæ, 1612).

2 Suárez, *Defensio Fidei Catholicae* (Conimbricæ, 1613).

3 The Counter-Reformation in fact only constitutes an episode of the Catholic Reformation, which cannot be reduced to it. The Catholic Reformation is characterized by an effort of theological clarification in relation to the controversies of the epoch, namely, the relations of Scripture with Tradition, the question of original sin and of justification, the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and the meaning given to the sacraments.

Sépulveda⁴ and Bartolomé de Las Casas,⁵ which was linked to the question of the recognition of a universal humanity.

According to the anthropo-theological position defended by Suárez, the rational creature, man—free, finite, and subject to the passions—must be understood in relation to some general factors such as society, history, and the human race. The direction of this undertaking in Suárez, for instance, aims towards a redefinition of the finality of legislative power as the creation of free citizens⁶ (whose freedom, moreover, could not be satisfied by the simple concession of the freedom recognized as necessary for the peace of kingdoms), and makes room for a grasp of the real relation that directs the bonds between individuals: “The legislative power of men is uniquely ordered to the social, civil, and moral peace of the human community.”⁷ As a result, according to Suárez, political power cannot be conceivably justified unless one has the common good (identified all at once as the right to truth, freedom, culture, religion, prosperity, and peace) determine the boundaries of political autonomy; from the ethical and juridical point of view, the justification for the obligation of civil obedience (which in principle seeks the regulation of the public order) cannot be conceived apart from the determination of its limits.

On the one hand, Suárez is heir to the overarching view introduced by the medieval doctrine of the Germanic conception of the State, which is grounded in the law (*Rechtsstaat*), and according to which the State does not exist except by and for the law (thus implying the legality of an order governing the totality of existence in the realm of both public and private relations). On the other hand, the theory of ecclesiastical power is opposed to this orientation by the same fact that it invokes a beginning and an end, exceeding the limits of a purely legal order. This opposition marks the emergence of a process working towards the autonomization of the civil power in relation to the law, and leads to a recognition of the irreducibility of the State's foundation to the law, thus

4 Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, *Apología de J.G. Sepúlveda contra Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas*, traducción castellana de los textos originales latinos, introducción, notas e índices (Madrid, 1975).

5 Bartolomé de Las Casas, *Très brève relation de la destruction des Indes*, Editions Mille et une nuits, trans. J. de Migrode (Paris, 1999); *Las Casas et la défense des Indiens*, presented by M. Bataillon and André de Saint-Lu (Paris, 1971).

6 Suárez, *DF*, III, 9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 209): “...man is born free by viture of a sole natural right and he cannot be reduced to slavery,” and *ibid.*, II, 17 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 211): “For natural reason alone does not allow the transfer of power of one man over another by the simple designation of person without the consent and the actual free will of the one by which the power should be transferred or attributed.”

7 Suárez, *De leg.*, 3.13.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 223).

opening the need for a moral point of reference: one which shows that the State has the increase of well-being as its primary purpose, and that the law is only an institutional means for attaining this end.

Nevertheless, such an opposition cannot hide the need for placing the law as the legal act at the basis of the State, while still affirming the fulfillment of the law as simultaneously a function of the State; this law, given to man as the ultimate point of reference before the existence of a historic and earthly power, cannot be subject to modification by the latter. Hence, the revival of the opposition between positive law and natural law is precisely intended to respond to the apparent contradiction that: (1) the law is bound to the State, which fulfills it for its own ends, and (2) the State is bound to the law, which it also fulfills with respect to its own specific ends.

Suárez develops further the notion of the natural law, which he inherits from (1) studies of jurists and canonists who have used the texts of Roman law and canon law, (2) philosophers who draw from the thought of antiquity, especially Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero,⁸ and (3) the Fathers of the Church. For scholasticism, the difficulty tied to the recognition of a natural law as having an origin superior to human legislation consists in determining whether the essence of that law resides in the will or in reason. The Thomist position—beyond the differences concerning the origin of the natural law and the justification of its obligatory force—had made possible the acceptance of its existence and emergence from a transcendent principle, implying an origin superior to human legislation, to which the latter must conform. Anterior to the foundation of the State, the natural law,⁹ as an expression of natural inclination,¹⁰ implies obligations (do good, avoid evil) from which one can draw out directly or indirectly the juridical norms by which the State has the possibility of basing its existence on the law. It seems specific to the natural law to abstract from every earthly power in which it may be embodied—the pope, the monarch, or the sovereign people—the rules of its law, which in fact establish limits that cannot be transgressed, bracketed, or amended—whether through an act of government, custom, or the decision of the people—because

8 Dalloz, *Des lois et du Dieu législateur*. Livres I–II, a study and translation by J.-P. Coujou, *Avant-propos* (Paris, 2003), pp. 83–88.

9 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* II-I, q. 91, a. 2.

10 *Ibid.*, q. 94, a. 2: “It is according to the same order of natural inclinations that the order of the precepts of the natural law is taken. In fact, man senses from the beginning that he should search for the good corresponding to his nature, which is similar to all other substances, in the sense that every substance seeks the conservation of its being, according to its own nature. According to this inclination, whatever assures human preservation and all that impedes the contrary belongs to the natural law.”

these latter can at best only refer to the mutable and imperfect character of human reason.¹¹ No obligation can be the result of that which contradicts the immutable principles of the natural law.

The deduction of the natural law—by the reason immanent in God and immediately determined by the universal order of nature—remains inseparable from a theological-political orientation. But here a difficulty arises: in order to ascribe to this natural law its obligatory force, which act of the divine will does it refer to? Because of its absolute obligatory power and its status as an origin removed from every other law,¹² it pertains to the eternal law to respond to such a difficulty. The natural law is deduced from this eternal law, and it has its foundation in the participation of man as a rational and free being in the moral order of the universe, made accessible by the light of natural reason that God has granted us.¹³ It is promulgated,¹⁴ and it constitutes for all actions an immutable rule identical to itself. For Suárez, it is a question of establishing the obligatory force of law, and restoring it in relation to the will and the intellect—all with the goal of clearly distinguishing the natural law from the positive law.

Thus, the legislative will, the key to the vault of the political community's organization, has a constitutive force on the positive law, whereas reason does not have a normative status.¹⁵ The question of the normative force of the law is itself tied to the problem of the obligatory force of the agreement—whose origin is to be found in the natural law—opening the way to the State's recognition of the inviolable character (because the very being of man is inseparable from the right to life) of all the rights granted by agreement. In order to think of being-in-common in a manner consistent with the nature of man, one must first facilitate a move beyond the apparent antinomy between power and freedom, between the sovereign right of the community and that of the individual, and between inalienable rights and acquired rights. This means that the individual expresses a value not only by his participation in the whole, but also in himself—the community otherwise needing to consider the mode of being of the individual not as a mere instrument but as an end in himself, since natural

11 Ibid., q. 97, a. 1.

12 Ibid., q. 93, a. 3: "It follows that all laws, whatever they may be, derive from the eternal law insofar as they proceed from right reason." See St. Augustine, *Le libre arbitre*, [*De libero arbitrio*] (op. cit.) I, 15, pp. 422–423.

13 Ibid., q. 94, a. 4: "(...) all which man is inclined toward by nature reveals the natural law; and it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason."

14 Ibid., q. 90, a. 4, ad 1: "The promulgation of the natural law exists by the fact that God has introduced it into the mind of men in such a manner that it may be naturally knowable."

15 Suárez, *De leg.*, 3.20.3, 5, 8, 10, 11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, pp. 253–260).

rights must reside beyond the confines of the State, confirming that the sovereignty of the individual is at the origin of every political obligation.

2 The Conventional Character and Power of Human Law

Human positive law (with respect to all the considerations relevant to the theme of the eternal law and the natural temporal law) is unable to be reduced to the mere expression of the principles of the natural law. Though it receives its reason for existing by its conformity to the latter,¹⁶ it nevertheless assumes a specific extension because of its historic application.¹⁷ Regarding the temporal law—insofar as it is distinct from the eternal law of God¹⁸—Suárez makes a distinction between the natural and the positive. The natural moral law, Suárez explains, is itself temporal because it is created conjointly with man, as something distinct from the eternal law of God, which is specifically the law of an uncreated being. The positive law, in turn, is subdivided into divine or canonical law (possessing a supernatural character and belonging to the sphere of grace) and human law. Book III of *De legibus* takes as its point of departure the study of the positive human law, while referring to book IV for an examination of the divine or canonical temporal law. In fact, just as nature supposes grace, human law will need to be considered as anterior to the divine law, according to the order of its generation.¹⁹ Thus, if grace accommodates itself to nature, in order to govern the human community the nature of man as such requires “communication and equitable relations of inferiors with superiors both reciprocally and between the members themselves, only in the domain of external acts.”²⁰ In this sense, there should be a reaffirmation of Thomas Aquinas’s proposition,²¹ which claims that obedience to human beings should be reduced to the sphere of bodily behaviour, i.e., corresponding

16 *De leg.*, 3.12.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 216): “(...) the natural law forbids all that is immoral. Therefore, the civil law cannot derogate from the natural law, and man cannot be obliged at the same time by laws that oppose it.”

17 *Ibid.*, 3.12.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 219): “The law will be obliged to adjust itself to the human community according to its natural conditions. For this reason, civil laws do not prohibit all vices. And the power of constraint of the State does not extend to all vices because that would exceed the human condition.”

18 *Ibid.*, 3.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 176).

19 *Ibid.*, 3.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 176).

20 *Ibid.*, 4.12.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 376).

21 Thomas Aquinas, *ST II-II*, q. 104, a. 5.

to the order of human and sensible subjects. In the same way, one confirms that the canonical tradition, as Suárez recalls,²² habitually establishes an analogy between civil law and the body, and between canon law, the body, and the spirit. The finality of civil law consists in morality and the search for a utility inscribed in the temporal realm, which corresponds to living together (namely, the social peace and justice of the State), whereas canon law aims fundamentally at the salvation of the soul and the abstention from sins.²³ Thus, civil law “is going to direct the political government to the city, the protection of temporal rights, and the maintenance of the State in peace and justice. These bodily or temporal goods constitute, accordingly, the object of civil laws.”²⁴

For these reasons, and to respond to the need for clarity and the satisfaction of a methodological imperative of expository convenience, it seems fitting to have the study of human law as a starting point, even though canon law actually represents a more eminent subject. This eminence can be rationally explained in the following manner: as soon as the spiritual good of this life is identifiable with a disposition intrinsically ordered toward supernatural happiness, the political power, which by itself does not orient men toward such a happiness, can no longer pretend to direct toward this end; a power's *raison d'être* appears inseparable from the final end that it pursues, and the manner by which it prepares us to reach it. It thus appears that civil power, not being directed to the supreme happiness of the future life, cannot lay claim to exist for the spiritual happiness of the earthly life. One must conclude—and this has repercussions for the methodological order—that the immediate finality and subject matter of a power appears proportionally articulated; these do not possess a sense of reference to the final end of all power that constitutes the intelligibility and reason of being. And, as a consequence, the categorization of human law into civil law and canon law is there to confirm that “the civil power does not have as its final end the supernatural happiness of the future life, nor that of the present life.”²⁵ In conformity to these distinctions, in order to produce the specificity and intelligibility of the positive human law, it is primarily required, from a methodological point of view, to determine its origin, its form, and its content, as well as the limits and conditions of its promulgation. Secondly, one must explain the nature, necessity, the formal requirements, and the type of obligation that it is bound to include among these subjects.

22 Suárez, *De leg.*, 3.11.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 213).

23 Ibid., 3.11.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 213).

24 *Des lois* (op. cit.), I, 3, n. 21, p. 129.

25 *De leg.*, 3.11.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 213).

When one considers the notion of the positive law, it comes by means of a process of abstraction, implicated in its distance from the divine law and the human law. Positive human law is divisible into the law of the people (*'iuris communis'*) and the law that consists of an element of a proper law (*'iuris proprii'*), which concerns a specified community.²⁶ The critical examination of the law of nations having been accomplished, it is fitting to analyze human law in its particularity, which corresponds appropriately to the human positive law, and manifests the specific law of a community or State. The division of human law into civil and canonical should not lead one to forget that the latter, if it can claim to be universally common with the same recognition as the Church, nevertheless corresponds, historically and socially, to the Church of Christ; however, it could still be shared by the assembly of peoples, who are not all part of the Church.²⁷ Accordingly, it becomes possible and legitimate to distinguish two conditions in the civil law: one that is characterized by its simplicity, such that it has existed among the pagans and is found among the infidels, and the other in harmony with the faith, and manifested in the practice among the faithful of the Church.

The deepened study of canon law will allow Suárez to specify the action of religion in the constitution of a community. Religion, he maintains, is effective in unifying the conscience of citizens. In that way it likewise seems that the relations of the governors to the governed—who, in the logic of obedience, constitute the rule of every political community—only become effective on the basis of a common religion. This latter point, as the principle of unification and affirmation of the people, could only lead to identifying a pure political invention intended to preserve the prince or the republic from corruption, as in the view of Machiavelli.²⁸ For Suárez, the Catholic faith, by the same standard as justice, represents a legitimate foundation of communitarian unification. In this sense, because it refers to the supernatural order just as the concept of the mystical body is applied to the political body to indicate the unity of all the community's members, the critical examination of canon law should confirm the presence of a unity only valid in the spiritual realm. In the same way,

26 Ibid., 3.1.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 176).

27 Ibid., 3.1.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 176).

28 Machiavelli, *Discours sur la première décade de Tite Live* in *Œuvres* (Paris, 1952), I, XII, pp. 414–417. See p. 415: "In this way, therefore, it is the duty of princes and heads of a republic to maintain in its foundations the religion that is professed; for there is nothing easier for keeping his people religious, and, as a consequence, good and one. Also all that tends to favor religion should be welcome, although one would recognize the falsity; and one is bound to this the more one has wisdom and knowledge of human nature."

the republic will be described as a mystical body, because, as a political body, it should express a unity equivalent to the perfection of its being.

The comprehension of the process of communitarian unification requires, in effect, the comparative study of the subject of civil law and of canonical law, which allows at once canonists and jurists to draw out one central difference: “the subject matter of civil laws is temporal, that of canonical law is spiritual.”²⁹ This, moreover, implies that a spiritual power should correspond to spiritual matters and a civil power to temporal matters. It seems fitting then to conclude that when one considers the origin and particularity of power established by the civil law, they appear to be of the natural order. Obviously, that does not mean that they would flow immediately from nature, but they are issues of a power connatural to man. As far as canonical law is concerned, it is attributed to men by the intermediary of a supernatural power; the justification and the understanding of this law are to be found in the nature of the power from which it emanates.³⁰ It is clearly evident from this differentiation that the power possesses a double function: to direct human beings toward a natural or a supernatural end.³¹ For the first, the political power proves sufficient, while for the second, the end exceeds human capacity, given that only God is actually able to direct man toward a supernatural end. In this sense, so long as it is not in contradiction with faith and religion, civil obedience among Christians remains essential, even if the requirement has its foundation in the natural law.³²

When one considers the civil law and the temporality in which it is inscribed, it is appropriate to consider the nature of human beings and their legislative power. One must determine the possibility that there exists in men a faculty for promulgating laws that oblige other men who are originally their equal and who possess an equivalent freedom.³³ It is a matter of precisely explaining and justifying the reason why even when “man has been created free, he is still not without the capacity and disposition to be subject to another man for a just and reasonable cause.”³⁴ For at the origin of this problem, there is the

29 Suárez, *De leg.*, 4.11.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, pp. 370–371).

30 Ibid., 4.prol. (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 326).

31 Ibid., 4.1.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, pp. 326–327).

32 *DF* 6.6.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 688).

33 *De leg.*, 3.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 176): “The question is the following: whether, by speaking only of the nature of things, men can rule other men and oblige them through their own laws.”

34 *DF* 3.1.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, pp. 205–206): “In the same way, once the State is formed, the submission of individuals to the sovereign ruler or public power is natural insofar as it

declaration that man is naturally free, and in fact only subject to his Creator. Consequently, “the sovereignty (*principatus*) of one man over another runs counter to the order of nature and implies tyranny.”³⁵ Moreover, this point is confirmed for Suárez by reference to the Fathers of the Church, who proposed that man had been created naturally free, and only received directly from God the power to exert his mastery over irrational creatures; this leads to the conclusion that the right of certain men to subjugate other men has its origin in sin,³⁶ or in the conflict between men. For example, according to the analysis of St. Augustine, “in the natural order in which God first created man, no one is a slave of man or of sin.”³⁷

Now if, on the one hand, the human community is immediately ruled by God by means of the natural law, on the other hand, it does not remain less free according to the right which is its own. It is enough, nevertheless, to understand that possessing such a freedom is not incompatible with an autonomous power for the community to govern itself and to exercise an authority over its members, all by having permanently in mind that one must exclude the subjugation of the community to another man, since that is not conceivable except by the standard of the principles of the natural law. For “God does not immediately grant to any man such a power until, through the intermediary of human institution or election, it is transferred to another.”³⁸

Man is born free by virtue of the sole natural right qualified to grant it, and not simply by a precept.³⁹ This juridical specification proves to be a determining factor, for the prescription of the natural law does not mean that all mankind remains permanently free; it amounts to saying that there is no prohibition

conforms to natural right reason and is necessary for the appropriate conservation of human nature.”

35 *De leg.*, 3.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 176).

36 Saint Augustine, *La cité de Dieu*, trans. L. Moreau, revised by J.-C. Eslin, Editions du Seuil, 3 volumes (Paris, 1994), vol. 3, Livre XIX, 15, p. 126: “The primary cause of slavery is therefore the sin which makes man hold man in bondage and his whole destiny.” Saint Augustine, cited in the *Deuxième Épître de Pierre*, 2, 19: “Man, in fact, is a slave of the one who has conquered him.”

37 Saint Augustine, *La cité de Dieu* (op. cit.), volume 3, Livre XIX, 15, p. 126.

38 Suárez, *DF* 3.2.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 209). Suárez invokes St. Augustine, for whom it is “a general law among all men that each people must obey its king” (*les Confessions*, trans. Arnould d’Andilly, ed. O. Barenne [Paris, 1993], III, 8, p. 105); the foundation of the authority of kings resides in an agreement of human society, which reaffirms precisely that it does not spring forth immediately from a divine institution, since every human contract is not actualized except by the will of men.

39 *DF* 3.1.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 209).

for a man to be brought under subjugation (without which the transfer of power would become inconceivable). One must understand that in the logic of political alienation, such a renunciation cannot be accomplished without the consent of the man or without a legitimate reason invoked by a just power.⁴⁰ In this sense, the complete political community (which is therefore self-sufficient according to the Aristotelian conception) is actually said to be free according to the natural law, without being subjugated to an individual or legal demand external to it; it possesses the source of that democratic political power immanently within it as a whole,⁴¹ so long as it does not set up a transfer of power. However, as has been previously analyzed, this same community can, through its own will, renounce its power or right to another power or right, and that for the benefit of a determined person or assembly it is able to lay claim to the legitimate exercise of power.⁴² It thus becomes possible to understand the ends and limits of political power for Suárez, all the while granting that the political authority—implying a temporal power of governing men—possesses a just foundation appropriate to human nature.⁴³

The civil obedience owed to sovereigns by the mediation of the civil law, even if it has its own foundation in the natural law, can be said to be in force according to the law of nations, given that in actuality it is not derived directly from the natural law, for it is necessary to suppose from the start “the union of men in a political body and in an autonomous community.”⁴⁴ Consequently, the proposition that this comes from the natural law presupposes the existence of a contract among human beings. From this, one understands why the obligation of civil obedience—as much in its form as in its content—is not identical for each group of men subject to a government. The degree of

40 Ibid., 3.1.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 209).

41 Ibid., 3.1.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 209).

42 Ibid., 3.2.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 209), where one reads: “In the final analysis it follows from this thesis that no king or monarch receives (according to ordinary law) political power directly from God but through the mediation of human will and institution.” This thesis does not have Bellarmine as its author, as Suárez justly relates; it is already present in: Cajetan, *De auctoritate Papae et Concilii*, tract. 2, c. 10, ad 5, confirm. 2; Alphonsus de Castro, *De lege poenali*, (Parisiis, 1578) I, c. 1 fol. 487–488; Jean Neys (Driedo A Turnhout), *De libertate christiana* (Lovanii, 1540), I, c. 2, pars 3, p. 98; Vitoria, *Leçon sur le pouvoir politique* (op. cit.), n. 8, pp. 49–53; Soto, *De iustitia et iure*, Salamanca, intro. V. Carro and Spanish trans. M. González Ordóñez (Madrid, reprint 1967–1968), 5 volumes, volume II, Lib. IV, art. 1, pp. 300–303; and Luis de Molina, *De iustitia* (Maguntia, 1602) vol. I, tract. II, disp. 21, p. 109.

43 *De leg.*, 3.1.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 176).

44 *DF* 6.6.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 689).

obligation proper to the civil law exists in each nation in relation to the historic and conventional institution of the realm, and in relation to the contract established between the governed and the governing in each. Written laws (and it is precisely this that constitutes their force), or previously customs, may introduce a constancy of rules in the face of the historical development, which provides a cure for the fallibility of human memory.

In a manner analogous to Vitoria, Suárez determines the function of the law: to guarantee the freedom of all in such a way that the transfer of power does not allow for the quantitative productions of force or a situation of anarchy. The civil law should be the expression of the republic, and in obeying it, citizens should conform themselves to the principles of the natural law, and consequently, obey the one who moves in the direction towards the fulfillment of their human nature. The subject of the law, because he is aware of his finitude and his condition as sinner, freely accepts the need for the universal formula given by the natural law. The following, however, is no less true:

This obedience does not require obedience to the king who orders things illicit or contrary to the salvation of the soul. And the perversity of the king could be so greatly opposed to the community's common good or the contracts and agreements established by the kingdom that the community of people, by means of a common decision, could annul the contracts and agreements established by the kingdom as well as the obedience and civil fidelity owed to them.⁴⁵

Thus, in these circumstances, the political community has the legitimate power to dismiss the king, and the representatives of the community act legitimately in constraining the sovereign or justly executing him, because their action is accomplished in terms of a public, rather than private authority.⁴⁶ Consequently, obedience to the civil law cannot be unconditional. If a legitimate king rules in a tyrannical manner and the community has no other way to ensure its own conservation than by removing the king, this final recourse is legitimate.⁴⁷ And precisely at this moment the political community acts as a

45 *DF* 6.6.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 689): "...It likewise follows that the bond of such fidelity and obedience does not oblige in certain instances and it can even be annulled in certain circumstances with the conditions explicitly established in the original agreement between the king and the kingdom or intrinsically implied by him as a result of the requirement of the natural law itself."

46 *Ibid.*, 6.4.18 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 681).

47 *Ibid.*, 6.4.15 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 680).

whole through public decision, manifesting an agreement of the entire body precisely by affirming itself afresh as a moral and collective entity.

Two arguments confirm the political-moral foundation of disobedience to civil laws: (1) according to natural law, it is legitimate to repel violence with violence; (2) while even one such response appears indispensable to the preservation of the State, it does not seem less repudiated by the clauses of the original contract by which the community has transferred its power to the sovereign. By using this point to reinterpret the thesis defended by Thomas Aquinas,⁴⁸ it is judicious for Suárez to say (in order to resolve this apparent difficulty so there will not be sedition when one opposes a king who rules tyrannically) that certainly such a resistance is the product of the legitimate power of the community, which aims to decrease greater evil for the people. Suárez likewise confirms Mariana's thesis, according to which it is licit to kill a tyrant comparable to "a ferocious and cruel beast"⁴⁹ as an exercise of the right to defend one's own life, as otherwise invoked in the course of war. The example of tyrannicide only confirms a general principle, according to which a positive law that contradicts a precept of the natural law cannot pretend to stand as a law, which comes back to stating that the natural law constitutes the foundation of the validity of positive laws.

The ordinance of the human law, just as it confirms its temporal dimension and the legitimization of certain conditions of sedition, also has as its regulating norm the intrinsic rectitude of acts expressed by the natural law,⁵⁰ all having as a constitutive principle the common good,⁵¹ as well as the best guarantee for the realization of particular goods. However, the exact determination of the principles and general norms of the moral life for men living in political

48 Thomas Aquinas, *Opuscula theologica et philosophica tam certa quam dubia*, Opusculum XVI, lib. I, cap. 6 (éditions Vivès, vol. 27, pp. 343–344): "Videtur autem magis contra tyrannorum saevitiam non privata praesumptione aliquorum, sed auctoritate piublica procedendum. Primo quidem si ad ius multitudinis alicuius pertineat sibi providere de rege, non iniuste ab eadem rex institutus potest destrui vel refrenari eius potestas, si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur... Si vero ad ius alicuius superioris pertineat multitudini providere de rege, expectandum est ab eo remedium contra tyranni nequitiam.... Quod si omnio contra tyrannum auxilium humanum haberi non potest, recurrendum est ad regem omnium, Deum, qui est adiutor in opportunitatibus, in tribulatione."

49 Juan de Mariana, *Del rey y de la institución real* (1599; Madrid: El libro para todos, 1961), vol. I, Libro I, cap. VI, p. 109.

50 See Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Ethicorum*, ed. Marietti (Turin, 1949), I, 12, n. 1023: "Omnia iusta positiva vel legalia ex iusto naturali oriuntur," and *ST I*, q. 95, a. 2.

51 Suárez, *De leg.*, 3.12.19 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 221): "Human laws can establish the just milieu for what concerns human acts."

society and searching for concrete rules of conduct necessarily requires recourse to the positive law. Thus, positive laws imply an indirect line with the norms deduced from the precepts of the natural law, and this line manifests the introduction of complementary determinations that, in the same way, reveal the circumstances that turn out to be contingent. One verifies historically in this sense that if positive laws are an application of the natural law to concrete and changeable situations, they are likewise subject to a possible perversion.

Human law represents, in the final analysis, the unique way by which inter-individual relations⁵² can be regulated in a temporal manner, by obliging or eventually constraining individuals determined to pursue their particular interest, and pointing them instead toward the common good.⁵³ The study of the reason for the law's existence is directed, by this fact, to determine the inherent characteristics of all civil law. If the function of the sovereign consists in being of service to the common good by respecting justice, one can deduce three specific conditions for every civil law: (1) every law should respond to the imperative of supporting the common good or the public utility; (2) these laws oblige all the members of the political community, hence they have a universal objective and in a fundamental way they assert themselves equally with respect to all; (3) they necessarily imply the eventual use of a constraining force to be effective. The affirmation of the necessity of the civil law is inseparable from the affirmation of the necessity of a political power, without which any republic is inconceivable. And in the absence of the law, the exercise of power with authority and justice would be impossible, and for the same reason the regulation of power for the common good would be inconceivable. In the final analysis, when one considers the law and the government, they must be defined as instruments in the service of the republic, and hence of the common good, which leads precisely to conceiving the sovereign as a public person.

In the same way, the civil law must be conceived from the point of view of its utility for the moral life of man, where it refers the latter to his engagement in the path toward his final destination, namely, happiness. Nevertheless, in terms of the condition for the possibility of the community's preservation, the positive law enables one to specify the sociopolitical contents: justice and peace. Thus, as the exercise of political power shows, "it is not possible to maintain justice and peace without a government having the power of

52 Ibid., 3.11.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 213), see, for example, the reference of Suárez to Thomas Aquinas, *ST* II-I, q. 99, a. 3.

53 Ibid., 3.11.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 213): "The finality of the State corresponds to a true political happiness."

commanding and punishing.”⁵⁴ The power to declare the law and the right stripped of all actual power of constraint is a pure illusion, as Suárez reminds us.⁵⁵ Conformity to the common good consequently constitutes the foundation for the legitimate exercise of all civil law.⁵⁶ The legislator, through the intermediary of the civil law, puts in action his moral influence on the human community in the design of governing it.

In order to apprehend the process of proceeding, it is fitting to refer to the four causes that allow for the law’s intelligibility:⁵⁷ (1) the efficient cause of the law refers to the person possessing the power of jurisdiction. If the republic is itself its own cause, the people, by obeying civil laws, are obeying the republic, and theologically are also obeying God, who is the author of the power expressed in the latter; (2) the material cause, called the subjective, resides in the intellect or the will, since the material cause called the objective refers to the just object aimed at by the law; (3) the formal cause denotes the method for the authorization and promulgation of the law; (4) the final cause is, as such, identified with the search for the common good. In the same way, one could say that Suárez applies the four Aristotelian causes to the determination of the human law, which is what Vitoria⁵⁸ has attributed to his conception of political power. The common good of the State is thus identified as the final cause of the civil law. By the means of legal justice, the civil law attributes to the communal good a meta-individual value, which, by its universality, transcends the simple addition of particular goods. It consequently confers a political actuality to the moral power it expresses. Politics, in terms of legislative practice in history, cannot pursue something other than the humanity of the human person, realized in the Suárezian view as reason and freedom. In terms of natural law ethics, it shows man what he should or should not do in order to be truly human, that is to say, worthy of the use that he makes of his reason and freedom. According to these premises, the human law has the duty, through

54 DF 3.1.4; *ibid.*, 6.4.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 676): “First of all, ...vengeance and punishment of wrongdoings are ordered to the common good of society and, in the same way, have been uniquely entrusted to the one to whom the political power of governing the community has been confided. Secondly, to chastise is an act of a superior having jurisdiction; therefore, if a private person does it, this constitutes an act of jurisdictional usurpation. Thirdly and finally if it were otherwise, it would give way to unending troubles and disorders in the State, and the way to civil discords and assassinations would be open.”

55 *Ibid.*, 6.4.18 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 681).

56 Suárez, *Des lois*, I, 7, n. 4, p. 188.

57 *Des lois*, I, 13, n. 1, p. 271.

58 Vitoria, *Leçon sur le pouvoir politique*, intro. and trans. M. Barbier, part 1 (Paris, 1980), n. 2, pp. 37–40.

the mediation of legal justice, of establishing the appropriate realization of morality and politics according to their finality. One understands in the same way that the duty of the natural law likewise consists in establishing that the ends of the political order could not be external to morality without threatening the historical realization of the unity of the human race.

In this sense, it belongs to human law to allow men to live politically in peace and justice, which are the conditions for the “adequate preservation of human nature.”⁵⁹ The political exigency remains, therefore, inseparable from the sphere of obligation: to render actual in each individual the realization of his moral dimension of existence.⁶⁰ Human law thus expresses the moral finality of the political order in the sense that, as the instrument of civil power, it obliges in conscience, calling to mind in this way that this power derives its ultimate origin from God. It seems clear that the effects of the law nevertheless exceed the limits of human power, and reaffirm implicitly its divine source. This does not, however, lead to the conclusion that the capacity to establish laws would be in itself spiritual and supernatural, and one must insist on the following nuance: if the divine character of its origin implies that it could not have human beings as its cause, it nevertheless expresses a connection in keeping with the natural order among men, and could in this sense be qualified as natural and human.

In the end, the agreement evoked between morality and the political order finds its limit in the constitutive separation of all social life: the sphere of the private and that of the public. Another distinction can be added to the equation. Whereas the immanent end of the natural law has the goal of producing morally good human beings, the proper end of the civil law is directed toward the common good.⁶¹ The necessary interdependence of the two domains, however, does not infer their identification. In no case, Suárez explains, can the power of the State in its action cover over the entirety of the moral sphere, which requires its specific prohibitions and obligations.⁶² It is clearly evident that the civil law is not in a position to form the basis of the morality of an act. Instead, it imposes the obligation by which the moral rectitude of a virtue will

59 *De leg.*, 3.11.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 213).

60 See, on this matter, the critique that Suárez directs to the political philosophy of Machiavelli concerning the move toward the autonomy of politics with regard to morality, *De leg.*, 3.12.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 215).

61 The existence of compulsion is realized in the civil law, whereas it is not in the natural law.

62 *De leg.*, 3.12.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 219): “(...) the civil law seeks to make men morally good but not absolutely good according to the understanding of morality. For this to take place, it would be necessary that they be free of all vices, and the civil law cannot pretend to have an efficacious means for this, even if it considered it.”

be respected, and it is in this sense that it establishes a just environment with respect to virtue.⁶³ The natural law, in turn, serves to draw the civil law's attention towards the metapolitical dimension of politics that the legislative system must incarnate, under pain of giving up the human fulfillment of man in the social sphere. The human efficacy of politics appears where no one expects it: in the moral exigency. The State, by acting in such a way that it renders temporally possible the existence of morality in the world, establishes human relations in the duration.

In order to do this, the existence of the law supposes that the legislator orders and imposes in an efficacious manner what has been recognized in proportion to its practical reason and what has been accepted by its upright will. One thus contributes to the genesis of the law as a morally efficacious way to guide the members of the political community to the end sought by the legislator, namely, the common good. The human validity of the law as a way of government clearly shows it to be an instrument of power, with a view to the specific fulfillment of the order of the community. The disposition to reason that extends the genesis of the law supposes three moments: (1) the judgment of what is right, which requires an act of understanding that brings to light what is rational and establishes the conformity of an act with the principal source of reason; (2) the choice of that which reason has offered as compatible with rectitude, implying an engagement of the will to accomplish the act chosen as right; (3) the understanding that imposes what is right, and this act of commandment constitutes precisely the law.

It follows from this that government—beyond its own political obligation, since it behooves it to make possible the common good through the mediation of the civil law—must respond to the moral obligation to conform itself to the natural function of political power.⁶⁴ But the moral duty of the members of the political community to obey laws corresponds to the political duty of the legislative authority. One such obligation is to understand the extent to which the contribution of citizens supports the social realization of the public good. In the final analysis, whether one considers the duty of the governor or that of the governed, it seems inseparable from the imperative of the common good. The obligation constitutes the specificity of the law, for if citizens are not obliged to obey laws, the power of governing would lose all efficacy. It expresses

63 Ibid., 3.11.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 213): "(...) the civil law considers the morality and temporal utility of the human community."

64 *DF* 3.9.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 249): "(...) the power of human government does not transcend the human order, and it is principally instituted in order to direct relations among men."

in this sense a double dimension, reflexive and bilateral: (1) by the bond that applies to the governing, and (2) by the bond that applies to those governed. From the theological and political perspective, it follows that from the moment when the political power is subordinated to the divine power and remains in its service, the human law implies the obligation in conscience of the members of the political community. Thus, the obligation of the civil law finds its origin in the affirmation of a double authority: (1) the obligation flows from the divine will, source of the eternal law and principle of the natural law as a first cause, inducing obedience to human laws within the limits previously established; (2) the obligation of the political will proceeds from it as its second cause, as it directs a particular act or behaviour in the temporal order. Consequently, the force and the power of obligation constitutive of the bond of the whole community exist in the civil law because of the coincidence of two causes: the universal will of the eternal law and the particular will of the sovereign. The theory of legislative obligation taken from these analyses serves precisely to allow for the political community of men associated organically in a State, by means of a natural right, to possess “a supreme temporal jurisdiction over itself.”⁶⁵

3 Ethical-Political Genesis of the State

The civil law, which is at the heart of the articulation between morality and politics, reveals, as a consequence, that the human development of man is necessarily within a community. It thus insures the passage from the moral theory of the natural law to social theory. It nevertheless becomes necessary from this to make sense of the existence of social groups and the historical form that promote unification: the State as the condition of the unification of action, in spite of the diversity of human relations. This latter is to be understood in Suárez not in a strictly formal and juridical sense; instead, it denotes the perfect community, organized politically and ordered toward an assembly of powers conferred by the civil law in order to accomplish the communitarian end that corresponds to the common political good.

St. Paul's formula of the ‘mystical body’, when it is applied to the political community, allows for an understanding of the specificity of the process of unification toward which the State should tend. The establishment of an analogy with the human body proves illuminating.⁶⁶ On the one hand, the

65 Ibid., 3.5.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 228).

66 *DF* 3.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 204).

notion of a 'body' expresses a unity that corresponds to that of the members of a community, analogous to the organic unity of the human body, the latter of which constitutes an incontestable point of reference by reason of its interior harmony. It is possible to envisage a clear similarity between the government of the temporal republic and the human body. One must nevertheless guard against confusions that could emerge by limiting oneself to such an analogy, which is precisely why we maintain the notion of a 'mystical body'. The body, by the physiological processes that structure it, assures the conservation of each of its parts; the preservation of each part remains subservient to the preservation of the whole. Now in the political body, one such principle can be denied: that which tries to say that each part has no center of interest other than itself, and that which claims, for example, that a good for the part cannot constitute an evil for the whole, and vice versa.

The Aristotelian heritage of the theory of distributive justice allows a concrete matter to be brought to bear, as well as the beginning of a solution. The idea of distribution⁶⁷ receives an extension beyond the economic sphere, since society as a totality, and considered from the point of view of justice, implies a division of functions, rights, and duties. In thinking of society as a global system of distribution, Suárez is equally concerned with avoiding the thesis that identifies society as a distinct entity of individuals who make it up, and avoids as well an individualistic conception wherein society is merely the summation of individuals and their interactions. The thesis of distributive justice allows for the renewed use of the metaphor of the body by insisting on the fact that society does not exist in the absence of individuals, among whom there is a distribution and who also partake in the whole. And justice, likewise, entails that individuals could not affirm their social existence without the rule of distribution that assigns their place in the whole. It is precisely there that justice, by means of institutions, directs the whole of the shared operations. In this way Suárez⁶⁸ reminds us that the general formula of justice—to render each one his due (*jus suum unicuique tribuens*)—is in this sense at the heart of the moral comprehension of the body politic.

The metaphor of the body, which in itself also harmonizes with the development of a living person, expresses the following demand: the improvement of the human faculties that require in the specific case an authority and direction. According to the logic of the bond uniting the part and the whole, it seems that domestic society, naturally first, is not sufficient in this. The family, with respect to the political society, constitutes an imperfect society because it

67 *Disputatio de justitia*, in *Opuscula theologica*, s. 1, n. 12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 11, pp. 518–519).

68 *Ibid.*, s. 1, n. 9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 11, p. 518).

does not permit progressive achievement of human possibilities such as the arts, the economy, the sciences, law, etc., and in the same way, does not lead to the realization of its moral destination. The multiplicity and juxtaposition of families could only be the occasion of an accidental aggregate.⁶⁹ In order for a community to claim the status of a political society, there must be a balancing of the human multiplicity toward the moral union, which presupposes a free agreement, express or tacit, implying cooperation and reciprocal assistance, as well as subordination to the sovereign authority of the community.⁷⁰ The perfect society or civil community, according to the Aristotelian thesis, constitutes the end of domestic society, and the specificity of the perfect community consists precisely in the implication of a public power, an authority. Two constitutive dimensions of the latter should thence be drawn out: (1) the dimension of a social community in which all men participate by the fact of possessing a rational nature and by aspiring toward the same common good; and (2) the dimension of political community formed by a moral congregation, the State, instituted by human law completely in accord with rational nature. One thus has to deal with a regrouping of men who, unified by conventions, orient themselves toward a common end under the direction of an authority, implying a moral bond by which individuals do not live among themselves as private persons but as elements of a whole state community.

As a result, there is a clear distinction: the human regroupings are not identifiable with herds but with societies; they are not purely and simply engendered by nature, but imply a conformity to nature, accompanied by the will. Without the social naturalness, no grouping would come to be; the will cannot pretend to produce independently from a given fact that existed before it. And in the absence of the will, only the communal instinct could prevail without the emergence of the possibility of a complete sociability. If one understands human liberty as the power to choose, political association will be interpreted in its human dimension, namely, as free, but not unless the decision intervenes in a direct manner. Nevertheless, as the introduction of every convention reveals, the actual intervention of freedom by the intermediary of a decision presupposes a direct link with nature.

In this perspective, for the emergence of political power to be intelligible, it must be placed again into the intricacy of necessity and the will, the mark of the political dimension of the human. As a consequence, the political

69 *De leg.*, 3.1.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, pp. 176–177).

70 *De opere sex dierum* 5.7.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 3, p. 414) and *De leg.*, 3.35.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 316): “The reason resides in the fact that the community is situated above any person who belongs to it.”

association “has not been actualized without a particular agreement, either express or tacit.”⁷¹ For there to be a society, it is necessary to make reference to the will being given, for without agreement, this same society remains inconceivable. The ontological status of man as being created or being shared is endowed by reason of his nature with specific potentialities constituting the matrix of the political existence, which should allow him to fulfill his highest office: that of being a free participant in the genesis of every social organization and of its most exalted historical form, namely, the State. The political understanding of this participatory freedom, as it confirms the natural condition of men (implying a harmonious cooperation between the first cause, the Creator, and secondary causes), can be made manifest historically in an express or tacit manner.

Civil community, consequently, cannot result from the natural evolution of the familial community any more than a natural descent could claim to reach the status of a nation, since the existence of the latter presupposes freedom as a condition. Historically, a free decision implies an agreement constituting the efficient and proximate cause of the civil society. It is manifest that, for Suárez, such consent rests in the social nature of man, who has the Creator as his final foundation.⁷² The political society, having nature as its origin and completed by the mediation of the agreement of wills, requires the preservation of this agreement by a unifying force, a civil authority, which directs the activity of the members of the whole toward a common end. The unity of the State in itself is subservient to the subjection of the members to this authority, which expresses the principle intrinsically.⁷³

The critical examination of the natural condition of men likewise confirms that the civil power is not the result of sin, but of something fundamentally in conformity with nature, for it must be said that it existed in the state of innocence itself, under the form of a directive and not coercive authority.⁷⁴ The realized political authority is equivalent to a moral human unification, leading to the existence of a single sovereign, one law, and a single finality identical for all. The self-sufficiency of the political society implies a juridical autonomy as a specific and supreme authority. Consequently, civil society defines itself by the aptitude to receive laws and to be politically governed,⁷⁵ which implies the

71 *De opere sex dierum* 5.7.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 3, p. 414): “(...) aliqua unione politica, quae non fit sine aliquo pacto expresso, vel tacito iuvandi se invicem.”

72 *De leg.*, 3.3.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 182).

73 *Ibid.*, 3.3.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 182).

74 *De opere sex dierum*, 5.7.6–8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 3, pp. 414–415).

75 *Des lois*, I, 6, n. 20, pp. 180–181 and *De leg.*, 3.9.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 203): “Le pouvoir législatif réside dans la totalité du corps politique, de telle sorte que ni la communauté sans le

existence of a supreme power or sovereign who cannot be limited by particular interests, nor hindered in the realization of its functions. For this condition, it will be legitimate to speak of the State, and one will be able to assimilate the civil society to a morally united multitude, taking the name of a mystical body.⁷⁶

As Suárez recalls, St. Jerome and St. Cyprian, from the starting point of the image of the body, notably suppose that, on the one hand, not only “is the prince necessary in the republic but likewise there should only exist one.”⁷⁷ On the other hand, the term ‘mystical’, by introducing a difference from the physical body, indicates the existence of a spiritual order that transcends the reference to such materiality. In the same way, a distinction between the moral and juridical person and the physical person becomes legitimate.⁷⁸ “When we speak of a unique political sovereign, we understand a tribunal or a power either in one single natural person or in a council or congregation of many as in a fictive person [*una persona ficta*].”⁷⁹ The supposed person, equivalent to what one would call the moral person, indicates for Suárez that one cannot make reference to a physical person (*persona vera*), but it is a matter precisely of coming to a double opposition: that of the individual person with the collective person, and that of the physical person with the moral person. There follows in the Suárezian perspective an identification between the fictive and mystical character of the person. The attribute of person applies both to the individual sphere and the collective. It is fitting for this theory of the moral person, through the expression of the unity of the *corpus politicum mysticum*, to reflect on the ontological source of political society and to insist on the reciprocal implication of unity and being.

To propose that the republic constitutes a mystical body comes back to the recognition that it is analogous—within the limits formulated earlier—to an organism whose unity is not conceivable without diversity. It is fitting to promote in the same way the moral reality of the social unity by distinguishing it carefully from a mechanical aggregation or a physical unity. The identification of the republic with a mystical body confirms its status of unity, and consequently leads to investigating the specific being of the political community. The condition of the whole being-in-common resides in the fact of it constituting a

gouvernant, ni le gouvernant sans la communauté, n'aient de compétence pour établir les lois.”

76 *De leg.*, 3.2.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 181).

77 *DF* 3.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 204).

78 *Ibid.*, 3.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 204).

79 *Ibid.*, 3.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 204).

unity; the latter, as the ontological principle, is capable of being put into practice, for it allows the bases of the organization of the republic to be established. The unity is, in fact, deducible, not only from the necessity of the community and the functioning of its power, but also from its end, identifiable with its conservation.⁸⁰ For the unity of the republic that constitutes its perfection is precisely a good in the sense that it is this unity that must be desired by the reality of its perfection, namely, coexistence and peace through justice among men.

From the distinction between the physical person and the moral person, it is no less necessary to carry out a differentiation between real unity and fictive unity. Thus, concerning simple beings, their unity is identifiable with simplicity. If one considers the unity of the republic as a moral person, it presupposes the composition of parts (individuals, representatives, institutions, etc.) that are irreducible to their pure integration in the totality. With regard to the individual, he has a mode of being distinct from the republic; his being is inseparable from the being-in-common proper to the State without being merged with it. Thus, as Suárez reminds us in several places: "Man by nature tends toward political community and requires the latter for adequate conservation of his life as Aristotle justly taught."⁸¹ In the final analysis, the constitution of a being-in-common is not, as in the exhibition of such a tendency, the product of a mere calculation of interests or a transcendent process making abstraction from secondary causes; rather, it expresses a temporal human work, originally circumscribed by the order of nature and inducing a permanent effort. The ontological implication of the recognition of human aptitudes consists precisely in joining together divine and human action. To define the individual as a social animal has the consequence of integrating socialization into the moral human process of the temporal development of humanity. In the same way, it is a matter of clearly indicating whether the figure of the sovereign can make decisions according to a logic that imitates the founding of a social order analogous to the one created by God. In fact, the social structuring seems anterior to every governmental action. It is a result of the natural law, without which every social organization is incapable of achieving its proper ends. Consequently, the government actualizes such an order and preserves it. Indeed, the tendency to live as a community does not lead to a harmonious order that could be maintained by the free interplay of relations among individuals without requiring a principal political director. Indeed, the

80 Ibid., 3.1.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 204).

81 *DF* 3.1.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 204). See *De leg.*, 3.1.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, pp. 176–177); *ibid.*, 3.1.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, 179); *De opere sex dierum* 5.7.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 3, p. 414).

order in the human sphere is not desired and achieved freely; it requires political power.

When one investigates the origin of the position according to which political power—on the condition of being instituted in conformity with the natural law—is just and legitimate, as Suárez recalls,⁸² it leads one back to the thesis of the pastorate, developed by Fathers of the Church such as St. Jerome⁸³ and St. Cyprian.⁸⁴ Theologically considered, the pastorate is related to salvation, since it is concerned with guiding each person as well as the community toward salvation. In the interpretation of the Fathers of the Church mentioned above, this implies that the pastorate is in a strict relation with the law, because the way toward salvation requires a submission to the order willed by God. Consequently, the pastorate is inseparable from faith in the truth proclaimed by religion. Nevertheless, for Suárez, the political government of men is irreducible in its comprehension of the pastorate of souls, in the same way, for instance, that he clearly establishes the distinction in the finality of civil law and canonical law. A precarious eschatology (taking its measure from the security, economy, implementation of regulations, preserving coexistence, etc.) that would make political power possible is advanced in the face of an eschatology incapable of managing the urgency of the present human condition. The political government requires putting into place, in a historical setting, rules for determining how to behave in relation with others, with institutions, and with the sovereign power. To govern is not more intelligible as an act analogous to the divine act in relation to nature, or a shepherd in relation to the flock, but it assumes the use of a rationality proper to the historicization of the public sphere; that leads to a limitation of the force of the stronger by the rule of law, an equalization of the stronger and the possibility of a combination of the less powerful against the more powerful. The temporal exercise of power is comparable to an anchoring in the temporal sphere, underlining the indefinite process of the art of politics and promoting in the same way a conception of an open historicity.

All social formation actually rests on a natural human development, expressed by the fact of being a social animal. This status, however, cannot hide the ambiguous situation of the human. On the one hand, by his liberty and reason, man occupies a central place, which comes to confirm the supreme end toward which he should be destined. On the other hand, however, he is equally confronted with the uncertain and indeterminate character of his destination; his humanity appears to him as a mark of his weakness and his

82 Ibid., 3.1.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 204).

83 St. Hieronymus, *Epistola* 125, ad rusticum, n. 15 (PL 22, 1080).

84 St. Cyprianus, *Quod idola non sint*, c. 8: CSEL 3, 26 (PL 3, 576).

limits, with respect to a totality that exceeds him. The possibility of his improvement, as the very reason that ensures his conservation, requires the omnipresence of others. Thus, to define man as a social animal implies the recognition in him of a moral task inseparable from improvement, by which he proves that he is prepared to escape from the psychological and physical conditions of his empirical existence. By the freedom of his will and the autonomy that his reason confers on him, man carries within himself a power of rupture and beginning. This likewise gives rise to the perspective of an accomplishment tending toward a completion, directed by a providence reconciling man to the world. One such improvement inseparable from the menace of corruption—insofar as it confirms the content of the notion of the state of nature—implies a constrained and unachievable process, having the bearing of a propaedeutic of morality.

At the origin of the social bond between men, there is more than the contingent character of a physical indigence on which Vitoria insisted in a pertinent way. An ontological exigence here presides, for to be defined as a social animal expresses a tension of nature versus grace, that is to say, the possibility for freedom to transcend the ways of necessity accompanied by a refusal of an empirical genesis of social and moral values. To exist humanly, man cannot manage the economy in the Suárezian perspective apart from the help of virtue (*auxilium virtutis*). Moreover, such assistance can only exist through the society that constitutes the privileged instrument of the rectification of morals and the union of individuals. Socialization as an opening of the specific earthly destiny of man inaugurates the rational future of human destiny. Each man has need of other men and the heritage of their experience,⁸⁵ of tradition, of a continuing collective labour, and of culture, as inscribed into the duration of the humanity of each person in a world that can be his, thanks to the adequate development of his aptitudes. This presupposes each man existing in a proper place, conceived in a logic of extension: the family, the social group, the political organization implying mutual assistance, and the universal bond of necessity. Suárez brings to mind in this perspective the difference existing between an imperfect or familial community, and the perfect or political community: the first is composed of the husband, wife, and children, while the second, which consists of numerous families, is self-sufficient and suitable in itself to procure all the things necessary for a good life.⁸⁶ For this to work, the existence

85 *De opere sex dierum* 5.7.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 3, p. 415): "(...) non enim possent singuli omnia per se experiri."

86 *De leg.*, 3.1.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 177): "(...) By the very nature of things, a political community, consisting of at least a City-State and formed by several families, is necessary more-over for the human race."

of a power consonant to the government of the community is a condition for the possibility of the preservation of its autonomy.⁸⁷ The agreement of the perfect community with reason and the natural law implies, in this perspective, a similar agreement with the power destined to govern, without which there would be the threat of a political disgrace (discord and anarchy) and ontological disgrace (corruption and estrangement from the supreme good). Consequently, it would not be absurd to suppose that a constitution resting completely on the principles of the natural law could remain for the human species the ultimate justification of its historical existence.

For such an agreement to be historically effective, it is necessary to have recourse to a civil magistrate who, by the sovereignty of his function, disposes according to his political power, from the faculty enacted by laws,⁸⁸ that which necessarily includes—as the preceding analyses have shown—the power to rule the members of the community. From the moment when each member searches out his particular interest—frequently in contradiction to the common good—a disharmony of fact, internal to the community, cannot be denied. For as experience and political practice confirm, that which accidentally leads particular interests to accommodate themselves to the interests of the common good, cannot conceal the fact that particular interests are satisfied, not by respect for their common value, but quite simply because this responds to their particular interest.⁸⁹ This report carries in itself one of the proofs, among those previously evoked, of “the legitimacy and the necessity of political power,”⁹⁰ the latter revealing to a man, or a multitude of men, that in which the power of governing resides.

A double demand for understanding political power is made manifest by this: that of explaining the necessity of obligatory force naturally, and that of justifying it practically. For Suárez, one must understand, as he ironically remarks, that such a power is incumbent on men because they “are not naturally governed in politics by angels nor directly by God-Himself who ordinarily operates by means of adequate causes.”⁹¹ Even among angels, there exists a government and a hierarchy. Consequently, necessarily and naturally, men

87 Ibid., 3.1.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 177).

88 Ibid., 3.1.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, pp. 177–178): “The human government, when it is sovereign in its order, possesses the power of establishing laws proportionate to its sphere of competence, namely, it can establish the valid and just manner of civil or human laws by natural right in order to realize the other conditions necessary for the law.”

89 Ibid., 3.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 177).

90 Ibid., 3.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 177).

91 Ibid., 3.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 177).

cannot be governed except by men.⁹² And within this perspective, the argument developed by Suárez does not rest on the reference to sin but on the natural condition of man defined by the fact that “man is a social animal and requires by nature a form of communitarian life before being necessarily ruled by a public power.”⁹³

A particular point of Suárezian reflection illustrates this. The metaphor of the government of the angels and its parallel with the government of men allows for a theological-political interpretation of the Kantian formula of the “people of demons.”⁹⁴ The problem of the fallen nature of man, by leaving room for the natural condition of men, does not recover on account of the theological inscription of the natural law in history; rather, it augments the difficulty by the fact of its reference to the question of political power, that is to say, it poses the question of the limit of the political realization of the principles of the natural law and the renunciation of a model of a perfect civil society. Thus, the temporal city will never be able to rejoin the eternal city of God, since this would require that faith substitute itself as the unifying force of the community by a natural bond. As neither the people of angels nor the people of demons, the government of men by men confirms that it is not morality that precedes a judicious organization of the State. On the contrary, it is appropriate to hope by the latter for a possible moralization, with virtue representing a necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment of a humane world. It is not necessary to have angels in order to constitute a State that has the principles conformed to the natural law, for it is possible, as in the last analysis, to find a solution for creatures whose motives for action rely on the opposition to virtue. The power of the State and the organization of the system of civil laws are directed at the universal requirement of conservation claimed by every rational being; nevertheless, this does not hide the particular interests striving to exempt themselves from the laws of the State, their force being annulled in the end, which is to say that the public result is the same if individuals are not guided by their particular interest and aspire naturally to the common good.

As a result, the virtue achieved among human beings cannot be a condition for the State’s coming to light: firstly, because the political order seems like it

92 *DF* 3.2.17 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, pp. 211–212): “Royal power does not proceed by a divine positive institution; instead, it possesses its origin only from natural reason by means of the free human will.”

93 *De leg.*, 3.1.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 179).

94 Kant, *Projet de paix perpétuelle*, trans. J. Gibelin, 3^e édition (Paris, 1975), 2^e section, 1^o supplément, p. 44.

cannot escape the conflicts of empirical history, and secondly, because the State has force as its origin. No moral transformation is required for the establishment of the State: neither angels nor demons are required, as it is necessary to form it with human finitude and fallibility. These latter qualities are not what defer indefinitely the formation of the political community; on the contrary, they can be utilized in its favour. If one considers the hostile passions of individuals, the ones with regard to others like pride and concupiscence, they appear in the perspective of reason calculated to work within the law as the same matrix of the political order. The question of the establishment of the State cannot, as a consequence, correspond to that of an organization conformed from the outset to the principles of the natural law. It comes back to the articulation between the natural condition of men and their historical development, implying the opposition of individual wills among themselves. This condition does not render the problem of the State insoluble; rather, it gives reason for the elements of its solution.

The power of the State is instituted “for ordering relations among men”;⁹⁵ it utilizes the antagonism of particular interests in working out this ordering, so that it comes back to itself to produce a situation of equilibrium corresponding to justice and peace.⁹⁶ Such a situation harmonizes with one in which the sovereign power of the law is affirmed: “A power is called sovereign when it does not recognize any other power that would be superior to it.”⁹⁷ It has the function of rationally governing individual interactions by leading men who constrain each other to conform themselves instead to the power of the law. This latter function inscribes itself into the logic of a reform of morals, virtue being considered in the political order as what is prepared to succeed to discipline and not precede it. The rule of the law also assumes “a subjugation to the civil order,” the sovereign power constituting “a certain form of dominion.”⁹⁸ One understands then that the formation of the State is not dependent on the moral improvement of man. Rather, it is necessary to say that the stability achieved by the force of law and the calculations of right reason will make possible man’s access to virtue, through the intermediary of the “jurisdictional dominion.”⁹⁹ By the working of inter-individuality, men are compelled to accept the constraint of this rule of law, which amounts to saying that they are

95 *DF* 3.9.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 249).

96 *Ibid.*, 3.5.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, pp. 224–225): “The political power is in itself ordered directly and only to the well-being and happiness for the duration of the present life.”

97 *Ibid.*, 3.5.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 224).

98 *De leg.*, 3.1.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 178).

99 *Ibid.*, 3.1.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 178).

compelled to become good citizens who are prepared for the ethical destination of humanity. The recognition of the necessity of this constraint of the rule of law does not mean that one can confuse it with the realization of virtue. Consequently, one does not give an ethical value to the constraint produced politically and empirically, as it is merely a technical efficacy. In this sense, the logic of coercion induces rewards and punishments by technical action, without intending to clothe them with a moral dimension. By the mediation of the natural right, the natural law precisely calls to mind the fact that the Machiavellian comprehension of jurisdiction—which bases it on legal restraint—leads to a confusion of the law and the political order, the source of despotism, from which one should flee.

The logic of the extension (from the social group to the political organization) previously evoked, which is characteristic of the natural condition of men and proper to the social bond, is equally understandable from the desire for a happy life, which the political power is not able to manage. The process of socialization requires a community directed to the good. It reveals that such a desire is tied to the original absence of this good, and in the same way, it implies an effort to remedy it. In the state of nature, this desire expresses a tendency toward its proper growth. Thus, the desire to be happy is inseparable from the joy that presupposes the presence of others as the condition for its diversification and augmentation. Suárez confirms this central dimension of inter-individuality from the notion that sharing “this community of life is not only desirable because of the necessity of mutual assistance but also because it is desirable in itself, namely, for the great pleasure of living and honest communication that man truly loves.”¹⁰⁰ The process of socialization and historical development reinforce this ontological principle. It likewise makes clear that the inscription of law into human history harmonizes not with nationality but with human culture according to nature. The political history of societies, being composed as the mode of empirical and earthly existence of humanity, is concerned with promoting a cultural conception of history that rationalizes its function. The historical reality of the natural law will be justified by its destination. In recognizing man as a social animal, for Suárez it is a matter of refusing to conform the law to nature in order to reconcile it to the destiny of man, which thus implies searching in the future of humanity for reasons for its intelligibility, with grace confirming, from the theological point of view, such an inquiry. According to this perspective, the natural law, in terms of its end, is inscribed into a practical teleological vision constituting the guiding path of human development in order to bestow upon it a meaning and a consistency.

100 *De opere sex dierum* 5.7.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 3, p. 415).

It plays the role of a critical model of the legitimate representation of the finality of societies in history. In the end, by its articulation of the right of nations, it truly allows a prospective deciphering of the development of law.

To be a social animal is linked logically in the same way to the means that providence employs for constraining individuals to inscribe themselves into the realm of inter-individuality, in order to become engaged in the process of civilization. Suárez makes clear that “the civil authority with temporal power for governing men is just and in conformity with human nature.”¹⁰¹ In this respect, society is seen as a natural and empirical phenomenon, a production of the artistic nature subservient to the designs of providence. The constraint that results from this proceeds from force and expresses the power of a unifying coercion without which one could just as easily reduce the instrumental role of the social community to the realm of natural necessity. In this sense, society constitutes a necessary product of nature by which individuals are removed from the violence of purely passionate relations. Society must, however, prefigure the possibility of allowing a government that rests exclusively on the principles of the natural law. If it is proper to recognize conceptually a division between the state of nature and the civil state (history previously allowed rationalizing the transition from one to another), the latter remains inseparable from the process of the civilization of morals. It will pertain historically to politics to regulate, according to the natural law, the problem of the ends of the social existence of man.

The need for compulsion in its unifying function brings forth an echo of the need for political power, natural society reflecting back in this way to the emergence of every State out of force. This point cannot exclude the first character of political unity, the original form of human unity. Historically, it seems that the political exercise of compulsion precedes the juridical foundation of a governmental authority that is prepared to be accepted freely. If the governor is the empirical holder of force, it is equally assumable by an agent of the natural unity of the people. In this sense, the political coercion flows from an instrumental rationalization of the nature by which the governors are occasionally the causal expression. They are identifiable as the means of a development whose finality can feasibly escape them.

The question of compulsion in the articulation of the establishment of the legislative power does not miss solving the following problem: does the legislative power reside in men considered individually, in the community, or in the combination of the two?¹⁰² As it has been explained, no individual is naturally

101 *De leg.*, 3.1.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 176).

102 *Ibid.*, 3.2.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 180).

superior to others, and it remains problematic to determine who in the community could have received such power; this could not spring from men themselves because no one is prepared to give what he does not possess, namely, the power of commanding other men. God cannot be any more at the origin, since that would suppose that the power could never change hands and it should always endure in the human community, thus signifying that the latter would endure indefinitely, which is evidently contradicted by historical development. It seems clear that the legislative power does not by nature reside “in any particular man but in the total collection of men.”¹⁰³ Hence, it is necessary to exclude the thesis of a political authority residing in atomized individuals, just as previously it was rejected that God directly communicates the authority to a determined man, the monarch, as James I advanced with his theory of the divine right of kings.

It remains, no less, that these precisions cannot forget that the State constitutes an entity ontologically independent of individual consent. In fact, the genesis of the State becomes intelligible from the social nature of man, articulated by a teleological process, which only implies the participative power of individuals as secondary causes. The State historically possesses an objective end as a means for the temporal fulfillment of the humanity in man. Its status is determined in terms of a subtle dialectical articulation between nature and history. The political power, in reference to its origin, is in a position to be qualified as natural precisely because natural reason, independent of faith and supernatural revelation, enables the determining of what is indispensable for the conservation and tranquility of the State.¹⁰⁴ This constitutes precisely the proof for Suárez that power “exists in this community in the manner of a property derived from nature or from the creation of the State and its natural constitution.”¹⁰⁵ One theological argument comes to support this thesis, namely, that it would be a contradiction to claim that this power could be the object of a specific donation of God and a concession unconnected to nature, because

103 Ibid., 3.2.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, pp. 180–181), and *DF* 3.2.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 207): “In the first place, the sovereign public power, considered in itself, was conferred directly by God to men united in one State or in one complete political community, not in virtue of an institution or an act of specific and positive bestowal, nor by a donation totally distinct from the creation of such a nature, but by natural consequence from the force of its initial creation. This is why, in virtue of this form of donation, the political power does not reside in one single person or in a determined multitude but in the whole of the people or the body of the community.”

104 *DF* 3.2.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 207).

105 Ibid., 3.2.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 207).

this state of affairs would lead by degrees to an impossibility of political and historical reality: that of knowing the power by natural reason alone and invoking at the same time the necessity of recourse to revelation. Men, by the same fact that they associate historically to give birth to a State, make the power appear dissociated from the intervention of the human will.¹⁰⁶

In this perspective, the community is identifiable with the totality derived from the interaction of nature and will. For Suárez, the necessity of power follows as an unavoidable consequence. In this sense, ontologically and historically, nature and will harmonize and complement one another. In fact, if one considers that man is a political animal, that consequently he has been created as free but also with an intrinsic aptitude to conform himself to an authority—and, as a result, if what defines man does not depend on the will of associated men—there is no conflict between the will to live-in-common and the reality of obedience to an authority.¹⁰⁷

Politically and historically, power represents “a good use of human nature.”¹⁰⁸ When one considers power in its physical and moral aspects, “it must necessarily spring from the author of nature.” Furthermore, “those who exercise this power in the human community are ministers of God. They do nothing but administer the power they have received from God.”¹⁰⁹ Theologically, it is legitimate to assert that all power constitutes a temporal imitation of the infinite and perfect power of the *Ipsium Esse*. The creature is not prepared to order by itself because it does not exist by itself. Political authority is ontologically the reality of a being subject to participation, an *ens participatum*.¹¹⁰ This explains precisely why power is not the prerogative of anyone by nature, and it is necessary to insist on the fact that God has not assigned authority to sovereigns according to an identical modality by which he has assigned it to pontiffs;¹¹¹ consequently, it is proper to hold historically to a judicious distinction between temporal power and spiritual power.

The Suárezian logic of demonstration here takes the following form: everything from the natural law comes forth from God as the author of nature; the political sovereignty is the natural law, and consequently, it has God as its author. This creation of nature and power by God implies that the emergence of power and the emergence of the community go hand in hand.¹¹² The human

106 Ibid., 3.2.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 208).

107 Ibid., 3.1.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, pp. 205–206).

108 *De leg.*, 3.3.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 182).

109 Ibid., 3.3.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 182).

110 *DF* 3.1.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 205).

111 *De leg.*, 3.2.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 180); *DF* 3.2.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 206).

112 Ibid., 3.3.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, pp. 182–183).

multiplicity in politics can reflect in its own way the order of being as a whole, which is expressed temporally in the following manner: the power resides in the community, for the community. Politically, the ontological unity between the power and the community (which takes on a circular form since there is no community without power and this power exists itself originally in the community) is inseparable from the revelation of its proper good, discovering again in the same way the convertibility between being and the good. The *corpus mysticum politicum* and the original democracy constitute precisely a historical expression of this convertibility in their will to fulfill the humanity in man through peace and justice. The human person, a finite creature included between nature and freedom, understands himself historically from three centers of unavoidable references: the community, the power, and the law. By means of this triple center of reference, moral theology seems inseparable in its logic from the achievement of a social ethic and a political philosophy.

As the previous remarks on the notion of the political contract have shown, such a contract inserts itself into the framework of a society understood as a whole, looking toward the fulfillment of the public good and capable of recognizing the legitimacy of an authority as the principal director. If one considers the origin of the political society and that of political power, they are, by their simultaneity, inseparable. Nevertheless, the constitution of the political authority is not reducible to a human artifice; it is the object of an immediate donation by God as the Creator of nature, and the form of human nature is granted by God, who determines what is inherent to it. The political exigency comes together on this point with theological exigency to open the way to a teleological understanding of the possible fulfillment of man in history.

4 The Historical Finality of the State

The genesis of the State historically reveals that each political body tends to develop for itself a complete society supplanting the forms of primitive communities that were materially there from the beginning. From the intra-state point of view, it has been shown that the moral legitimacy of acts of civil obedience is inseparable from the pursuit of the common good. The generalized duty of subordination to the laws of the State exists in virtue of such an ordination toward this common good. The latter appears historically as the result of values and social conditions, whose fulfillment creates the matrix of a situation of peace, justice, and public prosperity. From this it follows that, temporarily, the common good circumscribes the autonomy of the political order. Such a good historically manifests the material and spiritual realization proper

to each State, and constitutes a specific reference to the political sphere. It incarnates itself into the right to truth, culture, freedom, and religion. The natural rights realized historically in the State represent the first moment of this common good, identified with the good of persons defined as being free.

The intra-state ordination toward the common good is, in the final analysis, the ordination of each citizen toward himself. The legitimacy of political power implies for such adequacy the respect of the fundamental values of the person and the setting up of adequate means in order that citizens may be prepared to realize the values that look after the preservation and growth of their humanity. This analysis, by confirming from the historical and social perspective the irreducibility of the common good to the sum of particular goods, insists on the super-individual character of the good for which the political community must aim. It follows that politically, but likewise ontologically, the difference between the common good and the particular good cannot be reduced to a merely quantitative difference. The State in its historical evolution thus reveals that the citizens, as well as their political existence, enter into a process of differentiation, making up a moral whole through the unity of consent, in reference to the unity of one power and in terms of a unity of purpose. With respect to its development, the State must be set forth as a collective and independent person, expressive of rights and specific duties flowing from their ordination to the common good.

In this sense, in the interpretive perspective, the examination of history reveals that this common good assumes a dynamic and varied character in terms of the past and the specific situation of each country, namely, in terms of geography, climate, and development. Political pluralism remains articulated according to the will and the customs of each nation, which comes back to the recognition that there is no political predetermination. In the same way as it has established the consideration of custom, the condition of the possibility of the justice of one human law cannot lack an accord and a mutual agreement with the morals of a nation. Nevertheless, the recognition of the historical and variable character of the common good cannot pass in silence over what is the only conceivable contribution to the realization of a possible order. This order is a result of justice, as prudence was a result of law and political practice. Since historically and politically this order takes the form of calculation and foresight, it implies in its application a search for tolerance, in order to preserve social harmony. Politically, this historic dynamic of the common good makes the diversification of the forms of government clear while making communal order and freedom possible within the temporal realm.

In this perspective, peace is historically identified with a situation of social coexistence according to the order of freedom. Man constitutes himself here

as a person, that is to say, as a member of the State and the world community. According to Vitoria as well as Suárez, the development of States also shows that peace should culminate in the assertion of itself in order to respond to a social reality of interhuman, political, and international relations. The search for the common good assumes that freedom and power express themselves in an objective order, natural and independent of the human will, which refines and actualizes itself throughout history. The development of States reveals as a consequence a dynamic of peace, held historically between the natural order and the institutionalization of power. In this sense, the order of peace appears inseparable from a juridical order. It includes, in its foundation and development, the rights of the person, the State, and the international community—conditions for the possibility of the progress of nations. Economic relations—the search for equity in the financial political order—constitute a determined element in the actuality of such a development.

The ethical-political dimension of the origin of the State likewise resides for Suárez in the refusal of every attempt—past or yet to come—to establish a universal society by force and in reference to a power that extends to the whole human race.¹¹³ Suárez¹¹⁴ objects to the thesis of Bartolus of Sassoferrato,¹¹⁵ affirming that the Roman Emperor and his successors possess and exercise a supreme power over the whole world, which the Spanish Jesuit deems erroneous and unfounded. The Emperor never received from God such a universal power, argues Suárez, and he likewise never gained it. Consequently, since Christ never granted him such power, the supreme Pontiff, who has only an indirect power over temporal affairs, would not have any right to recognize such power in the Emperor. First, in terms of history, the power of governing has never been one for the totality of the human race; it necessarily became something shared among the multiplicity of existing societies.¹¹⁶ Secondly, the existence of a universal political society never seemed necessary for the conservation and common good of humanity. In fact, not only would such a society prove to be a fabrication of the imagination, but even its existence

113 Ibid., 3,2.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 181): "It is not necessary for conservation or natural well-being that all men unite together into a single political community."

114 Ibid., 3,5.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 188).

115 Bartolus a Saxoferrato, *In Digestum commentaria* (Turin, 1589), livre 59, tit. 15, loi 24, nn. 6–7, fol. 275.

116 *De leg.*, 3,3.6 (ed. Vivès, vol 5, p. 183), and Aristote, *Politics*, 4,3.1290 a 5–7: "One sees clearly, by what follows, that there should necessarily exist several types of political society differing specifically one from the others since the parts of our societies are also composed differing specifically among themselves."

would risk bringing harm to humanity. Referring to Aristotle, Suárez reminds us that a city that is too large necessarily faces difficulty with its government. This difficulty, moreover, intensifies when a State is inordinately extended, and even more so in the case of the government of a world society.¹¹⁷

The diversification of the human race into peoples and States cannot obscure the ‘political and moral unity’ required by the natural law of charity and by mutual love.¹¹⁸ Two juridical orders can be drawn out from this: one is national, invested with a sovereignty specific to inter-individual relations; the other is international, possessing a sovereignty relative to relations among states. Historically but also ontologically, each State is a part of this whole in developing what represents the human race. In this sense, a universal society of States imposes a moral necessity upon constituted States. This implies the necessity of mutual assistance and of a universal common good. In conformity with this perspective, it will be legitimate to evoke a society of nations and an international law. Such a society is ruled by the law of nations, a positive law with an essentially customary origin that governs relations among nations in a sovereign manner.

The articulation between the intra-state realm and the inter-state realm helps as well in considering the relativity of States from a historical and theological point of view. The power of the Prince or the Sovereign Pontiff—in its quality of temporal dominion exercised in the name of the community that transfers the power to him—cannot claim to take effect except on a national level. The laws promulgated by the sovereign cannot claim to apply to the whole human race in its global dimension; its power only has meaning relative to the sphere subject to its jurisdiction.¹¹⁹ One must therefore conclude that the sovereign’s power of governing is limited to the jurisdiction in which it is exercised.¹²⁰ To be a temporal sovereign means, consequently, having the power to govern solely the juridical order to which it is connected.

From the point of view of ecclesiology, it is fitting to recall that sovereignty receives its double limitation from the divine positive law, which has effected its restriction to the purely temporal domain, and from the divine moral or natural law, which, because it is teleologically oriented toward political society, restricts its powers to the means required for such a realization of ends. If the State exists as a political order originating from the Creator—which, according

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 3.3.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, pp. 182–183).

¹¹⁸ *Des lois*, II, 19, n. 9, p. 627.

¹¹⁹ *De leg.*, 3.7.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 195), and *ibid.*, 3.6.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, pp. 192–193).

¹²⁰ Ibid., 3.9.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 202): “(...) All sovereign kings possess legislative power in the sphere that corresponds to them, namely each one within his own proper kingdom.”

to juridical terminology, amounts to saying that it is from the natural law—it does not depend any less on an agreement of citizens and therefore belongs to the realm of human positive law.¹²¹ In fact, the domain of the State's competence belongs to the temporal order, but the path to the religious supernatural good must be entrusted to the Church, the ecclesiastic society supremely charged with sovereign power in the subject-matter: "The rule that determines rectitude and morality of government must be spiritual."¹²² The Church includes all the powers that are indispensable for the supernatural good of believers, which are precisely conferred on her by Christ.¹²³ From a theological-political perspective, the power of the Church in the religious realm is equivalent to a supreme power.¹²⁴ The access to supernatural happiness and the religious good that this entails cannot belong historically to the competence of the State, which is teleologically oriented toward temporal welfare.¹²⁵ The finality of the State does not consist in assuring the spiritual welfare of its members here below. On the other hand, the religious good temporarily considered is ordered in itself to the supernatural happiness of the future life. The relation between the State and the Church leads precisely to investigating the bond between history and theology at the time when the appearance and consolidation of national States were progressively diminishing and the Schism and conciliarist ideas contributed to disturbing papal power.

This raises the following question, namely, whether the Church, with respect to the historical development of the State, could and should constitute a political society, since etymologically—corresponding to its usage in Greek political thought—it designates the assembly of citizens.¹²⁶ A corresponding question asks: to what extent is it the Church's responsibility to recognize the autonomy of the temporal order vis-à-vis its jurisdiction? Inquiring into the development of the State also means inquiring into the status of the Christian State. This questioning enters into the process of the development of moral theology as an independent discipline, and is applied to the practical problems of social life. Historically, this implies that morality is inscribed into a theological framework in which international law (and the situation of the Americas) is

121 *DF* 3.6.17 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, pp. 236–237).

122 *De leg.*, 4.9.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, pp. 366–367).

123 *Ibid.*, 4.1.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 329): "This power is a type of jurisdiction that pertains to the external ecclesiastical forum, and, for this reason, it is given by the Lord Christ with the attributes proper to jurisdiction."

124 *Ibid.*, 4.1.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 329): "The power of Christ, our Lord, is principally ordained to a spiritual and supernatural end, and on this account it came into this world."

125 *Ibid.*, 3.11.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 213).

126 Aristotle, *Politics*, 2.10.1272a10.

confronted, as are political and economic problems, and the origin and exercise of civil and ecclesiastical power. Inquiry into the status of the Christian State in history signifies an extension of the function of theology; the latter cannot be limited to uncovering and analyzing the power, goodness, and providence of God. Theology asserts itself at the same time in its speculative dimension, as well as in its practical dimension (in relation to the virtues, laws, grace, and the sacraments). If the proper object of theology is in the first place identified as God as he communicates Himself in divine revelation, it is equally identified in the second place as God, the principle and end of created beings. It follows that earthly realities likewise constitute the objects of theology, as they are created by God and in permanent relation with Him. In relation to this second perspective, it seems that theology also has man as an object, since he is a creature who reflects the being of God in a specific manner. Theology will consequently study, in a completely appropriate manner, all that relates to man as a creature of God, along with his ends and the means that guide these, such as the State.

When one considers for example the relation between the Church and a non-Christian State, the ecclesiastical power is confronted with the possibility of a redefinition prejudicial to its space of exercise. Nevertheless, if one admits that the State is founded on the natural law, by its status as a moral person, it must respect the rights of the other and has the obligation to fulfill its juridical and ethical duties. The pope, as representative of the Church, embodies in himself an indirect power of the latter over the pagan State. From these remarks, it is fitting to keep in mind that for Suárez, the understanding of the relations between the State and the Church assumes that they are two entities with distinct powers, having defined objects of office. In this sense, Suárez rejects the thesis of Marsilius of Padua, which claims that the Church does not receive any power of specific jurisdiction.¹²⁷ If one refers to the notion of power according to Marsilius of Padua, it must be linked to secular principles, whereas the administration of the sacraments and the preaching of the divine Word come back exclusively to the Church. This also affirms the preponderance of the emperor over the Christian world. As Suárez reminds us,¹²⁸ Henry VIII turned the thesis of Marsilius of Padua to his advantage by affirming the totality of the emperor's power, whether it be of spiritual or temporal nature. Historically, neither Henry VIII nor James I recognized any difference between the spiritual and the temporal power, for they compelled the Parliament to grant them the spiritual power as if it were the equivalent of the temporal

127 *DF* 3.6.5–6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, pp. 232–233).

128 *Ibid.*, 3.6.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 232).

power. Suárez¹²⁹ determines that the source of this historic and juridical relation of the Church to the State is in the Protestant thesis of Luther¹³⁰ and Calvin, according to which there was no true sacrifice in the Church, and consequently no true priesthood.¹³¹ Rather, they claimed that the sacrifice was merely symbolic, and the priesthood could be attributed to all Christians. It follows as a conclusion that, once one claims there is no power of specific original jurisdiction in the Church, the jurisdictional power included in the spiritual domain cannot have any source other than the temporal power.

It seems necessary for Suárez, following the light of St. Augustine, to bring up the following corrections to this point: if the kingdom of Christ is a spiritual kingdom (“this kingdom of Christ is neither material nor temporal but spiritual and eternal”¹³²), a mystical body, perfect and unique, is “a simple kingdom spread out into the whole of the world,”¹³³ it pertains to it to govern by a spiritual power appropriate to juridical principles. Such a power subsists in the Church, due to the fact that in the theological-political perspective of Suárez, a kingdom cannot endure independently of a power that insures its historical actuality; the specificity of the Church resides likewise in the fact that it is inscribed in a permanent manner in heaven and on earth.¹³⁴

The Church and the State must be distinguished by their origin, their nature, and their internal structure. In conformity with the theses of Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto, Suárez rejects the direct power of the pope over temporal matters while affirming his indirect temporal power. The justification for the specific independence of temporal power in relation to spiritual power resides in the fact that the first—in its domain by the same right as the second—is sufficient in itself (*per se sufficiens*), the two powers having been instituted according to a distinct modality by God; and it follows from this that every sovereign power is a supreme judge in its kingdom, created by its republic in temporal affairs. The Church, for its part, was directly instituted by a divine positive law, by a founding act of Christ. With respect to the power of the State, it is not instituted by divine positive law but by the natural law, which likewise amounts to saying that the form of government rests purely on human law.¹³⁵ If the temporal power is apt to reach by itself toward the end for which

129 Ibid., 3.6.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 232).

130 Luther, *Evangelien-Auslegung*, MK 7, 31–37 (Göttingen, 1954), p. 14.

131 *DF* 3.6.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 232).

132 Ibid., 3.6.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 233).

133 Ibid., 3.6.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, pp. 234–235).

134 *De leg.*, 4.2.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 333).

135 *De Censuris* 2.1.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 23, pp. 12–13): “Quod fit, ut usus hujus potestatis propter hanc causam non possit dici simpliciter aut divinus aut de iure divino, tum quia actus,

it was instituted, namely, the temporal common good,¹³⁶ it seems logical that it possesses autonomy with respect to every other power that pertains to its excellence. Nevertheless, the subordination of ends in the order of creation that have hitherto been disclosed imposes limits on this autonomy, and it is proper to invoke in this case an indirect power ordered to a supernatural end. Given that the order of grace does not abolish the order of nature, it is clear that citizens will need to show obedience to legitimate sovereigns, even if the latter are pagans and rule over Christians. In the final analysis, Suárez explains that the independence between the two powers does not lead to a radical separation. It follows that there is a specific relation between the two: the spiritual power possesses a supremacy by virtue of its end, the celestial happiness; however, the end of the temporal power, civil happiness (an end that cannot be perfect in itself), is itself ordered to celestial happiness. It follows that every civil power, whatever it may be, must refer itself to the spiritual power that is unique to the community of Christians.

The ecclesiastical power, as a supernatural power, has been instituted according to this perspective by a founding act of Christ, who has determined the form of government¹³⁷ and willed the following: that the Church last until the end of time as the visible kingdom of God, which assumes that the Church, considered as a perfect society, is the institution of a supreme authority capable of ensuring its unity. If one considers the constitution of the State, it is, by way of difference, of a purely human right, and is determined by the members who make it up. At the same time, it sheds light on the historicity of man, his true historical existence, which is something experienced by each people and the means by which he acquires his own essence. This constitution is connected to a history of the human person, implying that each nation contends with other peoples and events in the decision it is led to take. And, according to Suárez, the difference evoked is still confirmed by the fact that States are historically multiple, while the Church is fundamentally universal.¹³⁸

in quo talis usus consistit, non est a potestate divina immediate, sed ab humana; tum quia fit arbitrio et modo humano et ab hominibus invento, ut dicitur."

136 *DF* 3.6.17 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, pp. 236–237).

137 *Ibid.*, 3.9.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 249): "Christ, by his particular institution, looked ahead (one may say) and elevated the spiritual government of the Church. First, by instituting it in the mode of one mystical body diffused throughout the whole earth in which the unity of faith and the harmony in the fundamental rite of religion is directed to the worship of God and the sanctification of men."

138 *Ibid.*, 3.5.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 228): "For the Church includes in herself different kingdoms and States which, according to this political dimension, do not have any unity among themselves. Therefore, by virtue of natural right, there does not exist in the whole

One deduces here a superiority of the Church over the State, since the latter only possesses a relative and non-absolute sovereignty. In fact, the end of the State is subject: (1) to the final end of man according to the realization of eternal happiness by means of holiness in this life, which is procured by the Church; and (2) to the objective end of the totality identified with the glory of God. It is precisely from this point that Christianity can show what it brings to a State, which historically seems self-sufficient to itself. From the eschatological perspective and from the problematic of the hierarchy of ends, the superiority of the spiritual power is deducible from the fact that the two powers spring forth from God, and in the same way they are only participants in the divine power. And, ontologically, one recognizes the thesis according to which there exists a graduation ordained to participation in being and goodness, in terms of which it is natural that a being, though ontologically deficient, through a relation to another submitted to him can himself be submitted, in the same way that it happens according to the example of the body and the soul.¹³⁹ In terms of this constant, to what extent can the Church thus recognize the autonomy of earthly republics with respect to the ultimate end, whose interests it knows it represents in history? If the State must be founded historically on the natural law, it likewise becomes legitimate to demand how this law will be recognized by the Church. It seems clear that the political order has not been assimilated into a spiritual order; it pertains to it to conserve its validity and its autonomy even though it appears that history in its political dimension is elusive to those who construct it, men apparently knowing what they want without knowing as much what they are doing.

The State is created by natural law; it is accomplished in history, which appears at first unintelligible because it presents a confused entanglement of events. Nevertheless, if history constitutes a mystery, is it really impossible for man to discern in it a general evolution or moments of a guided development?

community of the Church one supreme temporal and universal jurisdiction over the whole Church, but there are as many supreme temporal jurisdictions as there are political communities, which are not members of one reign or civil State."

139 *DF* 3.21.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, pp. 302–303): "(...) In explaining the difference between the spiritual power and the temporal power, I have sufficiently demonstrated the excellence of the second in relation to the first, and I expressed the same thing *ex professo* in my work, *De legibus*. And having assumed the difference between the two powers, hardly any doubt can be considered; for the spiritual power is a more elevated participation in the divine power, having more perfect effects, a higher end, a more noble origin; and it is of such a superior order in divinity and excellence—as the holy Fathers have demonstrated with various expressions that I have already noted in cited passages."

This creation of the State as a sovereign moral person (dependent nevertheless on other States) reveals in its plan and its necessity perspectives of the divine wisdom. That leads to recognizing that the human order, ruling its collective existence in the heart of republics and nations, is joined again to the order of God. This latter truth does not annihilate the free exercise of the human will in history, implying at the same time that political action finds its reference in providential action. This latter point should establish the idea of the unity of history and its teleological unfolding, while still guaranteeing the proposition of eschatological perfection. From an eschatological point of view, divine providence extracts the good from a bad historical account that men are not in a position to prevent or to which God, in order not to deny human freedom, does not wish to impede. Historically, the laws of States vary within limits established by the natural law, and Suárez's analysis has precisely shown that the violation of the natural law leads to a negation—for the shorter or longer term—of the State by itself, namely, the disintegration of its purely human status. The State asserts itself in a history where it accomplishes the function assigned to it by divine providence, which makes the sovereigns conform to designs that surpass them.

When one considers the question of the birth of States, one is inevitably led to examine their growth and possible annihilation, as the movement of political history confirms with the emblematic examples of Athens and the Roman Empire. This history represents a cycle of the emergence and disappearance of kingdoms, republics, and empires. If the State primitively had been the product of pure relations of force, implying at the same time a state of instability proper to the reversibility of these very relations, the transition from this precarious situation toward the stable exercise of a power resting on the legitimate authority of the natural law is the index of progress. On the one hand, the emergence of States had actually favoured their factionalization, though on the other hand, the extension of the geopolitical and anthropological horizon from the encounter with of the New World opens the way to the thesis of a global community. As the previous study on the law of nations made clear, the focus on the foundation of state unity should be on equal footing with the deepening of the theory of the *communitas orbis*, an expression of the need for a human society transcending the controvertible historical bonds among the States.

The conception of the political society as a perfect and autonomous republic, and the conception of the Church as a supra-national society encompassing the whole of Christian nations, should be accompanied by the inauguration of an international society comprising the human race. In this sense, the States,

as members of one humanity, constitute the domain of the application of the law of nations. The perspective of a universal community was in fact, as Vitoria and Suárez remind us, foreign to the peoples of antiquity, torn apart by permanent wars among nations; it is equally absent in Greek thought, which claimed the City-State as the culmination of every political form. As one considers men or States, one sees that these are historically led to understand themselves as elements of a universal human society. The latter implies the transcendence of national citizenship, and at the same time a gathering together of the human race in the unity of its destination. It concerns invoking not only the perspective of a universal society—the principal founder of the identity of nature among men as free and rational beings—but also constituting a communitarian horizon, an opening toward the future and the possible by expressing the refusal to restrict the humanity of man from his historical positivity. If one envisages the rights of people with respect to the destination of the human race, they appear naturally cosmopolitan and their realization assumes the transcendence and limitation of national sovereignties through an association in conformity with the law of nations. For anthropology and for history, the juridical significance of cosmopolitanism is not separated from its cultural and moral achievement. It is fitting to focus on what is common to nations, as opposed to emphasizing their particularities at the risk of discrediting the interhuman values of civilization.

5 Conclusion

In considering the *Defensio fidei* and the *De legibus*, the Suárezian moment is placed, it seems, into a long-standing movement in political philosophy, which integrates the ancient notion of the State and the Aristotelian definition of man as a rational animal into the concept of faith, all while maintaining the rights of the individual and preserving the Christian idea of freedom, expressed in the theory of the natural law. The united position of a sovereign State and a sovereign individual carries with it a mutual disputation over the limitations assigned to their power by the natural law. Nevertheless, the possibility of this confrontation is inscribed into the implicit recognition that the order of the universe resides in the subordination of plurality to unity; human society, in a manner analogous to the relation existing between unity and plurality, implies the assignment of one common end to a single plurality, from the fact that the latter will not be able to arrive unless social unity governs this plurality and directs it toward its specific end, namely, the historical-political fulfillment of humanity from which the mystical body, as the more expanded spiritual and

temporal *universitas*, manifests the commonwealth of the human race. For human plurality to be realized it will, consequently, need to organize itself with a regulative unity that belongs precisely to the civil law to achieve in ruling the practical order.

(English translation by Robert Fastiggi)

Suárez, Heidegger, and Contemporary Metaphysics

Jean-François Courtine

It is simply wrong to say without further ado that metaphysics is essentially limited to the knowledge of being and that it must go beyond that to reach being. Philosophy invents itself; the history of philosophy informs.

ÉTIENNE GILSON

Half a century ago, Étienne Gilson asked: “Is there anything new in the adventures of being?”¹ The question was addressed, *cum grano salis*, to Heidegger, as one is made to understand by the reply immediately given:

Is there anything new in the adventures of being? This first comes up as the importance of being comes to be rediscovered and the problem of being is revived in the thought of certain contemporary philosophers. In order to renew it, they also propose to draw close to those data that were there at the origin of things, before God had penetrated it or been introduced.

Gilson, in the appendix that accompanies the second version of *L'être et l'essence*, already evokes the ‘case of Heidegger’, who the great historian at once greets warmly as a companion along the way, but also severely criticizes:

One would like to know how to tell Martin Heidegger how many unknown companions he has on the road where he sometimes, one might say, believes himself to be alone. And perhaps also that on those lost paths of the height of philosophical thought the most shrewd forest rangers sometimes delude themselves into believing they know where they are.²

This last remark is far from being a simple caprice, as the extension of this reflection in the *Constantes philosophiques* indicates:

When one is discouraged about meditating on being, one could be put at ease by observing the case of Heidegger. For here one finds concern for

¹ J.-F. Courtine, ed., *Constantes philosophiques de l'être* (Paris, 1983), p. 201.

² *L'Être et l'Essence* (Paris, 1962²), p. 377.

protecting against God a notion of being that would not even have Him come to mind if it had not inherited that which is better suited to the theology of the Middle Ages.³

There is no need here to give an account of the Thomism of Étienne Gilson, nor to subscribe to the idea that the great historian had rather imprudently employed the phrase “the metaphysics of the Exodus”⁴ in order to note that the ‘reception’ of Heidegger in the heart of the medievalist, both in Europe and in the United States, seizes upon the essential point of the renewed interest his work has aroused in the matter of ontology. The repetition (*Wiederholung*) of the question of being—or more generally, of the sense of ‘being’, the accent placed on the verbal or participial meaning of the word ‘to be’⁵—finds an echo particularly powerful in the field of philosophical and theological studies, whether it concerns Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, or the aforesaid ‘late scholasticism’. Certainly, Heidegger is neither the first nor the only one at the beginning of the last century to restore to ontology its scholarly nobility.

Indeed, the credit should first go to Husserl for having rehabilitated ‘ontology’ in 1913, a term until then deplored, at least since Kant. This rehabilitation would play such a considerable role for the *question of being* that the resolution was accompanied by a new division—into formal ontology and local ontologies—which had not been manifested in the classical schemas of general metaphysics and special metaphysics, nor even in the *mathesis* and ontic sciences.⁶ The turning point has often been noted, especially for understanding the Husserl-Meinong debate⁷ and for characterizing what Husserl, in the

3 *Constantes philosophiques de l'être*, p. 210.

4 *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*, 2nd edition (Paris, 1948), p. 50, n. 1.

5 Cf. on the verbal sense of being, E. Levinas, “Martin Heidegger et l'ontologie” (1932), repeated in *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, 2nd edition (Paris, 1967), pp. 53–76; see also on the partial sense, P. Hadot, “L'être et l'étant dans le néoplatonisme,” in *Études néoplatoniciennes*, coll., “Langages,” La Baconnière (Neuchâtel, 1973), pp. 27–41.

6 In § 10 of the *Ideen I* (Husserliana, III, 1, Nijhoff [La Haye, 1976], pp. 27–28), Husserl tries to specify the distinction between local, material, and formal ontology; in the period of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, he makes clear, “I have not yet dared to adopt the expression of *ontology*, which has become improper for different historical reasons: I have designated their study (op. cit., 222) as a fragment of an ‘*a priori theory of the object as such*’, what Meinong gathered together under the title of *Gegenstandstheorie* (*theory of the object*). On the contrary, I now hold as more correct—while taking note of the change in the situation in our epoch—the restoration of the ancient expression of ontology.”

7 Cf. for a recent and exemplary treatment, see Jocelyn Benoist “Husserl, Meinong et la question de l'ontologie,” in *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie, Husserl et la tradition logique autrichienne* (Paris, 1997), pp. 169–196.

draft of the foreword to the revised edition of the *Logical Investigations*, named “the purely rational science of objects,”⁸ in opposition to the tradition that had identified “ontology and science *a priori* as that which is actually real (*wirklich*).” Less attention, on the other hand, is given to the ‘change of situation’ that allowed for the return of the idea of ontology.⁹ The fact that the expression of ontology could become “shocking for different historical reasons” is without doubt sufficiently explained in reference to the Kantian decision, reiterated by the Neo-Kantians, to abandon “the proud name of ontology” in order to substitute it with the greater “modesty of a simple analytic of pure understanding;”¹⁰ as for the change allowing for a restoration of honour to ‘the ancient expression’, it seems to us directly tied to the Meinongian *Gegenstandstheorie*, and in particular to the work of a student of Meinong, Hans Pichler, the author of a remarkable little work in 1910 entitled *Über Christian Wolffs Ontologie*. Pichler, in fact, rather than considering Wolff as an illustrious representative of the dogmatic ontology condemned by Kant, sees in his *Ontologia* the foreshadowing of ‘the science of objects in general’, in a decided rupture with Aristotelian metaphysics:

Ontology is not, as in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, the science of being in general (*Wissenschaft vom Seienden überhaupt*); it is more universal (*allgemeiner*). The identification of *ens* and of *ὄν*, the translation of *ens* by ‘being’ <Sein> (“l’étant” <“das Seiende”>) is not pertinent. *Ens* signifies more often in Wolff—and already in the scholastics—purely and simply a thing or object [*Ding oder Gegenstand*]. Thus, ontology is, according to the Wolffian definition: *die Wissenschaft von den Gegenständen überhaupt, ohne Rücksicht auf Sein oder Nichtsein*—the science of objects in general, independent of every consideration of being or non-being. This translation of *ens* as *Ding* or *Gegenstand* is first testified to by the *Deutsche Metaphysik* of Wolff, where *ens* is rendered quite simply as “*Ding*.” It is only with the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the expression *Gegenstand* takes the place of *Ding*.¹¹

8 Husserliana XX/1, *Logische Untersuchungen, Ergänzungsband, Erster Teil, Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI Untersuchung und zur Vorrede für die Neuauflage der Logischen Untersuchungen*, éd. Ullrich Melle (Dordrecht-Boston, 2002), p. 291.

9 Ibid.: “Now, in my *Investigations*, the idea of being resumed life again in a proper manner, without resting on any historical supports, and in this way being exempt from the obscurities and radical errors that affect ancient ontologies and which have justified the resistance which has opposed them.”

10 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 246/B 303.

11 Hans Pichler, *Über Christian Wolffs Ontologie* (Leipzig, 1910), p. 3.

The same Pichler likewise emphasized (quite justly) the importance of another occurrence of ontology—or better *ontologia*—in the first *Critique* (B 873), which considers “the system of all the concepts and principles that correspond to objects in general.”¹² He could therefore comment with this passage, in Meinongian terms:

One such consideration of objects, worthy of a theory of the object freed from existence (*die “daseinsfreie,” gegenstandstheoretische Betrachtung der Gegenstände*), comes about for ontology from its own limits; the science of all objects in general could not be the science of being there (*Dasein*), for all objects do not exist, and existence (*Dasein*) is not an essential property of all objects in general.¹³

It is assuredly in this context that a determined Heidegger, in integrating Emil Lask and Paul Natorp, begins critically approaching the problematic of ‘*es gibt*’ from 1919 on, and during the summer semester of 1923 decides to undertake a course under the title ‘ontology’. For Heidegger, as indicated already by the title of the course—‘Ontology (hermeneutic of facticity)’—ontology provides (thanks to phenomenology) a ‘problematic base more secure’ for ‘modern ontology’, understood as ‘*Gegenstandstheorie*’ [object theory], and in particular for its return to its true foundation, the hermeneutic of facticity, this term being itself understood as the designation of the ‘character of being’ and ‘our own’ being there.¹⁴ The hermeneutic of facticity is understood here as a paleonymy that Heidegger will name ‘*Fundamentalontologie*’ in *Sein und Zeit* (§ 4), and in the thousand premises of the idea, it is precisely *Fundamentalontologie* as ‘the analytic existential of being there’ that stands out as that which would be fundamental to ontology.¹⁵

If one seeks to comprehend the scope and the consequences (direct or indirect) that could result from Heidegger’s new elaboration of the question of being—within the field of medieval philosophy as well as that of *Spätscholastik* [late scholasticism]—thus rejecting by the same stroke the

12 Cf. Michel Fichant, “L’Amphibologie des concepts de la réflexion et la fin de l’ontologie,” in *Akten des X. internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, Bd. I (Berlin, 2008), pp. 71 sq.

13 Pichler, op. cit., p. 4.

14 *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, GA 63, (Klostermann, Frankfurt 1988), p. 7: “*Faktizität* ist die Bezeichnung für den Seinscharakter ‘unseres’ ‘eigenen’ *Daseins*.”

15 Levinas’s study, “L’ontologie est elle fondamentale,” published in 1951 in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, has certainly contributed here to installing a complete counter-meaning (taken up again in *Entre nous, Essais sur le penser-à-l’autre* [Paris, 1991]).

scholarly discussions in the prehistory that oppose ‘Neothomism’ and ‘Suarezianism’,¹⁶ one must apprehend the Heideggerian *Seinsfrage* [question of being] in the true context of its elaboration: one must first clarify its distinction from an agreement with the Husserlian division between formal ontology and local ontology, and also from an agreement with the complete re-acclimation of ontology in the sense of a theory of object, from beyond being and non-being. The Heideggerian *Seinsfrage*—the point has been often emphasized¹⁷—is primarily a question of the *meaning* of being, or better yet, of the meaning of ‘to be’ through the comprehension of being (*Seinsverständnis*). According to the absolutely central formulation of *Sein und Zeit*:

Far from restricting the concept of the meaning given to the signification of the “content of judgment,” we understand it as the characteristic existential phenomenon in which the formal framework of what is understandable and expressible in the explication becomes visible in general.¹⁸

And this echoes forth, in a very rigorous manner, in the following elucidation of a late seminar (the Thor):

What does the *Seinsfrage* mean now in *Being and Time*? In *Being and Time*, the question is not: what is being? But: what is the “is”?—Immediately, one falls into difficulties. In fact, if the “is” is a being! And if, on the other hand, if it is not, will it be the simple empty fact of a judgment?—It is necessary to leave behind this perplexity. From a purely grammatical point of view to be is not only a verb, it is an auxiliary. But if one moves beyond grammar, it is necessary to ask: *to be*, insofar as it is an infinitive, is it not only an abstraction derived from “is”—or could one not say “is,” if it comes before the *to be*, is open and manifest?—This is why *Being and Time* explores the question through the optic of the *sense* of to be.—Sense, *Sinn*, in *Being and Time* is a signification absolutely precise, even if today it has become insufficient. What is meant by *Sinn von Sein*

16 One can return here to the works of Fr. Pedro Descoqs (S.J.) and his *Institutiones metaphysicae generalis* (Paris, 1925), or again, in the other ‘camp’, to the works of Fr. Gallus Maria Manser, most notably, *Das Wesen des Thomismus* (1932).

17 We take the liberty here to return to our study: “La question de l’être: sens de la question et question du sens,” in *Heidegger, l’énigme de l’être* (“débats philosophiques”), coll. coordinated by Jean-François Mattéi (Paris, 2004), pp. 71–103.

18 *Sein und Zeit*, 7th edition (Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), § 33, p. 156.

(sense of being)? This involves an entry into the domain of the project (*Entwurfsbereich*) that opens out to the comprehension of being (*Seinsverständnis*) [...] *Sinn* is understood from the perspective of *Entwurf* [plan] which is explained by *Verstehen* [understanding].¹⁹

It is certainly this type of problematization, and not many unoriginal and generally impertinent analyses, that Heidegger could dedicate to Suárez, allowing him to take note of the impact of Suárez's thought, and indeed the decided role this thought could have played in the renewal of studies devoted to the second scholasticism of these last fifty years. One still must specify that this role has been, no doubt, less that of an incentive than a provocation. In fact, if it first appeared that the attention Heidegger paid to Suárez corresponds to an approach looking to reinsert him into 'the great history of philosophy' by lifting him out of the closed world of seminaries and from the vain quarrels of the School, and restoring his central role as a mediator between the medieval and classical age, or even modern philosophy up to Kant, it must also be noted that the places where this re-evaluation is made explicit no longer manifest the slightest originality. For example, on the threshold of the great treatise of 1927, or still in the summer course of the same year, he notes that:

Suárez is without doubt the thinker whose influence is exercised with full force on modern philosophy. Descartes still depends directly on him and almost constantly utilizes his terminology. It is Suárez who, for the first time, systematizes medieval philosophy and in particular ontology.²⁰

Here, Heidegger is not saying anything that we do not already know, and which has been documented much more precisely in the *Index scolastico-cartésien* of Étienne Gilson in 1913, or M. Grabmann's article, "Die *Disputationes Metaphysicae* des Franz Suárez in ihrer methodischen Eigenart und Fortwirkung," first published in Innsbruck in 1917.²¹ Heidegger does, however,

19 GA 15, *Seminare*, ed. Curt Ochwadt (Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1986), pp. 334–335.

20 GA 24, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, hrsg. F.-W. von Hermann (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), p. 112. On this point, see also the two magisterial pages of Étienne Gilson, *L'être et l'essence*, 2nd edition (Paris, 1962), pp. 144–145.

21 Taken up again in *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik* (Munich, 1926), Bd. I, pp. 525–560. The significant study of Ernst Conze, *Der Begriff der Metaphysik bei Franciscus Suarez*, appeared in Leipzig (Meiner Verlag) in 1928. The same year, Karl Eschweiler provides in his *Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft* (Erste Reihe, Bd. I, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens) his pioneering study, "Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik auf den

introduce a notable difference of appreciation, as seen in what immediately follows the passage cited above. Heidegger, in fact, pursues this by expanding considerably the purpose and thus also the scope of this Suárezian mediation:

Formerly, the Middle Ages, which included Thomas and Duns Scotus, only approached Antiquity through commentaries that followed step by step the text studied. The fundamental book of Antiquity, the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, is not a book in one piece and does not consist of a systematic plan. This is what Suárez rightly saw in seeking to remedy what he regarded as a defect and by giving to ontological problems for the first time a systematic form, which in the future went on to determine up to Hegel the division of metaphysics. From now on one will distinguish *metaphysica generalis*, general ontology, and *metaphysica specialis*, namely, *cosmologia rationalis*—the ontology of nature— *psychologia rationalis*—the ontology of the —and *psychologia rationalis*—the ontology of God. This manner of regrouping the principal philosophical disciplines continues up to the *Critique of Pure Reason*.²²

One could emphasize once again all that in itself goes into this brief characterization, or conversely, one could highlight the inexactitudes or the unusual formulations here ('general ontology', 'ontology of God').²³ This is not what interests us, though; in fact, the distinctive Heideggerian trait that stands out in this analysis, and which is destined to have a rich development, is in fact his recollection of the Suárezian move toward two major stages in the history of philosophy: 'quite simply', the *First Critique* of Kant, or the *Wissenschaft der Logik*. And still, if there is any consequence to Heidegger's reprieve of motifs that can likewise be considered scholastic, it is also because in the first paragraphs of *Sein und Zeit* (to which we will return, and in which the project of a

deutschen Universitäten des 17. Jahrhunderts," but nothing allows us to think that Heidegger had any awareness of these last studies.

22 Ibid.

23 With regard to the history of the distinction between *metaphysica generalis*-*metaphysica specialis*, we recall the pioneering article of Ernst Vollrath, "Die Gliederung der Metaphysik in eine *Metaphysica generalis* und eine *Metaphysica specialis*," in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, Bd. XVI, Heft 2, pp. 258–284. See also, by the same author, *Die These der Metaphysik, Zur Gestalt der Metaphysik bei Aristoteles, Kant und Hegel* (Wuppertal-Ratingen, 1969). But one will refer first of all to the capital work of Albert Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik ? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, Texte und Untersuchungen*, 2nd augmented edition (Leuven, 1998).

‘destruction of the history of ontology’ is elaborated), or even more in the *Kantbuch* of 1929,²⁴ Heidegger inquires into the possibility of a refoundation (*Grundlegung*) of metaphysics. The refounding of metaphysics does not correspond to some enterprise of recovery, but more to a shedding of light on the difficulty, the *Verlegenheit*, of which it consists. Such is the true sense of the title of the work *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929). To expose the problem that is itself metaphysics, from its Platonic-Aristotelian establishment, under the heading of a science ‘researched’ and left unnamed, is in fact, at least formally, to reopen the question that was largely documented and discussed by Suárez in his first *Disputatio*, on the *subjectum* and *objectum metaphysicae*.²⁵ The question of the subject, of the γένος ὑποκείμενον, and the gnoseological and noetic question of the ‘mode of knowledge’ and its method are intrinsically connected, as Heidegger does not hesitate to recall:

The other essential motif of the formulation of the scholastic concept of metaphysics concerns the mode of knowledge and the method of this. As metaphysics has as its object being in general and the supreme being, “the object who matters to all humans” (Kant); it is the science whose dignity is the most eminent, the “queen of the sciences.”²⁶

Certainly, the Heideggerian treatment is radically different from the rather masterly attempt of the Suárezian ‘recapitulation’, insofar as the emphasis is placed immediately on the ‘*grundsätzliche Verlegenheit*’ [fundamental perplexity], which is metaphysics itself. “The name of metaphysics manifests, therefore, a fundamental difficulty of philosophy itself,”²⁷ a difficulty no longer faced as such, but avoided or eluded on behalf of a ‘duplication’ left unclear in itself:

Post-Aristotelian western metaphysics—Heidegger continues—does not owe its form to the heritage and development of a supposed Aristotelian

24 No doubt one can determine a Suárezian ‘moment’ in the work of Heidegger: it coincides with the the unending enterprise of *Sein und Zeit* and continues up to 1929–1930 (*Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*). One finds in the whole Heideggerian corpus about forty references to Suárez, but the most significant references appear in volumes 23, 24, and 29–30 of the *Gesamtausgabe* (GA 23, pp. 4, 5, 69, 92, 109, 145, 209, 230; GA 24, pp. 81, 111–116, 124, 126, 132, 135–139, 144, 168, 174, 210, 328; GA 29–30, pp. 77–81).

25 Cf. Jean-François Courtine, *Suárez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris, 1990), in particular pp. 195 sq.

26 *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, GA 3, hrsg. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), p. 9.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

system but to a failure to appreciate the uncertain and ambiguous state (*Nichtverstehen der Fragwürdigkeit und Offenheit*) in which Plato and Aristotle left the main problems.²⁸

One indeed sees by this, without Heidegger explicitly pronouncing its name, in what respect the *Disputationes metaphysicae*, with its aim of systematization and recapitulation,²⁹ could constitute a truly epochal stage in its tradition, which is often forgotten and obscured. Hence, to re-establish the foundation of metaphysics—in the same sense as the *Grundlegung* [laying the foundation]—forces the undoing of this recovery, tied not only to the systemization but also to the Christianization of the inaugural enterprise, and therefore also to the removal of the ambiguity in which the inherited problems remain: the difficulty, the perplexity, or the doubt (*Verlegenheit*) that belongs intrinsically to the Platonic-Aristotelian enterprise ‘finds its source’ in the obscurity that envelops the essence of the problems and the perceptions that are raised in this treatise, i.e., τὰ μετὰ φυσικά (and here, too, Heidegger from 1929 introduces implicitly what he will name several years later the ‘onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics’). “For as much as Aristotle explains his view on this subject, one sees a curious duplication (*merkwürdige Doppelung*) appear in the determination of the first philosophy.”³⁰ This duplication is characteristic of a πρώτη φιλοσοφία [first philosophy] that appears as much as “the knowledge of being as being (ὄν ἢ ὄν),” as “the knowledge of the most eminent realm of being (τιμιώτατον γένος), from which is determined being as a whole (καθόλου).” Heidegger’s refusal of every attempt of conciliation that calls for a development and evolution of Aristotelian doctrine, a refusal legible even in his vocabulary,³¹ leads to further digging into the duplication, deepening the

28 Ibid.

29 Cf. É. Gilson, *L'être et l'essence*, op. cit., p. 148: “Suárez posses a knowledge of medieval philosophy that a specialist of our days could not help but envy.” Cf. also from the same author, *Being and some philosophers*, 2nd edition (Toronto, 1952), p. 99.

30 Ibid.

31 “Diese doppelte Charakteristik der πρώτη φιλοσοφία enthält weder zwei grundverschiedene, voneinander unabhängige Gedankengänge, noch darf die eine zugunsten der anderen abgeschwächt bzw. ausgemerzt werden, noch läßt sich gar die scheinbare Zwiespältigkeit vorschnell zu einer Einheit versöhnen,” *KPM*, op. cit., pp. 7 sq. The formulations here return not so much to scholastic phrasings but to the contemporary debates of Natorp and W. Jaeger. On the emergence of the motif of the ‘collapse’ and the onto-theological ‘constitution’ of metaphysics, we take the liberty to refer again to our work: *Inventio analogiae, Métaphysique et onthéologie* (Paris, 2005), in particular chapters I and II.

Zwiespältigkeit [schism]. It also first names what Heidegger, since the summer course of 1927, calls the ‘ontological difference’, in the move toward a joint relation more original and more inwardly explored of being and time. What the first two paragraphs of the *Kantbuch* expressly formulate when taking a position on the ‘traditional concept of metaphysics’ was already present in *Sein und Zeit*: not only in virtue of the first thesis according to which “the central problem of all ontology is rooted in the phenomena of time correctly grasped and explained,”³² but also, and above all, through the idea of an *uprooted* Greek ontology, which, as a consequence, must begin by finding again the ‘soil’ that during the Middle Ages became a hardened doctrine (*diese entwurzelte griechische Ontologie wird im Mittelalter zum festen Lehrbestand*). Thus, one understands why the *Disputationes metaphysicae* of Suárez, mentioned a few lines below,³³ could figure as a major obstacle for an effort to restore the foundation of metaphysics; it is a matter of truly taking into account the *Zwiespältigkeit* [the schism], or of guarding against all attempts to simplify conveniently the duplication by permanently establishing an artificial unity, which is the same one that tradition will name, after Thomas Aquinas, *analogia entis*, or the analogical unity of the concept of being.³⁴

Beyond the formal references that appear in a few of Heidegger’s courses published later on, in order to understand the impact of his thought on Suárezian studies,³⁵ one must emphasize the stake of the first phrase of his

32 *Sein und Zeit*, p. 18 (we cite the pagination unchanged from the 7th edition, 1963): “...daß im rechtgesehenen und rechtexplizierten Phänomen der Zeit die zentrale Problematik aller Ontologie verwurzelt ist.”

33 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

34 Cf. J.-F. Courtine, *Inventio analogiae*, pp. 291–357.

35 We mention here, without pretending to be exhaustive, the following works: Hans Seigfried, *Wahrheit und Metaphysik bei Suárez* (Bonn, 1967); John P. Doyle, “Suarezian and Thomistic Metaphysics before the Judgment of Heidegger” (1972), reprinted in the invaluable collection, J.P. Doyle, *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548–1617)*, ed. Victor M. Salas (Leuven, 2010), pp. 89–107; John D. Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics* (NY, NY, 1982); Rolf Schönberger, *Die Transformation des klassischen Seinsverständnisses, Studien zur Vorgeschichte des neuzeitlichen Seinsbegriffs im Mittelalter* (Berlin, 1986); Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens, Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus—Suárez—Wolff—Kant—Peirce)*; or again, by the same author, “Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansätze und Folgen der Wiederbegründung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert,” in *Philosophie im Mittelalter, Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen*, ed. Jan. P. Beckmann, Ludger Honnefelder, Gangolf Schrimpf and Georg Wieland (Hamburg, 1987), pp. 165–186. We note, finally, the following, in order to consider recent contributions that respond directly to the Heidegerian ‘provocations’: Olivier

work of 1927, which came forth like a lightening bolt: “The question of being today has fallen into oblivion [...]” What is meant by ‘fallen into oblivion’? It appeared so quickly through a sort of ‘fall’, and what was at stake was not simply a negligence or lack of attention, as when I realize I forgot something like my umbrella at the dressing table! The *Vergessenheit* [forgetfulness] in question—naturally still unspecified in this initial phrase of the first paragraph of the ‘treatise’ (*Abhandlung*)—will be at the centre of Heidegger’s thought, as the current already visible in *Sein und Zeit*.³⁶ The concern, therefore, in the work of 1927 was to revive the γιγαντομαχία περί τῆς οὐσίας. The question of being, which inspired Plato and Aristotle, dies out with them, or at least, as Heidegger contends, it dies as an ‘explicit theme of true research!’ If this question was apparently sustained, it was through ‘deviations and alterations’ (*Verschiebungen*, ‘Übermalungen’):

This uprooted Greek ontology became fixed in the teaching of the Middle Ages. Its system is altogether different than a piece of a structure providentially seized. Within the bounds of a dogmatic assumption of the fundamental Greek conceptions of being lies much untapped work to be done within this system. In the scholastic mold, Greek ontology essentially is by way of the *Disputations* of Suárez for metaphysics and the transcendental philosophy of modern times is by way of and most decidedly in the foundations and goals of Hegel’s *Logik*.³⁷

Boulnois, “Heidegger, l’ontothéologie et les structures médiévales de la métaphysique,” in *Quaestio 1, Heidegger e i medievali* (Turnhout, 2001), pp. 379–406; Costantino Esposito, “Heidegger, Suárez e la storia dell’ontologia,” *ibid.*, pp. 407–430; Pasquale Porro, “Heidegger, la filosofia medievale, la medievistica contemporanea,” *ibid.*, pp. 431–461. We note in the same number the invaluable bibliography, “Heidegger e i medievali. Una bibliografia,” assembled by Annalisa Caputo and Costantino Esposito. This could be completed today by the following studies: Marco Forlivesi, “Impure Ontology. The Nature of Metaphysics and Its Object in Francisco Suárez’s Texts,” in *Quaestio 5* (Turnhout, 2005), pp. 559–586; Costantino Esposito, “Le ‘Disputationes Metaphysicae’ nella critica contemporanea,” in Francisco Suárez, *Disputationi metafisiche*, ed. C. Esposito (Bompiani, 2007), pp. 747–853; finally, we note the collection edited by Marco Sgarbi, *Francisco Suárez and his Legacy: The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy* (Milan, 2010).

36 Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, § 44.

37 *Sein und Zeit*, § 6: “Die Aufgabe einer Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie,” p. 22 (Diese entwurzelte griechische Ontologie wird im Mittelalter zum festen Lehrbestand. Ihre Systematik ist alles andere denn eine Zusammenfügung überkommenden Stücke zu einem Bau. Innerhalb der Grenzen einer dogmatischen Übernahme der griechischen

Greek ontology deprived of its 'roots'—'outside its soil' (*Bodenlosigkeit*)—came, therefore, to the Middle Ages as a body of fixed and consistent doctrine (*fester Lehrbestand*), by means of the reception of Latin Aristotelianism (via Avicenna and then Averroes), through vague successions of translation and then through the great commentaries: Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, or Duns Scotus, to cite only the great ones.³⁸ The uprooting and the obsessing that accompanies it are surely due, in the eyes of Heidegger, to the inscription of this *gigantomachia* [titanic struggle] into the Latin and Christian horizon (the impasse, moreover, having been established by the Syriac and Arab mediation), even if—and the point is all but secondary—the thinker from Freiburg furthermore stresses the affinity at least of Christianity to this Platonic-Aristotelian institution of metaphysics.³⁹ Without doubt, in this regard one can hear in Heidegger the echo of a powerful Nietzschean motif.

Carrying therefore his attention as an enterprise of deconstruction, or as the construction of a history of ontology—in view of emphasizing the landslides, replacements, and recoveries (*Verschiebungen, Übermalungen*) that characterize this history linked to the 'concept of being'⁴⁰—it is entirely natural in a sense that Heidegger should be guided by the Suárezian systematization, while at the same time he pretends to discuss, for example, Thomistic theses. This strategy is particularly striking in the course of 1927, where he examines what he names nothing other than 'the thesis of medieval ontology' in order to take hold of and retrace it to its Aristotelian origin.

What does this thesis consist of? In what context does it appear? The thesis pertains to the ontological constitution of being that is divided between the quiddity (essence), or in Heidegger's terminology '*Wassein*', and the *existentia*, apprehended here as *Vorhandenheit*, the latter entailing right away a

Grundauffassungen des Seins liegt in dieser Systematik noch viel ungehobene weiterführende Arbeit. In der *scholastischen* Prägung geht die griechische Ontologie im wesentlichen auf dem Wege über die Disputationes metaphysicae des Suarez in die 'Metaphysik' und Transzendentalphilosophie der Neuzeit über und bestimmt noch die Fundamente und Ziele der 'Logik' Hegels).

38 One finds the same analysis in F.-W. von Herrmann, ed., *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA 24 (Frankfurt, 1975), p. 112.

39 Cf. Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, GA 10, ed. Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt, 1997), pp. 107–108.

40 It is very significant that, from paragraph one of *Sein und Zeit*, which puts in focus several 'prejudices' (*Vorurteile*) that from the start bar the way to the renewed question in the quest for the 'meaning of being', Heidegger translates again, without explanation, the Aristotelian formula τὸ ὄν ἐστὶ καθόλου μάλιστα πάντων by the words "Das 'Sein' ist der 'allgemeinste' Begriff," as if the passage of *Sein*, *esse* to *conceptus entis* could itself go into the tradition that he means to critique.

depreciative value: it is given as subsisting present, there before, offering a purely theoretical consideration.

What is the context? It is the phenomenological discussion of “some traditional theses on being.”⁴¹ Phenomenology has in fact been determined as the ‘science of being’, where being is presented as ‘the unique and true theme of philosophy’. We recall that the course of the summer semester of 1927 directly followed two preceding ‘Lessons’ devoted to *The Fundamental Concepts of Ancient Philosophy* (GA 22) and *The History of Philosophy from Thomas Aquinas to Kant* (GA 23), respectively. The larger context of the Heideggerian mediation is even more apparent in the *Natorpbericht* of 1922,⁴² whose program was that of a ‘concrete interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy’, which seeks to question ‘the meaning and the destiny of Western logic and ontology’. No doubt the winter course of 1926–1927, *The History of Philosophy from Thomas Aquinas to Kant*, while it goes back to Suárez eight times (GA 23, pp. 4, 5, 69, 92, 109, 145, 209, 230), still does not assign to him any particular position. The route assumed by this history passes over the aforesaid late scholasticism and, after having treated Thomas Aquinas in the first section, considers Descartes, then Spinoza, Leibniz, and finally Wolff and his school. However, one remarkable passage from this course that has significance for the question we are considering here is the development devoted to the ‘*Gott-losigkeit der Philosophie*’ [the Godlessness of philosophy], a thematic already present in the Natorp report. After having indicated that philosophy is, as such, fundamentally ‘atheist’, Heidegger explains:

Atheist, not in the sense of some theory, such as materialism. Every philosophy whatsoever understands itself in terms of what it should necessarily know—and this precisely when it still has some “premonition” of God—such that the withdrawal by which it redirects life back to itself is, in religious terms, a way of declaring itself against God. But only by this does it remain loyal before God, namely to the height of the only possibility toward which it inclines; atheist, therefore, signifies this: delivered from every preoccupation and temptation of simply speaking religiously. [...].⁴³

41 One will find this motif again much later in *Kants These über das Sein*, in *Wegmarken*, GA 9, pp. 445 sq.

42 Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, Ausarbeitung für die Marburger und die Göttinger Philosophische Fakultät (1922)*, ed. Günther Neumann and Philipp Reclam (Stuttgart, 2003).

43 GA 62, p. 363.

In the course of 1926–1927, Heidegger returns to this *Gott-losigkeit* proper to the philosopher:

Strictly speaking, nothing can be established concerning the eternity of God because God can never be an object of philosophy. Everything that is discovered by the aid of the concept of God is an idol, which, philosophically, can only have this one meaning: to render visible what is the idea of the *summum ens* and the principal idea of being in general [...]. If there is a God, there is nothing left to discover of him by philosophy. He is not susceptible to being disclosed except insofar as he reveals himself. To give ear to revelation is something for which philosophy lacks any type of organ. Philosophy is godless; this does not mean there is no God, but it cannot any more affirm that there is a God.

This methodological atheism constitutes without doubt an essential element in the Heideggerian system and its critical and radical reading of the history of metaphysics: such an atheism retains the possibility of a discourse about God and a relation to the divine, and, in the case of Christianity, of the revelation transmitted by Scripture—something naturally closer to the Lutheran determination of *theologia* as *grammatica sacrae scripturae* than the view of theology as science elaborated in the thirteenth century. One can see in the claim of this *Gott-losigkeit* the principle of emphasising metaphysics as ontology, and on the other hand, of the critical updating of a constitutive structure of metaphysics in its Platonic-Aristotelian institution, namely, the onto-theo-logy, or -logic.

In the summer course of 1927, which I follow here from the first series guide, Heidegger specifies his interrogation, in reference to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z 1, the celebrated final section on the continuously researched question, which always leaves us in difficulty and puzzlement:

To suppose that philosophy is the science of being, then the first and ultimate question, the fundamental question of philosophy, is the following: what is meant by being? Proceeding from this, is something like being in general intelligible? How is the comprehension of being in general possible?

Undoubtably, this involves a very heavy *presupposition* with respect to philosophy in its history, which does not boil down to this fundamental question, this being rather fixed within certain boundaries, if not ‘localized’.⁴⁴ One

44 I refer immediately here to the luminous pages of Alain de Libera in “La philosophie médiévale,” in *Que sais-je?*, 2nd edition (Paris, 1992), pp. 69 sq.

understands also why, from this supposition, Heidegger would choose a privileged sequence: Scotus, Thomas, Suárez, and Kant. In this path, in support of considerations central to our purpose, Heidegger, in his course of 1929–1930 dedicated to the *fundamental concepts of metaphysics*,⁴⁵ examines in succession four ontological theses: (1) the Kantian thesis, elaborated in the framework of a critique of the ontological argument, namely, that being is not a real predicate, i.e., one that would concern real content, the ‘*realitias*’ that it has affirmed⁴⁶; (2) the thesis of medieval ontology; (3) the thesis of modern ontology, which essentially means here Cartesian ontology, according to which “the fundamental modalities of being are the *res extensa* and the *res cogitans*,” and finally, (4) the thesis of logic (illustrated here by Hobbes), according to which every being is left to reach across the ‘is’, i.e., being in the sense of a synthesis of judgment. He considers the four different theses thoroughly, but the ‘source system’ to the meaning that belongs to all four for the same general regimen of questioning—without ever arriving at the *Fundamentalfrage*—is that of the ‘meaning of being in general’. One will not see a simple universalist recovery of this most general question, which characterized *Sein und Zeit* from the first paragraph. In fact, if the question of being should be ‘repeated’ or ‘thrown back’ just the same as the *gigantomachia*, this is precisely because it has always been struck by three presumptions: (1) being is ‘the most general’ concept, following a double reference to Aristotle (*Metaph.* 3.4.1001a21) and Thomas Aquinas (*ST* I–II, q. 94, a. 2: *Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cujus intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit.*), a thesis that, in a sense, Heidegger takes hold of to delineate when he affirms, for his part, that the comprehension of being (the *Seinsverständnis*) belongs to being as a denomination of a fundamental trait (the ‘existentials’) or that comprehending is at first accorded to being, to which it corresponds (*Gehörigkeit, Zusammengehörigkeit*); (2) the concept of being is indefinable; (3) the concept of being is an ‘evident’ concept, taken at first as understandable in itself (*selbstverständlich*). One will note that when Heidegger formulates, very briefly, these three presumptions in this introductory paragraph, he himself resolutely introduces the concept of being (*conceptus entis*), the same as for Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.

45 I take the liberty of referring to my study, “Heidegger et Thomas d’Aquin,” in *Quaestio* 1, op. cit., pp. 213–233.

46 One understands why such a thesis could be reconciled with the Thomistic doctrine (*De ente et essentia*) of the accidentality being had with respect to the reality of essence. Cf. Pierre Aubenque, “La thèse de Kant sur l’être et ses origines aristotéliennes,” in *Problèmes aristotéliens* (Paris, 2009), pp. 351–372.

In fact, the critical discussion of the four theses of metaphysics seeks to show that these are never envisaged as “*Fundamentalfrage* of the whole science of being—the question of the meaning of being in general.” What Heidegger here names *Fundamentalfrage* will be thematized a little later (in 1935, in the *Einführung in die Metaphysik* [Introduction to Metaphysics]) under the title *Grundfrage* [foundational question], distinguished from *Leitfrage* [leading question]. One sees clearly how this ‘fundamental question’ supports itself—this having been done in order to go beyond the question of Brentano in his dissertation of 1862, which shows multiple meanings of being according to Aristotle—and how this question also does not cease to cut across the problematic of the *analogia entis*.⁴⁷

It is with regard to the discussion of the second thesis (that of medieval ontology)—to which Heidegger gives the title ‘the articulation of being’ (*Gliederung des Seins*) in his account of the ‘ontological difference’⁴⁸—that he proposes the more agile and developed reading of the *Disputatio XXX: De essentia entis finiti ut tale est, et de illius esse, eorumque distinctione*. It is not a question here of commenting in detail on the long commentary that Heidegger dedicates to the Suárezian analysis of the distinction (real, modal, or formal reason) between essence and existence.⁴⁹ We will confine ourselves to showing some typical traits of the commentary. A first, highly significant element deserves to be revealed: the analysis of the critical discussion of sections one to six of this *Disputatio* are framed in one part by the examination of the Kantian thesis that ‘being is not a real predicate’, and in another part by a return to Aristotle, or Greek philosophy in general, intended to show what is the imprint of the paradigm of *Herstellung* in the elaboration of fundamental ontological concepts (μορφή, εἶδος, τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι, ὕλη, ἔργον, ἐνέργεια...).

In the pages expressly devoted to the question of the ‘real’ distinction of essence and existence, one can again bring forth several notable traits: while Heidegger announces that he will examine this central question in Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Suárez, it is very clearly the Suárezian exposition that he takes as the true leading thread. There are several significant indications of this: while Heidegger quite justly notes that this distinction is proposed by Aquinas in *De ente et essentia* (p. 117), no reference is made to this treatise, and the entire construction of the problematic of the aforesaid

47 Cf. J.-F. Courtine, “La critique heideggérienne de l’*analogia entis*,” in *Les catégories de l’être, Études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale* (Paris, 2003), pp. 213–240.

48 *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA 24, pp. 109–110.

49 To highlight for confrontation, one will refer to the very rich chapter, “Essence and Existence,” in *Being and Some philosophers*, pp. 74–107, and in particular pp. 96–107.

distinctio realis is borrowed from the recollection of the principal distinction between the formal concept and the objective concept, between being taken as a verb and being taken as a noun (*ens participaliter sumptum, ens nominaliter sumptum*), as well as from the equivalence between being taken nominally (*ens: id quod sit habens essentiam realem*) and as a *res*. One will admit that this ‘focusing’, entirely controlled in other respects by the idea of the *conceptus entis* (117–124), is assuredly not the most adequate for doing justice to the Thomistic doctrine that never envisages *essentia* and *existentia* as two ‘*res*’, and which quite soon opposes essence and existence taken as *actus essendi*. One will likewise notice that in several direct references to Thomas Aquinas (four in all),⁵⁰ Heidegger rewrites *esse* as *existere*, for example in *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, XII, q. 5, a. 5: “*Accidens dicitur large omne quod non est pars essentiae; et sic est esse [sc. existere] in rebus creatis.*” All this happens here as if Heidegger were reconstructing the Thomistic reflection to the standard of the problematization of Giles of Rome or of Capreolus, cited a little farther down.⁵¹ In the same way, the account of the Scotist thesis is reduced to its most simple expression from a single reference, taken from the *Reportata Parisiensia*,⁵² though it is true to say that it is from the Suárezian account (XXXI, 2, 11) that the Scotist position is formulated:

Secunda sententia est, esse creatum distingui quidem ex natura rei, seu (ut alii loquuntur) formaliter, ab essentia cuius est esse, et non esse propriam entitatem omnino realiter distinctam ab entitate essentiae, sed modum ejus).

Heidegger, who in other places is often attentive to the tendency of terminological slips and/or translations,⁵³ here shows no concern about the presuppositions and stakes of the Suárezian reformulation, whether it concerns Thomas, Duns Scotus, or Henry of Ghent. This is particularly the case with the

50 *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* II, q. 2, a. 3 and XII, q. 5, a. 5; *ST I*, q. 3, a. 5, and finally *De veritate*, q. 27, a. 1.

51 *In Sent.*, II, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 1: “Esse nihil aliud quem quaedam actualitas impressa omnibus entibus ab ipso Deo vel a primo ente. Nulla enim essentia creaturae est tantae actualitatis, quod possit actu existere, nisi ei imprimatur actualitas quaedam a primo ente.” Capreolus, *In Sent.* I, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 1 (quinta conclusio): “Esse actualis existentiae non est res proprie loquendo [...] non est proprie ens, secundum quod ens significat actum essendi, cum non sit quod existit. [...] Dicitur tamen <existentiae> entis, vel rei.”

52 *Reportata Parisiensia* I, dist. 45, q. 2, schol. 1.

53 He will do this again at the end of this part of the course, which traces the ‘medieval thesis’ to its Aristotelian foundation.

distinction *esse essentiae*, *esse existere*, or with the concepts *esse in actu exercito*, *actualis existentiam*. All this happens, then, as if the ‘medieval thesis of ontology’ was entirely reconstructed by the terminology of Cajetan and Suárez, completely the same as in the Habilitation thesis, where the Scotist doctrine was reread in light of Rickert and Emil Lask. It continues that the reading proposed here of the Suárezian distinction, as *distinctio rationis*, at once removed from agreement with the Scotist *distinctio formalis* and “corresponding deep down with it,”⁵⁴ is particularly attentive to the argumentation of the *Doctor eximius* and gives it the most agreeable references. Heidegger thus omits the beginning of the following paragraph, which is evidently not without consequence for the context of the problematization:

Haec opinio tertia sic explicanda est, ut comparatio fit inter actualem existentiam, quam vocant esse in actu exercito, et actualem essentiam existentem...

Nevertheless, he follows faithfully with:

Essentia et existentia non distinguuntur *in re ipsa* [Heidegger emphasizes], licet essentia, abstracte et praecise concepta, ut est in potentia, distinguatur ab existentia actuali, tanquam non ens ab ente. Et hanc sententiam sic explicatam existimo esse omnino veram. Ejusque fundamentum breviter est, quia non potest res aliqua intrinsece ac formaliter constitui in ratione entis realis et actualis, per aliud distinctum ab ipsa, quia, hoc ipso quod distinguitur unum ab alio, tanquam ens ab ente, utrumque habet quod sit ens, ut condistinctum ab alio, et consequenter non per illud formaliter et intrinsece.

Thanks to this chapter’s double framework (Kant and Aristotle), one of the indisputable interests of these paragraphs directly and faithfully refers to the arguments of Suárez, by which Heidegger himself defines his position by agreement with Thomas and his commentators on the one side, and with Duns Scotus and the Scotists on the other, holding also to the restoration of Suárezian concepts in the Kantian and phenomenological lexicon (*Sachheit*, *Sachgehalt*, *Vorhandenheit*, *Wirklichkeit*, *Herstellung*).

This course of 1927, known only from a late publication in the framework of the *Gesamtausgabe* in 1975, almost assumes the figure of a *hapax* [once-used term] in the Heideggerian corpus, and from this it is not clear whether a

54 GA 24, p. 132.

relative pertinence is reflected by this contribution's title: "Heidegger-Suárez and contemporary metaphysics." By way of conclusion, let us reiterate that the eminent role that has been played over the last fifty years by the thinker of Freiburg—contributing to the study of the history of metaphysics, to the history of ontology, and to the meanings of being or the vocabulary of being—is twofold: on the one hand (without doubt the most important) he holds an important role in the recovery of the *gigantomachia peri tês ousias*, the project of a refoundation and then a passing beyond metaphysics—considered on a grand scale and in all its history, in a rupture determined as well by the gnoseological and epistemological orientation of philosophy, whether in the case of Neo-Kantianism or the Vienna Circle, whether by debates properly scholastic, confessional, or those of opposing doctrinal traditions of the different religious orders. On the other hand, he is also important, above all, due to his extraordinary effort of *provocation*, represented by the thesis of the forgetting of being, of the *onto-theo-logical* constitution of metaphysics, or of ontological difference. It is assuredly in the domain of medieval philosophy, and quite beyond Thomism, that he sets himself to the task of testing the power and the endurance of this frame of reading, whose harm is clearly assumed. The question here does not concern knowing whether different responses to these 'provocations' apply justly or not to the most secret Heideggerian purpose. What does, however, seem significantly incontestable is that a large part of the work of Heidegger was, in all events, nourished by research and discussions on a number of important historians of medieval philosophy, late scholastic in particular, which had never been done previously by any great thinker, including Hegel.

(English translation by Robert Fastiggi)

Suárez on the Subject of Metaphysics

Rolf Darge

1 Introduction

In order to attain a deep understanding of both the inner cohesion of the *Disputationes metaphysicae* and its position within the history of metaphysics, it is of crucial importance to determine what constitutes the common subject with which these investigations are concerned. Operating in the background here is the Aristotelian doctrine of ‘science’, to which Suárez accords systematic importance in his metaphysical inquiry.¹ ‘Subject’ here does not mean—as in the modern linguistic usage—the bearer of knowledge, the cognizant subject, but a fundamental part of what the cognizant subject, by its knowledge, is directed to. That which is actually known, according to Suárez, is a proposition—logically concluded from premises, which are recognized as being true—in which a property (predicate) is necessarily attributed to a subject.² In this context, the terms ‘subject’ and ‘property’ have, aside from their grammatical and logical signification, an ontological sense. The properties are considered ontological attributes, which necessarily inhere in the subject insofar as the substance is a substrate of an essential form—thus representative of a genus—so that these attributes may be inferred from its essential structure as its immediate and necessary consequences.³ Accordingly, a unitary science deals with objects of one genus; the subject as ‘genus-subiectum’ is the primary subject matter of a science that underlies all its propositions,⁴ which founds its unity and its distinction from other sciences. For this reason, it must primarily

1 Francisco Suárez, *DM, Opera Omnia* vols. 25 and 26, ed. Ludovicus Vivès (Paris 1856–1861); *DM* 1.Prol. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 2): “...primum omnium inquirendum nobis est huius doctrinae obiectum, seu subiectum.”

2 See Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.7.75a 39–b1, ed. William D. Ross (Oxford, 1964); *ibid.*, 1.10.76b11–16, and *Metaphysics* 3.2.997a 19–21, ed. William D. Ross (Oxford, 1958).

3 *DM* 1.1.28 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 11): “...illud est subiectum scientiae, de quo proprietates communiores in scientia immediate et per se demonstrantur.”

4 Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora*, 1.2.87a38. As for the origin of the term ‘genus subiectum’, see *Analytica Posteriora* 1.7.75a42: “τὸ γένος τὸ hypokeímenon;” lat.: “genus subiectum”: *Aristoteles latinus*, IV, 1–4, *Analytica Posteriora*, recensio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, eds. Laurentius Minio-Paluello and Bernardus G. Dod (Paris, 1968), p. 293, 75b1; also *Analytica Posteriora* 1.9.76a12.

be determined, in the course of the systematic foundation of a science, to which subject or adequate object of this science it refers. Suárez, therefore, in the first disputation, which is “about the nature of the First Philosophy or metaphysics” at first, seeks to ascertain “what the (adequate) object of metaphysics is.”⁵

In its determination, Suárez applies the commonly used formula “being insofar as it is being,”⁶ and thus adopts the traditional ontological concept of metaphysics, which scholastic authors contrast with the theological concept of metaphysics. This theological understanding was inherited from Greek Antiquity and prevailed in the Latin west until the twelfth century.⁷ Both conceptions are derived from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. In the sixth book, Aristotle calls the First Philosophy ‘Theology’, and assigns the divine as its subject.⁸ According to the fourth book, however, the First Philosophy is considered a universal science concerning being as being.⁹ In the course of the Aristotelian-reception, this ‘ontological’ explanation was preferentially adopted at the newly established universities in the thirteenth century, particularly at the University of Paris. Within a university setting, the possibility and need for Christian revelation, as well as a theology founded thereupon, needed to be justified, but within an Aristotelian framework of sciences a place also had to be created where Christian theology could be established. This place, however, could not be ensured by means of that very discipline that had itself yet to be legitimized. Rather, it could only be secured in such a way that First Philosophy—a well-established theory of the highest causes by its own philosophical means—breaks away from its traditional claim of being the exclusive science of the Divine. In the writings of Aristotle and of his Arabic commentator, Avicenna, the Latin authors found the philosophical and methodological

5 *DM* 1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 1): “De natura primae philosophiae seu metaphysicae;” *DM* 1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 2): “Quod sit metaphysice obiectum.”

6 *DM* 1.3.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 22): “...definiri potest metaphysicam esse scientiam, quae ens in quantum ens [...] contemplatur;” *DM* 1.5.38 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 48): “...loquendo igitur de subiecto huius scientiae secundum abstractissimam rationem eius [...] ut est ens in quantum ens.” *DM* 1.1.26 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 11): “Dicendum est [...] ens in quantum ens reale esse obiectum adaequatum huius scientiae.”

7 See *DM* 1.1.26 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 11). For the medieval discussion on the subject of metaphysics, see Albert Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen* (1965; 2nd rev. edn. Leuven, 1998); Ludger Honnefelder, “Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik,” in *Philosophie im Mittelalter*, eds. Jan Beckmann et al. (Hamburg, 1987), pp. 165–86.

8 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 6.1.1026a 15–32.

9 *Ibid.*, 4.1.1003a 20–26.

means necessary for such a redefinition of the universe of metaphysical discourse. Avicenna strictly applied the doctrine of the *Posterior Analytics* to the Aristotelian writings on the First Philosophy, and came to the conclusion that not the Divine, but only—as Aristotle declares in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*—being as being can be the subject of this science. Following Avicenna's approach, many Medieval Latin authors transformed the First Philosophy into the universal science of being as such. However, they explain the meaning of 'being as being' in a different way, thereby arriving at different ontological conceptions of metaphysics. During the course of the late medieval formation of philosophical schools (Thomistic, Scotist, and Ockhamist), designs of a theory concerning being as being increasingly competed with and set boundaries against each other.¹⁰ Yet, despite the differences in their ontological approaches, they share the common traditional view that First Philosophy is a 'real science' (*scientia realis*), referring to things (*res*) that actually exist, or can exist, independently from our mind.¹¹ First philosophy thus differs from logic, which, as *scientia rationalis*, also has a universal extension, but the proper object of logic does not exist independently from our mind.

There is debate about whether Suárez keeps to this traditional doctrine of real being. Many scholars hold that, for Suárez, the subject of metaphysics is not 'real' but 'objective being', in the sense of an inner-mental-objective structure. Accordingly, First Philosophy is subjected to a rationalization and subjectivization, which bridges the gap between the logical and the ontological approaches. Against this view, following a closer examination of the ontological status that Suárez assigns to the so-called 'objective concept of being' (*conceptus objectivus entis*), Jorge Gracia has argued in favour of a 'realistic' conception of metaphysics in Suárez.¹² The 'onto-logical' interpretation of Suárezian metaphysical thought, however, has also continued without further perturbation. According to its recent exponents,¹³ Suárez, when defining the

10 See Maarten Hoenen, ed., *Philosophy and Learning: Universities in the Middle Ages* (Leiden, 1995).

11 In recent research, it has become a topic of discussion whether or not Scotus considers metaphysics as a *scientia realis*. On this topic, see Rolf Darge, "Erste Philosophie als Transzendentalwissenschaft gemäß Duns Scotus: Seinswissenschaft oder 'Onto-Logik'?" *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 111 (2004): 43–61.

12 Jorge Gracia, "Suárez's Conception of Metaphysics: A Step in the Direction of Mentalism?" *The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65 (1991): 287–309; idem, "Suárez and Metaphysical Mentalism," *The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (1993): 349–354.

13 See Jean-François Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris, 1990), esp. pp. 185–187, 255, 264–268, 286–291, 319–321, 380; Victor Sanz, "La reducción suareciana de los

subject of metaphysics, uses in an extremely broad sense (*communissime*) the terms 'being' (*ens*) and 'thing' (*res*), in accordance with a thought pattern delivered by Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus. For these two medieval philosophers, the terms signify the 'not-absolutely-nothing' of what can be thought without contradiction (*cogitabile*), and thereby extend to mere thought-things as negations and conceptual relations. Following this interpretation, it has to be assumed that Suárez includes in the subject of metaphysics both real beings and thought-things. With such a view, Suárezian metaphysics turns out to be theory of the 'super-transcendental' objectivity, concerning that which is logically possible (*possibile logicum*), thinkable without contradiction (*cogitabile*), or the ontologically undetermined anything at all (*aliquid*, $\tau\iota$). The guiding interest of this interpretation is directed towards the confirmation of a specific scheme of the development of metaphysics from the late middle ages to modernity. According to this scheme—inspired by Heidegger, but outlined first by Gilson in his famous study of the history of the question of being—a line of development of metaphysical thought may be drawn from Scotus to Suárez, then from Suárez to the seventeenth-century school of metaphysics, and from this to Leibniz, Wolff, and finally, to Kant. This development may be characterized as a way of rationalization, subjectivication, and epistemological reorientation of metaphysical thought. It leads to a destruction or overcoming ('sublation') of metaphysics, understood as a doctrine of being. At the road's end stands modern ontology as a mere 'Onto-Logic', which prepares the reversal of Kant's transcendentalism.¹⁴ According to J.F. Courtine and other leading advocates of this view, Suárez, in this process, brings about the decisive

trascendentes," *Anuario Filosófico* 25 (1992): 403–420; Franco Volpi, "Suarez et le problème de la métaphysique," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 3 (1993): 395–411, esp. p. 410; John P. Doyle, "Between Transcendental and Transcendental: The missing Link?" *The Review of Metaphysics* 50 (1997): 783–815; Olivier Boulnois, *Être et représentation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (XIIIe–XIVe siècle)* (Paris, 1999), esp. pp. 480–486; Jean-Paul Coujou, "Introduction," in *Suárez et la refondation de la métaphysique comme ontologie. Étude et traduction de l'index détaillé de la Métaphysique d'Aristote de F. Suárez*, pp. *1–67; Costantino Esposito, "Introduzione," in Francisco Suárez, *Disputationi Metafisiche I–III*, intro., trans., and notes Costantino Esposito (Milano, 2007), pp. 7–28, esp. pp. 12–15.

- 14 Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique*, pp. 405–495, 521–538; 537: "...la métaphysique moderne n'est point ontologie, mais bien tino-logie, science générale (Leibniz) du *cogitabile*, de la chose au sens de 'quelque chose';" Boulnois, *Être et représentation*, p. 513: "...la métaphysique n'atteint au statut de science qu'en abandonnant son objet premier, l'être. La métaphysique ne devient ontologie qu'en devenant *tinologie*—science de *l'aliquid*, de ce qui est comme de ce qui n'est pas."

turn ('le tournant suarézien') by releasing the subject of metaphysics from any ontological orientation, and directing it instead towards an extra-mental existence by reducing it to the mere thinkable.¹⁵

Be that as it may, it is noteworthy that at the beginning of his explanation of the *ratio entis*, Suárez himself assures that the sense and spirit of the Aristotelian doctrine concerning being will be preserved.¹⁶ This assertion corresponds to the general purpose of the *Disputationes*, which is intended not only as a systematic textbook but also as a philosophical commentary on the *Metaphysics*. The *Disputationes metaphysicae* arrange and expose Aristotelian thought in accordance with the objective order. In order to reveal this connection and to make it verifiable, Suárez prepends a copious *Index locupletissimus in metaphysicam Aristotelis*,¹⁷ which summarizes the content of every book of the *Metaphysics*, analyses its key questions, and indicates where the issue under discussion will be treated in the systematic exposition that follows. It is generally accepted that Suárez constantly endeavours to reveal the scientific motives, reasons, and implications of his philosophical statements. Thus, it does not seem plausible to assume that Suárez's assertion that he would preserve the Aristotelian doctrine of being was only a rhetorical gesture, obscuring the real intention of his ontological approach ultimately aimed at overcoming the Aristotelian pattern of science. This gives us cause to consider more closely Suárez's explanation of the subject of metaphysics and the underlying pattern of science within his historical context.

In the following chapter, I will first recall the scientific ambition of the *Disputationes* by reference to some reflections in the *Index locupletissimus* from the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*. I shall then determine, on the basis of central texts from the first three disputations, what the subject of metaphysics is for Suárez by which he seeks to achieve his scientific aim. A consideration of the scientific character of Suárez's metaphysics will help to clarify the relationship of the Suárezian approach to the Aristotelian tradition of thought. The conclusions that will arise from this analysis will lead to a revision of the currently prevailing view of the position that Suárez's *Disputationes* hold within

15 Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique*, p. 286: "Le 'hors-néant' qui suffit à stabiliser l'objet de la métaphysique [...] ne requiert aucune référence—même implicite—à la sphère de l'existence;" *ibid.*, p. 264: "...l'étant réel, abstraction faite de l'exercice de l'existence, ne peut se définir que de et à partir de l'objectité, ou du degré zéro de l'objectité qu'est [...] l'esse comme cogitari;" *ibid.*, p. 268: "Suárez [...] délivre l'ontologie dans la figure désormais dominante de l'Onto-logique."

16 *DM* 2.Prol. (Vivès, vol. 25, p. 64): "curabimus Aristotelis mentem ac sensum."

17 *DM* (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. i-lxvi).

the history of modern school metaphysics. As will become apparent, Suárez does not intend to transcend the Aristotelian science of being towards a theory of the super-transcendental object of thought, but aims rather at completing the Aristotelian project of metaphysics by rigorously applying the scientific standards that Aristotle himself formulated but did not systematically apply to First Philosophy.

2 The Scientific Claim

The *Index locupletissimus* deals with the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*, under the title “On the Subject of this discipline and its parts, attributes and principles.”¹⁸ From the outset, Suárez understands the text from the perspective of an ontological synthesis that had come down from thirteenth-century scholasticism. In this synthesis, the multitude of determinations concerning the subject matter of the First Philosophy is related to the *Posterior Analytic*’s doctrine of science and, methodically following Avicenna, is brought to a unity. According to this view, the subject of First Philosophy is not the first in the order of causality or perfection, that is to say, the divine substance, but rather first in the sense of the first known absolute universal *ratio*, expressed by the word ‘being’ (*ens*). The opening sentence of the fourth book, “There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature,”¹⁹ is understood, then, to mean a formal determination of the subject, which has to be explained in this science by deducing its necessary attributes from its principles, and by establishing its essential partitions.²⁰

In the second chapter of book four, Aristotle seeks to explain the unity of First Philosophy with respect to the different uses of the word ‘being’ (*ón/ens*); in some of them, ‘being’ refers to mere beings of reason (*entia rationis*). Aristotle explains the unity of the subject of metaphysics in terms of the common focal point to which diverse senses of being refer (*pròs hen*), that is, substance (*ousía*). But is it not the case, then, that mere beings of reason also fall under the subject of First Philosophy so construed?

18 DM (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. xiv): “De subiecto huius doctrinae, eiusque partibus, affectibus, ac principiis.”

19 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 4.1.1003a21.

20 Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, esp. pp. 136–55; Honnefelder, “Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik;” Rolf Darge, “Die Grundlegung einer allgemeinen Theorie der transzendentalen Eigenschaften des Seienden bei F. Suárez,” *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 54 (2000): 339–358.

Suárez considers this question, and offers an answer that sets the course for the analysis of the concept of being that he will eventually offer. As Suárez reads him, Aristotle, when determining the subject of First Philosophy in the first chapter of the fourth book, only speaks about *real* being. Taken in an analogical sense—that is, analogical with respect to the “unity of the concept”²¹—‘being’ refers to one single objective content (*ratio*), which is found *intrinsically* in all significates including those that, in the context of an analogous predication, are called ‘being’ only in a subordinate manner. Only under this condition is being *qua* being considered the object of a scientific demonstration revealing its necessary attributes.²² In the second chapter, however, where privations, accidental being, and beings of reason are also called ‘*entia*’, Aristotle speaks about the whole range of meanings of the word ‘being’. Here too, indeed, he makes use of an analogy, though it is an analogy only in the sense of an external denomination of the objects in question, without a unity of the concept, as it is required for scientific demonstration. In line with this, in the sixth book of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle excludes mere accidental being (*ens per accidens*) and the mere beings of reason from the investigation of being as being.²³

Three basic assumptions of Suárez’s exposition are of interest here:

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- 21 *DM, Index* (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. xv): “...habet analogiam cum unitate conceptus.”
- 22 *Ibid.* (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. xv): “...responderi potest: de ente dupliciter posse nos loqui: uno modo ut comprehendit tantum vera entia realia, et illa omnia transcendit et sub se continet. Alio modo ut extenditur ad multa, quae vere et intrinsece entia non sunt, solumque per quamdam attributionem extrinsecam entia dicuntur, ut sunt privationes, vel entia omnino per accidens aut rationis. Priori modo videtur locutus de ente Aristoteles in capite superiori, et illo modo est proprie adaequatum obiectum et directum unius scientiae, ut habet analogiam cum unitate conceptus, et rationis obiectivae intrinsecae inventae in omnibus significatis etiam secundariis.” *Ibid.* (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. xv): “Unde fit, ut ens secundum adaequatam significationem possit esse extremum demonstrationis, in qua proprietates illi adaequatae de ipso demonstrantur.”
- 23 *Ibid.* (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. xv): “Posteriori modo videtur hic locutus Aristoteles de ente, et sic includit respectu multorum significatorum analogiam plurium conceptuum, et secundum extrinsecam denominationem respectu aliquorum. [...] Nec mirum videri debet, quod in diversa significatione sumat Aristoteles nomen entis in his duobus capitibus, nam in eis diverso modo loquitur; in priori enim cum adaequatum obiectum metaphysicae constituat, agit de ente secundum proprium eius conceptum obiectivum; in hoc vero capite agit de tota amplitudine significationis nominis entis; unde satis expresse plura numerat, quae entia non sunt, ut privationes et similia, quae ipsemet excludit ab obiecto metaphysicae directo, scilicet, et adaequato in lib. 6 in fine.”

1. Aristotle made no attempt—and in fact, it is logically impossible—to reduce ‘real being’ and ‘being of reason’ to a superordinate common concept of being.
2. As the proper object of First Philosophy, Aristotle determined the objective content (*ratio*) of real being, which in the strict sense is one and pertains intrinsically and essentially to everything that is real.
3. Only under this latter condition [2] is a theory of being as demonstrative science possible.

As we shall see, Suárez takes up precisely such an approach, and systematically unfolds a demonstrative science of being in his first two disputations.

3 The Formal Determination of the Subject

The first disputation begins with an investigation that attempts to determine the subject of metaphysics through a process of elimination. Six different traditional opinions are discussed and subsequently rejected. The first two²⁴ conceive metaphysics as the science of being in general, but give too broad a definition of its subject. According to the first thesis, ‘being’ must be understood in the most abstract sense (*abstractissime*), so that the subject includes not only all real beings but also mere beings of reason that have no real entity or essence. The second opinion considers real being in its entire range (*ens reale in tota sua latitudine*) to be the subject of metaphysics. This subject does not directly include beings of reason, however it would include such objects that are not essentially ‘beings’, but only in a completely accidental way, because they (e.g., a cairn) only exist as an accumulation of *entia per se* without an inner and essential unity.²⁵

Suárez refutes both positions with arguments taken from the Aristotelian doctrine of science, which maintains that that which is being only in a merely accidental way has no consistent essence and therefore also has no real definition or real attributes that could be deduced from this essence. In order to refute the first opinion, he takes up the above-mentioned argument from the *Index*. Beings of reason do not coincide with real things in a unique objective *ratio* of being under which they could equally be the object of a scientific investigation, but the adequate object of science requires an objective

24 See *ibid.*, 1.1.2–4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 2–3).

25 See *ibid.*, 1.1.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 3); *ibid.*, 4.3.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 126): “[...] sumitur per se et per accidens in ordine ad unitatem.”

unity.²⁶ Nevertheless, they may indirectly be objects of metaphysical consideration insofar as it is necessary for the purpose of the explication of its subject.

The remaining four opinions, thinks Suárez, interpret the subject too narrowly. Among them the most extreme is one that the famous Aristotelian ‘Commentator’ set against Avicenna’s view. According to Averroes, the subject of metaphysics is the Divine.²⁷ Suárez rejects this opinion—and its extension, according to which the subject also includes created immaterial beings (*intelligentiae*)²⁸—by means of traditional Scotist arguments. Both opinions erroneously presuppose that human reason is by itself able to gain direct insight into the proper mode of the being of immaterial substances. This insight, however, is only indirectly attainable for human reason by means of an inquiry that proceeds from one’s experience of the world and, through an analysis of our conceptual contents, leads to a universal determination, which is common to God and all other—material and immaterial—real beings.²⁹ Since there is a *ratio* of being common to God and to all created beings (thus preceding their proper *rationes* in the conceptual order, in relation to the universality of predication), and since the proper principles and attributes correspond to this objective *ratio* of being (which can be demonstrated from being as such), even if there were a separate science of immaterial being, another science that deals with these most general determinations (which God and creature have in common) would still be required. This science, moreover, would be called the ‘First Philosophy’.³⁰

Another erroneous opinion restricts the subject of metaphysics to finite being, divided among the Aristotelian categories (whether it include immaterial beings or not). In the first case, only God is not included, while in the second case, neither God nor finite immaterial substances are included in the subject of metaphysics. Instead, they are considered only as a principle or cause of this subject, but not as a part of it. The proponents of this view, according to Suárez,³¹ act wrongly upon the authority of Thomas Aquinas. The

26 See *ibid.*, 1.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 3).

27 *Ibid.*, 1.1.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 4–5).

28 *Ibid.*, 1.1.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 6–7).

29 *Ibid.*, 1.1.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 5).

30 *Ibid.*, 1.1.15 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 7).

31 *Ibid.*, 1.1.18–20 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 8–9); cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate* q. 5, a. 4 c (ed. Leonine, vol. 50, p. 154): “Unde et huiusmodi res diuine non tractantur a philosophis, nisi prout sunt rerum omnium principia. Et ideo pertractantur in illa doctrina, in qua ponuntur ea que sunt communia omnibus entibus, que habet subiectum ens inquantum est ens. [...] in qua considerantur res diuine non tamquam subiectum scientiae, set tamquam principia subiecti.”

assertions in question hold that we come to a knowledge of God only by means of a consideration of God as a principle. They do not deny that within the scope of being in general, metaphysics considers God as principle object and investigates His essence and attributes absolutely (*absolute*)—that is, without relation to other beings—as far as is possible by natural reason. Here, Suárez presupposes the Scotist doctrine according to which ‘being’ may be used in reference to God and creature in the same essential meaning.

The sixth opinion, which Suárez attributes to Buridan, says that the subject of First Philosophy is just substance as such.³² It fails to recognize that substance and accident can be reduced to a unique common objective *ratio* of real being, where *ratio* can be the subject of a science. The task of this science then consists in explaining the content and unity of this common objective *ratio* of being in general, and demonstrating the real attributes of being as such—which, according to their ontological status, evidently cannot be accidents.³³

The process of elimination leads to a positive conclusion, namely, that in accordance with *Metaphysics* IV, cap. 1, real being as such must be considered the subject of metaphysics.³⁴ This subject embraces God and every categorically determined finite being (material and immaterial), as well as their real accidents. It does not, however, include beings of reason, nor that which is a being in a completely accidental manner.³⁵

Hence, Suárez’s formal definition of the subject of First Philosophy supplies no support to the current, generally accepted interpretation, according to which his approach is aimed at a new ‘Onto-Logic’ of the pure thinkable. On the contrary, as demonstrated above, Suárez endeavours to conform his approach to the Aristotelian concept of First Philosophy and to the standards of an Aristotelian doctrine of science. Later we must consider whether those who would see in Suárez’s metaphysics an ontology of the ‘thinkable’ can reconcile themselves with Suárez’s reflections about the intension and the ontological status of this subject.

32 See *DM* 1.1.21–25 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 9–11).

33 Ibid., 1.1.23 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 10).

34 Ibid., 1.1.26 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 11): “Dicendum est ergo, ens inquantum ens reale esse obiectum adaequatum huius scientiae. Haec est sententia Aristotelis, 4 *Metaph.* fere in principio.”

35 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 11): “Ostensum est enim, obiectum adaequatum huius scientiae debere comprehendere Deum et alias substantias immateriales, non tamen sola illas. Item debere comprehendere non tantum substantias, sed etiam accidentia realia, non tamen entia rationis et omnino per accidens; sed huiusmodi obiectum nihil aliud esse potest praeter ens ut sic; ergo illud est obiectum adaequatum.”

4 Attributes and Principles of the Subject

According to the Aristotelian doctrine of science, the subject of a real science requires real attributes that can be demonstrated directly and *per se* about this subject, as well as requiring principles and causes, by which their necessary connection with the subject can also be demonstrated. In these regards, the science about being as being encounters two difficulties.³⁶ First, being as such cannot have real attributes different from itself because beyond being there is only nothing; the *ratio* of being is intrinsically and essentially included in every real attribute. However, according to the Aristotelian doctrine of science, which is guided by the categorical order, the subject cannot be included internally and essentially in its attribute.³⁷ Second, there is a being, namely God, that has no principles and causes; therefore, being as being must not necessarily have principles and causes.

Suárez solves the first difficulty by adapting the Aristotelian terminology—oriented towards the categorical forms of being—to the conditions of a theory of being as such, which transcends all the categories in the direction of the common (*commune*), and may thus be called ‘*transcendens*’ (‘transcendental’) in the pre-Scotist sense of what runs through all the Aristotelian categories.³⁸ Section 1.1 shows the baseline of the solution, and its elaboration follows in section 3.1. The decisive point of Suárez’s analysis consists in separating two questions that had been tied together and melded in the Scotist tradition of the *scientia transcendens*: (a) ‘whether the attributes of being *qua* being are real beings or mere beings of reason’, and (b) ‘whether they are only conceptually or also really distinct from being as such.’³⁹ Suárez’s analysis is directed explicitly against the Scotist assertion of a formal-real distinction between the attributes of being (*passiones entis*) and being as such.⁴⁰ In the sequel, the case that was inconceivable for Scotus becomes conceivable as they are considered real attributes, so that metaphysics is possible as a *scientia realis*, even though

36 For the following, see *ibid.*, 1.1.27–29 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 11–12).

37 See Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora*, 1.4.73a34–73b 5; *Metaphysics*, 7.5.1031a2–5.

38 See *DM* 47.3.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 797): “Transcendentales dicuntur, et a praedicamentibus distinguuntur, quia ad certum aliquod praedicamentum non pertinent, sed per omnia vagantur.” On Suárez’s usage of the terms ‘transcendens’, ‘transcendentalis’, see Rolf Darge, *Suárez’ transzendente Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition* (Leiden, 2004), esp. pp. 66–96.

39 *DM* 3.1.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 104): “...in huiusmodi attributis formaliter sumptis aliud esse, quod ipsa sint entia realia, vel rationis; aliud quod distinguantur re vel ratione.”

40 For a more detailed analysis, see Darge, *Suárez’ transzendente Seinsauslegung*, esp. pp. 118–138.

they do not constitute positive real properties that are really distinct from being *qua* being.⁴¹ In his answer to (a) and (b) Suárez follows the mainline scholastic doctrine of the transcendentals. Since Philipp the Chancellor's (ca. 1230) *Summo de bono*, the one (*unum*), the true (*verum*), and the good (*bonum*) have passed for these attributes⁴²; beyond these three, according to Suárez, no further attributes of being *qua* being have to be assumed.⁴³

Concerning their relation to being *qua* being, Suárez's view joins the pre-Scotist tradition of the doctrine of the transcendentals, which is guided by an Aristotelian explanatory model. In the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*, having explained that the subject matter of metaphysics is being *qua* being, Aristotle turns to 'the one' as a *per se* attribute of being, and explains its relationship to being as follows: "being and the one are the same and one single nature in the sense that they follow upon each other [...] but not in the sense that they are determined by one concept."⁴⁴ According to this assertion, the relationship between being and the one is characterized by two features: real identity and conceptual difference. In the pre-Scotist tradition of transcendental thought, the two were correlated in the sense of a conceptual explication without any real difference. This view is represented by an exposition of Thomas Aquinas that Suárez mentions in this context.⁴⁵ According to this exposition, the one adds to being only a conceptual determination, the negation of division.⁴⁶ Although this conceptual addition—just like any other negation—is a being of reason,⁴⁷ the one as such is not a being of reason, for 'one' signifies not only

41 DM 3.1.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 104): "...optime [...] fieri potest ut [huiusmodi attributa] sint realia, quamvis non re, sed ratione distinguantur."

42 See Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The case of Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden, 1996), esp. pp. 25–70; Jorge Gracia, "The Transcendentals in the Middle Ages: An Introduction," in *The Transcendentals in the Middle Ages, Topoi* 11, No. 2, ed. Jorge Gracia (1992), pp. 113–20; Jorge Gracia, "Suárez and the Doctrine of the Transcendentals," *ibid.*, pp. 121–133.

43 DM 3.2.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 108): "...dicendum est [...] tres tantum esse proprias passiones entis, scilicet unum, verum et bonum." In a detailed discussion, Suárez rejects the Scotist doctrine of the disjunctive *passiones entis* as well as the Thomist doctrine, which considers *res* and *aliud* (*aliud-qua*) as *passiones entis*. With regard to this discussion, see Darge, *Suárez' transzendente Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition*, esp. pp. 139–182.

44 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 4.2.1003b22–24.

45 DM 3.1.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 106): "...ita videtur rem hanc plane exponere D. Thomas [...]."

46 Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, n. 560, ed. Marietti (Turin, 1964), p. 156: "[...] superaddens indivisionis rationem, quae cum sit negatio vel privatio, non ponit aliquam naturam enti additum." Regarding Aquinas's conception of the one as transcendental, see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, esp. pp. 201–242.

47 *Ibid.*, lect. 2, n. 560, p. 156: "...negatio vel privatio non est ens naturae sed rationis."

the indivision of a thing but also the substance of a thing, together with its indivision; it means the undivided being or, said differently, being insofar as it is undivided.⁴⁸ Thus, by adding it to the *ratio entis*—which it essentially includes as a general aspect, but conceptually differs from being as such⁴⁹—the one gives a sort of explication of the nature of being *qua* being. Suárez explains the Aristotelian text in the same sense as Thomas.⁵⁰ Like Thomas, Suárez takes the structure of the one to be representative of the true and the good⁵¹: these, too, include the *ratio* of being, and thus are in substance or essentially the same as being. However, they also add to being *qua* being a conceptual aspect, which is not yet expressed by the word ‘being’. Accordingly, the true and the good give an inner explication of the nature or perfection of being *qua* being. ‘The true’ thus signifies being insofar as it forms the basis for a cognitive act that conceives something as it really is. ‘The good’, on the other hand, signifies being insofar as it includes or founds a relation of convenience, by which it is able to attract an aspiration for it.⁵²

But every being independently from the intellect—immediately by its own entity—is undivided, and is likewise a possible object of a true act of cognition and is, in a way, convenient and therefore attractive.⁵³ The conceptual additions are, consequently, not based on fictions of our intellect, but are due to the

48 Ibid.: “...unum [...] ipsum ens designat, superaddens indivisionis rationem;” *ibid.*, n. 553, p. 155: “...est enim unum ens indivisum.”

49 Ibid., n. 553, p. 155: “[...] significant omnino idem, sed secundum diversas rationes.”

50 *DM* 3.1.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 106): “Hanc conclusionem indicasse mihi videtur Arist., 4 *Metaph.*, cap. 2, simul dicens, ens et unum eandem dicere naturam, et nihilominus non idem formaliter significare; quia nimirum unum de formali addit negationem, quam non dicit ens; per eam vero nihil aliud explicatur, quam ipsamet natura entis.”

51 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 106): “Similiter autem dicendum est de vero et bono, et si quae sunt alia huiusmodi attributa; haec enim formaliter, et in ordine ad conceptionem nostram non dicunt idem quod ens.”

52 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 106): “...significant [...] ens sub quadam habitudine ad aliud, scilicet quatenus in se habet unde ametur aut vere cognoscatur.” Suárez takes the basic idea of an inner explication of being by its transcendental attributes from Thomas Aquinas, but, because of his different understanding of the meaning of ‘being’, does not follow his concrete explication of the one, the true, and the good. Rather, he looks for a new interpretation that brings together his own quidditative concept of being—inspired by Scotus—and the traditional Pre-Scotistic conception of the transcendental attributes of being; see my conclusions in *Suárez’ transzendente Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition*, pp. 387–405.

53 Ibid., 3.1.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 106): “...quamvis enim mens nihil de rebus cogitet, aurum est verum aurum, et est una determinata res distincta ab aliis; et similiter Deus est unus et bonus etc.”

fact that our finite intellect grasps the real thing by means of an inadequate abstraction.⁵⁴ For this reason, these attributes have to be understood as real, even if what they express in addition to 'being' is only a conceptual aspect.⁵⁵ And this, moreover, satisfies the requirements of a science as defined in the *Posterior Analytics*. Metaphysics, by immediately and *per se* giving evidence of these attributes from the nature of being as such, deals not with mere beings of reason, but accomplishes its task as a real demonstrative science of being *qua* being.⁵⁶

A second question remains, namely, whether this subject has principles and causes. Suárez solves this problem with an analysis of what can be regarded as a principle within the scope of a demonstrative science. He distinguishes two kinds of principles: (a) basic propositions, from which demonstrations proceed; and (b) grounds of being, which in the framework of a syllogistic demonstration are represented by simple concepts—more precisely, by the middle-term (*medium*), which joins the major and minor premises. Evidently, metaphysics is not deficient in principles of the first kind, and one of its primary tasks, according to Aristotle, consists of formulating and explaining the first principle of demonstration, namely, the principle of non-contradiction.⁵⁷ In his exposition, Suárez follows Aristotle for the most part.⁵⁸ Among the principles of knowledge from which the demonstration of the transcendental attributes of being proceeds, the principle of non-contradiction is the first and most fundamental one. Therefore, according to Suárez, it must be considered systematically in the context of the foundation of a general theory of the *passiones entis*.⁵⁹

The ontological grounds are further divided into causes, which are in reality distinct from their effects and principles of being, and which are only conceptually distinct from the *principatum*. As the objection proves, the subject of metaphysics has no principles of the first kind, though such principles are not

54 Ibid., 3.1.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 104): "...distinctio rationis, quae oritur ex praecisione intellectus, non est per conceptionem alicuius fictae entitatis, quae non sit in re, sed per modum solum inadaequatum concipiendi veram rem; potest ergo esse attributum reale quamvis modus attributionis et distinctionis sit solum per rationem."

55 Ibid., 3.1.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 107): "...quia de formali dicunt aliquid, quod suo modo in rebus, et vere ac simpliciter potest enti attribui."

56 Ibid., 3.1.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 106): "...metaphysica, quae est realis ac vera scientia, haec demonstrat de ente; non autem demonstrat aliquid ab intellectu fictum;" see also *ibid.*, 1.1.28 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 11).

57 See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 4.3.1005a30-b35.

58 See *DM* 1.1.29 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 12).

59 Ibid., 3.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 111): "Quibus principiis demonstrari possint passiones de ente, et an inter ea hoc sit primum 'Impossibile est idem esse et non esse'."

required for the status of metaphysics as demonstrative science. In order to prove the attributes of being *qua* being, it suffices to reveal their ontological grounds within the nature of being *qua* being—even if these grounds are not really but only conceptually distinct from them—due to the different aspects under which being is conceived. So for instance, unity is accounted for by the essential perfection every being possesses immediately in and through its own entity. Being is one insofar as it is undivided in itself, in the sense that its entity is not a plurality of completely determined real essences⁶⁰; the one adds to being—which it is essentially itself—only a conceptual aspect, namely, the negation of a manifoldness of perfect determinations of essence. In this case, the ontological ground and the grounded are not really but only conceptually distinct from each other.

5 Abstraction from Matter

In his explication of the subject of metaphysics, Suárez applies the traditional criterion of ontological abstraction from matter. “In this regard one can define, that metaphysics is the science which considers being insofar as it is being or insofar as it really abstracts from matter.”⁶¹ What is the sense of this definition? Does it entail a restriction of the subject to immaterial being, and consequently a reduction of the ontological concept of metaphysics to the theological one?⁶² To address this question, it is helpful to recall the origin of this formula in the context of the Aristotelian doctrine of science.

60 Ibid., 1.1.29 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 12); and *ibid.*, 4.1.21 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 121); see the analysis of Suárez’s concept of the transcendental unity in Darge, *Suárez’ transzendente Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition*, pp. 197–261.

61 Ibid., 1.3.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 22): “Sub qua ratione definiri potest, metaphysicam esse scientiam quae ens, in quantum ens, seu in quantum a materia abstrahit secundum esse, contemplatur;” *ibid.*, 1.2.13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 16): “Metaphysica vero dicitur abstrahere a materia sensibili et intelligibili, et non solum secundum rationem sed etiam secundum esse.”

62 The question arises whether this determination presupposes the actual or at least the possible existence of immaterial beings and their knowability for us; according to M. Forlivesi, the existence of spiritual beings is presupposed in Suárez’s concept of real being: M. Forlivesi, “Impure Ontology. The Nature of Metaphysics and Its Object in Francisco Suárez’s Texts,” *Quaestio* 5 (2005): 559–86, esp. 563–568. In any event, Suárez’s reflections on the subject of the First Philosophy at the beginning of the *Disputationes* must not be confused with the quest for the presuppositionless inception of philosophical thought.

In the sixth book of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle distinguishes between three theoretic sciences—philosophy of nature, mathematics, and first philosophy (‘theology’)—with respect to the manner in which their respective object is related to matter and motion.⁶³ In the Latin west, these considerations were already well known prior to the complete reception of the *Metaphysics*, for Boethius summarizes them in his treatise on Trinity (ca. 519)—frequently commented upon until the twelfth century—in order to elucidate the scientific position and methodological characteristic of his inquiry.⁶⁴ According to his exposition, it is peculiar to theology to deal with what is unmoved, abstracted, and separable (*sine motu abstracta atque separabilis*), “since the substance of God is without matter and motion.” First philosophy here is interpreted as science of the immaterial divine being, that is, theology. Boethius, unverified, presupposes that it is possible to get insight into the Christian doctrine of the Trinity by means of this (philosophical) theology; he does not yet discriminate between knowledge based on reason alone and knowledge based on revelation.

Both kinds of knowledge, which Boethius considers to be one, are separated by Latin authors of the thirteenth century. Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on Boethius’s treatise on the Trinity, introduces a second ‘divine science’ (*scientia divina*), namely, Christian theology (*Theologia sacrae scripturae*), which differs in principle from philosophical theology.⁶⁵ According to Aquinas, this kind of theology, founded upon revelation, is appropriate to the issue of Boethius’s treatise. The introduction of Christian theology, however, has consequences for metaphysics. It leads to a shift in the focus of metaphysical inquiry, from transmateriality to the highest universality (transcendentality) of its objects. Even then, metaphysics deals with the divine not as its

63 See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 6.1.1026a 18–25.

64 Boethius, *Quomodo Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres Dii*, cap. 2, in *Patrologiae cursus completus Series Latina*, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne (MPL), 64, p. 1250.

65 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate* q. 5, a. 4 c, ed. Leonine, vol. 50 (1992), p. 154: “Sic ergo theologia sive scientia diuina est duplex. una in qua considerantur res diuinae non tamquam subiectum scientie, sed tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia quam philosophi prosequuntur, que alio nomine ‘metaphysica’ dicitur; alia vero que ipsas res divinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientie, et hec est theologia que in sacra Scriptura traditur.” In *Metaph.*, prol., ed. Marietti (Turin, 1964), p. 1: “Dicitur [...] ‘metaphysica’, in quantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum.” See Jan Aertsen, “Was heißt Metaphysik bei Thomas von Aquin?” in *Scientia und ars im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter*, ed. Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg and Andreas Speer, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 22 (Berlin, 1994), pp. 217–239, esp. pp. 226–228.

subject, but as the principle of its subject, namely, being in general.⁶⁶ Aquinas finally expresses this result in terms of ontological abstraction from matter in order to integrate the traditional view.⁶⁷ To this end, he introduces a differentiation. The real abstraction from matter may be understood in two ways: first, in the sense of absolute immateriality, as is the case with God and purely spiritual substances, and second, in the sense of not-being-necessarily-in-matter, as is the case “for instance [with] substance, quality, being (*ens*), potency, act, one and many and suchlike.”⁶⁸ Metaphysics, or philosophical theology, deals with what is really abstracted from matter in such a way that it considers as its subject abstractions in the second sense, namely, being *qua* being, while it seeks what is abstracted in the first way, the divine, as the principle of its subject.⁶⁹

Suárez refers directly to this interpretation,⁷⁰ however he makes different use of it. It serves him not only in order to reconcile the ontological concept of metaphysics with the traditional theological concept, but also to delimit the subject area of first philosophy in order that it may ensure the autonomy of the other theoretical sciences. According to his view, this delimitation of areas is indispensable, since first philosophy, by explicating being *qua* being, also includes the diversity of the particular forms of being, especially the categorical forms in which the *ratio* of being is realized. For within the context of the determination of the subject of metaphysics, this *ratio* is not conceived formally by a complete abstraction from the particular forms of being, but is attained by a sort of total abstraction, as a potential whole that somehow

66 See above, n. 31.

67 See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate* q. 5, a. 1 c (ed. Leonine, vol. 50, p. 138).

68 Ibid.: “[...] siue numquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et angelus, siue in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa et huiusmodi.”

69 Ibid., q. 5, a. 4c, p. 154: “Theologia ergo philosophica determinat de separatis secundo modo sicut de subiectis, de separatis autem primo modo sicut de principiis subiecti.” In this sense, see also *In Metaph.*, prol., ed. Marietti, p. 2: “Quamvis autem subiectum huius scientiae sit ens commune, dicitur tamen tota de his quae sunt separata a materia secundum esse et rationem. Quia secundum esse et rationem separari dicuntur, non solum illa quae numquam in materia esse possunt, sicut Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam illa quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune.”

70 *DM* 1.2.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 17): “...recte notavit D. Thomas in prolog. Metaphysicae, non solum dicuntur abstrahere a materia secundum esse illae rationes entium, quae nunquam sunt in materia, sed etiam illae quae possunt esse in rebus sine materia, quia hoc satis est ut in sua ratione formali materiam non includant, neque illam per se requirant.”

includes these inferior forms.⁷¹ The Aristotelian doctrine of science rejects the Platonic model of a unified science, insisting instead on a plurality of sciences, each of which is methodically autonomous. Thus, the metaphysical field of vision has to be delimited in such a way that other scientific approaches to the categorical forms of being remain possible. Since concrete things, by some kind of abstraction, formally become objects of a theoretical consideration, this delimitation can be performed only by a distinction of the formal aspects—thus, by a separation of the different modes of abstraction—according to which the various types of theoretical science formally relate to things as their objects of knowledge.

According to the traditional view, the more a thing is separated from matter, the more it is understandable, and similarly, the more immaterial or abstracted from matter the object of an intellectual cognition is, the more certain this cognition is. Therefore, according to Suárez, the knowable objects—and, as a consequence, the theoretical sciences—distinguish themselves from each other through their respective degrees of abstraction from matter. Now the highest degree of abstraction, and accordingly, the highest possible certainty of knowledge, is due to the first and fundamental scientific discipline, assigned to first philosophy only insofar as the formal aspect by which being in general is constituted as an object of knowledge of first philosophy implies a real ontological abstraction from matter, in the sense of “being-never-or-not-necessarily in matter.”⁷² By explicating the nature of being *qua* being, first philosophy keeps itself—even if it applies attention to particular categorical forms of being—within the limits of this abstraction, “and it does not transcend them, for everything else belongs to philosophy of nature and to mathematics.”⁷³ Within the limits of this abstraction, it is concerned, for instance, with the particular *rationes* of created and uncreated being as such, of contingent and necessary being, of substance and accident, quality, action, operation, dependency, living being, perceiving, and understanding being, as well as with some *rationes* proper to immaterial beings, as for instance

71 Ibid., 1.2.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 16): “...cum metaphysica dicitur versari circa ens in quantum ens, non est existimandum sumi ens omnino ac formaliter praecisum, ita ut excludantur omnia inferiora, secundum proprias rationes, quia haec scientia non sistit in sola consideratione illius rationis formalis actualis; sumenda ergo est illa ratio, prout includit aliquo modo inferiora.”

72 Ibid., 1.2.13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 16).

73 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 17): “...ultra non progreditur, nam caetera ad physicam vel mathematicam spectant.”

the *ratio* of immaterial substance.⁷⁴ Furthermore, it is concerned with the *rationes* of cause, of causality, of effect as such, and of different types of causality, and last but not least, with the *ratio* of the first cause and of its universal (transcendental) causality. The investigation of these particular forms and modes of being is carried out following the investigation of being in general and its necessary attributes (up to Disp. 11). In both parts, the *Disputationes* intend nothing other than to explain the subject of metaphysics: being *qua* being.⁷⁵

6 The ‘Objective Concept of Being’

Instead of the traditional formula ‘*ens inquantum ens (reale)*’, Suárez sometimes uses the expression ‘*conceptus obiectivus entis*’ to define the subject of the First Philosophy.⁷⁶ This expression has attracted special attention among the exponents of the ‘Suárezian turn’ in metaphysics; their thesis is based, above all, on a particular understanding of the way in which Suárez uses the term ‘objective concept of being’. Therefore, we have to look more closely at his use of the term, and must ask how it fits the Aristotelian models of thought by which Suárez, as shown above, interprets the First Philosophy as real science about being *qua* being. Thus, the ontological status of what he means by ‘*conceptus obiectivus*’ must first be analyzed, followed by his explication of the metaphysical concept of being.

74 See *ibid.*, 1.2.16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 17–18). However, an investigation of the human soul is not found in the *Disputationes metaphysicae*. Following Aristotle, Suárez relegates this investigation to the last part of natural philosophy; see *DM* 1.2.20 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 19).

75 *Ibid.*, 2.Prol. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 64): “In posteriori [principali parti] praecipuam eius [i.e., subiecti huius scientiae] partitionem proponemus, atque ita res omnes, quae sub ente continentur, et illius rationem includunt, ut sub obiectiva ratione huius scientiae cadunt, et a materia in suo esse abstrahunt, [...] investigabimus et explanabimus.” The unity of metaphysics is the object of detailed reflections in *ibid.*, 1.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 22–25).

76 *Ibid.*, 1.1.23 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 10): “...simpliciter verius est dari conceptum obiectivum entis, secundum rationem abstrahibilem a substantia et accidenti, circa quem per se, et ut sic, potest aliqua scientia versari, eius rationem et unitatem explicando et nonnulla attributa de illo demonstrando; hoc autem fit in hac scientia [i.e., metaphysica].” *Ibid.*, 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): “...intendimus explicare conceptum obiectivum entis ut sic, secundum totam abstractionem suam, secundum quam diximus esse metaphysicae obiectum.”

6.1 'Objective Concept'

Suárez explicitly reflects upon the use he makes of the term '*conceptus obiectivus*', whereby he takes as a basis the triad of formal concept, objective concept, and language expression, a triad that is common in later scholasticism but understood in varying ways.⁷⁷ According to Suárez, the cognitive process of conception formally concludes with a concept that immediately represents the cognized thing as its natural reflection.⁷⁸ This concept, together with the corresponding act of conceiving, constitutes the '*conceptus formalis*'; it finds linguistic expression in a word. The word serves to express the concept only insofar as it signifies that which the concept represents naturally, by an imposition (*impositio*) based on the concept. Therefore, the linguistic expression directly signifies the object, which is represented by the formal concept.⁷⁹ Exactly in this way the expression 'being' relates to the formal concept of being and to its object.

That, however, which is represented in and conceived by the formal concept of the intellect—the known thing or, said in a more general way (considering that the intellect at times reflects on something, which only has *esse obiective* within the intellect), the conceived *ratio*—constitutes the objective concept.⁸⁰ In order to avoid a misunderstanding, Suárez explicitly points out that the term 'concept' in this context does not mean a mental structure, which terminates the process of conceiving inside of the intellect.⁸¹ 'Concept' is used here in terms of an extrinsic denomination (*denominatio extrinseca*),⁸² which characterizes the named thing not according to its own inner form, but with respect to something else, which from the outside (externally) relates to it. So, for

77 See *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 64): "Supponenda imprimis est vulgaris distinctio conceptus formalis et obiectivi." Regarding this distinction, see Theo Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache* (Leiden: Brill, 1987), esp. pp. 194–210; Elizabeth J. Ashworth, "Suárez on the Analogy of Being," *Vivarium* 33 (1995): 50–75, esp. pp. 70–72.

78 See *DM* 2.1.1, 11 and 13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 64–65, 69).

79 Ibid., 2.2.23 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 78): "...sicut voces expriment conceptus formales mentis, ita etiam immediate significant obiecta quae per huiusmodi conceptus immediate repraesentantur."

80 Ibid., 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "...conceptus obiectivus dicitur res illa vel ratio quae proprie et immediate per conceptum formalem cognoscitur vel repraesentatur."

81 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "...non est conceptus ut forma intrinsece terminans conceptionem."

82 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "'conceptus' quidem per denominationem extrinsecam a conceptu formali." On Suárez's doctrine of '*denominatio extrinseca*', see John P. Doyle, "Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suárez," *Vivarium* 22 (1984): 121–160.

instance, from the act of seeing (*visio*), which relates externally to a wall, the wall is called 'seen' (*visum*). The point of reference, from which the extrinsic denomination is carried out, is only the formal concept; 'objective concept', for its part, means the *ratio* or the thing, which is—and insofar as it is—the object to which the intellect in the act of cognition refers immediately by a formal concept.⁸³ Since the objective concept is not simply the existing thing, which in itself is concrete and singular,⁸⁴ but the thing in a certain respect—insofar as the intellect, by means of the formal concept, is directed towards it—it does not exclude from itself the features of commonness and indeterminacy concerning the individual and particular determination of the thing. Rather, it normally features them,⁸⁵ for in the normal case of conceiving, the formal concept terminates a process of abstraction in which the intellect prescind from any individual and particular determination of the thing, highlighting the structure in which it corresponds to other things and is similar to them.⁸⁶ This process of abstraction necessarily starts with singular real things given by experience. But in these things, the *ratio*, manifested abstractly by the objective concept, is 'concretely' given, coalesced with the rest of the determinations of the real thing. So, in substance, the objective concept is not a separate form apart from the concrete reality of things, but is the concrete thing, or the real content of the thing itself, insofar as the *ratio*, which is conceived within it through the formal concept, is nothing other than the *ratio* of the conceived thing.⁸⁷

Since the objective concept does not differ in substance or in content from the singular things but differs from them only *secundum rationem*, through the

83 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "...obiectum et materia circa quam versatur formalis conceptio et ad quam mentis acies directe tendit."

84 Ibid., 6.2.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 206): "...omnis res, quae existit necessario est singularis et individua."

85 Suárez does not exclude the possibility of conceiving individual things as such; see *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "...conceptus [...] obiectivus interdum [...] esse potest res singularis et individua." Regarding the epistemological justification of this view, see J. de Vries, "Die Erkenntnislehre des Franz Suárez und der Nominalismus," *Scholastik* 24 (1949): 321–349, and Courtine, *Suárez et le système de la métaphysique*, esp. pp. 157–181.

86 *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "...conceptus obiectivus [...] saepe [...] est res universalis vel confusa et communis, ut est homo, substantia et similia;" ibid., 6.1.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 204): "...est in rebus singularibus quaedam similitudo [...] in qua fundatur communitas quam intellectus attribuere potest tali naturae ut a se conceptae [...]."

87 Ibid., 6.2.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 206): "...hoc est quod intendimus; nam hoc sensu dicuntur universalis non esse separata, quia non sunt res realiter distinctae a singularibus, neque habent propriam entitatem et realem unitatem distinctam ab illis."

universality caused by the intellect, the theoretical scientific consideration that seeks to explicate real things according to their universal features meets its immediate object in the objective concept.⁸⁸ Due to those characteristics, the objective concept serves as a quasi interface by which one's scientific consideration attains the real thing, and it is the real thing that formally measures the mental activity wherein the theoretical consideration reaches its end.⁸⁹

Suárez interprets the objective concept of being and its importance for metaphysics on the basis of this conception: all real beings in their respective *ratio essendi* bear a resemblance to one another. Therefore, they can be conceived by a unique formal concept, which simply represents their common *ratio* of being, or beingness, and prescind from their differences.⁹⁰ Since this formal concept abstracts from all particular modes of being, the objective *ratio*, which it represents, necessarily has the character of ultimate universality. On the other side, however, this objective *ratio* really exists within concrete singular things—namely in-separately⁹¹—so that it is, in substance, nothing other than these real things in the entirety of their singular determinations; accordingly, each real *modus* and each real determination of being innerly and

88 Ibid., 6.2.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 206): "...scientiae non sunt de nominibus et conceptibus formalibus nostris, sed directe de rebus seu conceptibus obiectivis;" ibid., 6.5.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 223): "...dicitur esse scientia de universalibus et non de singularibus, non quia sit de nominibus et non de singularibus, sed quia est de conceptibus obiectivis communibus, qui, licet in re ipsa non distinguantur a singularibus, distinguantur tamen ratione."

89 Ibid., 1.4.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 28): "...nos ex rebus ipsis scientiam accipimus;" ibid., 1.4.29 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 35): "...mentis operationes ut rectae sint et verae, esse debent rebus ipsis proportionatae et commensuratae."

90 Ibid., 2.2.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 74): "...omnia entia realia vere habent aliquam similitudinem et convenientiam in ratione essendi; ergo possunt concipi et repraesentari sub ea praecisa ratione qua inter se conveniunt."

91 Ibid., 2.2.35 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 81): "...si [...] simpliciter sit sermo de ratione entis praecise concepta, verum est, rationem illam esse in inferioribus et in eis omnino et intime includi et nihilominus ratione praescindi, quamvis in re non sit praecisa;" ibid., 2.3.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 83): "...dicendum est, conceptum entis obiectivum prout in re ipsa existit, non esse aliquid ex natura rei distinctum ac praecisum ab inferioribus in quibus existit." J.-F. Courtine overlooks this central ontological supposition; he assigns to the objective concept of being in itself a sort of being and the status of an autonomous sphere beyond rea—actual or potential—being; see Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique*, p. 297f.: "L'in-détermination [i.e., of the objective concept of being] est ici positive, elle définit une sphère autonome, une 'entité' spécifique dont la réalité possible ou la possibilité réelle est en deca de l'alternative de l'*esse in actu* et de l'*esse in potentia*."

essentially includes the *ratio* of being.⁹² Consequently, even if it abstracts from the actual existence of things, the metaphysical explication of being, insofar as it considers the objective *ratio* of being *qua* being, is mediately directed towards the singular things in which this *ratio* possesses concrete reality. Suárez's position can be interpreted as a sort of circle that begins with real beings—"since we receive scientific knowledge from the things themselves"⁹³—and then ultimately reverts to them. This view perfectly matches the model of metaphysics as real science, which Suárez develops in his considerations about the subject of metaphysics following the Aristotelian tradition of the doctrine of science.

6.2 *The Ratio of Being*

According to the exponents of the 'Suárezian turn', Suárez releases the subject of metaphysics from any orientation towards actual existence in order to conceive it in an ultimate abstraction as that which is not (absolute) nothing, insofar as it is without contradiction and thus has the character of a possible object of thought.⁹⁴ In this way, he delivered the traditional science of being as a mere 'Onto-Logic' of the thinkable.⁹⁵ This interpretation, however, has to be examined more closely, with reference to the texts—particularly to texts of the second disputation—that directly pose the question of "what being *qua* being is."⁹⁶

Suárez's explication begins with a distinction in the way 'being' (*ens*) can be taken, where it can be used as a noun or as participle of the verb 'esse' (*sum*). In the second way, which underlies the nominal use, '*ens*' signifies what actually exists. Used as a noun, '*ens*' signifies that which possesses a real essence, and

92 Ibid., 2.5.16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 98): "...ratio entis includitur in omnibus substantiis et omnibus partibus earum et in omnibus accidentibus et in omnibus modis positivis rebus [...] ostensum a nobis est includi etiam in differentiis et in modis positivis intrinsecis; sed praeter haec nihil est in rebus."

93 Ibid., 1.4.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 28): "...quia nos ex rebus ipsis scientiam accipimus."

94 Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique*, p. 286: "Le 'hors-néant' qui suffit à stabiliser l'objet de la métaphysique [...] ne requiert aucune référence—même implicite—à la sphère de l'existence;" ibid., p. 264: "...l'étant réel, abstraction faite de l'exercice de l'existence, ne peut se définir que de et à partir de l'objectité, ou du degré zéro de l'objectité qu'est [...] l'esse comme cogitari;" ibid., p. 255: "...le non-nihil, c'est à dire ce qui peut non contradictoirement s'objecter à la pensée."

95 Ibid., p. 268: "Suarez [...] délivre l'ontologie dans la figure désormais dominante de L'onto-logique."

96 *DM* 2.Prol. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 64): "In presente [...] disputatione explicanda nobis est quaestio, quid sit ens in quantum ens."

thus is not mere fiction but is oriented towards an existence independent from thought.⁹⁷ In this nominal usage, it remains undetermined whether existence is actually given or not. This distinction is not found in Thomas Aquinas but rather explicitly in Duns Scotus, who makes use of it in order to base his new metaphysical approach upon it.⁹⁸ Scotus, however, does not regard himself as its originator, and refers to an old-established tradition of word usage.⁹⁹

According to the Aristotelian doctrine of science, only that which is necessary—i.e., that which cannot be anything other than what it is—can be known in the proper sense.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, only the *ratio* signified by ‘being’ in the nominal use can serve as the key aspect according to which metaphysics is directed towards real being in general, for actual existence does not belong necessarily to every real being.¹⁰¹ But every real being innerly and essentially—and thus necessarily—possesses the structure that the noun ‘being’ formally signifies¹⁰² and, by means of this aspect, can be an object of theoretical knowledge. Hence the subject of metaphysics is being, insofar as it is something that possesses a real essence.

In accordance with the Aristotelian tradition, Suárez explains what is meant here by ‘essence’. It is the first, innermost indivisible and incommunicable root of all activities and properties of the thing, and is expressed by the definition

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- 97 Ibid., 2.4.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 89): “Si ens sumatur, prout est significatum huius vocis in vi nominis sumptae, eius ratio consistit in hoc, quod sit habens essentiam realem, id est non fictam, nec chymericam, sed veram et aptam ad realiter existendum.”
- 98 See Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit* (Hamburg, 1990), p. 240.
- 99 Duns Scotus, *Super Lib. I. Perihermeneias*, q. 8, n. 10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, p. 551): “Unde solet antiquitus dici, quod *ens* potest esse Participium vel Nomen; *Ens* Participium significat idem quod existens, quia tenet significatum verbi, a quo descendit; *ens* Nomen forte significat habens essentiam, illud dividitur in decem Genera, et sic concedendum est, quod *Caesar est ens*, loquendo non de ente, quod est Participium.”
- 100 *DM* 1.3.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 22): “...supponimus [...] metaphysicam esse vere ac proprie scientiam, ut Aristoteles in princ. *Metaphysicae* et aliis innumeris locis docuit, et constat ex definitione scientiae quae ex 1 *Poster.*, et 6 *Ethicor.*, cap. 3, sumitur, scilicet, quod sit cognitio seu habitus praebens certam ac evidentem cognitionem rerum necessariorum per propria earum principia et causas, si sit scientia perfecti a priori. Haec autem omnia in hac doctrina inveniuntur [...]”
- 101 Ibid., 2.4.13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 91): “...existere [...] non habet necessariam connexionem cum essentia creaturae praecise concepta.” Ibid., 1.4.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 28): “Scientiae [...] per se loquendo non supponunt suum obiectum actu existere; hoc enim [...] accidentarium est ad rationem scientiae.”
- 102 Ibid., 2.4.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 92): “...habere essentiam realem convenit omni enti reali estque illi maxime essentiale.”

that determines what the thing in question is.¹⁰³ Its common designation by the artificial term '*essentia*', which is derived from '*esse*', originates from the realization that, in the order of foundation, it is what among all features of the thing is the first to subsist through the act of being.¹⁰⁴

Its characterization as 'real' highlights that essential moment by which the thing in question differs from a mere being of reason.¹⁰⁵ This moment may be explained both positively and negatively. Negatively, it can be said that the essence is real, insofar as it "is free from inner repugnancy and is not a mere fiction of the intellect."¹⁰⁶ In a positive way, it can be explained with regard to the effects of the essence, as well as to the ground of its being. In the first respect, the essence is 'real' insofar as it forms the principle or root of actual activities, effects, or properties of the thing.¹⁰⁷ In the second respect, 'real' can only be understood with recourse to an external ground of being. Since the divine essence has no external ground of being, this applies only to created essences. A created essence then is 'real' insofar as it "can actually be produced by God and constituted by Him in the being (*esse*) of an actual being (*ens*)."¹⁰⁸ Otherwise, the essence itself forms the first inner cause, the fundamental and simplest determination of every being. With regards to the essence itself, as ground the meaning of 'real' can only be explained by the statement that the essence is 'real' inasmuch as it "by itself is apt to be or to exist actually."¹⁰⁹

Nowhere does Suárez declare the mere *possibile logicum* to be the subject of first philosophy. Admittedly, he states that an essence is without inner repugnancy, but the interpretation has to take the context of this statement into account. First, this phrase characterizes the subject of first philosophy not

103 Ibid., 2.4.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 89): "...dicimus, essentiam rei esse id, quod est primum et radicale ac intimum principium omnium actionum ac proprietatum, quae rei conveniunt. [...] dicimus, essentiam rei esse, quae per definitionem explicatur."

104 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 89): "...appellatur 'essentia', quia est id, quod per actum essendi primo esse intelligitur in unaquaque re."

105 Ibid., 54.1.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 1016): "...dicendum [...] est, dari aliqua entia rationis, quae neque sunt vera entia realia, quia non sunt capacia verae et realis existentiae."

106 Ibid., 2.4.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 89): "...dicimus essentiam realem esse, quae in sese nullam involvit repugnantiam, neque est mere conficta per intellectum."

107 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 89): "...per hoc quod sit principium vel radix realium operationum, vel effectuum [...]; sic enim nulla est essentia, realis quae non possit habere aliquem effectum vel proprietatem."

108 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 89): "...sic dicimus essentiam esse realem, quae a Deo realiter produci potest, et constitui in esse entis actualis."

109 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 89): "...dicere possumus, essentiam realem eam esse, quae ex se apta est esse seu realiter existere."

simpliciter, but in a certain respect; it serves as an explanation of how a real being differs from a mere being of reason. Second, in this latter respect, it expresses only the first part of the whole thought; another partial thought follows immediately after, which denies the essence to be a mere product of the intellect.¹¹⁰ Just before, moreover, Suárez explains the *ratio* of real essence in the sense of a “non-fictitious, non-chimerical but veritable essence, which is suited for real existence.”¹¹¹ Thus, only both parts of thought *together* constitute the adequate definition. And this, again, is only the first approach by means of negation. Further explanations follow, which elucidate what is meant *per affirmationem*. Among them, the most important relates real being to its ground within the essence itself, and explains it as the aptitude for actual existence, imbedded in the essence itself.¹¹² It applies without restriction to every essence, and is used regularly by Suárez in order to distinguish real beings from beings of reason, which, according to his view as analyzed above, do not directly belong to the subject of first philosophy.¹¹³ This means that in the first approach, ‘*per negationem*’, the focus is not on the *first* partial thought, but on the *second* one. Indeed, for this distinction it does not suffice to indicate an absence of inner repugnancy, for pure logical forms as, for instance, the predicables (genus, species, etc.), are without inner repugnancy, but as pure mental relations that are not apt to exist independently from the intellect, they are nevertheless beings of reason and do not directly belong to the scope of metaphysics. Therefore, it is not the concept of logical possibility that is in the centre of this *explicatio entis*, but the idea that being by itself is oriented towards actual existence independently from thought. Following this line of thought, Suárez finally identifies the central concept of being (*ens*) with the concept of ‘thing’ (*res*).¹¹⁴ In order

110 See n. 106, supra: “...dicimus essentiam realem esse, quae in sese nullam involvit repugnantiam neque est mere conficta per intellectum.”

111 *DM* 2.4.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 89): “[...] essentiam realem, id est non fictam, nec chymericam, sed veram et aptam ad realiter existendum.”

112 *Ibid.*, 2.4.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 89–90): “...essentiam realem esse, quae ex se apta est esse seu realiter existere.”

113 See *ibid.*, 1.4.22 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 33); *ibid.*, 3.2.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 108); *ibid.*, 6.4.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 219); *ibid.*, 54.1.4, 6 and 10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, pp. 1016, 1018); *ibid.*, 54.2.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 1020).

114 *Ibid.*, 2.4.15 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 92): “Unde obiter colligo, ens, in vi nominis sumptum, et rem, idem omnino esse seu significare, solumque differre in etymologia nominum; nam res dicitur a quidditate, quatenus est aliquid firmum et ratum, id est non fictum, qua ratione dicitur quidditas realis; ens vero in praedicta significatione dicit id, quod habet essentiam realem. Eadem ergo omnino rem seu rationem realem important.”

to avoid any misunderstanding, once again he points out what must be understood by 'real':

We cannot understand that an essence or whatness is real without its orientation towards being and real actual beingness; for considering an essence, which does not actually exist, we only conceive that it is real with regard to its quality, according to which *being an actual entity does not conflict with it* [my emphasis]—what it has by actual existence. So even if actual being does not belong to the essence of a creature, the orientation towards being or the aptitude for being belongs to its inner and essential concept.¹¹⁵

This explication takes up Scotus's conception of being. But the pattern to which it conforms is not Scotus's exposition of the 'most general' (*communissime*), due to its ontologically undetermined way of using '*ens-res*'; according to this exposition, which Scotus presents in the famous *Quodlibet* q. 3 referring back to Henry of Ghent's distinction between two meanings of '*res*', the term '*ens-res*', in its most general use, signifies the not-absolutely-nothing of the "conceivable, which does not include a contradiction."¹¹⁶ Suárez, however, completely ignores this concept of being in his *Disputationes*. Rather, his explication takes up the narrower, ontologically determined concept of being, which Scotus expounds in his *Quodlibet* q. 3 by means of an opposition between being and relatively nothing—the being of reason, which is thinkable without contradiction, but is inapt for an existence that is independent from thought.¹¹⁷

115 Ibid., 2.4.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 92): "...quod vero essentia aut quidditas realis sit, intelligi non potest sine ordine ad esse et realem entitatem actualem; non enim aliter concipimus essentiam aliquam, quae actu non existit, esse realem, nisi quia talis est, ut ei non repugnet esse entitatem actualem, quod habet per actualem existentiam; quamvis ergo actu esse non sit de essentia creaturae, tamen ordo ad esse, vel aptitudo essendi est de intrinseco et essentiali conceptu eius."

116 Duns Scotus, *Quodlibet* q. 3, n. 2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 114b): "...conceptibile, quod non includit contradictionem." For the historical background, see my analysis in Rolf Darge, "Diese Lehre ist von allen die gewisseste". Die Radikalisierung der aristotelischen Seinslehre in der Hochschulmetaphysik der frühen Neuzeit," in *Der Aristotelismus in der Frühen Neuzeit—Kontinuität oder Wiederaneignung?* eds. Günther Frank and Andreas Speer, Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 115 (Wiesbaden, 2007), pp. 17–42, esp. pp. 30–39.

117 Ibid., q. 3, n. 2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25 [Paris, 1895], p. 114a): "Et secundo accipitur in isto membro, minus communiter pro ente, quod habet vel habere potest aliquam entitatem non ex consideratione intellectus."

In order to explain this narrower, quidditative concept of being, Scotus, in his *Ordinatio*, applies the well-known formula “that, being does not conflict with” (“*hoc, cui non repugnat esse*”).¹¹⁸ ‘Being’ (*esse*) in this context simply means being independent from thought, for Scotus opposes being (*ens*) to the mere product of the intellect, and defines it as that “with which the true being [*esse*] of essence or existence does not conflict.”¹¹⁹

The Scotist definition contains a double negation. Why does Suárez make use of this intricate explication? Why does he not define being (*ens*), following the pre-Scotist tradition, simply as ‘that which is’ or ‘what has being [*esse*]’?

In Suárez’s view, the scientific exploration of being attains the knowledge (*scientia*) to which it is dedicated, according to the Aristotelian doctrine of science, if and only if it considers all kinds of real things under the aspect of an ultimate abstraction that prescind from any character of finite, contingent being, thus only comprising the *ratio* of being, which finite beings have in common with God and in which they themselves have the character of what cannot be otherwise. This *ratio* of being, then, expresses neither actuality nor potentiality, neither contingency nor necessity; formally, it only expresses the essence, which by itself has the aptitude to exist independently from thought. Just this aptitude is indicated in disputation 2.4 by the double negation, the non-conflict with actual existence.

This conveys a threefold consideration:

First, it implies that the essence itself is not being (*esse*) and, therefore, in its aptitude for actual being, has to be distinguished from ontological possibility, which is a mode of being (*esse in potentia*).¹²⁰

Second, it indicates that this aptitude is identical with the respective essence. Thus, a being (*ens*), in order not to conflict with actual existence, does not require any further quality or relation. In particular, it does not need a relation to the divine exemplary cause, nor to divine omnipotence. Rather, it inherently, that is, by its very essence, has this aptitude for actual being. “Therefore

118 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 43, q. un, n. 7 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, p. 354); *Ordinatio* IV, d. 1, q. 1, n. 8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 16 [Paris 1892], p. 109); *Ordinatio* IV, d. 8, q. 1, n. 2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 17, p. 7); correspondingly: *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 314 (ed. Vatican, vol. 3, p. 191); *Ordinatio* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 50 u. 52 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, pp. 291ff).

119 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 50 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, p. 290): “...cui scilicet non repugnat esse verum essentiae vel existentiae.”

120 See *DM* 2.4.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 91): “...intelligitur, ens sumptum in vi nominis non significare ens in potentia, quatenus privative vel negative opponitur enti in actu, sed significare solum ens ut praecise dicit essentiam realem, quod valde diversum est.”

we only can say that a real essence is that which by itself is apt (*ex se apta est*) to be or to exist really.”¹²¹

Third, it indicates that this aptitude has the character of an inner essential necessity, for a non-conflict can become a conflict only through a change within the essential content of the extremes.¹²² So even God, who productively recognizes every thing with regard to its essence, before creating it, despite His omnipotence, cannot transmute the creatability of a thing to its contrary, because the creatability of the respective thing has its inner principle in the content or structure of its essence.¹²³ Therefore, according to Suárez, the question of why being created conflicts with the chimera but not with the human being, for example, has to be answered in the same way Scotus answered it: “because this one is of this kind and that one is that kind, no matter which intellect conceives it.”¹²⁴

According to this view, contingent existing things of the empirical world have something necessary wherein they can be objects of the science of being. Conversely, this means that the science of being, by considering the contingent existing thing as being, concentrates on its quidditative formal structure, by which it is necessarily oriented towards an existence independent from thought; its investigation thereby relates just to that structure, which contingent things share with God and all possible worlds insofar as they are able to be created or suited to exist independently from thought. This necessary structure, however, cannot be detected and explicated in any other way than by an *a posteriori* reasoning, which starts from experience and from an analysis of our empirical concepts of real things, for “all our knowledge begins with sensual perception.”¹²⁵ In this way, metaphysical research transcends the objects

121 Ibid., 2.4.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 89): “...unde solum dicere possumus, essentiam realem eam esse, quae ex se apta est esse, seu realiter existere.”

122 See in this sense also Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 60 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, p. 296): “...quidquid repugnat alicui formaliter ex se, repugnat ei, et quod non repugnat formaliter ex se, non repugnat.”

123 *DM* 2.4.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 89): “...dicimus essentiam esse realem quae a Deo realiter produci potest, et constitui in esse entis actualis;” *ibid.*, 30.17.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 209): “...explicatur infinita virtus seu capacitas (ut sic dicam) illius potentiae [Dei], ut quidquid ex se non repugnat, sit possibile per ipsam. Constat autem illud maxime repugnare quod contradictionem involvit...”

124 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 60 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, p. 296): “Et quare homini non repugnat et chimerae repugnat, est, quia hoc est hoc et illud illud, et hoc quocumque intellectu concipiente.”

125 *DM* 1.5.22 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 43): “...humana cognitio a sensu incipit;” *ibid.*, 1.6.27 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 61): “...omnis nostra cognitio a sensu incipit.”

of experience in the direction of the most general, super-categorical necessary structure of beingness, or essentiality as such it is 'transcending science' (*scientia transcendens*) about being *qua* being.

7 Conclusion

Suárez's metaphysical approach clearly transforms the Latin tradition of metaphysics that Scotus had introduced. However, this transformation does not consist in a transmutation of the science of being to a theory of the *possibile logicum*, the merely thinkable. In fact, it does not at all transcend the framework of the Aristotelian doctrine of science, according to which first philosophy is a real science of extra-mental being. Rather, Suárez confirms the conception of metaphysics as the theory of the universal quidditative structure, which God and all creatable worlds have in common. This conception does not mean a breakaway from the tradition, but only a continuation and radicalization of tendencies that characterize the development of metaphysics since the mid-thirteenth century, due to the reception of the Aristotelian *Metaphysics* and its Arabic interpretations. Here, of crucial importance is Avicenna's systematic adoption of Aristotelian metaphysical thought, and the change from a theological to an ontological concept of first philosophy: from its understanding as wisdom to its understanding as theoretical universal science; from the primacy of the order of perfection to the primacy of the order of predication; from the first beginning of thinking with divine being to the first beginning of thinking with the most universal *ratio* of being; and from the multiplicity of the categorically confined meanings of 'being' to the unity of the transcategorical concept of being as such. Suárez himself considers his approach not as a radical restart but rather as a completion of the traditional project of first philosophy. This project aims at an ultimate philosophical justification within the framework of a theoretical discipline that, on the one hand, meets all requirements of an Aristotelian demonstrative science and, on the other hand, does not contradict the Christian assumption of the contingency of any created being—and furthermore, that generally admits revelation as well as a theological science occupied with its explication as possible and reasonable.

With respect to the scientific foundation, Suárez's metaphysics implements the methodological requirements that Aristotle himself had formulated in his doctrine of science but had not accomplished in his doctrine of being. Against this background, Suárez regards his own systematic outline of metaphysics only as the realization of the Aristotelian program of a science of being *qua*

being, as his expositions in the *Index locupletissimus in metaphysicam Aristotelis* and in the prologue of the second disputation show.

Nevertheless, in this continuation, the Aristotelian doctrine of being undergoes a radical transformation. The focal point of this transformation is the new quidditative, entirely simple concept of being, which, according to Suárez, is predicated in just the same sense, from God and creature, substance and accidents—notwithstanding that the predication follows an ‘analogical’ order of the prior and posterior (*secundum prius et posterius*).¹²⁶ Through its consequent application and systematic explication, first philosophy in the *Disputationes* takes a new shape. A clear indication of this new shape is the division of the doctrine of being into a general part, which is concerned with being in general and the attributes and principles of being *qua* being, and a special part, which in the scope of the metaphysical abstraction from matter deals with particular forms of being—also and in the first place with God.¹²⁷ That way, the philosophical doctrine of God, which Suárez, in accordance with the philosophical tradition, considers to be the culmination of first philosophy, obtains a new systematic position, which indicates a shift of meaning. It no longer means a trespassing on the level of the transcendentals towards the transcendent divine being, which founds the transcendental being *qua* being; rather, it now means an *inner* constituent part and an innerly perfecting moment of the explication of being as being. According to Suárez, who follows Scotus in this view, a philosophical understanding of God beyond the subject of first philosophy is inconceivable because this subject coincides with the first adequate object of the human intellect, which circumscribes the horizon of that which is, in itself, understandable (*per se intelligibile*).

Thus, the first part of the science of being retains a strict orientation towards the explication of the most general, transcendental *rationes*, which innerly underlie all particular real structures, and are therefore implicitly comprehended in any apprehension of beings and are presupposed in any scientific

126 Regarding Suárez's doctrine of the analogy of being and the methodical function of this doctrine within the *Disputationes metaphysicae*, see Victor Salas's contribution to this volume, “Between Thomas and Scotus: Suárez on the Analogy of Being,” and Rolf Darge, “Grundthese und ontologische Bedeutung der Lehre von der Analogie des Seienden nach F. Suárez,” *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 106 (1999): 312–333.

127 *DM* 1.5.23 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 43): “Distinguendae videntur duae partes huius doctrinae: una est, quae de ente ut ens est, eiusque principiis et proprietatibus disserit. Altera est, quae tractat de aliquibus peculiaribus rationibus entium, praesertim de immaterialibus.”

investigation.¹²⁸ But these *rationes*, which open the horizon of the knowable, must be entirely simple. Accordingly, the understanding of these *rationes* necessarily has a maximum of simplicity and certainty. Therefore, with regard to this first part of the doctrine of being, there is, from Suárez's viewpoint, "no doubt that among all scientific disciplines, this one is the most certain,"¹²⁹ because it is the most concerned with first principles—that is, with these *rationes* and those propositions, which on the basis of their conception immediately become evident—and thus needs fewer additional assumptions, which are, in and of themselves, not evident.¹³⁰ The Aristotelian doctrine of being undergoes a radicalized transformation in this first part of Suárezian metaphysics, insofar as Suárez endeavours to accomplish the Aristotelian ideal of first philosophy by a systematic explication of the most simple and most general necessary structure of reality, asserting a claim to a maximum of scientific precision.

The great exponents of the European academic philosophy up to the eighteenth century derive their understanding of the subject of first philosophy from Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae*. Christian Wolff explains this subject in his *Ontologia* (1728)—the most important link between the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition of transcendental thought and the Kantian transcendental philosophy—literally in accordance with Scotus and Suárez as "that which is apt to exist, with which existence thus does not conflict"; therefore, the concept of being, as Wolff immediately adds, "absolutely does not include existence, but only the non-conflict with existence or—what is the same—the aptitude for existence."¹³¹

128 Ibid., 1.2.27 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 21): "...rationes universales, quas metaphysica considerat, transcendentales sunt, ita ut in propriis rationibus entium imbibantur;" *ibid.*, 1.4.13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 29): "...[metaphysica] transcendentales rationes entis declarat, sine quarum cognitione vix potest in aliqua scientia quippiam exacte tractari."

129 Ibid., 1.5.23 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 43): "Quoad priorem partem, non dubium est quin haec doctrina sit omnium certissima."

130 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 43): "...ea scientia est certissima, quae circa prima principia maxime versatur, et quae ex paucioribus rem conficit; ita vero se habet haec scientia, quia talis scientia magis est independens, habetque principia notiora, ex quibus alia principia robor et certitudinem accipiunt." Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1.2.982a30.

131 See Christian Wolff, *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia*, § 134, Ges. Werke II. Abt. Bd. 3, ed. Jean Ecole (Hildesheim re-print, 1962), pp. 115f.: "Ens dicitur, quod existere potest, consequenter cui existentia non repugnat. ...Notio entis in genere existentiam minime involvit, sed saltem non repugnantiam ad existendum, seu, quod perinde est, existendi possibilitatem."

Considering this link, a new perspective on the history of Kantian transcendental philosophy arises, from which prevailing interpretations become questionable. The ontological issues and main ideas that induce the new Kantian approach are not, as the prevailing view assumes, developed within a supposed tradition of an 'Onto-Logic' of the mere thinkable (*cogitabile, possibile logicum*). Rather, it is the inquiry into the necessary quidditative conditions of real existence, developed in the Aristotelian branch of academic philosophy, that prepares Kant's transcendental turn and his new approach towards the traditional question of how metaphysics, as science, is possible.

Suárez and the Baroque Matrix of Modern Thought

Costantino Esposito

1 'Baroque Thought'

Scholars now almost universally accept that Francisco Suárez's metaphysical, theological, and juridical thought constitutes a source of primary importance for the rise and development of modern philosophy. Indeed, one could even say that just such a figure as Suárez reveals the inadequacy of the interpretation of Renaissance and early modern thought as the mere gesture of breaking away from the scholastic tradition. One just has to consider the decisive role played by Jesuit teachings in Europe during the seventeenth century in order to perceive this tradition as a widely shared structure of thought, thanks, and only thanks, to which (paradoxically) the so-called 'moderns' could be 'against it'. The scholastic tradition invented and nourished, in some way, its own enemies, who often took their fundamental concepts directly from it.

Certainly, concepts that are similar can be used in partially—or indeed, totally—different contexts, and lead to incommensurate results. Yet, at the same time, one cannot deny that some of the *late-scholastic* theoretical options (from gnoseology to metaphysics, from theology to philosophy of law) lend themselves to being used in the decidedly and programmatically *anti-scholastic* perspectives of modern thought. Thus, at times, the conceptual dependence and debt between the two camps are to be sought not only, and not primarily, in what they explicitly have in common, but exactly in what most distinguishes them, as if their close bond persisted *sub contrario*. And one must not forget that this direct line between scholastic philosophy and modern thought is accompanied by, and often merges with, another line of thought, which divides—and at the same time binds together—the Catholic and Protestant theological camps, starting from the second half of the sixteenth century.

These forces—at once unitary and conflictual—in which doctrinal differences and ruptures should always be interpreted on the basis of a continuity and homogeneity of a metaphysical, or rather 'ontological', kind, are what we have come to call 'baroque thought'. It has one especially peculiar feature: that of constituting the theoretical 'matrix', or dominant line of thought, for a whole series of notably divergent, indeed conflicting, philosophical and theological doctrines. Hence, one could call it a 'neutral' matrix, which has represented the meeting point of a whole era—roughly from the Council of Trent to Kant's

critique of eighteenth-century rationalist *Schulmetaphysik*—because it has provided the conceptual basis and specific lexis for a variety of competing theories and conceptions of the world.

One should not be surprised by the fact that we indicate two very different phenomena as the temporal limits of our historical characterisation of baroque thought, for there is a *fil rouge* tying them together: the critical-transcendental turning point of classical metaphysics, effected by Kant, is undoubtedly the result of both the early modern contestation and the re-foundation of scholastic ontology. Yet, scholastic ontology, for its part, had already wrought a new synthesis and a profound ‘metabolisation’ of the divergent tendencies in the medieval schools within the uninterrupted Aristotelian tradition, in view of a renewed arrangement of Catholic theology first, and Protestant theology later.

In this historical characterisation of the ‘baroque’, which could ideally be dated from the 1560s (following the Council of Trent, which concluded in 1563) to the 1760s (including the publication of Kant’s *The Only Possible Argument for the Demonstration of the Existence of God* in 1763), Suárez undoubtedly occupies a key place.

Suárez must always be collocated within the context and tasks required by his time, which included: (1) the revival of the great legacy of medieval theology through the systematic reclamation of Aquinas’s *Summa theologiae* as the doctrinal canon of the Roman Catholic Church, especially in contrast to Lutheranism; (2) the elaboration of a metaphysical discourse, that is, of an ontology and a natural theology that could serve as the foundations for a revealed theology; (3) the reflection on the new status of natural law (a kind of theological-juridical anthropology) and of international law, in order to deal with problems linked to the spread of Church and State among the indigenous populations of the New World; and (4) the dissemination of his own teachings, whether directly or indirectly, in some of the most important Catholic universities and colleges, and then, surprisingly, even in some of the universities of Reformation Europe, especially with regard to his new system of ‘metaphysics’.

Yet, apart from looking back, Suárez must also be evaluated by looking ahead, since it is from him, or through him, that certain threads, which we will find in the weave of modern thought, begin to unravel. Hence, Suárez forms, as it were, a crossroads, a place of passage and *chiasmus*, indeed, an exquisitely *baroque* place, in which tradition ‘curves’ in order to form a new horizon of modernity, and modernity brings with it, shaping it in a new ‘fold’¹ and from unexpected perspectives, the metaphysical tradition of the past. Let us now try to follow some of these curvatures.

1 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, *Le pli. Leibniz et le Baroque* (Paris, 1988), pp. 38–54.

2 From Theology to Philosophy (and Back Again)

Francisco Suárez was never a ‘philosopher’ as such, but *only* a professional ‘theologian’—and what a theologian! If one takes into account the fact that from the mid 1570s he was one of the key players not only in the Society of Jesus, but also along the vaster front of the Roman Catholic Church in the doctrinal battle with Catholic orthodoxy, his theological orientation becomes more than obvious. The fact that a theologian would be concerned with philosophy is not, however, a novelty in the history of medieval thought, to which Suárez, as he regarded himself, is a true heir. In his case, though, we are faced with a new situation. On the one hand, he continues the consolidated theological practice in which philosophy—as a purely rational or natural science—must precede, on a logical and conceptual level, the ‘sacred doctrine’, that is, the science of revealed fact. On the other hand, he performs an inverse process that begins with revealed theology and seeks to elaborate a philosophical doctrine according to the order of reason alone, which can absorb and translate, on a purely natural plane, what mankind has apprehended historically as a fact of faith.

He thus carves a path—whether circular or zigzagging—that goes *both* from philosophy to theology and from theology to philosophy. Such an attempt certainly arises from the intention to fulfil the demands of the Counter Reformation, with its decisive reaffirmation of the natural (albeit fallen) goodness of mankind and the innate ability of reason to grasp the created being of all reality, as well as its completion through supernatural grace.

At the same time, the way in which Suárez seeks to achieve this goal is by elaborating an independent system (and a treatise) of philosophy, which, while excogitated in the light of *sacred doctrine* and with a view to serving the latter, can in principle be conceived and used apart from theology. This is indeed what was beginning to happen in various European universities, both Catholic and Protestant, in the seventeenth century, and then more decisively in rationalist scholasticism of the eighteenth century. Precisely because Suárez’s purpose was to fulfil a specifically theological task, he was the initiator of an independent and neutral treatment of metaphysics, that which today we would call modern ontology.

In a (perhaps still undervalued) work from 1959 on the fate of metaphysics from Aquinas to Heidegger, Gustav Siewerth writes that Suárez’s *Disputationes metaphysicae* represents the ‘last work’ of scholasticism, precisely because it demonstrates the dialectic movement between metaphysics and theology, which constitutes one of the most vital matrices of modern thought.² It represents,

2 Cf. Gustav Siewerth, “Das Schicksal der Metaphysik von Thomas zu Heidegger,” in *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. W. Behler and A. von Stockhausen (Düsseldorf, 1987), vol. 4, pp. 184–185.

moreover, a dramatic and historic turning point. In approaching philosophical discourse from an acquired, or already fully known, theological presupposition, one runs the risk of continually reducing what is known through historical revelation to what can be known through the internal principles of purely natural knowledge. The consequence of such a move is that one would therefore be 'transferring to philosophy the theological apriority of thought' (that is, dogmatic content or *depositum fidei*) and leaving theology with the mere role of an 'apologetic demonstration' of a revealed datum.³

This is the short circuit between theology and philosophy that Hans Urs von Balthasar calls 'the vicious circle, almost without an exit, of neo-scholasticism', in which the biblical revelation of God no longer seems to imply the 'philosophical mystery of being'; and while the latter is reduced to general and neutral principles, theology, for its part, is reduced to an apology in an altogether clerical sense.⁴

In effect, Suárez's first metaphysical gesture consists of assuming the *role* of metaphysician, *since he is already* a theologian; in other words, he represents a philosopher as a 'character', but is a theologian as an 'interpreter'. The paradoxical consequence of this procedure is that the more the metaphysical character has to be represented, in his true nature, as a pure researcher of the natural reason of being, the more his interpreter has *to know already* the origin and ultimate end of every thing. From this perspective, one can fully appreciate the significance of the fact that—as Suárez clearly states at the beginning of the *Disputationes metaphysicae*—he had to interrupt his treatment of sacred doctrine in order to prepare a didactic-systematic instrument for his young theology students:

...every day I saw more and more clearly the extent to which divine and supernatural theology needs and requires this human and natural [theology]—to such an extent that I did not hesitate to interrupt that unfinished work for a little while in order to give (or, better, restore) to this metaphysical doctrine its rightful place and standing, as it were. [...] In the present work I am doing philosophy in such a way as to keep always in mind that our philosophy should be Christian and a servant to divine theology. I have kept this goal in view, not only in discussing the questions, but even more so in choosing my views or opinions, inclining

3 Siewerth, *Das Schicksal der Metaphysik*, p. 260.

4 Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Herrlichkeit*, vol. 3.1: *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, Part 2: *Neuzeit* (Einsiedeln, 1965), pp. 386–387.

toward those which seem to comport better with piety and revealed doctrine.⁵

More than just a traditional *praeambula fidei* in order to understand God's supernatural revelation, this ground plan is a veritable hermeneutic circle from the *ratio metaphysica* to the *depositum fidei*. It is a circle that, nevertheless, is not perfect, for while it is true that, regarding doctrine, (revealed) theology is the starting point and goal of philosophical research, regarding our knowledge, it is philosophical research that makes possible the determination and even the 'fulfilment' of theological doctrine:

Even though divine and supernatural theology relies on the divine light and on principles revealed by God, still, because it is perfected by human discourse and reasoning, it is aided as well by truths known by the natural light. And it uses those truths as helpers and, so to speak, instruments in perfecting its own discourses and in illuminating divine truths. Now among all the natural sciences, the one that ranks first of all and goes by the name of First Philosophy is especially useful to sacred and supernatural theology. This is so, both because it comes closest of all of them to the cognition of divine matters, and also because it explains and confirms those natural principles which comprehend all things in general and which in some sense support and undergird every doctrine. [...] For these metaphysical principles and truths fit together with theological conclusions and arguments in such a way that if one takes away knowledge and complete understanding of the former, then knowledge of the latter must likewise be greatly undermined.⁶

5 *DM, Ratio et discursus totius operis. Ad lectorem* (ed. Vivès, vol. 25): "In dies tamen luce clarius intuebar, quam illa divina ac supernaturalis Theologia hanc humanam et naturalem desideraret ac requireret, adeo ut non dubitaverim illud inchoatum opus paulisper intermittere, quo huic doctrinae metaphysicae suum quasi locum ac sedem darem, vel potius restituerem. [...] Ita vero in hoc opere philosophum ago, ut semper tamen prae oculis habeam nostram philosophiam debere christianam esse, ac divinae Theologiae ministram. Quem mihi scopum praefixi, non solum in quaestionibus pertractandis, sed multo magis in sententiis, seu opinionibus seligendis, in eas propendens, quae pietati ac doctrinae revelatae subservire magis viderentur."

6 *Ibid.*, Prooemium (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 1): "Divina et supernaturalis theologia, quanquam divino lumine principiisque a Deo revelatis nitatur, quia vero humano discursu et ratiocinatione perficitur, veritatibus etiam naturae lumine notis juvatur, eisque ad suos discursus perficiendos, et divinas veritates illustrandas, tanquam ministris et quasi instrumentis utitur. Inter omnes autem naturales scientias, ea, quae prima omnium est, et nomen primae philosophiae obtinuit, sacrae ac supernaturali theologiae praecipue ministrat. Tum quia ad

Therefore, the task of metaphysics coincides with what is required by revealed theology, whereas the task of theology is already comprehended—by means of natural theology—*within* first philosophy. This was a very important moment in the ‘baroque’ reorganization of theological doctrine, entailing a new arrangement within philosophy itself. Accordingly, Suárez conceives the relation between natural theology (or ‘metaphysics’ *tout court*) and supernatural theology on the basis of another, epistemologically pre-existing relation, one between a *more general* part of first philosophy (which studies the general concept of being, together with its universal principles) and a *special* part (which considers the different kinds of determined or particular beings).

This is the late scholastic—or indeed, ‘modern’—reformulation of the famous *aporia* concerning the ‘object’ of first philosophy, which is both the study of being *qua* being (and its principles) and the study of the highest form of being, the ‘divine’ (*theologikē epistēmē*). The originality of Suárez’s contribution consists in presenting this reformulation as an editorial system, since he published the *Disputationes metaphysicae* in two volumes: the first (*Disp.* 1–28) is dedicated to the concept of being and its properties, while the second (*Disp.* 29–53) is dedicated to the different kinds of determined being, that is, God and His creatures. With this, the possibility of a revealed theological discourse comes to depend on the particular interpretation of the name, object, and task of metaphysics in its ‘general’ part.

In order to understand better what is really at stake in Suárez’s choice, it might be useful to compare it with the standard interpretation of metaphysics given by Thomas Aquinas, which is also elaborated from the perspective of a Christian theologian, but in a very different manner. In his Commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, Aquinas observes that the term ‘metaphysics’ is properly assigned to *sapientia* (as the *scientia regulatrix* of all other forms of knowledge) in that it takes into consideration the universal principles of intellectual knowledge, which are being and everything that belongs to it, such as ‘the one and the many, potency and act’. When this same science instead considers those entities that are completely separate from sensible matter in their very being, such as God and the separate intelligences, it is then called ‘divine science or theology’. Finally, because this science considers the first causes of things, it also earns the name ‘first philosophy’.

divinarum rerum cognitionem inter omnes proxime accedit, tum etiam quia ea naturalia principia explicat atque confirmat, quae res universas comprehendunt, omnemque doctrinam quodammodo fulciunt atque sustentant.... Ita enim haec principia et veritates metaphysicae cum theologicis conclusionibus ac discursibus cohaerent, ut si illorum scientia ac perfecta cognitio auferatur, horum etiam scientiam nimium labefactari necesse sit.”

For Aquinas, these three considerations meet in a single science, since the first causes coincide with the separate substances, while that which they cause—i.e., being in general (*ens commune*)—is the only true ‘subject’ (*subiectum*) of this science. Indeed, knowledge of the causes of this subject is the result to which this science must lead.⁷ Aquinas, therefore, highlights—on the basis of Aristotelian epistemological principles⁸—an essential difference between the subject of metaphysics (i.e., being in general, which *can also* exist without matter) and the first causes of that subject (i.e., God and the intelligent substances, which *can never* exist in matter). This means that, for Aquinas, God can never be considered simply as the ‘object’ of metaphysics, neither in natural theology nor in revealed theology. Indeed, on the one hand, the locution *scientia Dei et beatorum* is a subjective genitive, indicating the knowledge that God has of Himself (and of all things) and not the knowledge that we have of Him; on the other hand, while *theologia nostra* does consider *res divinae*, it only does so in that they manifest themselves through revelation, hence our knowledge only participates through assimilation in the knowledge proper to God.⁹

But let us return to Suárez. At the beginning of the *Disputationes metaphysicae* he examines the different names for metaphysics, such as ‘wisdom’, ‘prudence’, ‘philosophy’, ‘first philosophy’, and ‘natural theology’, taking all of them from different passages in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. The last name, in particular, constitutes the linchpin around which the redefinition of this science turns: *naturalis theologia* “deals with God and divine things insofar as this is possible in the light of nature.” And *for the same reason* it is also properly called metaphysics, “as if it were constituted after physics or beyond physics” (*quasi post physicam, seu ultra physicam constituta*), both in the so-called ‘subjective’ sense, in that it considers those things discovered after physical things, and in

7 Thomas de Aquino, *In Metaph*, ed. R.M. Cathala and R. Spiazzi, “Prooemium”: “Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune. Hoc enim est subiectum in scientia, cuius causas et passiones quaerimus, non autem ipsae causae alicuius generis quaesiti. Nam cognitio causarum alicuius generis, est finis ad quem consideratio scientiae pertingit.” On the problem of the relation between the ‘subject’ and ‘object’ of metaphysics in the trajectory Aristotle-Avicenna-Aquinas, see Jean-François Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris, 1990), part I, cc. 1–2; Pasquale Porro, “Tommaso d’Aquino, Avicenna e la struttura della metafisica,” in *Tommaso d’Aquino e l’oggetto della metafisica*, ed., S.L. Brock (Rome, 2004), pp. 65–87.

8 For the epistemological principles of Aristotelean science, see *Posterior Analytics* 76b¹⁰.

9 On the relation between the theology of philosophers (*scientia divina*), true divine knowledge (*scientia Dei et beatorum*), and the theology of revelation (*sacra doctrina*), cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Super Boetium de Trinitate*, q. 2, a. 2.; *ibid.*, q. 5, a. 4, ad 5; *ST I*, q. 1, a. 2; *ibid.*, I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1.

the 'objective' sense (*ex parte obiecti*), in that it deals with "the things that come after physical or natural things, because they go beyond the order of these and are constituted at a higher level of reality." So this science, as Aristotle says, will be *princeps et domina* with regard to all the others, "because it surpasses them in dignity and, in some way, establishes and confirms the principles of all the others."¹⁰

Yet if metaphysics indicates primarily 'natural theology' and deals with the highest level of reality, this means that the concept of God cannot be considered *only* as the cause of the object of metaphysics (being), but must itself fall directly within the object of this science. For this to be possible, God Himself must be considered, first and foremost, *as a being*, which presupposes the reason of 'being as such'. The *ratio* of supreme being—the *ipsum esse subsistens*, or universal cause of being, of which Aquinas speaks—can be traced back to the *ratio entis in quantum ens* along a precise genealogy that begins with Avicenna and, passing through Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, comes to Suárez (and, as we know, continues beyond the Spanish Jesuit, at least to Wolff and the eighteenth-century *Schulmetaphysik*).

This *ratio entis* is literally absolute, since it precedes—as an 'objective' concept—both creator and creatures (that is, determined beings), letting us think of them both simply as beings, and not, in the first instance, as in a relation among themselves. Since Suárez characterises *metaphysics* as *natural theology* (in view of *revealed theology*), he is obliged to base it on a preliminary 'ontology' (even though this term is not used in the *DM*).¹¹

3 Metaphysics and the Connective Tissue of Being

A metaphysics thus 'programmed' in an ontological sense can only have *ens in quantum ens reale* as its 'adequate object' (*adaequatum obiectum*). This is a minimal and abstract concept that *contains* everything, except for merely accidental beings and 'beings of reason' (even though Suárez will eventually include them in the *DM*). Beyond real substances and accidents, 'being as such' (*ens ut sic*) also includes God and immaterial substances. God's is a strange metaphysical fate. On the one hand, He is the principle of all beings, and in this

10 *DM* 1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 2): "Varia metaphysicae nomina."

11 In the most recent research, the first occurrence of the word 'ontology' is found in *Ogdoas scolastica* (1606) by the Calvinist theologian and metaphysician Jakob Lorhard, or Lorhardus; see Marco Lamanna, "Sulla prima occorrenza del termine 'ontologia'. Una nota bibliografica," *Quaestio. Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* 6 (2006): 557–570.

sense Suárez labels Him as *praecipuus obiectus*, the primary object of metaphysics. Yet, on the other hand, He is included 'in a precise sense' (*praecise*) within the *ratio entis ut sic*. In this case, therefore, it is as if the consideration of being 'as such' (*ut sic*) prescinded from a creatural relation, distanced itself from all generation (though *post factum*, since every being is what it is because it is created) and, in some way, reabsorbed in itself both origin and provenance. In other words, being is to be understood by abstracting it from its relation with the creator, even though, obviously, Suárez the theologian always presents this interpretation of being as a hypothesis, or better, as a merely logical-conceptual *fictio*.

In effect, how could a simple philosophical abstraction ever compromise God's priority? While it does not compromise His position at the summit of the whole system, it definitely compromises His presence within the *thinkability* of being. God creates being, true, but given that metaphysics must abstract from its datum, being can indeed be thought of in an absolute sense (*absolute*) apart from God, even though one must continue to recognise God as the most important 'contraction' or 'determination' of this being. Suárez writes:

God belongs to this science, not only as the cause of the object of metaphysics, but also as its principal part [...] Since God is an object [that is] knowable naturally in some way [...] He can fall within the sphere of a natural science, not only as extrinsic principle, but also as principal object: [...] so God falls, in an absolute sense, under the object of this science.¹²

As an extrinsic principle, He is the real cause; as the principal object, He is under the formal principle of *noesis*, that is, logical non-contradiction. 'Knowableness' thus becomes the measure of the relation to God, no longer considered God as such, but as *ens*—indeed, the supreme *ens*. Knowledge has thus definitively fixed God's place (and, by God, what a place!) within and under being.

Yet with the interruption of the original and constitutive nexus between *ens commune* and its first cause (an interruption only on a metaphysical and not on a physical or theological-revealed level), even the concept of being has a

12 DM 1.1.19 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 8–9): "*Deus non solum ut causa obiecti metaphysicae, sed etiam ut pars illius praecipua ad hanc scientiam pertinet. [...] Nam Deus est obiectum naturaliter scibile alioquo modo [...]; ergo potest cadere sub aliquam naturalem scientiam, non solo ut principium extrinsecum, sed etiam ut obiectum praecipuum [...]* ergo absolute Deus cadit sub obiectum huius scientiae."

different meaning from that in Aquinas. For the latter, being does indeed signify that which is divided into ten genera and that which indicates the truth of a proposition, but also, and above all, it signifies (in its primary meaning) the derivative of the verb *esse* in virtue of an *actus essendi*.¹³ For Suárez, on the other hand, the primary meaning of being is that of 'thing' (*res*), in the sense of 'essence' or 'quiddity'. Being is only *that* which is, irrespective of the provenance or derivation of its being. Starting from this point, one can (or must) *also* think of the relation between that which is and the subsisting being (or God), but this is only done *afterwards*, in a second moment, as an addition with regard to the primary meaning of being, which remains the key to open (or close, if you like) the total mystery of the sense of being. The basic consequence of this structuring of the 'object' of metaphysics is its unity, or oneness. The mental act with which we think of being (what Suárez calls the 'formal concept') forms a single, indivisible content, and is gathered in it, as the *objective concept*:

I say, then [...] that to the formal concept of being corresponds a single objective concept, adequate and immediate, which does not expressly state either substance or accident, God or creature, but all these things as one, in other words, since they are in some way similar and converge in being.¹⁴

So this is literally a *neutral* concept. On the one hand, being is a 'general' concept, the simplest reason for everything, and therefore *excludes* all diversity (that is, being this or that thing, since every determination and diversity always requires the addition of something to the abstract reason of 'beingness'). Yet, on the other hand, it is also *included* in all possible objects, even in God, which present themselves as the contractions or specifications of being.

Being is thus grasped and defined as 'object'; or rather, it delineates the horizon of an 'object-ness' in general, which precedes the existence itself of the object and is identified as the mere possibility of its knowable essence.¹⁵ The concept of being *qua* being is intended as a *ratio* that connects and comprehends all things,

13 Cf. for example, Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, c. 1; *In I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1; *Summa contra gentiles* I, c. 25, n. 10; *In Metaph.*, l. IV, lect. 2, n. 553.

14 *DM* 2.2.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 72): "Dico ergo [...], conceptui formali entis respondere unum conceptum obiectivum adaequatum, et immediatum, qui expresse non dicit substantiam, neque accidens, neque Deum, nec creaturam, sed haec omnia per modum unius, scilicet quatenus sunt inter se aliquo modo similia, et conveniunt in essendo."

15 On Suárez's concept of being as 'an objectness without an object', see Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique*, pp. 157 sq. (the expression comes from André de Muralt).

both finite and infinite, creatures and creator, to the extent that it becomes a veritable '*fabricatio universalitatis*' (DM 6.6.12). In this sense it is *transcendens*, not only because it is trans-genus and trans-category (i.e., indeterminable in any predication, but preceding and founding every category), but also because it can be something, in the minimal sense in which something 'is' (being), in contrast to being (or being opposed to) nothing. Such a *ratio entis* (objective since it is formal) grasps the *similitudo* and *convenientia* that all real beings possess in their *raison d'être*, and so they all convene:

...just as being and non-being are diverse and opposed primarily among themselves—the reason why we say that the very first principle is the one according to which *something is or is not*—in the same way, any being possesses a certain congruence or resemblance to any other being, since our intellect finds more congruence between substance and accident than between substance and non-being or nothing (*nihil*). Even the creature participates, in a certain way, in the being of God and so we say that it is, through some congruence or resemblance in being, at least the vestige of God....¹⁶

Yet here we notice a 'jump' between the two orders: the congruence between *all* beings—including God—is based essentially on the minimal reason of *not being nothing*, and only this can make the 'positive' participation of the creature (*vestigium*) in God thinkable (at least in a purely metaphysical sense).

4 Being and its 'Inferiors': Distinction, Inclusion, Analogy

Already with regard to the formal concept of *ens*, and then even more so with regard to the objective concept, a problem emerges regarding the relation between the transcendental concept (*transcendens*) of being and beings that convene in virtue of this concept. In short, this is a problem of the relation between the formal-objective unity of the concept of being, and its analogical

16 DM 2.2.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 74): "...nam, sicut ens et non ens sunt primo diversa et opposita, propter quod dicitur esse primum principium omnium, *quodlibet esse vel non esse*, ita quodlibet ens habet aliquam convenientiam, et similitudinem cum quolibet ente; majorem enim convenientiam invenit intellectus inter substantiam et accedens, quam inter substantiam et non ens seu nihil; creatura etiam participat aliquo modo esse Dei, et ideo dicitur saltem esse vestigium ejus propter aliquam convenientiam et similitudinem in essendo."

inclusion and predication in determined beings. Suárez's preference is immediately given to the analogy of intrinsic attribution:

...the analogy of being does not consist in some form, present intrinsically in just one of the analogues, and extrinsically in all the others; rather, it consists in a being, or entity, participated in by all of them intrinsically, and so it is in this reason that all things convene in reality, and consequently, they possess an objective unity in the reason of being.¹⁷

From this derives a twofold consideration of the relation between the general concept of being and the concept of determined beings. On the one hand, there is an *intellectual distinction* between the objective concept of being and all the particular reasons of being (for example, the reason of substance or accident); on the other hand, we find a *real indistinction* between the concept of being and the *inferiora* in which, from time to time, it exists.¹⁸ In other words, the problem lies in establishing what is the least possible distinction present in things, whether beyond the "perfect real distinction between reciprocally separable beings, there can be found in things—prior to [being found] in the intellect—another minor distinction, which is what usually subsists between a thing and its mode;"¹⁹ that is, whether being a *determined* thing is really a distinct mode from the thing itself (as when we say, for example, that the substance adds to the being a mode that the being in itself does not express). In an opinion that Suárez attributes to Duns Scotus and the Scotists, "being expresses an objective concept, distinct and precise, in reality, from all the inferiors, however simple they are, such as substance, accident and so on."²⁰ For Suárez, on the other hand, "one must affirm that the objective concept of being, since it exists in reality itself, is *not* something distinct and precise, in reality, from the inferiors in which it exists."²¹

17 Ibid., 2.2.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 75): "...analogia entis non est in aliqua forma, quae intrinsece tantum sit in uno analogato et extrinsece in aliis, sed in esse seu entitate quae intrinsece participatur ab omnibus; in illa ergo ratione habent omnia realem convenientiam, et consequenter unitatem objectivam in ratione entis."

18 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.2.15ff, *ibid.*, 2.3.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 75–76, 83).

19 Ibid., 2.3.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 82): "...supponendo, praeter distinctionem realem perfectam, quae intercedit inter entitates mutuo separabiles, posse in rebus ante intellectum aliam minorem inveniri, qualis esse solet inter rem et modum rei..."

20 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.3.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 83). Here Suárez refers to John Duns Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, qq. 1 e 3; *ibid.*, d. 8, q. 2; *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1.

21 Ibid., 2.3.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 83): "...dicendum est, conceptum entis objectivum prout in re ipsa existit, non esse aliquid ex natura rei distinctum ac praecisum ab inferioribus in quibus existit."

This is one of Suárez's most typical theses, and has been largely validated by posterity. The primary notion of being, at least in metaphysics, is not *participial*, which refers to the actual existence of a thing ('something existing in act'), but *nominal*, which indicates a "real essence, that is, not invented nor illusory, but rather true and apt to exist really."²²

So what does 'real essence' mean? (1) In a negative sense, "real essence is that which does not entail any contradiction, nor is it a mere invention of the intellect" (*quae in sese nullam involvit repugnantiam, neque est mere conficta per intellectum*). (2) In a positive sense, it is a *posteriori* "the principle or the root of real operations or effects" (*principium vel radix realium operationum, vel effectuum*), and a *priori* "real essence is that which can be really produced by God and can be constituted in the being of an actual being" (*dicimus essentiam esse realem, quae a Deo realiter produci potest, et constitui in esse entis actualis*).²³

This carries two important consequences. The first is that, for Suárez, the metaphysical relation essence-existence (*ens nomen-ens participium*) is absolutely not to be identified with the relation potency-act, since already in 'being' as a noun—that is, as a real essence—are included not only being in potency (the concept of a real being still without existence), but also being in act, to the extent that the notion of essence is virtually 'determined' or 'apt' to actual existence.²⁴ The second consequence is that being, intended metaphysically as a noun, is an *essential predicate* of every determined being: "it is predicated, in a quiddative sense, of its inferiors," and certainly not 'absolutely' (in which case it could only be predicated of God), but relatively, of its being as creature:

...so, even though being in act does not belong to the essence of a creature, nevertheless, the order of being or the aptitude for existence belongs *intrinsically* and *essentially* to its concept, and in this way, being is an essential predicate.²⁵

This solution to the problem of the relation between the concept of being and its inferiors leads Suárez to establish the relation between creature and creator as a *particular* or *special* determination of the more fundamental relation

22 Ibid., 2.4.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 89): "...si ens sumatur prout est significatum hujus vocis in vi nominis sumptae, ejus ratio consistit in hoc, quod sit habens essentiam realem, id est non fictam, nec chymericam, sed veram et aptam ad realiter existendum."

23 Ibid., 2.4.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 90).

24 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.4.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 91).

25 Ibid., 2.4.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 92): "...quamvis ergo actu esse non sit de essentia creaturae, tamen ordo ad esse, vel aptitudo essendi est *de intrinseco et essentiali* conceptu ejus; atque hoc modo ens praedicatum est *essentiale*" (my italics).

between a particular determination of (or a secondary addition to) the metaphysical constitution of every being (in this case, the being-creator or the being-created) and a being instead considered in itself, *only* as a being:

...it seems clear that the creature, in that it is a being, does not come to be defined through the creator, or the being of God, but through its being *as such*, and because it exists outside of nothingness: if indeed the relation to God were *added* to it, by saying, for example, that the creature is a being in virtue of its participation in divine being, then already the creature could no longer be defined as a being, but only as a determined being, in that it is created. Finally, by now it has already been shown that being is expressed with a single concept for everything that is contained in it, and that the reason for being that is expressed in creatures can constitute the starting point for finding a similar reason, existing in a more elevated way, in the creator too.²⁶

Certainly the theologian *knows well* that every being exists in that it is caused in its being by God, hence in the extent to which it is constituted in a relation of dependence on something other than itself. However, for the metaphysician, this relation can—indeed must—be suspended; in order to conceive being, one must no longer think of it necessarily and intrinsically *as* a relation. Only thanks to this absolute concept of being can one *subsequently* find a similarity between creator and creature, but then it will be too late to retrieve this relation at the origin of the concept itself of being. Nevertheless, one must not forget that the metaphysical pre-eminence of the concept of being as such, as opposed to the concept of creature-creator, has the sole purpose, for Suárez, of safeguarding (paradoxically) the very order of creation as possible and thinkable on the basis of natural reason.

5 The Invention of ‘Pure Nature’

Here the matrix of ‘baroque’ metaphysics again reveals itself, imbued moreover with the anti-Lutheran motivations elaborated by the Council of Trent,

26 Ibid., 28.3.15 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 18): “Item constat, creaturam, ut ens est, non definiri per creatorem aut per esse Dei, sed esse ut sic, et quia est extra nihil; nam si addatur habitudo ad Deum, verbi gratia, creaturam esse ens, quia est participatio divini esse, sic non iam definitur creatura, *ut ens est, sed ut tale ens est*, nimirum creatum. Denique iam supra ostensum est, ens uno conceptu dici de omnibus sub illo contentis, et rationem entis in

which sought to re-propose the classical ‘congruence’ between Catholic theology and natural metaphysics, by means of a systematic metaphysical re-foundation of theological discourse. In particular, Reformation theology had opened up a rift between the natural and the supernatural, between the created world and the transcendence of the Creator, between logical possibility and revealed fact, all of which had to be mended.

The way in which Suárez recomposes or mends this rift is especially worthy of note. He reaffirms the concordance between natural thought and the *depositum fidei*, while holding fast to the question raised by Luther about the radical separation between God and the world, and the unfathomable difference between the natural and the supernatural. In the Catholic response (at least, as proposed by Suárez), the way to safeguard this difference is not to set grace against a nature conceived in terms of an absolute fall and definitive decadence, but rather to think of an intermediate structure—a so-called ‘pure nature’—which allows us to determine afresh the nexus between grace and *natura lapsa*.

In other words, a ‘heuristic’ structure needed to be elaborated, which would allow the connection between these two irreducibly disconnected planes. From a Lutheran theological perspective, the gap between the natural and the supernatural could be filled only by the inscrutable action of divine grace, which could only be conceived by man through faith (*solo fide*), but which could no longer be ‘thought’ within the terms of a metaphysical discourse. Suárez tries, instead, to think of another nature, one not dominated by sin, which in principle—or better, as a hypothesis—does not need grace (hence it is *pure nature*), and with regard to which divine grace is effectively free, that is, not a must.

The question is developed by Suárez in the *De legibus*, especially in his treatment of natural law. For Suárez, in order to comprehend the concept of natural law, one has to consider that human life is oriented toward an ultimate goal that is not single but dual, both natural and supernatural. The pre-Christian philosophers “did not recognize a supernatural end for man, but only treated of a certain happiness in this life, or better, of a condition conducive to spending it in peace and justice.” As a consequence, they conceived laws “only with a view to this end,” and only distinguished between ‘natural law’ and ‘human law’ (the latter in the sense of ‘civil law’):

But since faith teaches that all men are oriented toward the supernatural goal of a future life, to be pursued with adequate means, then rightly

creaturis inventam posse esse initium inveniendi similem rationem altiori modo in creatore existentem.”

sacred theology concludes that this natural law is necessary for a very different motive, and that men need different positive laws with respect to those which philosophers have managed to determine.²⁷

It is important to underline that, for Suárez, the passage from an exclusively natural order in human life to a supernatural one does not entail the former being overcome by the latter, but rather, it entails maintaining—on a hypothetical level, as a mental experiment—a *merely* natural plane, distinct from the plane of an *effectively* existing nature; unlike the latter, it does not require supernatural grace in order to be complete and perfect. Man's natural condition, therefore, is not only distinguished from the action of grace, but is doubled, in its turn, into two states of nature. The first is *indifferent* to grace, while the second is oriented and *predisposed* to it.

This requires that man himself be considered in a *double register* (*secundum duplicem naturam et duplex rationis lumen*). In the first, man must be considered in his *pure nature*, that is, in his substance as a rational soul, hence in the light of a reason that is innate to that substance (*secundum puram naturam seu substantiam animae rationalis et consequenter secundum rationis lumen illi connaturale*); in the second, however, man must be considered according to the *nature of grace*, which infuses him from above, hence in the divine and supernatural light of faith, guiding and governing his earthly life (*iuxta naturam gratiae desuper homini infusae et secundum divinum ac supernaturale lumen fidei per quod pro statu viae regitur et gubernatur*).²⁸ So, on the one hand, there would seem to be a decisive metaphysical 'jump' between the two orders (nature-grace), while on the other hand, these orders belong together in a deeper way than might at first appear:

One can distinguish, therefore, a twofold natural law, one *purely natural*, the other *simply supernatural* but *nevertheless natural* in a certain sense, that is, in relation to grace. So, while even pure natural law is divine, since it emanates from God, the natural law of the divine order is much more divine. The former [pure natural law] comes from God through nature, from which it emanates as a property; the latter, on the other hand, comes

27 *De leg.*, 1.3.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 10; Pereña, vol. 1, pp. 46–47): "At vero cum fides doceat homines ad finem supernaturalem vitae futurae per convenientia media in hac vita exequenda ordinari, recte sacra theologia infert longe aliter esse necessariam hanc legem naturalem et pluribus legibus positivis homines indigere, quam iidem philosophi fuerint assecuti."

28 Cf. *ibid.*, 1.3.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 10; Pereña, vol. 1, p. 47).

from God, who instils grace and casts a supernatural light in order to direct men in the observance of the dictates of this law, with the help of stimulating and adjuvant grace [...] And so, one can say that both laws are innate to the human race.²⁹

Yet precisely because both derive from God and so both are innate to the human race, the relation between *purely natural* law and natural law *through grace* allows us to think of a *twofold order*: a pure nature and a pure grace, which are indeed coordinated, but also conceivable *ab origine* in terms of their discreteness.

This twofold system can be verified in Suárez's treatise *De gratia*, especially in the Prolegomenon entitled *De statibus humanae naturae*.³⁰ The initial problem here is whether man was created in a state of pure nature in order to have a supernatural end (*An possit homo in statu purae naturae creari, in ordine ad finem supernaturalem*).³¹ This is a strange question for a Catholic theologian, who begins from a point of knowledge of the gift and intercession of supernatural grace! Nevertheless, in this case too, Suárez poses the question just *hypothetically*, with a precise apologetic intention (against the Pelagian theory that all nature is already predisposed and destined *in itself* for grace) and in order to emphasise the complete detachment of absolutely free divine action, in contrast to what is due by nature to nature (not only in the face of the challenge represented by the Protestant Reformation, but also in the light of the famous *de auxiliis* controversy between Jesuits and Dominicans, on the aid given by divine grace to human freedom).

29 Ibid., 1.3.12-13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 5, p. 10; Pereña, vol. 1, pp. 47-48): "Si ergo lex naturalis duplex distingui potest: una pure naturalis, alia simpliciter supernaturalis; naturalis autem respective per comparationem ad gratiam; unde cum lex naturalis etiam pura divina sit, quia a Deo manat, multo magis lex naturalis divini ordinis divina est; nam prior est a Deo mediante natura a qua manat, tanquam proprietas eius; posterior autem est a Deo per se infundente gratiam et ipsum supernaturale lumen ac actualiter etiam dirigente homines ad dictamina illius legis perficienda per auxilia gratiae excitantis et adiuvantis. Denique utraque lex dici potest connaturalis generi humano" (my italics).

30 The elaboration of a treatise on grace dates to the courses held at the Collegio Romano in the early 1580s and to those held in Coimbra at the end of the 1590s, which were published posthumously between 1619 and 1621. In the Vivès edition, the *Tractatus de gratia Dei seu de Deo salvatore, iustificatore, et liberi arbitrii adiutore per gratiam suam* takes up four volumes (from nn. 7-10), with a fifth volume (n. 11) of theological pamphlets that deal with, among other things, the fundamental points of the so-called *de auxiliis* controversy, on the efficacious help given by God to human freedom.

31 *De gratia*, prol.4.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 179).

Among the different distinctions that can be made between the states of human nature, the first is that between *status viae* and *status patriae*. However, this distinction is not taken into consideration directly, since what interests Suárez is not so much our beatitude in heaven as the progress of our life on earth. In order to understand this progress, says Suárez, theologians refer to a second distinction, that between *status naturae integrae* and *status naturae lapsae*. Yet a third distinction is also possible—and here Suárez is accompanied by Gaetano Thiene and the ‘more recent theologians’—in which we do not begin from the states that “human nature has in fact assumed at different times” (*in diversis temporibus de facto habuit humana natura*), and instead, “we suppose that none of these is a state of pure nature” (*supponimus autem neutrum illorum esse statum purae naturae*). Considered as a mere hypothesis, the *status purae naturae* comes before the other two pairs, since in the latter something is always *added*—namely, God’s grace—which they lack in principle. And so:

...even though this state [of pure nature] *has not in fact been verified*, as I take for granted and as will be shown by sound doctrine in the following, *one can nevertheless think of it as possible*; indeed, it will have to be taken into consideration in order to understand the other states, since this state effectively constitutes *the basis of the others*.

Given its fundamental role, therefore, and in view of the whole doctrinal system, the hypothetical state of pure nature is treated *before* the others, and “only *after* can one speak of the other two and the various members into which they can be subdivided.”³²

The *status purae naturae*, furthermore, can be understood in two ways, one positive and one negative. In a positive sense, this state is one in which human nature possesses an essential perfection, and so all of its natural faculties are in concurrence with the divine, that is, there is divine providence that by nature belongs to it, in other words, which is naturally due to it (*concursum ac providentiam Dei sibi naturaliter debitam*). In this case, pure nature is simple created nature. But this state may also be understood in a negative sense, in the hypothesis that

32 Ibid., prol.4.1.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 179): “...et ideo Cajetan. et moderniores theologi tertium considerarunt statum, quem pure naturalium appellarunt, qui, *licet de facto non fuerit*, ut suppono, et infra juxta sanam doctrinam ostendam, *cogitari tamen potest ut possibilis*, et illius consideratio ad aliorum intelligentiam necessaria est, quia revera hic status est *veluti aliorum fundamentum*; ideoque de illo *in primis* dicendum est; *postea* vero de aliis duobus, et de variis membris in quae subdividi possunt, disseremus” (my italics).

there is *nothing* 'added' to it, that is, there is nothing that is not due to nature itself (*nihil naturae superadditum, ei non debitum*). So the latter would literally be above—or better, below—good and evil (*sive malum, sive bonum*), in other words, it would be a nature without sin and without punishment (*ut nec peccatum habeat, nec, quod est consequens, reatum poenae*). But, above all, it entails a nature untouched by the blessings of grace, since grace itself would be something *not* due to nature (hence the hypothesis is 'negative'); it would be a perfection or completion that nature does not require *per se* (*neque etiam affecta sit aliquibus gratiae donis, aut perfectionibus naturae non debitis*).

Especially indicative of Suárez's position is the fact that the 'positive' consideration of the state of pure nature—that is, being *simply* created in nature—does not constitute a problem (*nulla est quaestio*), and so is taken to be an obvious, accepted fact. Instead, what interests him *as a problem* is just the 'negative' meaning of *puritas naturalis*, that is, the *puritas* which only expresses a negation.³³

We can summarise the question as follows: can human nature be created pure, that is to say, completely without supernatural blessings or the ability to attain, through adequate means, those blessings of grace; in other words, can human nature have its own end?³⁴ The process suggested by Suárez is circular, or rather, zig-zagging: (a) one begins with the standard theological proofs of *sacred doctrine* (human nature created and redeemed by grace); (b) one goes backwards from this position and hypothesises their absence as *facta*, while restricting created nature to pure nature, to which grace is not due; (c) one can now return to understanding supernatural action in its absolute gratuitousness with regard to mere nature.

Regarding a: One begins with the affirmation that God could never create human nature without ordaining its ultimate goal, and so man could never be created—"etiam de potentia absoluta"—without an "*appetitus innatus*" or—"pondus naturae ad videndum Deum"—since this desire and this basic tendency (the true *gravitas* of human existence, as Augustine reveals in speaking of the disquiet in man's heart) are not really distinct from nature itself, which cannot therefore be created without them: "*non ergo potest condi natura sine illo*."³⁵

33 Cf. *ibid.*, prol.4.1.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, pp. 179–180).

34 *Ibid.*, prol.4.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 180): "Et ita quaerimus an possit humana natura ita pura creari, ut his donis supernaturalibus, et potestate proxima ad illa comparanda, omnino careat." It is this capacity that, in a technical sense, is called *potestas proxima* in order to distinguish it from *potestas remota*, which coincides with the capacity for obedience inherent in human nature.

35 Cf. *ibid.*, prol.4.1.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 181).

Regarding b: If it is true that pure nature is in itself neutral with regard to an ultimate goal, then one must admit that the action of supernatural grace is necessary for nature, and so one would have to refute the hypothesis of a pure nature.

Regarding c: This refutation, however, would carry a greater risk, as represented by the Pelagians' position (in particular that of Michael Baius): the gift of grace would be inherent in human nature itself, which would mean that eternal life would simply be innate.³⁶

Accordingly, the object of the theological debate, as Suárez presents it, is to question the fundamental nexus between nature and grace, between the simply natural and the supernatural, in order to avoid the danger of the latter being assimilated by the former. And this is the paradoxical solution that he proposes: to dissolve, at least hypothetically, the constitutive nexus between man and his ultimate goal, and to reconstruct a state *in puris naturalibus* in order to emphasise the absolute difference of the *supernaturalis*.

This is a paradoxical solution, as mentioned above, because in rebutting the self-sufficient naturalism of the Pelagian heresy, Suárez makes a substantial concession with regard to the *thinkability* of the purity of nature. For the Pelagians, purity means, in a positive sense, self-sufficiency (i.e., nature would be capable, in itself, of grace, which would thus be due to it). For Suárez, on the other hand, purity means, in a negative sense, the *non-necessity* of grace, and so its *necessary gratuitousness* with regard to nature. Yet both arguments hinge on the same concept, which the Pelagians consider as real and Suárez as merely hypothetical.

To 'undo' the Pelagian error, therefore, and provide a sounder reason for many of the dogmas concerning divine grace ("*Hoc existimo esse necessarium fundamentum ad evertendum errorem Pelagii, et ad reddendam solidam rationem plurium dogmatum de divina gratia*") one must affirm that eternal happiness (*beatitudo*), for which man was created and which he is promised as a reward for his merits (*merces meritorum*), is simply and absolutely supernatural ("*simpliciter et absolute supernaturalem esse*"). Man's ultimate goal, his eternal happiness, is not a goal of human nature in itself, but is beyond it and is prepared by supernatural providence ("*supra naturam hominis est, et ex supernaturalis providentia praeeparatur*").³⁷

36 Ibid., prol.4.1.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 181): "Inter assertionem autem Michaelis Baji, aliquas invenio ex quibus colligi potest illum sensisse vitam aeternam esse homini connaturalem, et quasi jure naturae debitam. Hinc enim dixisse videtur ad meritum vitae aeternae non esse necessariam gratiam adoptionis, sed solum ut homo legis opera faciat."

37 Ibid., prol.4.1.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 182), where we read again: "Illa ergo beatitudo supra naturam hominis existit, ut est quaedam formalis hominis perfectio, et consequenter etiam, ut est finis ultimus, supernaturalis est: nam beatitudo et finis ultimus idem sunt."

Suárez refers here to Thomas Aquinas and his doctrine of man's twofold ultimate goal. One goal is natural—or better, in the Aristotelian sense, inherent in man's intellectual nature—to which he tends through the impetus of his own nature, while the other exceeds nature, and is received through grace. Since the latter coincides with celestial happiness—i.e., with something supernatural—it must be said that if man is ordained to achieve such happiness—i.e., if he is created for this ultimate supernatural goal—this is not to be ascribed to his own nature (“*non esse ex naturae debito*”), but comes from God's free and amorous will (“*sed ex gratuita dilectione et voluntate Dei*”).³⁸

However, as often happens in Suárez's work, the explicit reference to Aquinas brings a silent (but appreciable) change of perspective. In my opinion, what is weakened, or indeed lost, in Suárez's reading is the fact that in Aquinas, the natural and the supernatural are conceived as a constitutive relation, not reducible either to a system of separateness or to one of inclusion; the difference and surplus between them (or, more precisely, of grace with regard to nature) does not mean that each can be thought without the other, but the opposite: the very difference of the supernatural comes to constitute the identity of the natural, without being annulled by it. For Suárez, on the other hand, it would seem that separation must precede this relation, which in turn must be understood as the *addition* of one term to another.³⁹

As Suárez himself admits, man was created *de facto* for a supernatural goal, and so he was created in grace (*omnis creatura intellectualis in gratia creata est*).⁴⁰ Certainly, he can lose his original sanctity through sin, as does Adam, but this confirms that he was never created in a state of pure nature, nor can he ever achieve it, since from an original state of grace (attested by the fact that he tends toward a supernatural goal), man does not pass to a state of pure nature, but to one of sin; and vice versa, from a state of sin, man does not pass to a state of pure nature, but returns to one of grace. So “as regards ordinary law, the rational creature cannot be, except in grace or in sin; hence not in pure nature.” However, for Suárez, the hypothesis of pure nature is too important, in view of a redefinition of the role of grace, to be jettisoned in virtue of the

38 Cf. *ibid.*, prol.4.1.10–11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 182). For Thomas, see, for instance, *ST* I, q. 23, a. 1.

39 On this question, see the following two classic studies: Henri de Lubac, *Surnaturel. Études historiques* (Paris, 1946), c. 5, and Michel Bastit, *Naissance de la loi moderne. La pensée de la loi de st. Thomas à Suárez* (Paris, 1990), part III.

40 *De gratia*, prol.4.1.13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 183): “...dicendum est primo, *de facto* nullam creaturam intellectualem fuisse aut existisse unquam in puris naturalibus conditam, cum solo ordinem ad connaturalem finem, imo neque esse posse secundum legem ordinariam a Deo statutam” (my italics).

primary theological acquisition of *de facto* creation. There is, though, another possibility—at least *de iure*—that cannot be excluded:

God could have created man in a purely natural order with respect to his ultimate goal, without thereby changing his nature, that is, without denying man anything to which he is entitled because of his nature [...] what God has indeed given to man, beyond pure nature, is grace, and so He could also not have given [him] grace, while still conserving the other laws of nature.⁴¹

So if God wanted (*si velit*), He could create, and also complete, *only* this natural capacity, and not give man anything that requires faith and grace (or rather, the mere *capacitas oboedentialis*) as its basis. On the one hand, “grace is not due to nature” (*gratia non est naturae debita*), but on the other hand, even if “human nature lacked grace, it would not be without anything that is its due” (*licet humana natura illa careret, nulla re sibi debita privaretur*).⁴²

In order to save the transcendent irreducibility of grace, Suárez leads us to think that, even though man was created for some kind of happiness and ultimate goal, he was not necessarily created for a happiness that is more than natural, and so is not necessarily lacking a supernatural happiness (what Suárez calls here ‘*clara visio Dei*’). In short, he *could* have been created in a state of pure nature, without the *appetitus naturalis ad videndum Deum*.⁴³ The *ratio a priori* for this lies in the fact that there is no active, or passive, natural potential in man for beatific vision—that is, for complete happiness—nor for grace. In other words, there is no potential in man with respect to which such a vision constitutes an innate goal.

True, in order to receive the blessings of sanctified grace and instilled virtues, man does have the right *potentia oboedentialis*, which allows him to receive an action coming from above without its following the necessary order

41 Ibid., prol.4.1.16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 184): “Secundo, dicendum est potuisse Deum creare hominem in puris naturalibus respectu finis ultimi, non immutando naturam ejus vel aliquid ei naturaliter debitum negando. [...] quia quidquid Deus contulit homini ultra puram naturam est gratia; ergo potuit illam non dare, servatis alias legibus naturae.”

42 Ibid., prol. 4.1.18 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 184).

43 Ibid., prol.4.1.19 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 185): “Nam est quidem verum, hominem non posse connaturali modo creari, nisi propter aliquam beatitudinem, et finem ultimum; negamus vero *necessario* fuisse creandum propter beatitudinem, quae consistit in visione clara Dei, nam illa supernaturalis est, et non deest alia beatitudo naturalis, propter quam homo in pura natura creari posset” (my italics).

of natural laws, and so it cannot be induced or caused by this natural order. However, for Suárez, this is precisely what does not allow for a direct connection between desire and vision. With respect to the *visio Dei*, human potential is a *potentia neutra*. If this were not the case, man would desire ‘naturally’ to know as the angels know; that is, he would tend by nature toward an abstract knowledge of God and things, which would be instilled in him. But this is not true, for if it were, it would be like saying that the human body tends naturally to fly; hence, one cannot think that man tends *naturally* toward that specific mode of divine knowledge, which is beatific vision.⁴⁴

From this perspective, nature is *sufficient in itself* and its appetite is already *fulfilled* naturally. However, it is clear—and worth repeating—that for a Catholic theologian this is, and must remain, a mere rational hypothesis, not a fact. One could almost say that it is more a heuristic fiction than a verifiable fact. Yet it is this very division between hypothesis and fact, between what God could have done and the recognition of what He has done, and between man’s virtual and actual capacity, that represents the critical node of the problem.

Herein lies the greatness, but also the ambiguity of baroque metaphysics, intended as the solution to the problem of the nexus between philosophy and theology. In order to safeguard the gratuitousness of grace, one has recourse to the concept of a pure nature; this purity, moreover, could be taken not only as a virtual, but also as an original structural condition (as indeed would soon happen in the course of modern thought). As a consequence, grace could be thought of as an accessory, and therefore not essential to an understanding of the structure and goal of nature. In other words, from being that which completes nature without taking anything away (*gratia non tollit, sed perficit naturam*), grace becomes that which is added to an already ‘complete’ nature.

Undoubtedly, in Suárez’s theological design, this new ‘baroque’ order certainly did not aim to weaken, but rather to emphasise divine revelation; furthermore, it was not limited to presenting divine revelation as the moment of completion of the pre-Christian natural order, but included and assimilated within it the natural foundation itself of theology. In short, the theory of pure nature, on a par with the neutral concept of ‘being as such’, was, for Suárez, the utterly ‘natural’ proof of God’s glory. The Jesuit motto *ad maiorem Dei gloriam* meant for him that revelation was called upon to see itself as the ontological structure of the natural world. And just as God’s infinite, sovereign, and eminent character can manifest itself only in His being a ‘being’, as an addition or contraction of a universal ontological order, so grace is supernatural because it

44 Cf. *ibid.*, prol.4.1.21 (ed. Vivès, vol. 7, p. 185).

is added to a nature that is almost absolute in its purity. It is obvious that both being and nature are *created* by God, but already here, in Suárez's writing, they begin to be thought of paradoxically, as if God did not exist—*etsi Deus non daretur*.

(English translation by Lisa Adams)

Francisco Suárez as Dogmatic Theologian

Robert Fastiggi

1 Introduction

Most contemporary scholarship on Suárez focuses on his contributions to metaphysics and law.¹ Suárez, though, as the preceding chapter has made clear, was first and foremost a theologian. Except for four years teaching philosophy at Segovia (1570–1574), the rest of his academic career was spent as a professor of theology: at Valladolid, Segovia, and Ávila (1574–1580); Rome (1580–1585); Alcalá (1585–1593); Salamanca (1593–1597); and finally Coimbra (1597–1615).²

2 The Theological Corpus of Suárez Published During His Lifetime

Most of Suárez's writings are theological in nature. Of the twenty-six volumes included in his *Opera omnia*, published by Vivès between 1856–1878—excluding volumes 27 and 28, which are indices—only the *Disputationes metaphysicae* (volumes 25–26) and *De legibus* (volumes 5–6) can be considered more philosophical than theological.³ But even in these writings, the theological dimension is not missing. For example, in the prologue to the *Disputationes metaphysicae*, Suárez writes: “It is impossible to be an accomplished theologian without first establishing a firm foundation in metaphysics.”⁴ His metaphysics, therefore, can rightly be called “Christian and at the service of theology.”⁵ Furthermore, Suárez's theological concern is even more pronounced in his *De legibus*: Book 4 of this work deals with canon law, Book 9

1 See Jean-Paul Coujou, *Bibliografía suareciana* (Pamplona, 2010).

2 See the chronology of Suárez's life in Raoul de Scorraille, *François Suarez de la Compagnie de Jésus*, Volume 1 (Paris, 1911), pp. xix–xxi.

3 See Coujou, *Bibliografía suareciana*, pp. 12–13, and 14, which mentions the added volume 29 consisting of six unedited writings of Suárez that are theological or ecclesiastical in nature.

4 Suárez, *DM, Ad lectorem, Opera omnia*, Volume 25 (Paris: Ludovicus Vivès, 1856–1878), henceforth Vivès.

5 John P. Doyle, trans. and ed., *The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: Metaphysical Disputations 28–29* (South Bend, IN, 2004), p. xi.

treats the divine positive law of the Old Testament, and Book 10 concerns itself with the divine positive law of the New Testament.

Suárez only began publishing when he was in his early forties. His first published works reflected on theological topics drawn from courses he had been teaching, and they were written as commentaries on Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, a common practice among theologians of Baroque scholasticism. The *De Incarnatione Verbi*, published in 1590 when Suárez was forty-two, was a commentary on questions 1–26 of the *tertia pars* of the *Summa theologiae*. The second volume, which then treats questions 27–59, was published in 1592. It is usually referred to by its subtitle, *De mysteriis vitae Christi* (On the Mysteries of Christ's Life). In this volume, Suárez treats the issues according to his own method of 'disputations', thus breaking free of the commentarial method typical of his era. Accordingly, he provides twenty-three disputations dealing specifically with the mysteries and prerogatives of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which occupy 336 double-columned pages in the Vivès edition.

So detailed is Suárez's discussion on the Blessed Virgin Mary that some consider him to be "the founder of systematic or scholastic Mariology."⁶ Along these lines, José Maria Bover observes that:

Mariology, as we understand it today, was a creation of the innate talent of Suárez; who, by gathering and arranging the materials accumulated through the ages; by contrasting opposing opinions within the Patristic tradition and theological reason; by organizing systematically the Mariological truths and theses, constructed a scientific work, consistent and harmonious, worthy of the Mother of God.⁷

After *De mysteriis vitae Christi*, Suárez continued to explore and write about various theological subjects. In 1594 he published a treatise on the question of whether works of mortification may be revived after repentance, *Questio Theologica: Utrum opera mortificanta...reuiuscant*.⁸ Because he had been teaching courses on the sacraments at Alcalá and Salamanca, it was fitting that his next publication would be on the sacraments. In what would become volumes 20 and 21 in the Vivès edition, in 1595 he published a volume treating the sacraments in general, as well as specific topics such as baptism, confirmation, and the Eucharist, using the structure of a commentary on the *Summa theologiae* III, qq. 60–83.

6 Michael O'Carroll, C.S.Sp., *Theotokos: A Theological Encyclopedia of the Blessed Virgin Mary* (Wilmington, DE, 1982), p. 334.

7 José Maria Bover, S.J., "Suárez, Mariólogo," *Estudios Eclesiásticos* 22 (1948): pp. 167–168.

8 Coujou, *Bibliografía suareciana*, p. 9.

Following a new edition of *De Verbo Incarnato* in 1595, Suárez's next publication was one he had been working on for some time, namely, his *Disputationes metaphysicae*, which appeared as two volumes in Salamanca in 1597. A major motivation for composing these fifty-four metaphysical disputations was Suárez's dissatisfaction with the way philosophy was being taught at Alcalá and Salamanca. He did not believe it corresponded to the methods envisioned by the Jesuit course of studies, the *Ratio studiorum*, for which he had served as an advisor.⁹ Therefore, he thought it important to provide a treatment of metaphysics more systematic than the previous approach, in which "the teaching was organized around commentaries on Aristotle and Aquinas, rather than a way that reflects the conceptual order of the material."¹⁰ His presentation of metaphysics is thus structured around being in general, *ens ut sic* (disputations 1–27), and the divisions of being, *divisiones entis* (disputations 28–54).

The brilliance and thoroughness of the *Disputationes metaphysicae* was recognized soon after its publication. Between its initial publication in 1597 and 1636, it had gone through seventeen editions.¹¹ Pope Alexander VII (r. 1655–1667) regarded it as one of the most important influences on his own intellectual development,¹² and much later John Paul II (r. 1978–2005) noted its widespread use even in German Lutheran universities.¹³

Next, in 1599, Suárez published a volume of six small works in theology, *Opuscula theologia sex*. These six small treatises were composed in response to Pope Clement VIII's appeal to the Jesuit superiors to have their best theologians address the *De auxiliis* controversy, which had arisen as a result of the Dominican attacks on the 1588 work *Concordia*, written by the Jesuit Luis de Molina (1536–1600), who was seeking to address the harmony of free will with divine grace, foreknowledge, and predestination.¹⁴ The titles of Suárez's six *opuscula* manifest his attempt to deal with the subtlest aspects of the controversy.¹⁵ *De concursu et efficaci auxilio Dei* tries to discuss the concurrence and

9 Benjamin Hill, "Introduction" to *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez*, eds. Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (Oxford, 2012), p. 17.

10 Ibid.

11 José Pereira, *Suárez: Between Scholasticism & Modernity* (Milwaukee, WI, 2007), p. 11.

12 De Scorraillie, *François Suarez*, vol. 1, p. 333.

13 John Paul II, encyclical, *Fides et ratio* (14 September 1998), no. 62.

14 See De Scorraillie, *François Suarez*, vol. 1, pp. 402–404.

15 The controversy resulted in a commission, formed by Clement VIII in 1597, that continued to examine the matter until 1607, when Paul VI approved a formula for ending the controversy. In essence, this 1607 formula forbade both sides from censoring each other and stated that a future decision would be forthcoming. Because of the subtlety of the issue, however, the Magisterium decided to allow the various schools (Jesuit, Dominican, and

efficacy of divine assistance with human freedom. The *De scientia Dei futurum contingentium*, for its part, deals with God's knowledge of future contingents, while the *De auxilio efficaci* takes a more in-depth look at workings of divine grace. His *De libertate divinae voluntatis*, moreover, focuses on the freedom of God's will, and the *De mentis mortificationis* investigates how works of mortification and penance contribute to the life of grace. Finally, in the *De justitia qua Deus reddit praemia*, Suárez attempts to explain how God rewards merits and punishes sins.

These six *opuscula*, however, were attacked by the Dominican Domingo Báñez (1528–1604), who was the chief opponent of Molina, Suárez's Jesuit confrere.¹⁶ Suárez wrote a response by way of a letter to Pope Clement VIII, which has been included among the six unedited works published in volume 29 of the *Opera omnia*.¹⁷

In 1602, Suárez continued his treatment of the sacraments with treatises on Penance and Extreme Unction, using the form of a commentary on part three of the *Summa theologiae*, q. 84–90, and various parts of the supplement to the *Summa*. In 1603, he followed this work by publishing treatises on censures and excommunication, namely, *De censuris* and *De excommunicatione*.

During the years 1606–1609, Suárez taught classes on grace and composed detailed works on the subject, which, however, would only be published posthumously in 1619. During these years he also published a number of noteworthy works, including the 1606 *De Deo Uno et Trino*, which included an index showing how the topics treated correspond to the first forty-three questions of the *prima pars* of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*. In 1606, Suárez also composed a work dealing with the break of Venice from the Holy See. He sent this work, titled *De Immunitate ecclesiastica contra Venetos*, to Pope Paul V in early 1607. The Roman Pontiff was so pleased with the treatise that he responded with a letter, dated 2 October 1607, which praised the work as that of an “outstanding and pious theologian” (*Theologum eximium...ac pium*), whence Suárez derived his sobriquet *Doctor eximius ac pius*,¹⁸ a title that Popes Alexander VII (r. 1655–1667), Benedict XIV (r. 1740–1758), and Pius XII (r. 1939–1958) have used in reference to Suárez.¹⁹

Augustinian) to hold their respective views as long as they adhered to the teachings of the Council of Trent. See Heinrich Denzinger and Peter Hünermann (henceforth Denz.), *Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, 43rd edn. (Freiburg, 2010), nn.1997, 1997a, 2008, 2564–65.

16 De Scorraille, *François Suarez*, vol. 1, p. 427.

17 See Coujou, *Bibliografía suareciana*, p. 14.

18 De Scorraille, *François Suarez*, vol. 2, p. 505.

19 Pereira, *Suárez*, p. 12.

The text of *De Immunitate*, however, was only published posthumously, and it is also included among the six unedited *opuscula* eventually included in volume 29 in the *Opera omnia*.²⁰

Between 1608 and 1609, Suárez published his first two volumes on the virtue and state of religion, *De virtute et statu religionis*. After his death, in 1624 and 1625, two more volumes of *De virtute et statu religionis* were published. These volumes—often referred to as simply *De religione*—are so detailed that they take up volumes 13 through 16 of the Vivès edition. In addition to covering the topic of religion as a virtue and a state, Suárez discusses prayer, devotion, the Liturgy of the Hours, vows, religious obligations, the varieties of religious orders, and the religious life of the Society of Jesus.

In 1612, Suárez published *De legibus*, a monumental treatise in ten books that takes up volumes 5 and 6 of the Vivès edition. Book 1 discusses the nature of law in general, as well as its causes and effects. Book 2 examines eternal law, natural law, and the law of nations (*jus gentium*). Book 3, for its part, takes up positive human law, considered in itself. In this book, Suárez also examines civil laws, and how and when they are appropriate. Book 4 is concerned with the positive ecclesiastical law, known as canon law. Among the topics treated here are: the relation of ecclesiastical power to civil power, whether canon laws bind in conscience, and whether ecclesiastical laws bind under the penalty of mortal sin. Book 5 looks at the variety of human laws, as well as multiple questions on the obligation of laws (e.g., whether ignorance excuses one from legal punishment). Book 6 examines the interpretation, mutation, and cessation of human laws, while Book 7 discusses the nature and obligation of unwritten laws or customs, and Book 8 deals with the notion and application of privileges. Book 9 treats the divine positive law of the Old Testament, discussing a number of important issues including whether the Old Law could justify people, and whether the precepts of the Old Law have ceased since the coming of Christ. Book 10 is a profound exposition of the New Law legislated by Christ. This last book examines the relation of the New Law to the Old and the perpetuity of the 'law of grace', and discusses how laws inform human beings internally and externally.

The year 1613 marks the publication of Suárez's last major work published before his death, namely, his *Defense of the Catholic Faith Against the Errors of the Anglican Sect* (*Defensio fidei Catholicae adversus Anglicanae sectae errores*). Usually referred to simply as the *Defensio fidei*, this treatise was written at the request of the papal nuncio to Madrid, Decio Caraffa, and Cardinal Scipione Borghese, nephew of Paul V, who, in 1610, informed Caraffa that the Holy Father

20 Coujou, *Bibliografía suareciana*, p. 14.

would be pleased if Father Suárez could refute the Anglican position of 'the divine right of kings,' defended by King James I.²¹

Because Suárez was already engaged in writing *De legibus*, the *Defensio fidei* was not published until 1613. The treatise is divided into six books. The first book examines the nature of the Anglican schism, and why the 'Anglican sect' can no longer be considered Catholic. Book two, furthermore, discusses the particular errors of the Anglican sect with regard to the Catholic faith. Book three is a systematic exposition of the power and authority of the Roman Pontiff. In a particular way, it treats the foundations and extent of papal authority, taking into account the distinction between the spiritual and temporal authority of the pope. Book four examines the immunity of the Church from temporal or secular jurisdiction, in direct resistance to the Anglican claim that the monarch is the 'supreme head of the Church'. Book five, moreover, is a refutation of the Protestant claim that the pope is the Antichrist. Finally, Book 6 critically examines the Anglican demand for English Catholics to take an oath of fidelity to the English monarch. For Suárez, such an oath of allegiance would compromise Catholic allegiance to the Roman Pontiff. He takes note of the Anglican persecution of Catholics, and the many English martyrs who have died because of their fidelity to the pope and the Catholic faith. The *Defensio fidei* was burned in London in December of 1613,²² and because of its challenge to the divine right of kings, it was also examined by the French Parliament, which soon condemned it as well, and had it burned in Paris in June of 1614.²³

3 Posthumous Theological Writings

Suárez retired from teaching in 1615 at the age of 67, and he died on 25 September 1617, a few months shy of his seventieth birthday.²⁴ After his death, his friend and Jesuit colleague, P. Baltasar Álvares (1561–1630), edited practically all of his remaining writings and arranged for their publication.²⁵ These posthumous writings are almost entirely theological. Parts I and III of Suárez's treatise on grace, *De gratia*, were published in Coimbra, Portugal, in 1619. Part II of *De gratia* was published later in Lyon, France, in 1651.²⁶ In 1620, Suarez's

21 De Scorraile, *François Suarez*, vol. 2, p. 172.

22 Ibid., p. 194.

23 Ibid., pp. 202–204.

24 In addition to De Scorraile, see P. Monnot, "Suarez, François," in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, vol. 14 (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1941), 2640.

25 Monnot, "Suarez, François," 2641.

26 Coujou, *Bibliografía suareciana*, p. 11.

treatise on the angels, *De angelis*, was published in Lyon. This was followed by the publication of his treatise *De opere sex dierum et de anima* in 1621, also in Lyon. This book comments on the work of creation as described in Genesis, and also provides a detailed philosophical discussion on the nature of the soul. In 1621 in Lisbon, Suárez's book on the "Synodal Constitutions of the Diocese of Guarda" (*Constituições synodales do Bispado da Guarda*) was published in Portuguese. This volume, though, is not included in the *Opera omnia* of Vivès.

In 1624 and 1625, volumes 3 and 4 of Suárez's work *De virtute et statu religionis* were published. A few years later, in 1628, his treatise on the final state of man was published as *De ultimo fine hominis* in Lyon. In the same year and also in Lyon, his *Tractatus quinque in primam secundae* was published, which covers topics such as the voluntary and involuntary acts of the will, good and evil acts, and the passions. This *Tractatus* combines with *De ultimo fine hominis* to form volume 4 of Suárez's *Opera omnia* in the Vivès edition. In 1632, a final section of Suárez's treatise *De religione* was published in Lyon, and almost two decades later, in 1651, the second part of *De gratia* was published in Lyon. In 1655, Suárez's treatise "On the true understanding of efficient grace and its harmony with free will" (*De vera intelligentia auxilii efficacis, ejusque Concordia cum libero arbitrio*) was finally published.

After 1655, there was a long gap before any more of the *Doctor Eximius's* writings would be published. In 1859, however, J.B. Malou published six unedited works of Suárez as *Opuscula sex inedita*. These six treatises contain: (1) a commentary on the decree of Clement VIII regarding confession and absolution of a penitent at a distance from a priest; (2) a letter to Clement VIII regarding the *De auxiliis* controversy and the opposition of Báñez to certain positions of Suárez; (3) a treatise on the Immaculate Conception of the Most Blessed Virgin Mary; (4) a treatise in three books on the violation of ecclesiastical immunity by the Republic of Venice; (5) Suárez's judgment on the institute of certain English religious groups designated as Jesuit; and (6) three letters regarding the interdict of Lisbon in 1617 by the apostolic nuncio.²⁷ These six treatises were later included as volume 29 of the *Opera omnia*.²⁸ They touch on some very important issues, even though they have not been given much historical attention.

4 The Structure of Suárez's Dogmatic System

From what can be seen above, Suárez did not compose a *summa* of dogmatic theology as a unified whole. Nevertheless, because his writings are so extensive,

²⁷ Coujou, *Bibliografía suareciana*, p. 14.

²⁸ Ibid.

later editors would attempt to arrange his works according to the *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas, which follows, in its own way, the general structure of the *Sententiae in IV libros distinctae* of Peter Lombard (c. 1100–1160), usually identified simply as the *Sentences*. Lombard's treatise begins with God, one and Triune (book 1); he then continues with a consideration of creation and creatures, which includes the creation of angels, humans, and then the fall of humanity through the sin of Adam and Eve (book 2); this is followed by a discussion of the Incarnation as the remedy to the fall (book 3); and, finally, the sacraments are presented as the preeminent means for the restoration of fallen human nature and as the preparation for the last things (book 4).²⁹

Thomas's *Summa theologiae* can be understood according to a similar pattern, however its structure is much more detailed. The *Summa theologiae* is divided into three parts, with the second part further divided into two parts. The *prima pars* considers God in himself, and God as the efficient cause of creatures. Thus, it discusses the following themes: God as one and triune; creation; the angels; the six days of creation, leading up to the creation of man; and the governance of creatures.³⁰ The first part of the second part, or *prima secundae*, considers God as the end attainable by man through his acts. This part, therefore, considers man's ultimate end, as well as human acts, passions, habits, vices, and sins, and it then moves on to discuss the different types of law, and the nature and categories of grace. The second part of the second part, or *secunda secundae*, treats human acts as they tend toward or away from the ultimate end of man. Consideration, therefore, is given to the virtues (both human and theological) as well as vices. Attention is also given in this part to acts that pertain to certain human beings, such as prophecy, the gift of tongues, and the state of perfection. Finally, the *tertia pars* examines the Incarnation as the means by which God serves as the redeemer and repairer of human defects. This third part not only studies the mystery of the Incarnation, but it also considers the sacraments as the means by which the saving work of the Incarnation is applied.

As is well known, Thomas died before completing his *Summa theologiae*. His great work, therefore, ends with his general treatment of the sacrament of penance. His disciples, though, subsequently supplied a supplement that makes use of his earlier writings on the sacraments of extreme unction, holy orders, and matrimony, as well as his writings on the last things. In this way, the

29 See Ulrich G. Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, trans. Michael J. Miller (Washington, D.C., 2010), pp. 60–61.

30 Pereira, *Suárez*, p. 46. Pereira relies upon John of St. Thomas (1589–1644) for understanding the structure of Thomas's *Summa theologiae*.

Summa theologiae could serve as a complete, systematic presentation of Catholic dogmatic theology.

By the sixteenth century Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* and *Summa contra gentiles* had replaced the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard as the primary texts for theological instruction in the universities of Europe.³¹ The use of the *Summa theologiae* as the basic source for philosophical and theological instruction would continue into the twenty-first century, especially in seminary education.³² The Jesuits had also embraced St. Thomas Aquinas as their preeminent guide for theological training, although they were allowed to disagree with the Angelic Doctor provided they did so "with gravity and respect."³³

The importance of Thomas Aquinas helps to explain why various collections of Suárez's works are arranged not chronologically but systematically, according to the framework of the *Summa theologiae*. This can be seen in the twenty-three volumes of the *Opera omnia*, published in Venice between 1740 and 1750, and in the twenty-six volumes of the Vivès edition of the *Opera omnia*, published between 1856 and 1877.³⁴ In the introduction to volume 1 of the Vivès edition, there is a table of contents that relates the various volumes of the *Opera omnia* to corresponding parts in the *Summa theologiae*.³⁵

While the various writings of Suárez can be arranged according to the basic framework of the *Summa theologiae*, such a comparison will reveal certain gaps in Suárez's coverage of all the topics involved. For example, Suárez only covers four out of the seven sacraments, leaving extreme unction, holy orders, and matrimony untreated.³⁶ Also missing from Suárez's work is a specific treatise

31 Thomas O'Meara, O.P., *Thomas Aquinas: Theologian* (Notre Dame, IN, 1997), pp. 160–161. See also Romanus Cessario, O.P., *A Short History of Thomism* (Washington, D.C., 2005), p. 64, where he notes the Belgian Peter Crockaert's use of the introduction of the *Summa* as a textbook in Paris in the first decade of the sixteenth century, and twenty years later in Salamanca by Francisco de Vitoria, O.P.

32 See examples of magisterial support for Thomism in philosophical and theological education in Denz. nn. 3135–3140 (Leo XIII, *Aeterni Patris*, 1879); 3601–3624 (Congregation for Studies, *The 24 Metaphysical Theses*, 1914); and 3894 (Pius XII, *Humani generis*, 1950).

33 Carlos Noreña, "Suárez and the Jesuits," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* [special issue on Francisco Suárez edited by Jorge Gracia] 65.3 (1991): p. 282.

34 Coujou, *Bibliografía suareciana*, pp. 11–14. On p. 12, Coujou notes that in the Vivès edition there are also the two volumes of indices (27 and 28) and the added volume 29, consisting of an unedited *Opuscula*.

35 Francisco Suárez, *Opera omnia*, vol. 1 (Paris: L. Vivès, 1856), pp. iv–vi.

36 There is a certain irony in this observation because Aquinas left the *Summa theologiae* unfinished precisely while treating the sacrament of penance. The coverage of extreme

on the last things, which made its way into the *Summa theologiae* via the supplement. Suárez, though, does discuss many issues related to the last things in *De anima*, *De ultimo fine hominis*, and *De fide, spe et charitate*.

Suárez does not have a separate treatise on moral theology, however this can be explained by the fact that he lived during a time when large synthetic treatises on moral theology were only beginning to appear with regularity.³⁷ Nevertheless, he does treat many themes of moral theology in *De anima*, *De ultimo fine hominis*, *De fide, spe et charitate*, and especially in *De legibus*. Furthermore, in areas such as social ethics, political theology, and international law, Suárez clearly goes into much more depth than Aquinas and the other medieval writers.

As with moral theology, treatises on ecclesiology were only beginning to emerge during the post-Tridentine period. Suárez, though, covers many aspects of ecclesiology in depth in his *Defensio fidei*, including the primacy and authority of the pope, the nature and authority of ecumenical councils, and the infallibility of both ecumenical councils and the Roman Pontiff. In a special way, Suárez argues for the indefectibility of the Catholic Church, which is upheld by the faith of Peter and the Roman See. As he writes:

The faith of Peter was Catholic and unable to fail; but the faith of the Roman Church is the faith of Peter. Therefore, the faith of the Roman Church is the Catholic faith, from which this See can never defect.³⁸

Suárez lived during a time when systematic treatises on mystical theology were also just beginning to emerge.³⁹ His own contribution to this field can be found in his massive treatises on *De virtute et statu religionis*—commonly known as *De religione*—found in volumes 13 through 16 of the Vivès edition. Suárez regards contemplation as “almost the final end to which the human mind can ascend and reach in this life.”⁴⁰ He also classifies the various religious orders according to whether they seek contemplation as their highest end

unction, holy orders, and matrimony in most editions of the *Summa theologiae* rely on a supplement consisting of earlier writings of Aquinas that discuss these sacraments.

37 José Pereira and Robert Fastiggi, *The Mystical Theology of the Catholic Reformation* (Lanham, MD, 2006), pp. 30–34.

38 Suárez, *DF* c. 5, n. 7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 24, p. 22): “Fides Petri catholica fuit, et deficere non potest; sed fides Ecclesiae Romanae est fides Petri; ergo fides Ecclesiae Romanae est fides catholica a qua numquam illa sedes potest deficere.”

39 See Pereira and Fastiggi, *The Mystical Theology of the Catholic Reformation*, 34–35.

40 Suárez, *De rel.*, tr. 4, 2.9.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 14, p. 155); see Pereira and Fastiggi, *The Mystical Theology of the Catholic Reformation*, p. 264.

(e.g., the Carmelites) or pursue contemplation in support of asceticism, holiness, and service to the Church (e.g., the Theatines and the Barnabites).⁴¹ He also accounts for the orders that seek a balance between asceticism and contemplation.

We see that Suárez's corpus includes not only dogmatic theology, as reflected in the *Summa theologiae*, but also areas of theology that were developing and expanding during the post-Tridentine period, viz., political theology, ecclesiology, and mystical theology. How, though, should his dogmatic theology be structured? As has been noted, the editors of the nineteenth-century Vivès *Opera omnia* tried to arrange the writings of Suárez according to the three parts of Thomas's *Summa theologiae*. While arranging the theology of Suárez within the Thomistic framework can be defended, José Pereira has proposed understanding the *Doctor Eximius's* philosophy and theology as a whole rather than in separate categories. According to Pereira, the writings of Suárez combine to form a 'super-system', structured around the concepts of being, God, creation, and final causality. There are, in this super-system, four categories: (1) being as such (*ens ut sic*); (2) God in Himself (*Deus in se*); (3) God as efficient cause (*Deus ut causa efficiens*); and (4) God as final cause (*Deus ut causa finalis*).⁴²

According to this structure, being as such is considered as created and uncreated, and these distinctions are treated in the fifty-four *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597). God in Himself, as One and Triune, is the subject of Suárez's *De Deo Uno et Trino* (1606). God as efficient cause takes into account corporeal and incorporeal creatures, as well as man as a composition of matter and spirit. Three treatises of Suárez cover these topics in a special way: *De angelis* (1620), *De opere sex dierum* (1621), and *De anima* (1621). God as final cause includes a number of themes. It considers God as an end in Himself, which is the theme of *De ultimo fine hominis* (1628), and it includes God as the legislator who directs creatures to their proper ends, which is the subject of *De legibus* (1619). Likewise, it embraces God as the sanctifier, which is the focus of the treatises *De gratia* (1619 and 1651) and *De fide, spe, et caritate* (1622). It also includes God as worthy of adoration, which is the major theme of *De religione* (1608–1625), and finally, it considers God as redeemer, which is embraced in both *De Incarnatione* (1590–1592) and *De sacramentiis* (1593–1603). According to Pereira, "these are the main treatises that constitute the Suarezian synthesis, possibly the most titanic enterprise in systematics ever undertaken by any single individual in the history of thought."⁴³

41 See Pereira and Fastiggi, *The Mystical Theology of the Catholic Reformation*, pp. 264–271.

42 Pereira, Suárez, p. 59.

43 Ibid.

5 Main Contributions to Dogmatic Theology

A systematic exposition of the dogmatic theology of Suárez would require a book-length treatise. Thus, in the present context, four of his many contributions to dogmatic theology will be noted.

First, there are Suárez's contributions to *Mariology*. Many Marian scholars today consider him to be "the founder of systematic Mariology."⁴⁴ The overall structure of Suárez's Mariology is presented in the twenty-three disputations of *De Mysteriis Vitae Christi* (i.e., the second volume of his 1592 commentary on *tertia pars* of the *Summa theologiae*). These disputations are arranged around the themes of: Mary's sanctification, Mary as Mother of God, and her initial sanctification (disputations 1–4), the virginal integrity of Mary (disputations 5–6), the ongoing sanctification of Mary in the events of her life and her role in the events of Christ's life (disputations 7–17), the graces, merits, and consummated sanctification of Mary in her glorious death and assumption (disputations 18–21), and the veneration owed to Mary, her role as intercessor, and her cooperation with Christ in the work of redemption (disputations 22–23).⁴⁵

In these disputations, Suárez explains in great detail the scriptural, patristic, and theological reasons for Catholic beliefs in Mary's threefold virginity (before, during, and perpetually after giving birth).⁴⁶ He defends Mary's Immaculate Conception and Assumption, and states that these doctrines are capable of being dogmatically defined (which they were in 1854 and 1950, respectively). Furthermore, he provides reasons why it is proper to affirm that Mary cooperated in the work of redemption in a unique and irreplaceable manner. Thus, she merits our redemption in a congruous manner (i.e., with *meritum de congruo*), though not in the condign manner (i.e., with *meritum de condigno*), which is reserved only for her Son.⁴⁷

Suárez's importance for Catholic Mariology is evident in that he is cited by canonized saints such as St. Louis Grignion de Montfort (1673–1716), the author

44 Michael O'Carroll, C.S.Sp., *Theotokos: A Theological Encyclopedia of the Blessed Virgin Mary* (Eugene, OR, 2000), p. 334.

45 See Robert Fastiggi, "Mary's Coredemption According to Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548–1617)," in *Mary at the Foot of the Cross--IV: Mater Viventium. Acts of the Fourth International Symposium on Marian Coredemption* (New Bedford, MA, 2004), pp. 338–351.

46 See Robert Fastiggi, "Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548–1617) on Mary's *Virginitas in Partu* and Subsequent Doctrinal Development," in *Marian Studies Volume LVIII (2007): The Virginitas of Mary* (Dayton, OH, 2007), pp. 26–45. Suárez defends the traditional understanding of Mary's *virginitas in partu*, viz., that in giving birth, the physical sign of her virginity was miraculously preserved.

47 Suárez, *De mysteriis vitae Christi*, 23.1.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 19, p. 331).

of *True Devotion to Mary*,⁴⁸ and St. Alphonsus Liguori (1696–1787), the author of *The Glories of Mary*, who several times cites Suárez saying that we should implore the help of Mary “in order that the dignity of the intercessor may supply for our own unworthiness” (*ut dignitas intercessoris suppleat inopiam nostram*).⁴⁹ Pope Pius XII also held Suárez in high esteem, and refers to him in support of the solemn definition of the Assumption in 1950⁵⁰ and for the feast of the Queenship of Mary in 1954.⁵¹

Suárez also makes a significant contribution to *Christology* in his treatise *De Incarnatione*. Ultimately, he defends the Scotist position that the Incarnation was not dependent on the fall of man. He distinguishes between God’s primary motivation for the Incarnation, which is based on his desire to join himself to creation, and his secondary motivation, which is to redeem humanity from sin after He foresees the fall of man through his *scientia media*.⁵² Suárez was so convinced of the predestination of the Incarnation that he believed God revealed the image of Christ, the Incarnate Word, to the angels as their Lord. As a result, Lucifer, in his pride and disobedience, resisted, and persuaded many other angels to join him in his rebellion.⁵³ Suárez finds support for this position in Scripture (Jn 8:44)⁵⁴ and in various Church fathers such as Lactantius, Tertullian, and Cyprian, as well as the medieval author Bernard of Clairvaux.⁵⁵

A third major contribution of Suárez is in his *theology of grace*. Suárez lived through the *De auxiliis* controversy, when the Dominicans and the Jesuits were trying to explain how divine omnipotence, foreknowledge, and the human dependence on grace could be reconciled with free will. In response, Suárez developed a system known as Congruism, which was a development of the system advanced by Luis de Molina (1535–1600). This system takes into account not only God’s foreknowledge of future contingents, but also his divine providence

48 See Louis de Montfort, *Secret of the Rosary*, n. 54 and *True Devotion to Mary*, n. 40.

49 Suárez, *De mysteriis vitae Christi*, 23.3.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 19, p. 336); see St. Alphonsus Liguori, *The Glories of Mary*, trans. Rev. Eugene Grimm (Brooklyn, NY, 1932), c.. III, I (p. 110) and c. V, I (p. 154).

50 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 42 (1950): p. 767.

51 See Denz., 3914.

52 See *De Incarnatione* 5.1-2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 17, pp. 197–220); see also the discussion of Suárez’s treatment of the motives for the Incarnation in P. Dumont, *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, vol. 14 (Paris, 1941), pp. 2655–2660.

53 Suárez, *De ang.*, 7.13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 2, pp. 881–891).

54 Suárez points to Jn 8:44, in which Jesus speaks of the Devil as “a murderer from the beginning.” He understands this as referring to Lucifer’s “homicide” committed by his rebellion against the Son of God, whom he foresaw: cf. *De ang.*, 7.13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 2, p. 886).

55 Suárez, *De ang.*, 7.13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 2, p. 886).

whereby he seeks to arrange events in a manner congruous with a free human assent to his grace.⁵⁶ Pope Benedict XIV mentioned Suárez along with Molina in his letter to the Grand Inquisitor of Spain from 31 July 1748, and he defended the right of the followers of Suárez to uphold the latter's position.⁵⁷

A fourth contribution to dogmatic theology can be found in Suárez's *ecclesiology*, as has already been noted. Suárez is a great defender of the papacy as necessary for unity in the Church, as he himself writes: "It is necessary that there be in the Church some supreme power to which belongs the government of Christ's universal Church."⁵⁸ He believes this teaching is *de fide* doctrine, which he finds is supported by Scripture, the fathers, and the Councils of the Church. At the time, those who opposed papal authority raised the possibility of a pope being a heretic. To this, Suárez replied that the authority of the Roman Pontiff exists by divine law—i.e., *de iure divino*—and God will ensure that papal definitions will never be erroneous.⁵⁹ Even if a pope, as a private person, might hold an erroneous position out of ignorance or confusion, God, in His divine Providence, would make sure that such a pope would never harm the Church.⁶⁰ As Suárez sees it, "if Peter or his successor could deceive the Church, she would not be a firm and stable edifice."⁶¹ Christ, though, prays that Peter's faith will not fail (cf. Lk 22: "*ut non deficiat fides tua*"), and this ensures that the See of Peter, by divine protection, will never bring error to the universal Church.

Suárez also contributes to another issue of ecclesiology: the relation of unbelievers (infidels) to the Church.⁶² Here he identifies three orders of infidels: those who do not wish to believe even though they have been preached to sufficiently; those who have heard nothing about the Christian faith; and "those who have heard something about the Christian faith, although in an inadequate manner,"⁶³ such as Turks, Saracens, and Indians. The infidels of the

56 On Congruism, see John Hardon, S.J. *History and Theology of Grace* (Ypsilanti, MI, 2002), pp. 273–275; see also De Scorraile, *François Suarez*, vol. 1, pp. 401–478 for a detailed discussion of the whole *De auxiliis* controversy and Suárez's role in it.

57 Denz., 2564.

58 *De Fide*, 9.6.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 12, p. 263).

59 Cf. *ibid.*, 10.6.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 12, p. 319): "...Deus promisit Papam definientem numquam erraturum..."

60 *Ibid.* (ed. Vivès, vol. 12, p. 319): "Quamvis enim efficere Deus possit ut haereticus Papa non noceat Ecclesiae, suavior tamen modus divinae providentiae est..."

61 *Ibid.*, 5.8.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 12, p. 162).

62 See, especially, *De fide, spe et caritate*, tract. I (ed. Vivès, vol. 12, pp. 334–360, 404–425).

63 Ilaria Morali, "Religions and Salvation: The Early Modern Period (1453–1650)," in *Catholic Engagement with World Religions: A Comprehensive Study*, eds., Karl Joseph Becker and

first order are liable to God's judgment and damnation. Infidels of the second kind are in invincible ignorance and God seeks to find a way for them to be "sufficiently enlightened and pressed on to faith."⁶⁴ For the third group, it is necessary that they manifest some type of prayer and faith in God, as well as "an intention and a desire for salvation."⁶⁵

6 Suárez's Influence and Theological Legacy

It is somewhat ironic that Suárez, who was primarily a theologian, seems to have had greater influence in the areas of metaphysics and international law than dogmatic theology. This might be due, in part, to the strong preference the Magisterium has manifested for Thomism since *Aeterni Patris* (1879). It might also partly be due to the rejection of Suárez's interpretation of the Decree of the Holy Office, issued on 20 June 1602, regarding confession and absolution of an absent person.⁶⁶ In a subsequent Decree of 7 June 1603, the Holy Office rejected Suárez's claim that a confession would be invalid only if both the confession *and* the absolution occurred in absence.⁶⁷ Suárez, it could be argued, was only highlighting an ambiguity in the initial Decree. Nevertheless, a public rebuke by the Magisterium recorded in the well-known Denzinger *Compendium* might have raised a spectre of suspicion for those who would identify themselves as Suarezian. This was so even though Suárez immediately submitted to the 1603 Decree of the Holy Office, and Paul V would later recognize Suárez as an "outstanding and pious theologian" (*eximius ac pius*).

In spite of the 1603 rebuke, appeals to Suárez's authority have not been lacking in the centuries following his death. Pope Benedict XIV cited him as an authority in his February 1749 Brief to Cardinal Henry, Duke of York, on the question of the validity of baptism done by heretics.⁶⁸ Pius XII, as we have seen, also cited Suárez as an authority for both the Dogma of the Assumption in 1950,⁶⁹ and his 11 October 1954 encyclical, *Ad caeli Reginam*, on the

Ilaria Morali (Maryknoll, NY, 2010), p. 81; cf. Suárez, *De fide, spe et caritate*, tract. I (ed. Vivès, vol. 12, p. 425).

64 Morali, "Religions and Salvation," p. 82; see Suárez, *De gratia*, 4.11.17 (ed., Vivès, vol. 8, p. 318).

65 Ibid., p. 83; see Suárez, *De fide, spe et caritate*, tract. I n. 10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 12, p. 427).

66 Denzinger-Hünemann, 1994.

67 Ibid., 1995.

68 Ibid., 2567.

69 Cf. *Acta apostolicae sedis* 42 (1950): pp. 767 ff.

Queenship of Mary.⁷⁰ In addition to these papal citations, the name of Suárez is regularly cited in pre-Vatican II manuals of dogmatic theology, such as those by Ludwig Ott,⁷¹ Adolphe Tanquerey,⁷² and the four volumes of the *Sacrae Theologiae Summa* of the Spanish Jesuits (1950–1951).⁷³ When scholastic theology fell out of favour after Vatican II, interest in Suárez also declined, especially among the Jesuits. There are, however, signs of renewed interest in the writings of the *Doctor Eximius*. As Catholic theology seeks to ground itself more and more in the great theologians of the past, the outstanding contributions of Francisco Suárez will become increasingly more apparent.

70 Denzinger-Hünemann, 3914.

71 Ludwig Ott, *Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma*, trans. Patrick Lynch (St. Louis, MO, 1954). There are nineteen citations of Suárez.

72 A. Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1930). There are seventeen citations of Suárez in these three volumes.

73 Patres Societatis Iesu Facultatum Theologiarum in Hispana Professores, *Sacrae Theologiae Summa*, 4 vols. (Madrid, 1950–1951); there are numerous citations of Suárez in each volume; there are probably close to two hundred citations in the four volumes combined.

Suárez on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Universals¹

Daniel Heider

1 Introduction²

Suárez elaborates his theory of universals in the sixth Disputation “On Formal and Universal Unity” of his two-volume *Disputationes metaphysicae* (hereafter *DM*).³ *DM* 6 constitutes, in order, the second disputation, in which the Jesuit examines various kinds of transcendental unity. The first treatment, i.e., that contained in *DM* 5 (“Individual Unity and Its Principle”),⁴ is concerned with the question of individual unity, which, in comparison with the two other kinds of unity, is considered ontologically privileged. Despite its main focus on the metaphysical aspect of the problem, the psychological and, marginally, the logical facets of the issue are taken into account as well.⁵ Contrary to Duns Scotus, whose treatment methodologically determines Suárez’s approach in *DM* 6, the

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2 For a detailed exposition of Suárez’s theory of universals, also in the context of comparison with other Second Scholastics, see Daniel Heider, *Universals in Second Scholasticism. A comparative study with focus on the theories of Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548–1617), João Poinset O.P. (1589–1644) and Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola O.F.M. Conv. (1602–1673)/Bonaventura Belluto O.F.M. Conv. (1600–1676)* (Amsterdam, Philadelphia, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2014).

3 Suárez, *DM* 6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 201–250).

4 *DM* 6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 145–201).

5 The psychogenesis of universals and the brief evaluation of various kinds of intentions are also discussed in *De anima* (henceforth *DA*) in the second part of the question “*Utrum in rebus materialibus cognoscat intellectus noster singularia*” of the 9th Disputation, “*De potentia intellectiva*.” As regards *De anima*, I shall quote from Salvador Castellote’s critical edition *Francisco Suárez Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*, available at <<http://www.salvadorcastellote.com/investigacion.htm>>. As for the logical treatises, unfortunately neither Suárez’s Commentary to Aristotle’s *Organon* nor the Commentary to Porphyry *Isagogé* are available. About the destiny of Suárez’s logical treatises, with the high degree of probability worked out by Suárez during his teaching in Segovia in the first half of the 1570s, see Raoul De Scorraillie, *François Suarez de la Compagnie de Jesus*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1911), 1:416. Suárez himself gives notice about his intention to compose a logical treatise on predicables. See *DM* 6.8.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 233).

Spanish Jesuit comes to universals only after treating the convoluted issue of individual unity. The inversion of Scotus's procedure (apparent in *Ordinatio* 2.3.1),⁶ given by the existence of common nature as the evident point of departure, clearly foreshadows the opposite setting and 'tuning' of Suárez's theory.

Within the context of Suárez's Disputation, I shall focus on its metaphysico-epistemological core, which corresponds to what in the logical treatises of Suárez's era is more or less presented under the titles "*De universale in communi*" or "*De universale secundum se*." This core is located in the first six sections, and also partially in the seventh and eighth sections, of the *DM* 6. Focused on the central metaphysical problem of the ontological foundation of our universal concepts and their psychogenesis, and on the ontological evaluation of various types of universals and intentions, the following issues shall be set aside: the quality and sufficiency of the division of the logical universal into five predicables;⁷ the nature of the distinction between the higher metaphysical grades (e.g., animality and rationality);⁸ the issue of the actual predication of the so-called metaphysical abstracts ('humanity is animality');⁹ and the problem of the physical foundations of logical intentions, i.e., from which hylomorphic principles the genus and difference are derived.¹⁰

Suárez's terminology is traditionally scholastic. Individual unity, the property of being a singular entity, is defined by means of the incommunicability and indivisibility of many instances of the same kind as the original (divided) entity. Universal unity, by contrast, is characterized by communicability and divisibility into individuals of the same kind as the divided entity. Following Porphyry, Suárez maintains that universals are not communicable in parts, in the way that a cake can be shared by the members of a family. Nor is it shared successively, as a used car is shared by all its temporary owners. Universal unity, rather, is the unity that is communicable to all its instances as a whole at the same time.¹¹ By using the term 'communicability', Suárez explicitly endorses Aristotle's definition of the universal as capable of being in many and also predicable of many.¹² Suárez embraces the commonplace typology of universals, namely, universal in causation (*universale in causando*), universal in signification or representation (in *significando* or *repraesentando*), universal

6 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, q. 1 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, pp. 391–516).

7 See mainly *DM* 6.8.5–15 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 233–236).

8 *DM* 6.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 236–244).

9 *Ibid.*, 6.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 244–247).

10 *Ibid.*, 6.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 247–250).

11 Paul Vincent Spade, *Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham*, trans. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1994), p. x.

12 Predicability is taken by Suárez as the property of the aptitude to be in many. See *DM* 6.8.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 232).

in being (*in essendo*), and universal in predication (*in praedicando*). In the regressive delineation of the subject matter of *DM* 6 (in the eighth section), Suárez remarks that the first two kinds of universals are, in fact, not universals, and thus fall outside the object of enquiry. The universal cause (God) as such, being eminently the singular being, is universal only in respect to its (heterogeneous) effects. The same holds for the universal in signification and representation. As common terms (written or spoken), or as formal concepts (the mental acts by which things are apprehended), they are thoroughly singular. They can be taken as universal only when interpreted as the signs representing or signifying the multitude of singulars. Consequently, only the third and fourth types (*in essendo* and *in praedicando*) of universal are forthrightly relevant for Suárez's detailed elaboration of universals in *DM* 6.¹³

2 Formal and Individual Unity

The emphasis on the ontological priority of individuality, supported by Suárez's statement that the principle of individuation is the whole entity (*entitas tota*),¹⁴ finds a loud echo at the very beginning of the *DM* 6. Shall we say that individual unity is the only kind of transcendental unity, being not only extensionally but also intensionally equivalent to transcendental unity? Though at the beginning of the *DM* 5 Suárez claims that the extension of individual unity is all-embracing because all beings—whether actual or only possible—are singular, he adds the important qualification 'immediately'. Thus, by means of their individuality, it can be said that extramental natures are real beings (*entia realia*) as well. Also, the tenor of *DM* 4.9 (immediately preceding *DM* 5) suggests that natures also meet the definition of (transcendental) unity, which is the privation of division in their formal or essential predicates. For example, man *ex definitione* cannot be formally divided into the predicates 'man' and 'non-man'. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same can be said of the generic (and higher) predicates.¹⁵

It must be said that by endorsing this type of indivision essential to natures as such, Suárez ranks himself in the broad camp of authors invoking Avicenna's theory of indifference of essence.¹⁶ As generally known, the interpretation of

13 See *DM* 6.8.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 232). See also *ibid.*, 6.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 201).

14 See *ibid.*, 5.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 180–188).

15 *Ibid.*, 4.9.13–14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 144–145).

16 Avicenna latinus, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* V–X, critical edition by S. van Riet and E. Peeters (Louvain, Leiden, 1980), pp. 227–238.

Avicenna's statement 'horseness is only horseness'—implying that the essence of a horse is given solely by its quidditative predicates—has become the object of various interpretations since the thirteenth century. Two interpretations, however, have become by far the most influential. The first, established by Duns Scotus, affirms that the extramental common nature differs from the individual difference by means of a formal distinction (*distinctio formalis*), considered by mainstream Scotists as the *actual* distinction in a thing itself (*ex natura rei*). Along with this interpretation, the common nature is to be considered not only according to its quidditative predicates (*per se primo modo* predicates), but also along with the predicates *per se secundo modo*, among which the unity following a nature's entity is relevant for us. According to the second approach, initiated by Aquinas, there is nothing more than a so-called virtual distinction (*distinctio virtualis*) between the given metaphysical grades. The grades differ virtually, in the same way as the different 'virtues' to warm and to dry differ in their cause, for example, in the sun. Both virtues, however, are really one and the same thing, though they are capable of producing two different effects. Similarly, two discriminable grades are capable of occasioning two different notions in our intellect.¹⁷ In contrast to Scotus, Aquinas unequivocally denies any middle distinction between real and conceptual otherness. For him, common nature is considered only according to quidditative predicates.¹⁸

Scotus's theory undergoes two different interpretations in *DM* 6. The first exposition can be characterized as uncharitable, rejecting Scotus because of his excessive realism. The second, on the other hand, is conciliatory, aiming to harmonize the theories of both philosophers. The uncharitable stream in the exposition can be observed right away at the beginning of the *DM* 6.¹⁹ Suárez claims that Scotus's thesis about the formal distinction between the common nature and individual difference inevitably leads to a state of affairs in which the formal unity remains *literally* one and the same in things. Albeit the Jesuit's interpretation seems not to deny the *physical* multiplication of formal unity, Suárez's metaphysical system does not allow for any distinction other than real (which can also encompass modal distinctions)²⁰ and conceptual distinctions.

17 See *DM* 7.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 251).

18 With respect to Avicenna as the milestone in Western metaphysics, see Joseph Owens, "Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics," *Mediaeval Studies* 19 (1957): 1–14.

19 *DM* 6.1.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 201–202).

20 The extrinsic modal distinction is a type of real distinction, in which its extremes are separable only asymmetrically. Whereas sitting (*sessio*) is separable from Peter (who is sitting), Peter is not separable from his sitting. See *DM* 7.1.16–26 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 255–260).

Scotus's formal distinction, in Suárez's rendering, thus becomes the real distinction *sensu stricto*.²¹

2.1 *Scotus on the Common Nature According to DM 6.1*

Though it is right to regard Suárez as 'the Problematicist', who is chiefly seeking solutions to problems, the historical (scholastic) context in his case cannot be ignored.²² As has already been suggested, his main point of departure embodies Scotus's theory of the less than numerical unity of the extramental nature. What argument, however, could he offer in support of the claim that the extramental nature—with its formal unity—is *literally* common and one to many individuals?²³ Suárez presents four arguments, of which I shall only discuss the first three, since the last is really only an extended version of the third argument. First, leaning on the authority of Aristotle, Suárez claims that the modes of unity, inclusive of the unity of species and genus, are not conceptual but real.²⁴ The given kinds of unity must therefore be accepted as the real properties (*passiones*) of being. Suárez also refers to the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* (chapter 15), which Scotus himself employs. Here, Aristotle confirms the real status of the unity of species and genus by the link to a real relation of similarity, which cannot be disassociated from the notion of unity. If a real relation is to be *real*, it must have a real foundation, which must be considered a partially identical aspect in both extremes.²⁵ Second, Suárez brings up the argument that an object, insofar as it is an object, is naturally prior to the cognitive act.²⁶

21 As regards Suárez's critique of Scotus's theory of formal distinction as the actual type of distinction, see *DM* 7.1.13–15 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 254–255). Admittedly, Suárez's theory of distinctions can be seen as the common cause of his rather unfaithful interpretations of Scotus. See Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit* (Hamburg, 1990), pp. 229–234.

22 As for the label 'The Problematicist' in connection with Suárez, see Jorge J.E. Gracia, *Philosophy and Its History. Issues in Philosophical Historiography* (New York, 1992), pp. 268–273.

23 *DM* 6.1.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 201).

24 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, Mass., London, 1996), 1016b31–1017a4.

25 See Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3. p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, p. 398). See also *DM* 6.1.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 202).

26 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3. p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, p. 394). See also B. Ioannis Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Libri VI–IX, Lib. VII, q. 18, ed. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, F. Kelley, G. Marci, T. Noone, and R. Wood (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1997), p. 345.

The object is the extramental nature, which is the object of real definition. Thus, nature cannot have its definability through the intellect's efficiency. If it were the intellect that provided a thing with its definability, the definitions would have to be situated in the intellect. Then, the intellect would be the only device conferring the requisite unity upon the extramental thing. However, that would consequently destroy the real character of essential definition and of scientific enquiry in general. The claim that Peter and Paul are defined by one and the same definition thus assumes a real unity common to both of them.²⁷ Suárez then presents a third argument, namely, that the formal unity of an extramental nature must be seen as the full-blown type of transcendental unity because each privation of division implies and corresponds to unity and entity. Distinctively enough, Suárez here introduces the well-known Thomist evasion, and claims that the nature as such is one and common only negatively.

Here, a brief digression into the theories of Aquinas and Cajetan is appropriate. What does Cajetan, one of the main proponents of the theory of negative unity, actually mean by the phrase 'the negative community' of a nature? According to Aquinas's *De ente et essentia*, the foundational text for all Thomist versions of moderate realism, nature absolutely considered (*natura absolute considerata*) can be neither one nor many, neither singular nor universal. In a direct link to Avicenna, Aquinas asserts that, as such, nature has only quidditative predicates. If it were intrinsically one, it could not become particularized; likewise, if it were many, it could not become one by the intellect's abstraction. By that claim, Aquinas in fact denies *any* unity to nature absolutely considered.²⁸ In his famous commentary on the treatise in question, Cajetan interprets Aquinas's denial of unity to nature absolutely considered as a denial only of numerical unity. Under the strong influence of the Patavian Scotists (headed by Antonio Trombetta), Cajetan (though not the first Thomist to endorse it)²⁹ attributes a special type of unity to nature as such, namely, formal unity. Yet, resistant to several Scotistic points of doctrine, Cajetan holds that the given formal unity is one and common only negatively and deficiently. In an analogy to a surface (the example used by Suárez) with respect to its colour, one must consider that if the surface were intrinsically (*per se*) white, for example, it could not become non-white, and if intrinsically non-white, it could not

27 Ibid. (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, p. 403). See *DM* 6.1.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 202).

28 Thomas de Aquino, *De ente et essentia*, c. 2. <<http://www.corpusthomicum.org/oe.html>>.

29 Thomas de Sutton (in the treatise *De natura generis*) already ascribes this sort of unity to nature as such.

become white. Also, the nature as such is neither one (universal) nor many (singular), because both come to it only on the basis of its existential condition. What is typical for Cajetan is that its negative (indifferent) character is ensured not by its quiddity, but only by its specific condition (status), which in the case of nature absolutely considered is its solitude (isolation). Whenever that solitude is lost, the negative community and oneness disappear as well.³⁰ That is also why, for Cajetan, nature as such cannot be understood as literally common.

This theory, tampering with the negative oneness and community of nature as such, is decisively impugned by Scotists.³¹ Nature absolutely considered as formally undivided, even existing extramentally in singulars, must be taken as formally one and thus formally common. It is not the isolation of nature as such that makes it common and whose ontological condition gets lost in singulars, but rather, it is the quiddity itself with its necessary properties, among which the unity with its commonness and indeterminacy stand out. Conceived as the full-fledged unity *ex natura rei*, distinct from the individual difference and taken as a transcendental property, the common formal unity in singulars cannot be lost.³²

2.2 Suárez's 'Nominalization' of Scotus

Suárez's theory takes its shape from four pregnant conclusions. Whereas the first can be assessed as being fully in harmony with Scotus's position, the remaining three manifest a tendency that can be called 'the nominalization of Scotus'. The first conclusion entails a formal unity '*per se*', which extramentally belongs to the nature or essence. It is a real unity because, as the arguments for Scotus show, the negation of essential division is also real.³³ The second, in accordance with what is shown in *DM* 5.2, where the doctrine on the ontological status of individual difference is given as only conceptually added to the objective concept of the common nature,³⁴ Suárez asserts that formal unity is

30 Thomas de Vio, Caietani, *In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis*, Commentaria, ed. P.M.-H. Laurent (Turin, 1934), Capitulum IV, p. 93; 96–97.

31 See, e.g., Bartholomeus Mastrius, *Cursus philosophicus integer, Metaphysica*, Venetiis, apud Nicolaum Pezzana, 1727, Disp. IX: "De Natura Communi sive Universali," pp. 96–105.

32 See Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vactican, vol. 7, p. 404); cf. *DM* 6.1.5, 7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 202).

33 *DM* 6.1.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 203).

34 *DM* 5.2 seems *prima facie* to indicate that the only intelligible way for the addition of an individual thing to common nature is when the common nature is an extramental thing, independently existent of singulars, to which consequently some other thing is added. However, that would be an entirely misleading conception, because Suárez decisively

only conceptually distinct from individual unity. The Jesuit is sure that only this kind of distinction is proved by Scotus's above-mentioned arguments. Nevertheless, what all the arguments on behalf of the formally distinct haecceity prove is actually Suárez's own opinion, which is that individual difference is only virtually distinct from the specific nature. If the individual difference differs from the specific nature only conceptually, nothing more can be expected in the case of the distinction between individual and formal unity.³⁵ The third conclusion is only a confirmation of Suárez's general anti-Scotistic attitude: formal unity, he argues, cannot be considered as *ex natura rei* distinct from individual unity. Even though individual unity can be prescinded from common nature and thus considered *in ratione* as actually different, the specific nature is truly a real being only when it exists in individuals. In itself, it does not exhibit sufficient entitative robustness to constitute the extramentally distinct extreme. No being other than an individual (whether *in actu* or *in potentia*) can be a real being (*ens reale*), namely, a being having an aptitude for actual existence, the adequate object of Suárez's metaphysics.³⁶ A fourth conclusion, the corollary of the co-existence of individual and formal unity, asserts that formal unity, insofar as it exists in things themselves, cannot be maintained as common to many because it is multiplied (though entitatively, which for Suárez in fact means in all possible extramental aspects) as many times as there are individuals. In Suárez's elimination of the realm of metaphysical formalities (realities) by means of the physical (entitative) absorption of the extramental entity, no other conclusion could have been anticipated. If the only full-blown extramental unity is individual unity, the specific natures must be (physically) multiplied in things themselves as well. No extramental thing can actually be called physically or metaphysically (in the sense of *sui generis* dimension of Scotistic formalities) common. Accordingly, the formal unity of the extramental nature and its community has to be considered as two different things.³⁷

denies such an existence. The only way to understand the question of 'the addition' is that what is added is the specific nature, understood on the level of the objective concept, which is the extramental thing inasmuch as it is cognized. Suárez thus distinguishes two sub-questions in the issue of the addition of '*res individua*' to the specific nature. The first one regards the added object, which must be conceived as real. The second query concerns the way of addition, which, in contrast, is to be regarded as something arising '*per rationem*'. See *DM* 5.2.16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 153).

35 *DM* 6.1.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 203).

36 Regarding the definition of *ens reale* or *essentia realis*, see *DM* 2.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 87–92). See also *DM* 6.1.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 203–204).

37 *DM* 6.1.11–12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 204).

It has been said that Suárez takes Scotus's arguments as actually proving his own conclusion. How, though, does Suárez reinterpret the above-mentioned arguments from Scotus's theory? What do they actually prove? Suárez is convinced that they are, at most, evidence that the unity and commonality of the specific nature is fundamental. The fundamental commonality, moreover, is not the literal community but the qualified resemblance of individuals of the same kind, which all exhibit the multiplied formal unities defined by means of the same formal indivision. Independent of the operation of understanding, individuals of the same kind are not one thing with true unity. Formal unity is thus fully in accord with numerical (entitative) multiplication. It is incompatible only with essential dissimilarity.³⁸ Only if individuals are dissimilar in the degree that they happen to be inconceivable by the common formal concept, then formal unity of the given things can be denied to them.³⁹ Although Suárez subscribes to Scotus's statement that nature does not have its definability through the agency of the intellect, he remarks that it holds only fundamentally and remotely. Real definitions are not properly in things but in the intellect. Contrary to Scotus, for Suárez, any condition laid on a real definition is far from being connected with the assumption of the existence of the common nature *ex natura rei* different from the individual differences.⁴⁰ Its reality is sufficiently justified by the assumption of the extramental essence, considered solely in its quidditative predicates.⁴¹

3 Formal and Universal Unity

After his exposition of formal unity, Suárez ontologically evaluates universal unity. It has been said that formal unity is real unity, though admittedly a deficient one. Instead of being a truly positive unity, it is the multitude of individuals, related by an essential affinity rooted in the formal unities of each singular's essence. Universal unity, on the other hand, includes two notes in its definition, namely, unity and communicability. Without being one, it cannot be regarded as one universal, but at most as an aggregate of things (*ens per accidens*). Free of communicability, moreover, universal unity would turn into individual unity.⁴²

38 Ibid., 6.1.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 205).

39 As for this definition of the fundamental sameness or resemblance, see James F. Ross, "Suárez on Universals," *The Journal of Philosophy* 59 (1962): 736–748, p. 745.

40 *DM* 6.1.13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 204–205).

41 Ibid., 6.2.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 206).

42 Ibid., 6.2.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 209).

3.1 *Suárez on the Distinction between Formal and Universal Unity*

By saying that formal unity is the plurality of essentially similar individuals, any identification of formal unity with universal unity is ruled out by Suárez in advance. Formal unity alone is not sufficient for the unity of a universal nature (the first conclusion). Three affiliated arguments are subsequently brought in. (1) The unity of a universal thing, inasmuch as it is universal, must be the unity that is *peculiar* to it. It cannot belong to a singular insofar as it is a singular. That, however, is exactly what happens to formal unity. Though formal unity does not intrinsically require material division, it does not necessitate being conceived as universal, either. As indifferent to both, it can exist while being under both conditions, that is, as particularized and as universalized. (2) Universal unity, insofar as it is universal, cannot be multiplied according to a number. If it were, the specific unity would be numerically divisible as well. Consequently, one would obtain the same number of kinds as the number of individuals. The universal *man* would thus be multiplied into Peter and Paul, who would consequently become the exclusive representatives of their own species. Suárez points out that universal unity is not what is divided, but rather what is participated in by its inferiors and what makes the particulars one (e.g., of the same kind).⁴³ (3) Universal unity bespeaks the undividedness of several things in a thing that is denominated universally one, so that none of those inferiors contained under it, taken by itself, possesses that whole universal unity.⁴⁴ Accordingly, universal (specific) unity is to be taken as the quasi-potential whole, of which, contrary to formal unity, it cannot be said that it is composed by itself and in itself of some individual entity. Universal unity is not the actual whole, which bespeaks the multipliable formal indivision, but the potential whole by means of which all things are one.⁴⁵ It may be concluded that all these arguments show that universal unity makes up a distinct kind of unity, different both from individual and formal unity. Although it includes formal indivision, it differs from it as well. In addition, it requires undividedness and (proximate) disposition to be in many.⁴⁶

Regarding the second conclusion, Suárez offers the expected statement: the unity of universal nature *qua* universal is not real and is not in things, insofar

43 See also Porphyry, *Isagogé*, ed. and trans. Paul Vincent Spade, p. 6.

44 It is necessary to distinguish between 'undividedness' and 'indivision'. Whereas (formal) indivision does not rule out the numerical (material) division, the undividedness of universal unity does. As for this distinct English terminology, see Francis Suarez, *On Formal and Universal Unity*, trans. James F. Ross (Milwaukee, WI, 1964), p. 45.

45 *DM* 6.2.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 209).

46 *DM* 6.2.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 209–10).

as they exist in reality independently of the operation of understanding. By that claim, Suárez *prima facie* seems to rule out *tout court* the opinion that universal unity as such can somehow be grounded in extramental things.⁴⁷ Only individual and formal unity are unqualifiedly real. Nevertheless, the only specification in the case of formal unity, not with respect to its reality, is the fact that formal unity, strictly speaking, is not a unity but the relation of similarity. Moreover, the relation of resemblance is not only insufficient but also unnecessary for being universal. It need not be *actually* instantiated by the plurality of essentially similar instances. Thus, the nature of heaven can be universal without the assumption of the existence of an actual multitude of similar instances of nature. What is indispensable here is only its dispositional communicability.⁴⁸

3.2 *Fonseca on Universal Unity and the Aptitude to Being in Many*

The main challenge to Suárez's doctrine on the unity of universal nature is not represented by Scotus, but rather by Pedro da Fonseca (1528–1599). Without exaggeration, it can be said that Fonseca represents one of the strongest historical influences upon Suárez's doctrine of universals. That impact is predominantly negative, however.⁴⁹

In his *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* (book 5, chapter 28, question 3) Fonseca advances four conclusions, of which the third and fourth later become the object of Suárez's critique. The first two can be regarded as being in harmony with Suárez's thought. They assert: (1) universal unity is not the numerical unity proper to singular things; and (2) the unity of universal things cannot be sought in the genus of formal unity because formal unity is multiplied, whereas universal unity excludes such multiplication. After the first part of the third thesis, Fonseca holds that universal unity must be peculiar to universal things. So far, there is no disagreement with Suárez. However, Fonseca then adds that such unity can pertain to universal things only insofar as they are *prior* to their determination (contraction) by particulars. Fonseca is clear about the fact that, as particularized, they necessarily lose their aptitude to be in

47 In *DM* 3.2, Suárez's identification of 'the unity of reason' and the universal unity shall be specified. One thing can be stated beforehand. Were universal unity entirely the unity of reason, it would be difficult to justify its presence in Suárez's *metaphysical* project, which is devoted to the kinds of transcendental (i.e., real) unity.

48 *DM* 6.2.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 210–211).

49 As regards the comparison of the philosophical doctrines of Suárez and the more realist doctrine of Fonseca, see Stephen Menn, "Suárez, Nominalism and Modes," in *Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery*, ed. Kevin White (Washington, D.C., 1997), pp. 201–225.

many. That is also why the nature of man as such cannot *per se* (intrinsically) preempt that unity. If it did, then it would have to have it also when being particularized. It can have it only *per accidens*, that is, by means of its absolute status of solitude (isolation), which is understood by Fonseca as the condition naturally antecedent to the particular determination. Thus, only by having the unity of precision (*unitas praecisionis*) can it also have the aptitude for being in many. The fourth conclusion, the unity of precision as a distinct type of unity, must be conceived as a mixture of formal and numerical unity. By virtue of belonging to nature, it has something of a formal unity, with which it is nevertheless not identical because formal unity is not able to justify the ascription of a number to a common nature. It is clear as daylight, however, that we do in fact count natures, for example, we say that human and equine natures are two natures. Consequently, the item of numerical unity cannot be restricted only to the singulars afflicted by the accident of quantity. As such, it must also be opened to entities having the unity of precision.⁵⁰ Formal unity in itself cannot be regarded as a sufficient guarantee of the attribution of numerical unity to the universal nature because of its multiplication. That is why the unity of precision must also have numerical unity. Alongside this, there are many predicates belonging exclusively to the nature absolutely considered, which belong to it neither intrinsically as quidditative predicates nor as being particularized, but only because of its absolute status prior to contraction by particulars. As examples, Fonseca mentions predicates such as 'not to be generated', 'not to be corrupted', 'not to exist really', and 'not to walk'.⁵¹

How does Fonseca understand the aptitude of universal things to be in many? Following Fonseca's doctrine on the unity of precision, the aptitude

50 Petrus Fonseca, *Commentariorum Petri Fonsecae Societatis Jesu: In Metaphysicarum Aristotelis Stagiritae* [hereafter *In Metaphysicarum*], Lib. 5 Met., c. XXVIII, q. III, sect. I–II, Haeredum Lazari Zetzneri (Coloniae, 1615), pp. 959–960. The same theory can be found also in Thomas de Sutton's treatise *De natura generis*, which Fonseca, as all of his contemporaries, falsely attributes to Aquinas (see Fonseca, *ibid.*, p. 968). Regarding the same ascription made by Suárez, see *DM* 6.3.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 211). Regarding the general opinion in the sixteenth century that *De natura generis* is the authentic writing of Aquinas, see Ester Caruso, *Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza e la Rinascita del nominalismo nella Scolastica del Seicento* (Firenze, 1979), pp. 74–75, note 125. "...licet in natura animalis non sit unitas vel pluralitas secundum quod est nata recipi in pluribus inferioribus, cum possit in uno recipi et in pluribus, est tamen in ipsa natura, absolute accepta et secundum quod non est in inferioribus considerata, quaedam unitas, cum definitio eius sit una, et nomen unum, ut patet" (Thomas de Sutton, *De natura generis*, c. 4, <<http://www.corpusthomisti.com.org/xpg.html>>).

51 Fonseca, *In Metaphysicarum*, sect. IV, p. 967.

cannot be had by the common nature in singulars. In contrast to Scotus and Suárez, Fonseca affirms that no nature in singulars can have the remote aptitude to be in many.⁵² Fonseca adduces three arguments for this point. (1) The theory working with the notion of remote potency, identified with the formal unity of extramental nature, cannot be correct because one cannot assume the simultaneous determination and indetermination in numerically the same thing and according to the same aspect. Thus, the human nature in Peter is fully determined to Peter in a way that it currently cannot retain its indeterminacy towards being in Paul. It might be objected that the indetermination of human nature to the plurality of individuals is, after all, compatible with the determination to Peter because the determinacy and indeterminacy are conceived according to different aspects (*rationes*). Once human nature is understood as determined to Peter, at another time it can be taken as naturally prior to the individual contraction because as such, it is not of itself singular. Fonseca retorts that if both unities were compatible, it could be said that Peter currently disposes of the habitual knowledge of Greek grammar, namely, after its acquisition, and does not dispose of the same habitual knowledge insofar as temporally preceding that acquisition. That, however, is nothing less than a contradiction.⁵³ (2) If human nature in Peter had the aptitude to be in Paul, then the singular nature of Peter could be in Paul. That, nevertheless, would turn singular unity to communicable unity, which also entails a contradiction.⁵⁴ (3) The putative remote aptitude of human nature can be either numerically one and the same in all singulars, or many and particularized. The first alternative implies an absurd state of affairs that would impede, among others, the very possibility of creation and annihilation. If numerically one and the same man were in all human beings, Paul could not be created because the numerically same human nature would already exist in Peter. Similarly, Peter could not be annihilated because the numerically same man would still remain in Paul. The second possibility is not much better. Given that the aptitude to be in many is multiplied, whence does human nature receive its numerical unity, which is necessary for universal unity? Some advocates of that option reply that numerical unity is ensured by the common concept representing human nature as numerically one species. A strong predilection in thoroughgoing realism nevertheless prevents Fonseca from agreeing with that claim. Fonseca is sure that such a reply is nothing other than a side step, illegitimately deriving

52 As regards Scotus's opinion, see Scotus, *Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Lib. VII. Metaph., q. XVIII (St. Bonaventure, 1996), pp. 347–348.

53 Fonseca, *In Metaphysicarum*, q. IV, sect. 4, pp. 979–980.

54 Fonseca, *In Metaphysicarum*, q. IV, sect. 4, p. 980.

the unity of what is represented from what it is representing by which a *circulus vitiosus* is committed. Followers of the second option can agree with Fonseca's reply and state that in order to designate human nature as numerically one universal thing, it is necessary to have recourse to the formal unity of human nature, this time conceived not as multiplied in singulars but precisely as common. Not even that solution, however, can be accepted (though it is in fact embraced by Suárez). For Fonseca, something cannot be called numerically one by means of unity, which in itself is not numerically one. Formal unity, though taken precisely, can never be numerically one.

Human nature can be considered as numerically one only by means of what Fonseca calls the unity of precision.⁵⁵ The given disposition must be something positive, which is for Fonseca nothing other than a potential or aptitudinal mode that the nature possesses prior to its contraction into singulars. Fonseca identifies this mode with the mode that an effect has while still being in its cause(s). The potential mode, accountable for the nature's ability to be in many, is considered as the separable (extrinsic) mode, which does not belong to the nature intrinsically, but only contingently. It pertains to it only when having the abovementioned special status of potentiality, which is prior to the status of actuality occasioned by its determination by particulars. When the nature is reduced to actuality from potentiality, the unity of precision, together with its potential mode, necessarily becomes lost.⁵⁶

3.3 Suárez's Dismissal of Fonseca's Unity of Precision

In structural analogy to Fonseca, Suárez also distinguishes between the predicates belonging to nature *per se* and those belonging to it because of its solitude. The term *per se* (*secundum se*) designates the necessary connection of a predicate and subject. For example, the predicates 'animal' and 'rational' belong *per se* to 'man' because both are the quidditative parts of the definition of 'man'. The same can be said about properties (*propria*), such as being risible (*esse risibile*). If the term *per se* is understood in that quidditative sense, Suárez agrees with Fonseca that universal unity does not belong *per se* to the nature. It is clear that the unity of precision is not part of the necessary connection between the subject and the predicate. The phrase *per se*, nevertheless, can be also considered in the sense of 'solitarily (absolutely) considered'. After that exposition, still in agreement with Fonseca, Suárez says that the predicates attributed to the nature in that way belong to it only contingently by means of a certain 'existential' condition. However, whereas for Fonseca nature's

55 Ibid., q. IV, s. 4, pp. 980–983.

56 Ibid., q. IV, s. 2, pp. 974–975.

solitude is the status belonging to nature prior to its particularization, Suárez unambiguously dismisses that claim as entirely inconceivable. For him, there are no predicates belonging to nature, which is taken according to that potential status. All the above-mentioned predicates can be easily shown to belong to the nature only *a posteriori*, either as being the intrinsic part of a singular or as being abstracted by the intellect.⁵⁷

Every being and unity, if it is to be real, must be either singular or exist in particulars. Thus, the statement claiming that the extramental unity of precision becomes lost when contracted by particulars commits an obvious offence against that premise. If the given unity of precision disappeared when contracted by particulars, it could exist neither as singular nor as its part. It can be objected that the extramental unity of precision belongs to the nature according to its essential being (*esse essentiae*), never according to its existential being (*esse existentiae*). Though according to the existential being it can exist only as particularized, or intentionally, it is no less true that according to the essential being it can (additionally) exist 'absolutely'. Suárez refutes this objection by reference to the adequate object of metaphysics, which is for him real being. Real being, according to Suárez, cannot be considered without the feature of the real aptitude to (actually) be. If the aspect of actual producibility were missing, a real being would be immediately replaced by a being of reason (*ens rationis*). If the unity of precision cannot belong to the nature as existent in singulars, then it cannot pertain to the nature, which has the disposition to be either. Moreover, the extramental unity of precision cannot belong to the nature taken potentially because it cannot belong to it as being *in actu*. The parallelism of universality and individuality in the order of actual and potential being precludes the ontological asymmetry advocated by Fonseca.⁵⁸ The same distinction found between the common nature and individual difference of an existent thing must be considered within a possible being.⁵⁹

What about the negative predicates that allegedly claim that nature has the unity of precision? These predications are, for Suárez, nothing other than sophistical equivocation. The predicates in propositions such as 'nature as such is not generated' are said not of nature having the extramental unity of precision, but only of the nature occurring in individuals or in the intellect. Recourse to Fonseca's theory, furthermore, can be avoided by the following analyses. First, the propositions can be understood to hold with respect to the nature having the unity of precision formed by the intellect. By contraction, in

57 *DM* 6.3.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 213–214); see also *ibid.*, 6.3.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 212).

58 As regards this parallelism, see also *DM* 5.5.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 178).

59 *DM* 6.3.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 212–213).

particulars, the natures become generable and corruptible; by being abstracted, on the other hand, they become resistant to becoming (*fieri*). If they are interpreted in that way, negative propositions can be considered as true because the abstracted natures also abstract from the '*hic et nunc*', and thus from corruptibility. By receiving the rational unity of precision they happen to be at least negatively ubiquitous and eternal.⁶⁰ Second, the given sentences can be shown to be so unqualifiedly, namely, in the manner that the natures as such are in no way generated and corrupted. If they are read in that fashion, the propositions are not true. It holds that, at least by means of their existence in individuals, they are subjected to '*fieri*'. Thus, at least secondarily, they are generable and corruptible. Third, those propositions can be expounded as follows: "The nature as such is not generated (corrupted) essentially in the first mode (*per se primo modo*), but only by means of individuals, in which it exists." If they are interpreted according to this manner, they can be considered as true. However, then they are not about the natures having the extramental unity of precision, but only about the natures existent in individuals. It must be concluded that the above-mentioned predicates, according to Suárez, do not belong to natures having an extramental unity of precision, but only to the natures existent in individuals or abstracted in the intellect.⁶¹

3.4 Suárez on the Disposition to Being in Many

The refusal of the extramental unity of precision leads Suárez also to rebut Fonseca's theory of the potential mode, which exists in universal nature prior to its determination by particulars. Despite no explicit mention of Fonseca in *DM* 6.4, the whole '*Dico secundo*' can be considered an ongoing implicit critique of Fonseca's doctrine.⁶² The disposition to exist in many things, he claims, cannot be the real property belonging to common nature prior to the operation of the intellect. First, if the nature can be considered as precised only by the intellect, then analogically the disposition to being in many can belong to the nature only as precised by the intellect. Second, that disposition can belong either to the nature taken as existent or as non-existent. It cannot pertain to it as existent, though, since it does not exist unless made individual through identity. However, it cannot be said that it belongs to it as non-existent either because the same principle governs individuality and universality in the order

60 By using the term 'negatively eternal' Suárez refers to Aquinas, namely, to *ST* I, q. 16, a. 2, ad 2. Ultimately, universals can be called eternal only with respect to some eternal intellect, which is the Divine intellect. See *DM* 6.7.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 231).

61 *DM* 6.3.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 213).

62 *Ibid.*, 6.4.6–9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 218–220).

of actual and possible being. Thus, the given aptitude cannot be held as a property belonging to the nature independent of understanding. Third, the aptitudinal mode of being in many does not find its place in Suárez's metaphysical system. The extrinsic mode can be considered only as the real being (parasitical to its 'res', though), which cannot be something that is unable to exist *in actu*. By being called real and positive, it must *ipso facto* be included in the extension of real being. Nevertheless, if it *ex definitione* cannot exist outside its causes, it does not make sense to accept it as 'real' and thus as prior to understanding.⁶³

Suárez then turns to the second negative '*Dico*', this time focused on what he labels the ultrarealist interpretation of Duns Scotus, who claims that the disposition to being in many occurs in nature insofar as it exists '*a parte rei*'.⁶⁴ The critique is underlined by Suárez's analogy between prime matter and substantial form, and between common nature and individual difference, which he attributes to the advocates of the thesis. According to the claim, the common nature of Peter retains its remote disposition to being in Paul in the same way as prime matter, being informed by the substantial form of Peter, keeps its remote ability to being in Paul. Even though it does not have the proximate potentiality to be in Paul, because it is impeded by the substantial form of Peter, it can be a part of Paul provided that the substantial form of Peter is replaced by the substantial form of Paul. The same holds for the aptitude of the common nature being under the individual difference of Peter to be in Paul. Suárez waives that analogy by adverting to the crucial distinction between those two types of composition: the hylemorphic composite as the distinction between two incomplete beings is real,⁶⁵ while the compound of the common nature and individual difference is only conceptual (having its foundation in things). That is why the common nature existing in Peter cannot lose the individual difference of Peter and acquire the different individual difference of Paul in the same way as it occurs in the successive exchange of substantial forms in the numerically same prime matter.⁶⁶

63 Ibid., 6.4.6-7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 219-220).

64 About the ultrarealist interpretation of Scotus claiming that the common nature exists in singulars '*per inexistential*', see Johannes Kraus, *Die Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus O.F.M. von der Natura communis. Ein Beitrag zum Universalienproblem in der Scholastik* (Freiburg, Paderborn, Paris, 1927), p. 65.

65 The contrast between two types of composites is even more evident when Suárez's reification of prime matter is taken into account. By virtue of that prime matter having the entitative act (*actus entitativus*), Divine intervention can exist without the substantial form. See *DM* 15.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 532-536).

66 *DM* 6.4.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 216-217).

Having eliminated two rival theories, Suárez comes up with his own two-part conclusion. First, the disposition of a common nature to being in many is only indifference or non-repugnance that has its basis within nature in itself (*secundum se*). Secondly, '*in actu*' belongs to the nature only insofar as the nature undergoes an abstraction of the intellect. By that dual conclusion, Suárez, as he himself acknowledges, endorses the position of Cajetan and other Thomists.⁶⁷ How does he explain it though? Suárez expounds his conclusion by raising the two possible interpretations of his claim that the non-repugnance to being in many has its basis in nature in itself. According to the first interpretation, it can be said that the non-repugnance to being in many belongs of itself and positively to the nature by virtue of its formal unity. Predictably, Suárez considers this interpretation implausible. If it were so, the given indifference would have to be inseparable from the nature and thus it would have to accompany it everywhere, that is, also in extramental reality, which is not compatible with Suárez's emphasis on its particularization. The second interpretation maintains, on the other hand, that the non-repugnance to being in many is not something positive by virtue of the formal unity, but only something negative by virtue of its formal unity, which is taken absolutely (*ex vi unitatis suae formalis precise sumptae*). Suárez embraces this second interpretation. It has been said that formal unity is of itself indifferent to individual unity. The repugnance to nature's being in many thus comes to it not from formal unity but from individual unity. What is important is that the given basis of this non-repugnance to being in many is for Suárez not something that would exist exclusively as abstracted by the intellect, but as something *existing in the thing itself* (*in re existens*).⁶⁸ Nevertheless, Suárez does not think of remote potency as (metaphysical) potency, overlaid by the '*ex natura rei*' distinct metaphysical act, but only as the natural condition of a finite nature, which is why the multiplication of individuals within the same species is not repugnant to it.⁶⁹

67 For Cajetan, the conception of nature absolutely considered is not compatible with the condition 'existing outside the soul'. Human nature existing extramentally can never be considered as negatively common. As negatively common, it can be considered only when it is considered extramentally and in itself (Cajetan, *In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis*, p. 96). My interpretative hypothesis is that Cajetan's position, in contrast to Suárez's, led to two different interpretations. Although Cajetan is inclined to admit to the validity of the exposition espoused by Suárez—to be common negatively pertains to the nature existent in the extramental singular things—the Thomist accent on the solitude of nature, after all, can also be accepted as a certain indication that Cajetan considers nature absolutely considered in Fonseca's sense of the unity of precision.

68 DM 6.4.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 220).

69 DM 6.4.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 220–221).

The second part of Suárez's '*Dico*' results from what has been said above. The nature's actual non-repugnance to being in many is not enough for it not to be determined from itself, provided that it has determination from elsewhere (the individual difference). It must be absolutely and entirely (*simpliciter*) indifferent. That kind of indifference can be attributed neither to the nature existent prior to its determination by individuals, nor to the nature that exists extramentally in things themselves, but only to the nature insofar as it exists objectively in understanding.⁷⁰ Thus Suárez—being led by the Jesuit's conciliatory ethos—declares this statement as commonplace, and as ascribed not only to Aristotle, Averroes, Albert the Great, Aquinas, Durandus, Giles of Rome, and all Thomists, but even to Scotus, despite the fact that "his words are particularly equivocal."⁷¹

4 Epistemology of Universals and Intentions

Despite the fact that the context of *DM* 6 is metaphysical, Suárez devotes the whole sixth section to the issue of the psychogenesis of universals and intentions.⁷² In the context of universals the word '*intentio*' has a twofold meaning: the term of the intellectual operations (the so-called *intentio intellecta*) and the logical (second) intention, which is built upon the first. The reason why Suárez deals with the issue of the psychogenesis of universals in the whole section of *DM* 6 is not to give the fullest possible elaboration of the complex problematic of universals in all its disciplinary facets,⁷³ but above all to pave the way for the ontological evaluation of the various types of universals, among which the metaphysical (*universale metaphysicum*) and logical universals (*universale logicum*) stand out.

4.1 *The Direct and Comparative Acts of the Intellect*

It has been said that universal unity is to be identified with the unity of reason. As other scholastics, Suárez surmises that the intellect, by virtue of its immateriality, is the exceptional power capable of generating universality. It remains to answer by which type of intellectual act it arises. Three options are

⁷⁰ Ibid., 6.4.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 220).

⁷¹ Ibid., 6.5.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 222).

⁷² Ibid., 6.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 223–228).

⁷³ That cannot be the case because the question of the logical intentions and predicables, when compared to the extensive discussions common in the logical treatises of Suárez's contemporaries, is treated only marginally.

presented, which all have their own ramified psychology fully-fashioned in *De anima*.⁷⁴ The first option is the agent intellect (*intellectus agens*), which, by means of abstraction from images (*phantasmata*), directly produces the intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*) representing the universal quiddity of a material singular. The passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*), on the other hand, is the receptacle, and is quite different from the agent intellect as its main function is the reception and retention of the universally representative species, previously abstracted by the agent intellect. On the level of intentional representation, the dematerialization of the sensible species from the material *phantasmata* equals their de-individualization. Whereas sensory cognition (as Aristotle says)⁷⁵ is bound to the direct cognition of sensible particulars, the intellect, on the level of direct and immediate cognition, is restricted to the apprehensive abstraction of material quiddities. As is well known, Suárez is a sharp critic of all versions of the material principle of individuation⁷⁶ and of the epistemological claim that material singulars are grasped by the intellect only indirectly by their conversion to *phantasmata*.⁷⁷ For Suárez, the dematerialization of singular sensible species cannot be considered as implying their de-individualization. At most, it may be seen as their spiritualization or elevation from the material to the spiritual order. The representative function of an intentional species remains basically the same. Individuals must be known directly by the intellect, by means of their proper and distinct species.⁷⁸ As is well known, by that criticism Suárez detaches himself from Aquinas, for whom material singulars are cognized only indirectly and by means of reflection on sensory images. That critique alone is evidence that Suárez's complex theory of universals, despite the strong resemblance to the theory of Aquinas and Cajetan, cannot be considered as a pure offshoot of Thomism.

74 In the context of intentions, the most important are the issues of intentional (intelligible) species, intellectual acts, and mental word (expressed species). Unfortunately, all those issues cannot be dealt with in the scope of this essay. See *DA* 5.1-5.

75 Aristotle, *On the Soul*, ed. and trans. W. S. Hett (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2000), 417b22-24.

76 See *DM* 5.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 161-175).

77 As for Suárez's theory of the intellectual cognition of material singulars, see *DA* 9.3.1-11. As regards the lucid presentation of Suárez's theory of the intellectual cognition of singulars and universals, see James B. South, "Singular and Universal in Suárez's Account of Cognition," *Review of Metaphysics* 55 (2002): 785-826.

78 Regarding Suárez's theory of intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*), see Leen Spruit, *Species intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge*, vol. 2 (Leiden, New York, Köln, 1995), pp. 294-306.

Given the epistemological point of departure, formulated already in the notes to his lectures held in Segovia in the 1570s (published posthumously in *De anima*, 1621), Suárez makes allowance for two other options, which he does not find mutually exclusive. Thus, universals can come up either by the absolute precise act of the passive intellect, by which nature is grasped and separated from its individuality according to its essence (nature) and its precise formal '*ratio*', or they can be produced by the collative or comparative act, by which the nature, directly prescinded from particulars, is related to things, in which it extramentally exists, and from which it has been abstracted. According to the first option, it holds that after the intellect's conception of the proper and distinct concept of Peter (the epistemological point of departure for Suárez), it comes to cut off Peter's common nature from his individual difference (both being *in re* virtually distinct). It must be said that, contrary to the interpretations viewing Suárez as a representative of a crude form of conceptualism basically dependent on the *abstractio per confusionem*,⁷⁹ it is the direct objective precision (*abstractio per praecisionem*), realizable on a unique sample, that separates one of the extramental metaphysical components from the other. Every comparison of Peter and Paul according to the common aspect 'being a man' already assumes the precise isolation of that common essence. Even though the Jesuit's repeatable refusal of the claim that the (univocal) sortal similarity must be based on extramental partial unity, which is '*ex natura rei*' distinct from individual difference,⁸⁰ Suárez is working with the notion of identical essence, generable by the direct precise act of the intellect, which he considers to be the inevitable assumption of each comparison of particulars. Without the very detection of that identical essence, similar things could not be identified as similar.⁸¹ That is why the comparison of particulars comes only *after* the objective precision of the absolute universal.

Leaving aside the universal acquired by the direct precise act, the full-blown (logical) universal is to be thought primarily as the relational

79 The abstraction *per confusionem* entails only the production of analogical concepts. The concepts originated by that type of abstraction are not univocal because the contrary and incompatible differences are actually fused in them. The uncharitable interpretation of Suárez is presented, for example, in Francisco L. Peccorini, "Suárez's Struggle with the Problem of the One and the Many," *The Thomist* 36 (1972): 433–471; "Knowledge of the Singular: Aquinas, Suárez and Recent Interpreters," *The Thomist* 38 (1974): 605–655.

80 See *DM* 6.9.19–20 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 242–243).

81 See *ibid.*, 6.6.11–12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 228). The similar refusal of the interpretation of Suárez as a crude resemblance of nominalism is brought in Walter Hoeres, "Wesenheit und Individuum bei Suarez," *Scholastik* 37 (1962): 181–210, especially p. 210.

entity.⁸² As such, it arises, as has been suggested, by means of a comparison of an abstracted nature with its inferior natures, which comes after the comparison of the plurality of singulars of the same kind or of the same genus (inferiors need not be only extramental singulars but also the logical intentions, such as species). It is by means of a comparison of the nature with its inferiors that one obtains a notion of the respective universal. Suárez is confident that the universal abstracted by the precise act constitutes the proximate foundation for that respective universal. The direct universal (the output of the precise act) cannot be considered the respective universal because it is only the absolute entity, likened by Suárez to Plato's idea of existing intellectually. Even though the direct universal is exposed relationally—and as such it is endowed with 'the accident' of indifference and the disposition to being in many things implying the relational aspect—the given relation is the real and transcendental relation. The transcendental relation, as it is well known, is fully compatible with the existence of absolute reality.⁸³

4.2 *The Ontological Evaluation of the First and Second Intentions*

In contrast to William of Ockham's psychological theory of intentions that considers concepts as natural signs (the acts of intellection), that is, as (mental) singular acts inhering subjectively in the mind, Suárez's register is broader.⁸⁴ If a satisfactory theory of predication is to be given, according to Suárez one cannot tamper only with the subjective concepts rigidly belonging to the category of quality. What is conceived when one apprehends *man* does not fall under the category of quality but under the category of substance. Moreover, a singular entity (subjective concept) cannot be predicated of another singular entity. The mental sign of *man*, for example, cannot be said of the mental sign of *Peter*. Those are the reasons that led Suárez to embrace,

82 The very etymology of 'universal' suggests the relational aspect of one above the many, one against the many, and one in many. As regards Suárez's own affirmation concerning the respective nature of the universal *qua* universal, see, e.g., *DM* 6.6.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 225).

83 See *DA* 5.3.30; *DM* 47.4.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 803); *ibid.*, 6.6.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 227).

84 As regards Ockham's doctrines on intentions, see Larry Hickman, *Modern Theories of Higher Level Predicates. Second Intentions in the Neuzeit* (München, 1980), pp. 38–42 (the first intentions), pp. 73–84 (the second intentions). Suárez's conception of the first and second intentions is one of the numerous evidences that Ockham's authority, with respect to Suárez's theory of universals, is not to be overestimated. As for the substantial differences between Suárez and Ockham on the level of the ontological status of universal concepts, see Carlos P. Noreña, "Ockham and Suárez on the Ontological Status of Universal Concepts," *The New Scholasticism* 3 (1981): 348–362.

besides the formal concepts, also the objective concepts, whose ontological status varies according to the given content of this or that concept.⁸⁵

It has been said that the universally denominated nature, in accordance with what the authors of early modern scholasticism commonly called the physical (material) universal (*universale physicum, materialiter sumptum*), exists extramentally. It is labelled 'physical' because it is determined by particulars by means of which it is also subjected to sensible accidents and changes, which are the domain of natural philosophy. At the same time, though, the physical universal is not entirely extrinsic to metaphysical and logical investigations. It exhibits the formal unity that pertains to the metaphysical investigation treating the kinds of transcendental unity. Moreover, formal unity can also be found among immaterial beings such as God, which makes it all the more the object of metaphysics.⁸⁶ As such (at least indirectly), it also belongs to logic because it constitutes the remote foundation of the intention (or second intention) of universality.⁸⁷

As extrinsically denominated, the physical nature 'dresses up' the objective being; it becomes the objective concept. Besides the formal concept (*prima intentio seu conceptus formalis*), Suárez also accepts the first objective intention (*prima intentio objectiva*). Admittedly, the ontological evaluation of the first objective intention is one of the trickiest issues in Suárez's philosophy in general, and we cannot delve into the details of the discussion here.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, one finds sufficient textual evidence that, as compared with Scotists and Thomists,⁸⁹ Suárez's theory of the objective intention is willing to

85 As regards Suárez's 'realistic' presentation of the ontological status of objective concept, see mainly *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 64–65).

86 *DM* 6.2.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 210).

87 *Ibid.*, 6.8.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 232). See also *DA* 9.3.22.

88 As an example of a certain intrinsic ambiguity of the objective concept in Suárez, follow the illustrative discussion between Jorge J.E. Gracia and Norman J. Wells. See: Jorge J.E. Gracia, "Suárez's Conception of Metaphysics: A Step in the Direction of Mentalism?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65 (1991): 287–310; Norman J. Wells, "Esse Cognitum and Suárez Revisited," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (1993): 339–348; Jorge J.E. Gracia, "Suárez and Metaphysical Mentalism: The Last Visit," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (1993): 349–354.

89 As the representative of the ontological evaluation, according to which the first objective intentions are beings of reason, see, for instance, the theory of the Franciscan Scotist, Constantine Sarnanus (d. 1595). About the detailed exposition of Sarnanus's theory, see Larry Hickman, *Modern Theories of Higher Level Predicates. Second Intentions in the Neuzeit*, pp. 44–47. Despite the doctrinal resemblance with Thomists, the difference in accent can be observed in the ontological impact of the device of extrinsic denomination.

admit both evaluations, that is, as implying both real and rational being. The first objective intention is the abstracted nature (*natura abstracta*), which exists only intellectually. Two aspects are to be distinguished in its genesis. In the first phase, the given intention is neither something existing in the extra-mental nature (it does not exist as abstracted), nor is it a kind of being of reason (that originates only when it is thought in the manner of something real). Just that reflection ‘as if’, however, has not already taken place. So what can that first objective intention be? Should it be said that the first objective intention is a diminished being (*ens diminutum*), standing between real and rational being? To cut through the paradox, two basic principles (devices) employed by Suárez must be taken into account. First, there is the above-mentioned distinction between the essence and its condition ‘being abstracted’, and second, there is the idiosyncratic interpretation of the notion of extrinsic denomination as the means by which the first objective intention comes into being. What does Suárez mean by the extrinsic denomination, though? James F. Ross, employing the analogy of attribution for an explanation of this concept, says that in the context of universal denomination of the intellect, the extrinsic denomination is “a kind of secondary reference where the same term is used to refer to both the thing which has the property primarily signified by that term and to things related in various ways to something’s having the property signified by that term.”⁹⁰ The universality extrinsically denominated by the intellect primarily occurs in the intellective act (formal concept), which is the real denominating form. That denominating form, conceived as the primary analogate of the analogical concept of ‘universality’, exhibits the transcendental relation to the denominated thing (the secondary analogate), which is meanwhile taken precisely without its reflection on its condition. As such, that denominating form is only a real being as is the physical universal. Both factors, inherent to the intellective act identified with the extrinsic denomination, are real. That is why if one considers precisely extrinsic denomination as

Not as late as the reflexive cognition (as it is in Suárez) is what actually forms the being of reason, but already the direct act of extrinsic denomination. The difference is largely given by the significant doctrinal differences in the epistemological issues, such as the nature of the mental word and intelligibile species. For the difference in the ontological evaluation of the extrinsic denomination between Suárez and John of St. Thomas, see Theo Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache. Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache* (Leiden, New York, Copenhagen & Cologne, 1987), pp. 202–203; 210–214. As for John of St. Thomas on the extrinsic denomination and its ontological import, see Johannes Poinset, *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus*, vol. 1: *Ars Logica seu de forma et materia rationandi* (Hildesheim, Zürich, New York, 2008), p. 304.

90 James F. Ross, *On Formal and Universal Unity*, p. 10.

the act resulting from the real form, directed by means of transcendental relation to the real thing, no being of reason can be made up yet.⁹¹

What is crucial for Suárez is that the condition of universality comes on the tapis only by means of a reflection of the intellect upon a given condition, which is 'added' to the nature by the previous precise act. Only after the intellect's reflection upon the condition of 'being abstracted' and of 'being indifferent to many' does the mind come to the awareness that the abstracted nature has the 'form' of 'being denuded from the individual difference'. By that reflection, the intellect 'quasi-effectuates' the next intellectual operation, namely, the comparative or collative act, by which the abstracted nature is cognitively related to its inferiors. By that collation, the relation of reason with the second intention (the intentions of a higher order) is established. Its proximate foundation arises only by means of reflection on the quasi-property ('to be abstract'), which the nature, as the subject of the rational relation, takes on by means of the direct precise act of the passive intellect. The given property, thought of as if it were real property, constitutes the foundation of the given relation of reason.⁹² As compared to the real relation, it is, of course, ontologically deficient because its foundation, subject, and also terms (especially in cases when we compare generic nature to species) are not real but only rational.⁹³ Coming back to the issue of the ontological status of the first objective intention, Suárez's *prima facie* surprising evaluation seems to be more intelligible now: *prior* to the intellect relating the abstracted nature to its inferiors, the abstracted nature—namely, the first objective intention—is not to be considered as a being of reason but as something that is included under the scope of real being (*sub latitudine entis realis*).⁹⁴

For Suárez, the very act of comparison is conceived as the second formal intention (*secunda intentio formalis*).⁹⁵ The second formal intention, moreover, is considered as the act that 'builds' on previous objective knowledge of the first objective intention, which is reflexively apprehended. It is that reflexively apprehended first objective intention, and not the directly denominated nature, that Suárez identifies with the metaphysical universal. In analogy to the first formal intention, the second formal intention (*notitia comparativa*) is

91 *DM* 54.2.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, pp. 1021–1022).

92 *Ibid.*, 6.6.4, 8–9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 225, 227–228). See also *ibid.*, 54.2.15–16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, pp. 1022–1023).

93 *DM* 54.6.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 1039).

94 See *ibid.*, 54.2.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 2012). See also *ibid.*, 6.7.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 229); *DA* 5.3.27.

95 *DA* 9.3.21.

qualified as the real singular being. The case with the second objective intention (*secunda intentio objectiva*), however, is different. As the apprehended nature *qua* apprehended, and as rationally related to its inferiors, it can be considered as nothing other than the relation of reason. This relation of reason under which the nature stands is what Suárez called the logical universal (*universale logicum*). Its administration, nevertheless, is primarily the task of the dialectician, not of the metaphysician.⁹⁶

5 Conclusion

Suárez's metaphysical theory of universals is led by the main objective of justifying the process of scientific enquiry on the basis of the Aristotelian assumption of universal and necessary essences. Suárez is clear about the fact that this justification cannot be accomplished by the ontological underpinning brought by the theories of Platonism, ultrarealism, and ultranominism. With respect to his goal, the given theories are either entirely useless or blatantly insufficient. Besides the overall unintelligibility of 'the monsters of ideas',⁹⁷ he argues, the separated ideas are entirely functionless. First, they cannot be cognized by the human intellect since the only way to establish universal cognition is by means of abstraction, which originates in sensory knowledge. Second, as separated, they cannot be predicated of their own inferiors, which violates the identity theory of predication. They are relevant only in the context of the universal in causation, he concludes, which is far from the issue of the universal in being and predicating.⁹⁸ Moreover, the position of clear-cut ultrarealism (immanent realism), represented in late medieval philosophy by well-known authors such as Walter Burley and John Wycliff (not explicitly mentioned by

96 *DM* 6.8.4 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 232–233). By that, Suárez decisively denies the opinion that the second intentions are based on the real properties of things or natures themselves. He is far from accepting the statement of the so-called *modistae* in the late thirteenth century, considering the second intentions as founded on the real properties of extramental things. Suárez's doctrine is much closer to the doctrines of Scotus and Aquinas, who ground the given intentions on the *mental* properties of the thing known *qua* known. On the doctrinal contrast between the theories of Aquinas and Scotus, and that of Simon of Faversham (c. 1260–1306) and Radulphus Brito (d. 1320), see Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus* (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2002), pp. 45–137. As for Aquinas's theory, see also Robert Schmidt, S.J., *The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas* (The Hague, 1966), pp. 122–126, and also 306–311.

97 As really different from singulars, they can be only singular, and never universal.

98 Suárez treats the universal in causation in *DM* 25 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 899–916).

Suárez in *DM* 6, though),⁹⁹ assuming the immanent existence of the *universale in actu* in extramental things, is dismissed as early as *DM* 5.1. The non-existence of the actual universal in things leads to a contradictory state of affairs in which the same universal *man* existing in Peter and Paul comes to be simultaneously the same and distinct from itself.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, his denial of the strict parallelism between *lex mentis* and *lex entis* is what ranks Suárez among the outright opponents of all forms of excessive realism. With equal decisiveness, Suárez turns down another excess, according to which universality is given solely by linguistic (conventional) terms (*voces*) and by nominal distinctions. This sort of extreme nominalism is reprehended by Suárez as ‘hardly believable’ (*vix autem credibile*).¹⁰¹

Suárez’s metaphysics of universals is fundamentally formed by the moderately realistic conceptions of John Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas. In contrast to Pedro Fonseca, they all admit that universal unity is nothing more than the unity of reason with a foundation in a thing. Nonetheless, they differ in what exactly that foundation is. On the issue of *fundamentum*, Suárez draws his inspiration both from Scotus (the conciliatory reading) and from Aquinas (and his disciples). He agrees with Scotus’s thesis, which lays a strong emphasis on the actual presence of formal unity in extramental things and on its rudimental non-repugnancy to being in many. However, as is well known, no explicit mention of the term ‘formal unity’, let alone its existence in extramental things, can be found, as for example in Aquinas’s *De ente et essentia*. On the other hand, especially when taking into account Suárez’s dominant uncharitable exposition of Scotus, the Jesuit is much closer to the Thomists’ denial of ‘*ex natura rei*’ distinction. By that refusal, it is easy for Suárez to dismiss the opinion according to which the (common) nature disposes of the literal (formal) community *sui generis*. By the same token, Suárez highlights the distinction between formal unity and its community, which leads to his recurrent statements about the essential resemblance in things.

Whereas the metaphysics of universals approximates Suárez to Aquinas and Thomists rather than to Scotus, the issue of the psychogenesis of universals is the manifestation of the Jesuit’s doctrinal divergence from Thomism. Suárez’s decisive emphasis on the primary cognition of singulars, apprehended by the singular intentional species out of which the universals, even within the

99 The position seems to be also sufficiently represented in Suárez’s uncharitable reading of Scotus.

100 *DM* 5.1.4–5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, pp. 146–147).

101 *Ibid.*, 6.9.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 238).

same singular species (sic!),¹⁰² are acquired by the possible intellect by means of formal precision, is anything but Thomist. Despite its crucial resemblance to Scotus and Aquinas, the ontological evaluation of various intentions, given by the evaluation of the logical intentions as the relation of reason, cannot be entirely labeled as 'Scotistic' or 'Thomist' either. The claim that the first objective intentions fall under real being—a statement based on Suárez's understanding of extrinsic denomination—moves Suárez, after all, away from both Scotists and Thomists.

Despite Suárez's well-known conciliatory attitude to conceptualism, declared by frequent assertions that his doctrine differs from it only '*in modo loquendi*',¹⁰³ the Jesuit's doctrine on formal unity is nevertheless evidence of doctrinal difference. *Expressis verbis*, Suárez denies the claim that the class of singulars is what is immediately signified by the universal concepts. If the extensionalist reading of universals were right, science could not be about objective concepts or things (being the same for Suárez!), but only about words or formal concepts. Without the ontological assumption of universal specific natures, virtually distinct from individual differences, the intellect (and also the material sensory powers) would grasp nothing more than the accidental similarities of singulars inclusive of their individual differences. That would, with respect to the relevant abstractive operation, imply the adoption of what is called the abstraction *per confusionem*, or formal (subjective) precision. Needless to say, that operation is far from being capable of generating univocal logical concepts, which, as it has been stressed, are for Suárez in their first phase formed by the so-called objective precision.

102 DA 9.3.13.

103 DM 6.2.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 206); see also *ibid.*, 6.5.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 223).

Suárez's Psychology

Simo Knuuttila

1 Introduction

In 1572 Suárez lectured in Segovia on questions related to Aristotle's *De anima*, which largely defined the scope of teaching psychology in sixteenth-century universities. Before his death in 1618, Suárez planned to prepare these lectures for printing, but he managed to rewrite only the first twelve chapters of the first book and to abridge only some parts up to chapter six of the second book. These texts were combined with the rest of Suárez's original work by Baltasar Alvares, who edited the entire work and published it in 1621. The early lecture series, which was not published in Suárez's lifetime, was edited by Salvador Castellote in 1978–91. In this chapter, I follow the 1572 text (C) and also give references to the 1621 version (A). Suárez also deals with questions pertaining to philosophical psychology in some parts of the *Disputationes metaphysicae* and in his theological commentary on Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*.¹ In fact, Aristotle and Aquinas are the most quoted authors in Suárez's psychological works. The Jesuit usually points out when he is deviating from their views, and he often seeks harmonising interpretations, although some of his basic insights, such as the theory of non-causal psychological connections, go in another direction. Duns Scotus is one of the sources for his non-Thomist views, though Suárez is familiar with a great number of medieval and early

1 For the editing history, see the introduction in Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De Anima*, an introduction and critical edition by Salvador Castellote Cubells (Madrid, 1978–91) (hereafter C); the work from 1621 is found in Francisco Suárez, *De anima* in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3 (Paris, 1856) (hereafter A). For psychology in the sixteenth century, see Katharina Park and Eckhard Kessler, "The Concept of Psychology," in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, 1988), pp.355–363. See also Tuomo Aho, "The Status of Psychology as Understood by Sixteenth-Century Scholastics," in *Psychology and Philosophy: Inquiries into the Soul from Later Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought*, ed. Sara Heinämaa and Martina Reuter, *Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind* (Dordrecht, 2009), pp.47–66; Dennis Des Chene, *Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul* (Ithaca, NY, 2000); Sascha Salatowsky, *De Anima: Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 43 (Amsterdam, 2006).

modern theological, philosophical, and even medical works. One special feature of Suárez's discussion of these is his critical attitude toward Cajetan.

2 The Levels of the Souls

Suárez teaches that the discipline of the soul in Aristotle's *De anima* forms part of natural philosophy, which concerns composite substances consisting in matter and form. The treatise on the soul is the principal part of the branch of natural philosophy that deals with living beings.² The soul, as the form of these composite substances, provides them with the powers for all or some of the vital operations that Aristotle mentions in Chapters 2 and 3 of book 2 of *De anima*: vegetation, sensation, appetite, local motion, and intellection. Suárez discusses the soul as the substantial form in disputation 1 of his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* (C), while he discusses the differences between the vegetative soul of plants, the sensitive soul of animals, and the rational soul of humans in disputation 2, and the powers of the soul in general in disputation 3. In the version of *De anima* from 1621 (A), these themes are dealt with in books 1 and 2. After this introductory part, Suárez deals with each vital power or faculty in detail.

The elementary level of life is found in the vegetative functions of growth, nutrition, and reproduction. While the vegetative power characterizes all composite living beings, it is the only power of the soul of plants. Animals and humans, however, have in addition various cognitive and moving powers, all these functioning through bodily organs, and humans still have the rational faculties of intellect and will, which have no immediate bodily organ. These three kinds of living beings differ from each other through the three kinds of soul, and correspondingly, the discipline concerned with bodily living beings can be divided into the study of plants, animals, and humans.³ According to Suárez, all life activities of composite beings derive from the soul, which is the formal cause of their life.⁴ Instead of following the doctrine of the plurality of soul-forms in animals and humans, though, he assumes, like Thomas Aquinas, that the three kinds of souls of corporeal beings have powers that are really distinct from substance itself, hierarchically higher souls being provided with the powers of lower souls.⁵

² C prooem. 1–6, 13.

³ C prooem. 9; *ibid.*, 2.1.4; *ibid.*, 2.2.7; A I.7.3.

⁴ C 1.1.8–9; A I.2.26–8.

⁵ C 1.1.8; *ibid.*, 2.1.4; *ibid.*, 2.6.6–9; A I.8.17–18; *ibid.*, II.1.4–5. For the denial of the plurality of substantial forms, see *DM* 15.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25 [Paris, 1861]).

Next, Suárez mentions that one might wonder whether courses on works dealing with plants and animals should precede the study of Aristotle's *De anima* in learning natural philosophy. His answer to this concern is that the traditional order, which follows the Aristotelian *corpus*, is reasonable because the soul is the principle of living things, and one should proceed from the principles to the composites.⁶ He adds that the discipline of the soul is the noblest of all natural disciplines, due to the nobility of its subject. In the ranking of all disciplines, it comes third after theology and metaphysics.⁷

According to Suárez, the soul of plants and simple animals is extensional, in the sense that the parts of these beings may remain alive when they are divided. The soul of more complicated animals is not extensional or divisible, and the same holds of humans as well.⁸ Nevertheless, while the animal soul exists only as a form of the body, the human soul can also be separated from the body and is in this respect like a separate substance.⁹ The soul is the informing principle of matter, as well as the source of life for the composite. As the formative principle of matter, the soul determines the structure of the corporeal organism and the organs that serve the living functions of the composite.¹⁰ Apart from the rational powers of intellect and will, the powers of the soul are located in bodily organs or vegetative functional parts, with which they form ahylomorphic entity. As a substantial form, the soul does not produce any acts by itself; rather, it operates through powers that are really distinct from the soul.¹¹ These powers are classified on the basis of their formal objects.¹²

Suárez's analysis of the operations of the powers of the soul is teleological. He argues that the substantial forms of things represent possible ways of being,

6 C prooem. 6, 8.

7 C prooem. 28.

8 C 2.7.3-5, 10; A I.13.3-6.

9 C 2.4.7; A I.12.4. For the medieval discussions of the human soul as a form and a spiritual substance, see Carlos Bazán, "The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas' Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 64 (1997): 95-126. While Suárez believes that the intellectual soul is incorruptible because of its simplicity, he is more interested in developing other arguments for immortality that would be more consonant with the philosophy of embodied souls and the doctrine of resurrection. See South, "Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul's Dependence on the Body," in ed. Benjamin Hill and Henrick Lagerlund (Oxford, 2012), pp. 121-136.

10 C I.3.8; A I.2.11, 25.

11 C 3.1.4-7, 14; *ibid.*, 3.3.4; A II.1.4; *ibid.*, II.3.2-3. As also indicated by Suárez, the Thomist thesis of the real distinction between the soul and its faculties was commonly regarded as one of the differences between Thomism and Scotism.

12 C 3.2.11-13; A II.2.12-13.

and that nature has given them the necessary powers through which the proper way of being of each composite can be realized:

Art imitates nature, for the instruments in art are what the powers are in nature. As a craftsman first considers an operation which demands an instrument and matter which could be worked on with the help of the instrument and then makes the instrument of such a matter and form which are required for this end, in the same way one should think about natural powers. The soul which was the principle of many operations with respect to various objects required various kinds of powers for various operations and objects, and therefore nature gave it such powers of the soul as were adequate for such acts and objects.¹³

According to Suárez, living beings differ from other things by "having the principle of their perfect-making operations in themselves." While the operations of spiritual beings, such as angels, are immaterial and wholly separated from corporeality, the operations of plants and animals are material because they take place through material things. The vegetative and sensory activities of humans are also material, but the activities of the human intellect are immaterial, although they are also dependent on the body. Because all composite living beings are corporeal, they can be characterized as animated bodies that are living as long as they are formed by the soul and dead when the body is no longer informed by the body.¹⁴ The vegetative functions are basic for these beings because their life and death depend on nutrition.¹⁵

The soul-depending acts of the living composites are called vital acts, which are sharply distinguished from the acts of non-living things. Vital acts, as distinct from the changes in non-living things, are not caused by an external efficient cause. They are produced by the soul through the relevant faculties and, as will be seen, may be necessitated by external physical changes, as the vital acts of plants and many sensory acts are, or by other vital acts, as many of the higher acts are. However, according to Suárez, being externally necessitated is not the same as being caused by an efficient cause. He maintains that efficient causation is transient, in the sense that the active cause influences the passive power by making the latter receive something from the activator.¹⁶ Nothing like this can take place in the vital acts, which are operations of the powers of

13 C 3.2.8; cf. A II.2.9.

14 C prooem. 6, 11; *ibid.*, I.1.3; A I.1.3-4; *ibid.*, I.2.32-4.

15 C 4.3; A II.6.

16 C 3.2.4; A II.2.4-5.

the soul. The soul and its powers are not material principles, hence their acts cannot be affected by material causes even though they are realized through material instruments. Since vital acts ultimately proceed from the active intrinsic soul-principle, they are not efficiently caused by other vital acts either, and do not produce transient effects.¹⁷ The notion of a vital act, which refers to various functions of living beings, was not uncommon in medieval philosophy. John Capreolus characterizes vital acts as “the acts of living beings in so far as they are living and those are living beings which move by themselves.”¹⁸ Some medieval writers associated this with the view that the soul is the principle of life and more or less directly the principle of the activities of living beings.¹⁹

3 Vital Acts and Their Non-causal Connections

Vital acts, which are not externally caused, may be determined by non-vital changes or by other vital acts. Through these non-causal connections, they are included in the vital net that contributes to the perfection of the life of the composites. Suárez explains the coordination of the vital acts in terms of the harmony that is derived from the fact that the acts are ultimately dependent on one soul: “the identity of a principle cannot be better concluded from anything else than from the concord and harmony between its powers.”²⁰ He often repeats this view by referring to the coordination (*co-ordinatio*), harmony (*harmonia*, *consonantia*), concord (*consensus*, *consensio*), or sympathy (*sympathia*) between the various acts of the vegetative powers, external and internal senses, the imagination and the intellect, and the cognitive, appetitive, and motive powers.²¹ Suárez invokes these concepts to explain the connections between vital acts, which are seemingly caused by efficient causality. In reality, Suárez affirms, vital powers form a centralized network in which the actualization of

¹⁷ C 5.3.3; 5.4.4; A 3.3.3; 4.5.

¹⁸ *Super primo Sententiarum*, d. 3, q. 3 (Venice, 1514), 70v.

¹⁹ The acts associated with life were called vital acts by Peter John Olivi and many others after him. See Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, vols. I–III, ed. Bernard Jansen (Quaracchi, 1922–1926), q. 71 (II, 644) q. 72 (III, 24–25). In dealing with cognitive and motive acts, Olivi mentions the view that the vital acts cannot have an external efficient cause (q. 72, III, 33). See also Sven Knebel, “Scotists versus Thomists: What Seventeenth-Century Scholastic Psychology Was About,” *The Modern Schoolman* 74 (1997): 219–226.

²⁰ C 2.7.11; cf. A 1.13.11.

²¹ C 2.5.5; *ibid.*, 2.7.11; *ibid.*, 6.2.10; *ibid.*, 9.2.12; A 1.13.11; *ibid.*, III.9.7; *ibid.*, IV.2.12; *dm* 18.5.3; *ibid.*, 18.8.40; *ibid.*, 23.1.11; *ibid.*, 23.5.14; *ibid.*, 23.7.2.

one part is followed by the actualization of another part, without external efficient causation.²²

Suárez's terminology is partly derived from Neoplatonic sources, which was not unusual in Renaissance natural philosophy. However, his use of these concepts in eliminating efficient causality is regarded as an original innovation.²³ For Suárez, the soul is the principle of the powers and the sympathetic connection between their acts.²⁴ Furthermore,

The interior and exterior senses are rooted in the same soul, and thus it is the same soul which sees by sight and imagines by imagination. There is consequently such a natural concord among these powers that when the soul perceives something by sight, a similitude of this is immediately repeated in imagination...there are many other similar concords between vital powers which are rooted in the same soul, for when one operates, the other immediately operates.²⁵

In dealing with cognitive vital acts, Suárez often refers to the attention of the soul.²⁶ He sometimes describes attention as a conscious attitude of the subject, but it also has a more theoretical pre-conscious role as a unifying factor.²⁷ While his approach was influenced by Augustinian and related traditional ideas, Suárez stressed, following the thesis of the distinction between the soul and its powers, that vital attention is not the same as a cognitive act, but is one of its constituents.²⁸ Thus, the attentive activity of the principle itself is a constitutive element of the act, and contributes to the coordination of the contents of the faculties, which are connected by natural sympathy.²⁹

22 Josef Ludwig, *Das akausale Zusammenwirken (Sympathia) der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suarez* (Munich, 1929); see also James B. South, "Singular and Universal in Suárez's Account of Cognition," *Review of Metaphysics* 55 (2002): 785–823, esp. pp. 800–804.

23 Ludwig, *Das akausale Zusammenwirken*, p. 86.

24 Cf. Salvador Castellote Cubells, *Die Anthropologie des Suarez. Beiträge zur spanischen Anthropologie des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts* (Freiburg-Munich, 1962), pp. 104–107.

25 C 6.2.13; A III.9.10.

26 "All cognition takes place through vital attention and the change of a power" (C 6.4.7; A, III.11.5).

27 See Ludwig, *Das akausale Zusammenwirken*, p. 32; Castellote Cubells, *Die Anthropologie des Suarez*, pp. 123–125.

28 C 5.3.4; A III.3.4.

29 The details of the role of the attentive influence remain sketchy in Suárez; see the discussions in Ludwig, *Das akausale Zusammenwirken*, pp. 40–61, and James B. South, "Francisco Suárez on Imagination," *Vivarium* 39 (2001): 143–156.

Though Suárez wanted to eliminate external efficient causation from psychology, he sometimes employs the notion of a partial cause to explain the connections between vital acts.³⁰ A partial cause immediately precedes another in a regular succession of events. However, there is a metaphysical unifying principle in the substantial attention of the soul. Suárez explains the connection between the acts of fantasy and appetite as follows:

We can more easily avoid these problems by denying the active concurrence of cognition with the act of appetite, maintaining that through representing an object it merely provides a condition, after which the appetite produces its act through the natural sympathy between these powers, to which these powers' being rooted in the same soul best contributes. The soul or the subject through the soul is that which principally operates and uses these powers and thus, when it perceives an object agreeable to it by one power, it strives for it by the other, not through effecting on one by another but because when it perceives the object through one power, it is excited to operate through the other. This excitement does not result from a real and effective mutation, but from a metaphorical or final one, thus not requiring a local propinquity but merely that of the soul (*animalis*), so to say.³¹

4 Vegetative Powers

After a general discussion of the soul and its powers, Suárez deals with the vegetative powers. Vegetation includes nutrition, growth, and reproduction, which are common to plants, animals, and humans. The soul of plants has only the power for those operations that manifest themselves in vegetative vital acts. Suárez analyses the object of vegetative powers, by which he means the results of the activities with respect to matter, the physiological side of these operations, and the nature of the vital power itself:

The object of the active potencies is different from the matter on which they operate. The object...is the outcome, as the object of building is a house, and the matter is the stuff which is required for their action.³²

³⁰ For the Scotist conception of partial cause in Suárez, see C 5.4.7, 14; A III.4.6, 12.

³¹ *DM* 18.8.40.

³² C 4.1.7; cf. A II.4.7.

Suárez's accounts of the vegetative powers of animals are largely based on traditional views of medicine and philosophy. He refers to the doctrines of the humours, the vital spirits, and the nerves without entering into details, but discusses the main organs and their development and tasks somewhat more thoroughly.

The central part of nutrition is the metabolic process, which, in Suárez's view, is a vital act that takes place through the bodily capacities, under the guidance of the soul. The life of material beings is dependent on regular nourishment: food is necessary for restoring the elements consumed by natural heat, which is necessary for bodily vital acts, and water is continuously needed to prevent drying up.³³ Human nutrition is a complicated process, and its central organs are the liver, which changes the foodstuff into blood, and the heart, which distributes the nourishing blood to all parts of the organism.³⁴ Growth is another vegetative process that is based on nutrition.³⁵ While nutrition and growth serve nature's aim of preserving the subject, the production of male and female semen in animals serves the goal of preserving the species.³⁶ Suárez comments on the views of reproduction in Aristotle, Galen, and Aquinas, whose works he often refers to in discussing the vegetative operations. He regards nutrition as the basic vegetative function, arguing that the growth and production of semen are parts of the nutritive system, which is guided by the one vegetative power of the soul.³⁷

5 Sensory Powers

Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, and many other thirteenth-century Aristotelian authors argued that sight is a passive potency, which acts to see external objects. These objects, however, are also the ultimate cause of the act. Since an Aristotelian passive power is actualized by an active power only when these powers are in contact, Aristotle and his followers argued that the object of vision functions as a cause of the act of seeing by changing the medium so that the visible form without matter becomes immediately present to the power of seeing. This gave rise to the medieval theory of imperceptible species in the medium and the sensory faculty. The same theory was applied to other

33 C 4.3.6-8; A II.6.6.

34 C 4.8.9-14; A II.11.7-10.

35 C 4.6.15; A II.9.17.

36 C 4.4.5; A II.7.5. For male and female semen see C 4.9.1; A II.12.2.

37 C 4.6.16; *ibid.*, 4.7.6-10; A II.9.18-19; *ibid.*, II.10.6-8.

senses as well. While those who followed Averroes spoke about the 'spiritual' or 'intentional' presence of the form in the medium and sense organs, others preferred the conception of the multiplication of species, the visible form producing first a species, then another, and so on. There were also varying views on whether the species themselves were corporeal things, physical qualities of the medium, or spiritual entities separated from physical things.³⁸

In late medieval and Renaissance times, the theory of the passive sensory powers and the species as activators was increasing superseded by various conceptions of the active sense that were influenced by Averroistic and Augustinian ideas. Averroes suggested that there should be an active sensory power that transforms the species in the medium into a non-corporeal activator of the sensory powers.³⁹ The Augustinian view, which held that cognition involves active attention, was further developed by various figures such as Robert Kilwardby, who was a contemporary of Aquinas.⁴⁰ The species theory, however, which was meant to explain the actualization of potencies, was not helpful with respect to the intentionality of sensory experience, as was stressed by Peter John Olivi and John Duns Scotus. Olivi thus applied Augustinian terminology in his intentionalist theory, which claimed that the soul is capable of attending directly to external objects without mediating species.⁴¹ Influenced by Henry of Ghent, Scotus, for his part, combined the species theory with the

38 Simo Knuuttila, "Aristotle's Theory of Perception and Medieval Aristotelianism," in *Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Kärkkäinen, *Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind* (Dordrecht, 2008), pp. 1–22.

39 Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, ed. F.S. Crawford, *Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem Versionum Latinorum VI.1* (Cambridge, MA, 1953), II.60 (221).

40 See *De spiritu fantastico*, ed. P.O. Lewry in Robert Kilwardby, *On Time and Imagination*, *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi IX* (Oxford, 1987), nn. 103, 112.

41 See Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Bernard Jansen, vol. 3 (Quaracchi, 1926), q. 72 (9): "However much the cognitive power is informed by a habit and a species, which differ from the cognitive act, it cannot proceed to a cognitive act if it does not first tend toward the object, so that the gaze of its intention is actually turned and directed to the object." Scotus distinguishes between receiving the species and tending to the object: "For the cognitive power must not only receive the species of the object, but also tend through its act toward the object. This second is more essential to the power since the first is required because of the imperfection of the power. And the object is the object because the power tends to it rather than because it impresses a species." Robert Andrews et al., eds., *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VI–IX*, *Opera philosophica 4* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1997), VII.14, 29 (290), translated by Robert Pasnau, "Cognition," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge, 2003), p. 288.

active sense. The reception of the form in the organ, he argued, is merely passive, but this is a necessary rather than sufficient condition for activating the sensory power, which takes place by the activity of the soul.⁴² This kind of idea, with a more complicated account of active and passive sense, was associated with Averroes's remark about the agent sense proposed by John of Jandun, whose theory continued to be discussed in the Renaissance.⁴³ John Buridan, on the other hand, developed the active sense in a hylomorphic direction.⁴⁴

42 See John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima*, ed. Carlos Bazán et al., *Opera Philosophica* 5 (Washington-St. Bonaventure, 2006), 12 (p. 106): "There are two ways how the potencies mentioned can be thought to be passive. First, the potency immediately receives the second evoked act and is determined by the species of its object presented to it in the organ of a sensory power for sensing or in a phantasm for understanding, the species being in no way in the potency. The potency elicits this second act by its active power, activating the potency and determining it to know the object from which the species comes, as it were by means of the species presented to it, although the species does not inform the potency in any way." For similar ideas in Henry of Ghent, see M. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in the Mature Thought of Henry of Ghent," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 49 (2011): 181–220.

43 "Similarly, we do not say that the sensory potency which receives a sensation is in itself primarily and directly affected by the sensible object itself, although its becoming actual presupposes the actualisation of a certain potency which is in itself passive or capable of being affected by the sensible object, and when this potency is actualised by the activity of the sensible object, in the same instant of time the agent sense causes sensation in the passive sense which is disposed in a certain way by the species. And in this way, we interpret all authorities who state that the sensible object moves the sense from potency to act: not that the sensible object or its species caused by the object efficiently causes sensation or directly and per se acts on the sensory potency, but because it produces its species in the sense-organ which is the disposition of the passive sense for receiving sensation." John of Jandun, "Sophisma de sensu agente," in *Pour l'histoire du sens agent. Le controverse entre Barthélemy de Bruges et Jean Jandun. Ses antécédents et son evolution*, ed. A. Pattin (Leuven, 1988), pp. 140–141; there are editions of many texts related to Jandun's treatise in Pattin's work. For the active sense in Kilwardby and Olivi, see Juhana Toivanen and José F. Silva, "The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi," *Vivarium* 48 (2011): 245–278; for later eclectic active sense theories, see also Leen Spruit, "Renaissance Views of Active Perception," in *Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Kärkkäinen, *Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind* (Dordrecht, 2008), pp. 203–224; Cees Leijenhorst, "Cajetan and Suárez on Agent Sense," in *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht, 2007), pp. 237–262.

44 "While the soul is the principal formative cause of perception below God, it is not sufficiently actual for this without the sensory species—however, the composition of the soul

The activity of the soul in perception was also often characterized by using traditional Augustinian terms of intention or attention.⁴⁵ Many defenders of the activity of the sense held, like John of Jandun, that if a sense-power is activated by the causal influence of the species, an ontologically lower thing would analogously have a causal effect on an ontologically higher entity.⁴⁶ While the incorporeal intentional species of Albert the Great and Aquinas avoided this criticism, they were commonly regarded as corporeal. These discussions of the nature of the species in the medium and the passivity and activity of senses continued into sixteenth-century Aristotelian accounts of perception.⁴⁷ Alongside these, there were also Platonist theories, as well the panpsychist theory of Telesio and Campanella, in which perceptions were acts of the active material spirit.⁴⁸

and the sensory species is already sufficiently actual for this, as is stated in the third book about the intellect and its act. For on having the first act with proper dispositions it can bring itself to the second act, provided that there is no hindrance." John Buridan, "Quaestiones in libros Aristotelis De anima," in *John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation. An Edition of Book II of His Commentary on Aristotle's Book De anima (Third Redaction), with an Introduction and a Translation of Question 18 on Sensible Species*, ed. P.G. Sobol, Ph. D. dissertation (Cornell University 1989), II.10, pp. 158–159.

- 45 See, for example, Nicole of Oresme, *Quaestiones in Aristotle's De anima*, ed. Benoît Patar, *Philosophes médiévaux* 32, Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie (Louvain and Paris, 1995), II.8–9.
- 46 John of Jandun, *Sophisma de sensu agente*, ed. Pattin, pp.130–131: "That which produces is always nobler than that which receives...The power of the soul necessarily and *per se* presupposes something nobler than what the sensible species presupposes in its subject, for while the power of the soul presupposes the soul as its subject, as everybody agrees, the sensible species necessarily and in itself presupposes neither the soul nor anything nobler than the soul nor as noble as it."
- 47 Gregor Reisch describes the change in the sensory medium in his influential *Margarita philosophiae* (Strasburg, 1504) as follows: "The object either continuously multiplies a species after a species, all the way to the sense, or it instantaneously causes the whole species in the whole intervening medium between itself and the sense, if it is sufficiently powerful. Thus the medium is necessary for sensation, since the species are multiplied there" (X.2.2). Agostino Nifo criticized John of Jandun's view of active sense in his *De sensu agente* (Venice, 1517): "There is no agent sense because the sensory forms outside the soul are the immediate and *per se* efficient causes of sensation; they function as instruments of the first mover, whatever it is, and the receptive cause is the passive sense" (128v). Nifo later became an adherent of the active sense views; see Spruit, "Renaissance Views of Active Perception," pp. 215–216. For the passive sense view, see also Juan Luis Vives's influential *De anima et vita* (Basel, 1538), 31.
- 48 See Michaela Boenke, *Körper, Spiritus, Geist. Psychologie vor Descartes* (Munich, 2005).

Suárez, moreover, was familiar with the scholastic discussions of perception, and he dealt with many of the views just mentioned in disputation 5 (cognition in general), disputation 6 (sense perception in general), and disputation 7 (particular senses) of his *De anima* commentary (C); these are in book III of *De anima* (A). His own view is based on the idea that the non-vital changes in the medium and the organ cannot be the cause of perception, which is a vital act, although they can be regarded as necessary conditions that also determine the act.⁴⁹ Distancing himself from the passive theory of perception, Suárez also criticizes the active sense theory of John of Jandun because it entails that the sensory acts are activated in a passive part by the active part of the sense. According to Suárez, there cannot be such a division in vital powers since it is "the first principle in this matter that what is effectively produced by an agent is intrinsically included in the vital act." There are no vital powers that are merely receptive or merely productive.⁵⁰ Thus, his own view is close to the Scotist idea that the power and the species form an active principle that elicits the act. Like Buridan and some other medieval thinkers, Suárez maintains that the presence of the sensible species transforms a sensory faculty into a higher level of actuality, after which the faculty may proceed to a second act, the actual sensation.⁵¹ According to Suárez, the actualization does not simply follow when it is made possible by the species: "The activity does not proceed from the species alone but rather from the soul and the powers."⁵²

Suárez argues that the cognitive sensory powers belong to the quantitative part of the living hylomorphic composite.⁵³ His point is that the material faculty of perception consists of both the sense organ and the power of the soul. This composite structure is meant to explain that a material species does not cause vision, which is a vital act and therefore of a higher ontological nature than non-vital material changes. In addition to the hierarchical difference between living and non-living beings, the vital powers are also hierarchically ordered: at the bottom, there are the very corporeal acts of the vegetative powers, next the sensory powers associated with corporeal organs and corporeal species, then the internal sense power with less corporeal species, and

49 C 5.4.4.3-7; A III.4.3-6.

50 C 5.4.2; A III.4.2.

51 C 5.4.14; cf. A III.4.12.

52 C 5.4.5; cf. A III.4.5. For related ideas in Suárez's contemporary Jesuits (Toletus and Rubio), see Alison Simmons, "The Sensory Act: Descartes and the Jesuits on the Efficient Cause of Sensation," in *Meeting of the Minds: The Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy*, ed. Stephen F. Brown (Turnholt, 1995), pp. 63-76.

53 C 3.3.4; A II.3.3.

ultimately the wholly incorporeal intellectual faculty.⁵⁴ The composite structure of the faculty of perception is also meant to be in agreement with the central thesis that the vital acts have no external cause. In Suárez's analysis, the species contributes to perception by causing a physical change in the sense organ, which is a necessary condition of perception. However, the sense organ is the lower part of the sensory faculty, which can be causally influenced, while the higher part derives from the soul as the vital principle. This composite power of perception is brought into a first actuality when the bodily organ is changed through a material emanation from the object. After this first actuality, no external influence is needed for the second actuality, which is the vital act itself. Referring to this composite power, Suárez says that the soul perceives through an instrument that includes a less noble part, a sensible species received by the sense organ, and a nobler part, which is the cognitive faculty of the soul:

A cognitive power which is informed by a species is an integral instrument by which the soul operates. The species is not an instrument which would be used by the power so that this species alone would immediately produce the cognitive act...But the cognitive power and the species form an integral instrument which immediately produces the act... Since there are two parts in this instrument, one which is most perfect but not representative of an object and another which is less noble but representative of an object, the act takes the perfection of its being from the former part and its capacity of representing from the latter one, in which it does not exceed the perfection of the species.⁵⁵

The species is representative because it emanates from the sensible object, and its presence in the composite sensory instrument unites the act with the external object. The acts are about present external objects, which are perceived as they are apt to cause species.⁵⁶ This was the view of many scholastic authors, who took it for granted that the species had a role in connecting the act with the external object. However, there was no real explanation of why the

⁵⁴ C 2.6.12; A I.7.5. See also note 86.

⁵⁵ C 5.4.16; cf. A III.4.14. See also Tuomo Aho, "Suárez on Cognitive Intentions," in *Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentators on Aristotle's De anima*, ed. Paul Bakker and Johannes Thijssen (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 201–202.

⁵⁶ C 5.1.3; *ibid.*, 6.5.4–5; A III.1.4–7; *ibid.*, III.12.3–4. For perceptual realism, see C 3.3.15 (A II.3.14); James B. South, "Suárez and the Problem of External Sensation," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 10 (2001): 217–240, esp. pp. 237–238.

presence of the imperceptible species in the organ can do this. Suárez also simply repeats the doctrine, and takes it for granted that the perceptible features of things are continuously multiplied through imperceptible intentional species, which cause the intentional change in the organ. The emanating species are called intentional because they serve the object-directed intentional acts of grasping the sensible aspects of objects.⁵⁷ Since the organs are material, the imperceptible sensory species are also corporeal and divisible.⁵⁸

All cognitive powers have an adequate formal object that involves the kinds of things to which the power is immediately and essentially directed. The adequate object of vision consists of light, and everything that is illuminated by light.⁵⁹ Light itself is a quality that is most prominently present in the sun, from which it is radiated on the surface of lucid things, but there are other sources of light as well, such as fire and the stars. Light makes potentially transparent things actually transparent, for example air, and it is seen in their transparency as well as in the sources of the light. Light itself is without a colour, but by illuminating coloured things it makes them visible as coloured.⁶⁰ Thus, a colour "has from itself a certain tendency to visibility and it is by itself able to be seen, but it requires a complement to this power and this is light."⁶¹

Because light and the illuminated colours are passible qualities, they produce a spherical radiation of intentional species in the medium between the object of sight and the subject of the act of seeing. The intentional species in the medium mediates the influence of the visible form on the organ of sight, which, together with the power of seeing, forms the instrument through which the subject sees things:

The eye receives the species from an object; through this reception the object is united with power of seeing and the power is constituted in the first act for seeing. Therefore this is sufficient for it to form in itself the act of vision, and everything else is fictitious or superfluous...This is confirmed by the fact that for the sensation through all other senses it is only required that there is a conjunction between the subject and the object

57 C 5.1.3-6; 6.2.6-7; A III.1.4-7; III.9.4-5.

58 Suárez stresses that the sensible species are material and divisible (C 5.2.17; A III.2.16). See also South, "Suárez and the Problem of External Sensation," pp. 226-230.

59 C 7.3.6; A III.16.6.

60 C 7.1.12; A III.14.7.

61 C 7.3.4; cf. A III.16.4.

which is formed in the power itself through the mediating species and the sensation is formed in the same power.⁶²

Suárez refers to Ockham, Durand of St. Pourçain, and Gabriel Biel as scholastic authors who held that it is not required for an actual perception that the object as an activator and the sensory power be in contact, and that intentional species are not needed for this purpose.⁶³ He regards this as mistake, though, and adds that almost all philosophers and theologians think, like Aristotle, that a contiguous connection between the activator and the power is necessary, and that it is constituted by the species as likenesses.

The organ of sight is the pupil, by which Suárez means the crystalline humour in the centre of the eye that is able to receive the intentional species. Suárez sometimes says that when a sensory potency is informed by an intentional species, the potency elicits the cognitive act. However, a further physical condition should be fulfilled, namely, the organ must also be informed by the fine spirit, which comes from the brain through nerves to the sense organs.⁶⁴ The role of this animal spirit remains unclear. In some places, Suárez seems to regard it as a physiological counterpart to the attention of the soul. The soul as the ultimate subject of perception controls the cognitive acts through the nervous systems, sending the animal spirit to that organ with the information that is relevant to the organism. In commenting on the influence of the brain on perception, Suárez writes:

I think that this power is communicated from the brain through the animal spirits which serve to support the sense-organs and preserve them in the disposition which is apt for perception. These spirits are dependent on the actual flux from the brain; therefore the sensation is immediately lost when connection to the brain is prevented. This power is probably also communicated by the mode of attention since the sense cannot perceive if the soul is not attentive. The attention is dependent on imagination.⁶⁵

The same mechanism is found in other senses, as well. Sound is a sensible quality that is brought about by a percussion or division, intentionally radiating from the source as long as it is actual. While the objects of sight do not change the medium or the organ except in an intentional way, the objects of

62 C 7.4.2; A III.17.2.

63 C 5.1.2; A III.1.2.

64 C 7.5.7; *ibid.*, 7.9.2; A III.18.8; *ibid.*, III.22.2.

65 C 6.6.10; cf. A III.13.7.

other senses change it intentionally and in a non-intentional way.⁶⁶ A non-intentional physical change that is associated with sound is a violent movement of the air, though it cannot proceed as far as the intentional forms through which the original sound is heard. Suárez argues that if the non-intentional motion constituted the change in the faculty, one would hear this and not the original sound in the direction where it comes from.⁶⁷ The organ of hearing is the air, which is closed in the concavity of the ear. This is connected with the brain in the same way as the eyes, hence the power of hearing actualizes itself when the organ receives an intentional species and the animal spirit flows into it from the brain.⁶⁸

Suárez criticises those who locate the organ of smell in the brain, arguing that “the brain is the fountain of all senses and not an organ.” In his view, the organ of smell is in the head, behind the nose.⁶⁹ The organ of taste, moreover, is the tongue, and the organ of touch is the flesh. These senses are described in traditional ways, except that in Suárez's view it is not necessary that the intentional radiation from the object changes the organs of taste and touch through the medium. Their object is usually contiguous to the organ.⁷⁰

6 Internal Senses

After the chapters on perception, Suárez turns to the traditional doctrine of internal senses (C 8; A III.30–31). The background for this topic has been shaped by Avicenna, who developed Aristotle's remarks on common sense, imagination, and memory into an influential doctrine of five internal senses, which continued to be discussed in philosophical psychology through the seventeenth century. In Avicenna's taxonomy, the common sense receives the impressions of external senses, and differentiates and synthesises simultaneous perceptions by several senses. Distinguishing between receiving and retaining impressions, Avicenna introduces the retentive imagination as the power that retains the contents of the common sense. A third power, which is called *estimative*, grasps the ‘intentions’ of things, such as their hostility or dangerousness, as well as other harmful and useful aspects that are not perceived by the external senses. A fourth power is the compositive imagination, which

66 C 7.15.1; A III.28.1.

67 C 7.6.1, 6; *ibid.*, 7.8.7; A III.19.1, 8; *ibid.*, III.21.5.

68 C 7.9.1–2; A III.22.1–2.

69 C 7.12.3; A III.25.2.

70 C 7.14; A III.27.

can combine and divide between sensory forms and intentions. The fifth power involves memory, which receives impressions from the estimative power, and recollection, which retains them ready for recall. Following ancient medical discussions, Avicenna locates the internal faculties in the ventricles of the brain, the common sense and retentive imagination in the front ventricle, the estimation and the compositive imagination in the middle ventricle, and memory and recollection in the rear ventricle.⁷¹

Most medieval Latin thinkers had the common sense to differentiate and synthesise between simultaneous sensations, such as the taste and colour in a particular object, and to perceive that one perceives. Avicenna, however, thought that reflective acts belong only to the immaterial intellectual faculty.⁷² Latin authors also usually followed Averroes in giving up Avicenna's distinction between the retentive imagination and the compositive imagination as two separate faculties, ascribing their activities to one faculty, which was called imagination or fantasy.⁷³ Avicenna's estimative faculty, furthermore, was often discussed as an instinctual power of choice in animals; following Averroes, Aquinas regarded the corresponding non-instinctual capacity of the human sensory soul as part of the sub-intellectual cogitative power that recognizes individual things as representatives of common natures or as good or evil. While many writers found this a respectable theory until the seventeenth century, there had also been critical voices since Duns Scotus's thought experiment: a lamb would flee a sheep miraculously changed to be like a wolf in all sensible accidents, which it would not do if it had an estimation of the agreeability of the object.⁷⁴ Some medieval authors such as Peter John Olivi also wanted to reduce the number of inner sense faculties, arguing that their names refer to various functions of one

71 Avicenna, *Liber de Anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, ed. Simone van Riet, Avicenna Latinus (Louvain-Leiden, 1968), 1.5, 87.19–88.28; 89.44–90.60. See also Deborah Black, "Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations," *Topoi* 19 (2000): 59–75.

72 See, for example, Aquinas, *st*, ed. Pietro Caramello (Turin-Rome, 1950), I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 2; René-Antoine Gauthier, ed., *Anonymi Magistri Artium (c. 1245–1250) Lectura in Librum De anima*, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 24 (Grottaferrata, 1985), II.24 (410, 416); Anonymous, "Quaestiones in de Anima," ed. Carlos Bazán, in *Trois commentaires anonymes sur le Traité de l'âme d'Aristote*, ed. Maurice Giele, Ferdinand Van Steenberghen, and Carlos Bazán, *Philosophes médiévaux* 11 (Louvain-Paris, 1971), II. 39, 463; John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Secundum et Tertium de Anima*, 9 (71–72); John Buridan, "Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima," II.22, in Peter Sobol, *John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation: An Edition of Book II of His Commentary on Aristotle's Book of the Soul*, Ph.D. dissertation (Indiana University), pp. 367–371.

73 Aquinas, *st* I, q. 78, a. 4.

74 John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, n. 62 (ed. Vatican, vol. 3, pp. 43–44). William Ockham and Gabriel Biel also considered separate estimative cognitions as

faculty. According to John Buridan, there are only two faculties, one with the functions of common sense, fantasy, and estimation, and a second for sensory memory, which stores not only intentions but also the sensible species of externally perceptible qualities.⁷⁵

These medieval discussions form the background for Suárez's description of internal senses. As for the common sense, he remarks that while it is required for discerning between simultaneous impressions, it is less clear whether it is needed for the awareness of perception.⁷⁶ Suárez follows the common scholastic opinion that one should not regard common sensibles as the proper objects of the common sense.⁷⁷ Fantasy, furthermore, is defined as "the power to receive and retain the species of external senses and to operate with them when the objects are absent."⁷⁸ According to Thomas Aquinas, '*phantasia*' and '*imaginatio*' mean the same thing, though for Suárez, the latter term refers to the power of combining sensible forms and constructing impossible contents.⁷⁹ With respect to the Thomist distinction between the estimative and cogitative power, Suárez remarks that the human cogitative internal sense does not include ratiocination or composition, although it does not operate simply by natural instinct but also by cognitive experience.⁸⁰ Memory, for its part, is the power to remember past things as experienced earlier; in animals,

superfluous; see Ockham, "Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum," d. 3, q. 2, in *Opera theologica*, vol. 3, ed. Stephen F. Brown and Gedeon Gál (St. Bonaventure, 1990), pp. 410–411; Biel, *Collectorium in quattuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. Wilfrid Werbeck and Udo Hofmann, I, d. 3, q. 6, a. 1.3.6 (Tübingen, 1973), pp. 231–232. According to Buridan, the common sense as an estimative power grasps non-sensible Avicennian intentions; see John Buridan, *Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima*, II.23, p. 388. See also Peter of Ailly, "Tractatus de anima," in *Die philosophische Psychologie des Peter von Ailly*, ed. Olaf Pluta, Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 6 (Amsterdam, 1987), 4.4, pp. 27–28.

75 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 63–66, pp. 596–606; for the one internal sense view, see also Anonymous, *Lectura in Librum De anima*, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 24 (Grottaferrata, 1985), II.26.2, p. 441. For Buridan's view, see *Quaestiones in tres libros De anima Aristotelis*, 2.23, pp. 380–382.

76 C 8.1.2; A III.30.1. Suárez refers to his earlier discussion of whether the senses are aware of their acts. His point is that through the attention, which is part of perception, some sort of awareness of perceiving is included in perceptions themselves, but an internal sense is also aware of them, See C 6.4.7–8; A III.11.5.

77 C 8.1.2; A III.30.2. For this view in Averroes, see *De anima* II.63–5, 225–229. For Aquinas's criticism, see *Sentencia libri De anima*, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino doctoris angelici Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita*, 45.1 (Paris, 1984) II.13, p. 119.

78 C 8.1.7; A III.30.7.

79 C 8.1.8; A III.30.7.

80 C 8.1.10; A III.30.7.

it is particularly the power to preserve the representations of the estimative power, even when the objects are not present. Reminiscence, on the other hand, is primarily an intellectual power because it involves reasoning, but there is also a sensory reminiscence, which is based on the succession of apprehensions.⁸¹ Suárez presents a collection of various views about the number of internal senses. He does not, however, mention the medieval theories of one internal sense power, apparently thinking that the two-powers view was the most economic among his predecessors. His own opinion on the matter is that there is one faculty with many functions.⁸²

Suárez deviates from the common traditional view of the seat of different internal senses in different ventricles of the brain, assuming instead that the organ of the internal sense power might be the rear part of the brain.⁸³ In medieval theories, it was usually assumed that the intentional species, which first contributes to the actualization of external senses, is then transmitted to the internal sense, where it forms a phantasm.⁸⁴ Since Suárez found several problems with this inner traffic, he tried to explain the acts of the internal senses without it. Suárez therefore proposed that the cognitive contents of the simple acts of the internal sense about sensory objects are similar to those of perception, although they do not require the presence of an external object for their actuality. The presence of the representation of an object in the internal sense brings about its first actuality, the second actuality being the corresponding awareness. If the first actuality and the intentional internal species are not caused by the intentional external species, could they be caused by the sensory act itself, on which they are dependent? Suárez remarks that the internal sense and its species are more perfect than the external senses and species because internal acts and species do not require the simultaneous causal influence from corporeal objects.⁸⁵ How, then, could the act of a higher sense be caused by the activity of a lower sense? Suárez suggests that perhaps this is not problematic, since the second actuality of the external sense is nobler than the first actuality of the internal sense. He continues:

Therefore, in comparing the first act of one power to the first act of another, that one is more perfect which is an act of a more perfect power, and it is the same in comparing the second acts to each other. Nevertheless,

81 C 8.1.11-12; A III.30.7.

82 C 8.1.13-21; A III.30.8-16. For Suárez's theory of the internal sense powers, see also South, "Imagination," pp. 122-137.

83 C 8.2.8; A III.2.6-7.

84 See Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 78, a. 4.

85 C 6.2.9-11; A III.9.8.

in comparing a second act of a less perfect power to the first act of a more perfect power, the former will be more perfect because in its own nature it is constituted in a higher grade of actuality... An external perception would produce in the internal sense a species as if imprinting there a perfect similitude of itself which the internal sense can very well conserve due to its natural disposition.⁸⁶

The proposal seems to be that the first actuality of the internal sense is externally caused. One might assume that, analogously to sense perception, it is only the second activity that is not externally caused, being actualized by the power itself when the necessary condition is met. However, having said this, Suárez goes on to note:

When the soul perceives something by sight, a similitude of this is immediately repeated in imagination, not through a potency distinct from imagination but by the power of imagination, so that when there is an external sensation, a species naturally results in the internal sense, not because of the activity of perception but because of the activity of the soul itself through imagination.⁸⁷

The production of the representation of the sensed species in the internal sense is dependent on a sensory act, to be sure, but this connection is not a case of efficient causality. Explaining how the hierarchical difference could be avoided, Suárez demonstrates that the main reason for not accepting a causal link between vital acts is that they are not transient and not passible. Rather, the vital powers of external and internal senses are rooted in the same soul, and consequently can be sympathetically activated so that one operates immediately when another operates.⁸⁸

7 Intellect

According to the Thomist view, which forms the background of Suárez's discussion of higher cognitive acts (C 9, A IV), the intellect is a spiritual power

86 C 6.2.12; A III.9.9. The first part of the translation is quoted from South, "Imagination," p. 142.

87 C 6.2.13; A III.9.10; see also C 6.5.8; A III.12.7.

88 C 6.2.13; A III.9.10. In his *Disputationes metaphysicae*, Suárez returns to the traditional view that the species are transmitted from the eye to the inner sense through the optic nerve (*DM* 18.8.40).

that has no bodily organ. It does not need the body for its activities, as is clear from the angels, but it functions in humans by using concepts that it forms through turning to the phantasms whenever it thinks with universals. The proper object of the intellect is the essence or substantial form of things. This is potentially intelligible and made actually intelligible through the intelligible species, which the active intellect forms by illuminating the phantasms and abstracting the form from the material and singular aspects of the relevant phantasms. The passive intellect is then actualized by an intelligible species in the same way as a sensory power is actualized by a visible species. The function of the active intellect is to form the intelligible species, and the function of the passive intellect is to understand the object when it is informed by this species. According to Aquinas, the intelligible form is not the object of the act of intellection. He argued, instead, that it is not that which is understood but that through which the intellect understands. The intellect treats its extramental proper object as a universal form, although the universal aspect exists only in the intellect. If the universal forms subsisted in the extramental world, they could directly activate the possible intellect and the active intellect would consequently be superfluous. Similarly, the passive intellect would be superfluous if the active intellect understood the species or the phantasms.⁸⁹

Why should the active intellect turn to the phantasms whenever a concept is formed or used? Apart from the activating mechanism of the potency model, it was thought that understanding universals included their being about things with which one is acquainted through phantasms, although the essences themselves were not perceivable. Aquinas thought that while Plato regarded the universal idea as a model through which things are what they are and recognized as its copies, the followers of Aristotle regard the phantasms as examples of things with essences that are understood in a universal way.⁹⁰

Medieval adherents of the species theory maintained that the formal sameness between the species in the soul and the form in the object, whether perceptible or potentially intelligible, combines the acts with their objects; this connection, furthermore, is provided by the things themselves and makes cognition objective.⁹¹ Formal sameness somehow brings the world into the mind, and the adherence to this kind of realism may have contributed to

89 *ST I*, q. 79, a. 3; *ibid.*, I, q. 85, aa.1-3.

90 *Ibid.*, I, q. 84, aa. 4, 7.

91 *Ibid.*, I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 1; Ceslao Pera, Pierre Marc, and Pietro Caramello, eds., *Summa contra gentiles* (Turin, 1961-67), III.49.

overlooking the problems in the species explanation of cognitive acts.⁹² The question thus remains: what is formally the same as the substantial form in things—is it the non-relational abstracted species, the relational act of cognition, or something else?⁹³ It has been argued that Aquinas operates with a basic conception of intentionality that is not reducible to his insights about sameness or similarity in other contexts.⁹⁴ Unfortunately, Aquinas and his contemporary Aristotelians did not have much to say about the intentionality of cognitive acts themselves, although they took it for granted that they were about objects. Instead, Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, and Duns Scotus focused their attention on the difference between intention and species reception in cognition.⁹⁵

While Suárez follows the main lines of the Thomist theory, he criticizes the description of the agent intellect in Aquinas and later Thomists, particularly in Cajetan. Suárez is unsatisfied with the traditional attempts to explain how the active intellect illuminates the phantasms and how these contribute to intellection. He stresses that the illumination cannot be understood as a real operation in such a way that a phantasm as a material entity would be changed by the spiritual intellectual power to become a spiritual constituent

92 One problem is that when the immediate activator of the possible intellect is the species, which is rendered actually intelligible by the agent intellect, the caused actuality of the passive intellect does not seem to be the actuality of the form but the understanding of the object, which was not previously understood. This is not in agreement with Aristotle's thesis that the passive potency is actualized by an activator, which is already what the actualized potency will be (*Met.* 9.2). The same question could be asked about the senses. Insofar as the act of the faculty is perceiving the object that causes the act, this actuality differs from the actuality of the cause: the activator is the perceptible form as not perceived, and the actuality of the potency is an act of perceiving the object.

93 For some discussions of formal sameness in medieval theories of cognition, see Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 31–124; Dominik Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter* (Frankfurt am Main, 2002); John P. O'Callaghan, *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence* (Notre Dame, IN, 2003); Robert Pasnau, "Id quo cognoscimus," in *Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Kärkkäinen (Dordrecht, 2008), pp. 131–149.

94 Jeffrey E. Brower and Susan Brower-Toland, "Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality," *The Philosophical Review* 117 (2008): 193–243.

95 See notes 41 and 42 above; Peter King, "Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Medieval Theories of Mental Representation," in *Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Aldershot, 2007), 81–100; Giorgio Pini, "Can God Create My Thoughts? Scotus's Case against the Causal Account of Intentionality," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 49 (2010): 39–63.

of intellection, but it is also impossible that the phantasm as material being could have a causal role with respect to the act of understanding.⁹⁶ His own view is similar to his account of the relationship between the act of an external sense and the accompanying act of imagination, which is determined by the former but not caused by it. Accordingly, he writes:

The agent intellect never brings about an intelligible species unless it is determined by the cognition of the fantasy...This determination does not arise from any efficacy of the phantasm itself but only because it provides matter and a kind of example to the intellect, by reason of the union which it has in the same soul.⁹⁷

The determination between the acts exemplifies how “the act of one power has a necessary connection with the act of another.” Suárez thinks that whenever the intellect forms a simple intellection about intelligible things in the world, the imagination is actual, and vice versa. The phantasm, moreover, determines the content of intellection by serving as an example of what is understood as a universal.⁹⁸ Efficient causation is already blocked for Suárez by the principle that there cannot be any causal influence between the powers that belong to hierarchically different ontological levels, such as imagination and intellect, and as stated above, there is no efficient causation between the vital powers of the same level either. Vital powers are immune to external causal influence.⁹⁹ According to Suárez, the traditional notions of illuminating the phantasms, abstracting the species from the phantasm, or making intelligible things actually intelligible should all be understood as referring to one act, since “the active intellect does not have any other act but producing the intelligible species.” Thus, the illumination of the phantasms is the production of the species in the possible intellect; this is called the illumination of phantasms because in this way the intellect grasps what is represented in phantasms.¹⁰⁰ As for abstracting the species and making things actually understandable, Suárez states:

I am sure, however, that an object does not become actually intelligible except through the production of the intelligible species in which the

⁹⁶ C 9.2.5-10; A IV.2.4-10.

⁹⁷ C 9.2.11-12; A IV.2.11-12. See also C 9.7.5-6; A IV.7.3.

⁹⁸ C 9.2.13; A IV.2.13.

⁹⁹ Ludwig, *Das akausaule Zusammenwirken*, pp. 35-61; Leen Spruit, *Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge* (Leiden, 1995), vol. 2, pp. 294-307.

¹⁰⁰ C 9.2.14-15; A IV.2.14-15.

thing is represented in a special way...the intelligible thing does not move our intellect effectively since it is not actually intelligible, but it changes the intellect formally through the species in which it is included in a special way...The species is said to be abstracted because the active intellect by its power produces a spiritual species which represents the same nature which the phantasm represents.¹⁰¹

Suárez argues that the intellect can understand a singular thing through its proper species and concept, thus distancing himself from the Thomist view that the intellect is familiar with the particulars only indirectly, through reflecting on a universal concept as being abstracted from the phantasms of singulars. For Suárez, the intellect forms concepts differently, depending on whether one is considering individuals or their common features with a universal. One thinks about individual human beings with concepts that are formed on the basis of the species. These correspond to phantasms that are more concrete than the phantasms that are sufficient for a universal concept.¹⁰²

In forming these concepts, whether universal or particular, human beings do not know their essence except through their empirical features. This is a limitation of their intellect and the reason for the necessary conversion to phantasms, which, in comparison to higher intellects, shows that human beings have the lowest status in the hierarchy of intellectual beings.¹⁰³ The different operations of the active and passive intellect derive from the same imperfection. Suárez thinks that it is more reasonable to regard these as operations of one intellectual power than of two genuinely distinct powers.¹⁰⁴ In addition to discussing the formation of simple concepts, Suárez deals in a traditional way with combining and dividing concepts, and the difference between a mere apprehensive composition or division and an assertive judgment about them. These are operations of the one intellectual power, as are the acts of theoretical and practical reasoning.¹⁰⁵

8 Appetitive Motive Powers

Following the scholastic tradition, Suárez explains that in addition to the cognitive powers of the soul there are also appetitive powers that bring about

¹⁰¹ C 9.2.16-17; cf. A IV.2.17-18.

¹⁰² C 9.3.3-12; A IV.3.2-11.

¹⁰³ C 9.7.7-8; A IV.7.4.

¹⁰⁴ C 9.8.18; A IV.8.13.

¹⁰⁵ C 5.6.6-7; *ibid.*, 9.9.13; A III.6.3-4; *ibid.*, IV.9.10.

behavioural changes. The appetitive power at the sensory level is the seat of the passions or emotions, and that at the intellectual level is the will.¹⁰⁶ In addition to these two appetitive powers there is a separate motive power, which is responsible for the involuntary, continuous movements of the heart and the lungs, and for the involuntary or voluntary movements of the parts of the organism that are required for the actions suggested by the appetitive powers. In his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* (book 5 of the *De anima*), Suárez discusses the appetitive powers in general in disputation 10, moving to focus on the passions in disputation 11, the will in disputation 12, and other moving powers of the soul in disputation 13. The will is discussed in many other places as well, and a longer discussion of passions is found in disputation 1 of the fourth tract of his commentary on Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*.¹⁰⁷

Suárez regards the appetitive powers as cognitive, functioning in co-operation with the act of external or internal senses or, as with the will, the acts of the intellect. The sensory appetite is by nature inclined to achieving sensible good things, whether directly or by avoiding harmful things. Its acts are reactions to relevant cognitive functions grasping their objects. The objects of the passions are things that make living beings feel pleasure or distress, and which are useful or harmful for them.¹⁰⁸ Animals recognise the objects as sensible good or evil by their estimative power. The evaluations of animals are mostly instinctual, while in humans the role of instinct is less dominant and the cognitive aspect of the passions is richer.¹⁰⁹ The passions are not free acts in the same way as those of the will, but human beings can control the passions and emotional behaviour by the will. The passions themselves are not chosen, being part of the psychosomatic mechanism that serves the lives of sensitive living beings.¹¹⁰

While the basic function of the passions as appetitive acts is to initiate behavioural changes, the acts are also associated with pleasant or unpleasant feelings related to the objects of adhesion or aversion. Suárez characterizes love, which is the basic passion, as an impulse, liking and pleasure with respect to an object.¹¹¹ More importantly, passions are associated with physiological

106 C 10.1.2-3; A V.1.2-3.

107 *Tractatus quinque ad Primam Secundae D. Thomae Aquinatis in Opera omnia*, vol. 4 (Paris, 1856), tract. IV, disp. 1, 454-477.

108 C 10.1.2; *ibid.*, 10.2.3; *ibid.*, 10.3.6-7, 11; A V.1.2; *ibid.*, V.2.3; *ibid.*, V.3.3-4, 8.

109 C 5.6.13-14; *ibid.*, 8.1.10; cf. A 3.6.7 (without the discussion of instincts); A III.30.7.

110 *Ad Primam Secundae*, 4.1.2.2 (457).

111 *Ad Primam Secundae*, 4.1.5.3 (462). The feeling aspect is assumed rather than discussed in Suárez.

changes, such as the heartbeat or the movements of vital spirits, expressive bodily movements, laughter and weeping in humans, and various behavioural acts that are different for different passions.¹¹² Cognition, feeling, bodily affect, and behavioural change are the traditional elements of the compositional analysis of emotions in the Aristotelian tradition and in Aquinas, which Suárez largely follows.¹¹³

Suárez has not much to add to the first part of Aquinas's taxonomy of emotions, which consists of the division of six concupiscible emotions: love, desire, and joy with respect to a good object, and hate, avoidance, and distress with respect to an evil object. The first pair (love-hate) is an initial reaction with respect to an object, the second pair (desire-avoidance) is a stronger reaction that inclines to an action towards the object, and the third pair (joy-distress) refers to an emotional state when the desire is fulfilled or the thing avoided takes place.¹¹⁴ While Aquinas claims that there are these six passions of the concupiscible power and five additional passions of the really distinct irascible power, Suárez argues that there is only one sensitive appetitive power:

Therefore, we can explain the reasons behind the names 'irascible' and 'concupiscible' in another way. In my opinion, they do not signify two appetites but one and the same conceived in different ways, since they can be considered as two in the object of the appetite: the 'appetible' good and whatever follows upon it of itself or what prevents the pursuit of such a good and deprives us of the beloved good. The appetite insofar as it desires the good is called concupiscible; insofar as it rises up against whatever gets in the way of this sort of good, so as to protect its good, it is called irascible.¹¹⁵

Aquinas's five irascible emotions are reactions to the objects that are first loved or hated by a concupiscible passion, and which are arduous and demand more effort: hope and desperation are about future good things (the former with a trust in success and the latter without it), courage and fear are analogous reactions to future evil, and anger is about a present evil. The concupiscible

112 C 11.2.1, 10–11; A V.5.1, 11–14; *Ad Primam Secundae*, 4.1.1.4 (457); *ibid.*, 4.1.4.7 (461).

113 See Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 32–35, 225–226, 246–253.

114 C 11.2.2; A V.5.2.

115 *Ad Primam Secundae* 4.1.3.2 (458); trans. in Peter King, "Late Scholastic Theories of the Passions: Controversies in the Thomist Tradition," in *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri, *Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind* (Dordrecht, 2002), p. 239.

passions are arranged into opposed pairs on the basis of opposed objects, and the irascible ones are so arranged on the basis of the opposed attitudes to the same object, except anger.¹¹⁶ While this is a possible classification of the irascible emotions in Suárez's view, he argues that the principles that Aquinas applies in the classification of the concupiscible passions offer a general formal taxonomy of all types of passion from the point of view of their relation to the end. The number of particular passions located within this framework is very great. Suárez then goes on to say that Aquinas's eleven passions may be separated on the basis of different motions and the alterations of the body associated with them. This remark, however, is not elaborated upon.¹¹⁷

Suárez regards the relation between the preceding evaluative cognition and a passion as an example of the sympathetic connection between vital acts without a causal influence. The appetitive power by itself is inclined towards its object and actualizes itself when there is a relevant cognitive act. The relationship between the passion and the accompanying acts of the moving power is also a sympathetic connection, whether at the level of inner vegetative acts or external bodily action.¹¹⁸ The organ of the passions is the heart, which is the centre of vegetative operations as well.¹¹⁹

Aquinas describes external physical pain and internal emotional pain as follows: external pain is caused by something repugnant to the body, while internal pain is caused by what is repugnant to sensory appetite. External pain follows an external perception, particularly that of touch, and internal pain follows an act of internal sense.¹²⁰ Presenting the same distinction, Suárez tries to specify the relation between the pain felt and the sensation of the object of touch. He is inclined to think that physical pain is not an adverbial aspect of sensation but a separate feeling in the appetitive power.¹²¹

One of Scotus's influential psychological innovations was the idea of the passions of the will, such as pleasure and distress; this was new in comparison to the traditional view that emotional passions were strictly restricted to the motions of the sensory soul.¹²² Scotus's theory was discussed by many

116 ST II-I, q. 23, aa. 1–4.

117 C 11.1.2; A V.4.3; *Ad Primam Secundae* 4.1.12.2–6 (475).

118 C 10.3.9; 11.2.10; A V.3.6; V.4.13; *Ad Primam Secundae* 4.1.1.4 (457); *ibid.*, 4.1.6.4 (464); *ibid.*, 4.1.12.11 (477).

119 C 11.1.7; A V.4.7.

120 ST II-I, q. 35, a. 7.

121 C 11.2.5–7; A V.5.10.

122 For Scotus's view, see *Ordinatio* III, d.15, q. un., nn. 47–49 (ed. Vatican, vol. 9, pp. 498–500); see also Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 265–271.

sixteenth-century writers, particularly because Cardinal Cajetan applied it in his commentary on Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*.¹²³ Suárez was sympathetic with Scotus's considerations about the pleasures and distresses of the will, except that in his view these were not passions but acts of the will, since all occurrences of the will are vital acts and therefore not externally caused. Furthermore, while pleasure and distress are considered acts of the will, they are not free acts, as they are determined by the awareness that pleasant or unpleasant things take place or may come to be. The will itself, as a vital power, is the source of these necessitated reactions:

But one might ask whether [joy] is an act produced by the will or whether it is merely a passion, since Scotus, in speaking about joy above, states that it is merely a passion. Similarly he says that fruition as an act is in the intellect and as a passion in the will. The basis of Scotus's view is that all acts of the will are under its control, but this is not the case with joy and distress...However, I say that fruition is an act which is effectively produced by the will...The strongest reason for this is the common principle that the acts of life proceed from an intrinsic principle, and joy is most manifestly an act of life...It is possible that it is a particular act of the will, which is vital, a particular rest or suavity and sweetness, which is born from the appetite itself through the presence of the good which is loved.¹²⁴

The main function of the will is to make decisions about action, and these acts are not determined by the evaluations of the practical intellect, which precede them. Hence, regarding the question of the freedom of the will, Suárez follows Scotus rather than Aquinas. According to Aquinas, the will naturally desires human good, and chooses recommendations derived through reason about how a good end is best achieved in a particular situation. These choices are free in the sense that they are based on the deliberation of reason rather than being externally determined. For Scotus, on the other hand, the will as a free cause decides whether or not it accepts the evaluative suggestion arrived at through reason.¹²⁵ Suárez defends the Scotist view of the freedom of the will, arguing

123 *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia iussu Leonis XII P.M. edita cum commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani* IX (Rome, 1889), p. 446; John Mair, *In primum Sententiarum* (Paris, 1510), I.1.6, 44ra.

124 *Ad Primam Secundae* 2.7.1.8-10 (252); joy is characterized as an action necessitated by achieving the object of one's desire. See also C 11.2.3; A 5.5.3; *dm* 23.3.15.

125 See, for example, Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 83, a. 1; John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* II.25, nn. 15, 16, 20, in *Opera omnia* XI (Lyon, 1639), p. 370.

that the will is not free if it is unable not to consent to the proposal of reason, or if it could not will otherwise when it wills something.¹²⁶ Suárez formulates his version of the Scotist libertarian psychology of the will by stating that the will “is determined by the intellect with respect to sufficiency, but it determines itself with respect to efficacy.”¹²⁷ Thus, the intellect neither causes nor necessitates the free acts of the will. Instead, the relation between these two vital powers is characterized in terms of sympathy, consonance, and consensus.¹²⁸

9 Summary

The questions that Suárez deals with in his psychology are for the most part traditional themes of Aristotelian scholasticism and Galenic medicine. While Aristotle and Aquinas are his main authorities, he often regards the new ideas of Scotus as worthy of consideration. In addition to scholastic works, Suárez also pays attention to sixteenth-century theological, philosophical, and medical discussions. His most significant new contribution to the field is his theory of non-causal sympathetic connections between vital acts. He returns to this conception in all his disputations about the powers of the soul, apparently thinking that it is an original systematic insight. This idea involves a teleological conception of the powers of the soul, which is considered the informing principle of the hylomorphic composite and the primary controller of the sympathetic network of vital acts for the survival and well-being of living corporeal creatures.¹²⁹ While Suárez applies the hylomorphic model to the analysis of vegetative and sensory powers, his treatment of the intellectual level is more dualist. Thus, the vital acts of composite beings are treated as being guided by the soul at all levels of their activities, and Suárez insists they form a centred unity because of the unity of the soul.

¹²⁶ *DM* 19.6.2; *ibid.*, 19.9.3.

¹²⁷ *Ad Primam Secundae* 1.8.4.11, in *Opera omnia* (Paris, 1854), p. 264. See also Sydney Penner, “Free and Rational: Suárez on the Will,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 95.1 (2013): 1–35.

¹²⁸ *C* 12.1.8; *A* V.7.7; *DM* 23.1.11; *ibid.*, 23.7.2.

¹²⁹ See also Simo Knuuttila, “The Connections between Vital Acts in Suárez’s Psychology”, in *Suárez’s Metaphysics in Its Historical and Systematic Context*, ed. Lukáš Novák (Berlin 2014), with minor overlappings.

Suárez's Influence on Protestant Scholasticism

The Cases of Hollaz and Turretin

John Kronen

1 Introduction

The fact that Suárez profoundly influenced Protestant scholasticism has long been recognized,¹ but the nature of his influence remains obscure. I wish to shed light on it by attending to the doctrinal commitments of the Lutherans and the Reformed, the two branches of Protestantism influenced by his thought. If one does *not* look to their doctrines (including those that separated them), one will not be able to explain why Suárez influenced Lutheran and Reformed Scholastics far more than he did such seventeenth-century thinkers as Hobbes or Locke, nor will one be able to explain why he had a greater influence on the Lutherans than on the Reformed.

In order to make my paper manageable, I shall concentrate on two representatives of high Protestant scholasticism,² the Lutheran David Hollaz and the Reformed Francis Turretin. Hollaz's *Examen theologicum acroamaticum*³ (hereafter *ETA*) and Turretin's *Institutio theologiae elenctiae*⁴ (hereafter *ITE*) are masterpieces of Protestant scholastic theology. When both wrote their dogmatics, the Protestant scholastics had had time to formulate precisely the doctrinal commitments of their respective communions, work out their logical entailments, and absorb what they could of Suárez; therefore, both the *ETA* and the *ITE* contain precise, sophisticated, and thorough summations of the results of the labours of over a century of Protestant scholasticism. Since the *ETA* and the *ITE* are theological in scope, my paper shall focus on the theological works of Suárez as well; it must be remembered, however, that Suárez,

1 See Robert Sharlemann, *Thomas Aquinas and John Gerhard* (New Haven, 1964), pp. 16–18.

2 I am using the divisions of Protestant Scholasticism into early, high, and late, proposed by Richard Muller in *Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics; vol. I, Prolegomena to Theology* (Grand Rapids, 1987), pp. 28–53.

3 Originally published in Stargard, 1707. In this paper I have used a facsimile reprint of the original (Darmstadt, 1971).

4 Originally published in Geneva, 1679–1685; English trans. George Giger (Philipsburg, 1992–1997). All page references here are to vol. 1 of Giger's translation.

Hollaz, and Turretin embedded their theology in a well-determined metaphysics, making ample use of philosophical terminology and argumentation.

The last aspect mentioned about Hollaz's and Turretin's theology raises a question I wish to address, namely, whether or not the Protestant scholastics were unfaithful to the sixteenth-century reformers, granted the latter's antipathy to Aristotle and the Schoolmen.⁵ In my view, Richard Muller is correct in thinking that the Protestant scholastics *were* faithful to the Reformers,⁶ and Ritschl was wrong to claim that Melancthon betrayed them by reintroducing Aristotelian philosophy into Protestant thought.⁷ I cannot adequately argue for this here, but will simply note in its support that Protestant scholasticism arose *only* among those Protestant communions that were 'catholic' in the sense of accepting the ancient ecumenical creeds and emphasizing their importance—viz. the Lutheran and the Reformed—and it did not arise among radical Protestants.⁸ The latter either rejected the ancient creeds or accorded them little importance. The catholic Protestants, in fighting for the truth and relevance of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation against attacks from the Socinians in particular, found that they were unable to do so without making use of the technical terminology that the Fathers had adopted from Greek philosophy in order to express those doctrines as precisely as possible.⁹ Once this happened, it was only natural that the catholic Protestants should re-appropriate the ontology implicit in the older theological terminology and therefore study with care the subtle analyses of that ontology in the Fathers and the Schoolmen. Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae* (hereafter *DM*) is the culmination of centuries of refinement of that ontology; indeed, one could argue it is a descendent of John of Damascus's *Philosophical Chapters*, though its size, rigour, and thoroughness make the comparison rather ridiculous. At any rate, that Suárez's metaphysics was in profound harmony with the ancient catholic faith made it attractive to catholic Protestants. This explains

5 It should be noted here, however, that even Luther was more ambivalent towards philosophy than is customarily thought. See Paul Althaus, *The Theology of Martin Luther*, trans. Robert Shultz (Philadelphia, PA, 1963), c. 8.

6 This is a constant theme of Muller's magisterial, four-volume *Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics* (Grand Rapids, MI, 1987–2003).

7 For a summary of Ritschl's arguments on this matter, see his celebrated essay "Theology and Metaphysics."

8 For an antidote to the tendency to see the reformation movements of the sixteenth century monolithically, see Carter Lindberg, *The European Reformations* (Boston, MA, 1996).

9 On this, see the passage by the early Lutheran Scholastic Martin Chemnitz, quoted by Henrich Schmid in *The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, trans. Charles Hay and Henry Jacobs (1875; repr. Minneapolis, 1961), pp. 138–140.

in general why Suárez had such an influence on Protestant scholasticism, but in order to understand his influence more specifically, we must turn to his theology.

2 Suárez's Theological Works

Suárez is now mainly known for his *DM*. This is understandable in light of the work's exhaustiveness, rigour, and profundity. But Suárez, though a great philosopher, was (as has been mentioned throughout this volume) first a theologian, whose primary impetus in writing the *DM* was to provide a complete explication and defence of the ontology necessary for understanding sacred theology; furthermore, Suárez's theological output was even more overwhelming than his philosophical work. The totality of his major theological works, published together after his death in a systematic (rather than chronological) order, dwarfs even Aquinas's *Summa*.¹⁰ Arranged systematically, they are as follows:

- De divina substantia eiusque attributis* (1606)
- De divina praedestinatione et reprobatione* (1606)
- De sanctissimo trinitatis mysterio* (1606)
- De angelis* (1620)
- De opere sex dierum* (1621)
- De anima* (1621)
- De ultimo fine hominis* (1628)
- De legibus* (1612)
- De gratia* (1619)
- De fide, spe, et charitate* (1622)
- De religione* (1608–1625)
- De incarnatione* (1590–1592)
- De sacramentis* (1593–1603)

It is a testament to Suárez's systematic ability that his theological works, written over a long period and interrupted by the composition of the *Disputationes*, could be published after his death according to a systematic arrangement, and also that these works are marvelously consistent with each other and with his philosophical works. In this paper I shall be most concerned with the first two

10 It is because of their size that I have used their two-volume, abbreviated edition, entitled *Theologiae summa, seu compendium*, ed. Francisco Noel (Paris, 1858).

works from the list above, though I shall also refer to *De gratia* and the *Disputationes*.

3 Hollaz and Turretin

Hollaz and Turretin wrote at the peak of Protestant scholasticism, their theological works being as scholastic in terminology, philosophical presuppositions, and method of argument as Suárez's. Both scholastics had read Suárez, as had been the custom of catholic Protestants going back to the early 1600s. Aside from doctrinal matters, they differ from Suárez in manifesting a stronger humanistic influence. This is shown by their mastery of Hebrew and Greek, and their concern with etymology.¹¹

Both Hollaz's *ETA* and Turretin's *ITE* are large works, though neither approaches Aquinas's *Summa* in length. The greater brevity of their works reflects Melancthon's insistence that theology should teach those points of doctrine that are essential for salvation, and should avoid vain scholastic squabbles concerning, for instance, the mode of angelic knowledge or the precise nature of divine concurrence.¹² By the time of Hollaz and Turretin, some of these questions had returned to Protestant dogmatics, but their treatment was briefer than in Suárez's work.

4 Suárez's Influence

In tracing Suárez's influence on Hollaz and Turretin, I shall attend to the following: (1) theological method, (2) natural theology, (3) the divine essence and attributes, and (4) God's knowledge and will in predestination. In many cases it is impossible to demonstrate Suárez's influence on Hollaz and Turretin, since even where his influence seems clear, they are often silent on the matter.¹³

11 Whether or not Suárez knew Greek is disputed, but his frequent citing of Greek editions of Aristotle's works is evidence that he did.

12 On the influence of Melancthon's theology on Protestant Scholasticism, see Kenneth Appold, *Abraham Calov's Doctrine of Vocatio in its Systematic Context* (Tubigen, 1987), pp. 16–21.

13 This should not be understood as arising from an antipathy to admitting agreement with a Jesuit—Hollaz approvingly cites Toletus on the nature of divine concurrence, and Turretin approvingly cites Bellarmine on predestination. Rather it should be understood as reflecting the mistrust that older theologians had of novelty in theology. Truly novel theological doctrines (as opposed to making explicit what was implicit in earlier

But one can hazard plausible guesses, and by comparing them with each other one can deepen one's understanding of the nuances of the relation between Roman Catholic theology and catholic Protestant theology. Indeed, one of the goals of this essay is to show that many of the common assumptions about the differences between the two rest upon gross generalizations and ignorance of classical theological works.

4.1 *Theological Method*

By examining the methods employed by Hollaz and Turretin in their dogmatics, one can reasonably infer the influence of Suárez.

With Turretin, one can identify the influence of Suárez's modification of the medieval *questio* method, as found in the *DM*.¹⁴ The *locus classicus* of the *questio* method is Aquinas's *Summa*, which is divided into three parts, each then divided into 'quaestiones', which are further divided into 'articuli'. The 'questions' of the *Summa* are *topics* around which Aquinas weaves questions, while the 'articles' are questions that have the form of 'whether p or not-p'. These are followed by a series of arguments (*Videtur quod*) for the answer contrary to the one Aquinas favours, then a citation from some authority on behalf of Aquinas's answer (*Sed contra*), followed by arguments on behalf of that answer (*Respondeo*), and finally responses to the 'Videtur' arguments (*Ad primum*, etc.).

In his *DM* Suárez greatly expands this method. The first difference is that in the place of 'questions' Suárez has 'disputations', and in the place of 'articles' he has 'sections'. The real difference, however, occurs *within* the sections. Instead of starting with brief arguments for a view contrary to the one he favours, Suárez first lists all the answers he has come across to the question raised in the section, and gives the names of the authors (or schools of thought) holding them, explicating their reasons in some depth. Usually he gives the answer he favours last. In the body of the section (*Quaestionis resolutio*), Suárez expounds at length upon the reasons for his favoured answer, in the process raising and answering objections. At the end of the section Suárez often notes again the main arguments for the opposing positions, sometimes making certain distinctions necessary to dispatch with them in full, and often simply observing that he has already done so. Occasionally he also raises new objections. When

formulations) were regarded as a mark of heresy. Hence Hollaz's and Turretin's preference, in citing authorities, for older authors—the Fathers and earlier scholastics (Anselm, Aquinas, Bonaventure)—rather than more recent ones.

14 This method evolved out of the longer classroom *lectio*, used to teach important texts. See Ulrich Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, trans. Michael Miller (Washington, D.C., 2010), pp. 39–43.

he does that, he answers them in the next section or directs the reader to the place in the *DM* where they are answered.

Turretin's method in the *ITE* is so similar to Suárez's in the *DM* that it is hard to think it accidental. Turretin's work, however, is divided into 'topics' rather than 'disputations', because Melancthon, the author of the first Protestant dogmatics, had divided his work into 'topics' (*loci*). Nevertheless, unlike Melancthon, but like Suárez, Turretin divides his *loci* into a series of 'whether' questions, questions that are usually followed immediately by 'we affirm (deny) against the *so and sos*' (Lutherans, Socinians, etc.). After this there is a fairly detailed elaboration of the arguments of the 'so and sos', and then, in the body of the question ('*Status Quaestionis*'), Turretin gives arguments in favour of 'the Orthodox' position, while also answering objections to it. At the end of the question ('*Fontes Solutionum*'), he makes a number of distinctions relevant either to understanding fully the nature of the 'Orthodox' position, or to grasping more fully the errors in reasoning of the 'so and sos'. Turretin's method in the *ITE* appears to be an abbreviation of Suárez's method in the *DM*.

Suárez's method in his theological works that are not commentaries on Aquinas's *Summa* is even further removed from the medieval *quaestio* than the *DM*'s approach. In such works, Suárez does raise questions (here called 'chapters!') around particular topics, but these are either followed immediately by one or more '*notae*', intended to clarify the question, or by a series of assertions ('*dico* 1', etc.). If these assertions do not immediately follow the question, they then immediately follow the notes. The fact that several questions in these works are followed by 'notes' may indicate that Suárez had become uncomfortable with a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer to deep theological questions, feeling the need to clarify them further before answering. Furthermore, Suárez concludes most questions in his non-commentarial theological works by raising objections and immediately answering them, so no new objection is raised before an earlier is answered. In this way, Suárez makes the dialectic involved in answering the questions he raises clearer than Aquinas's technique.

If we look at the method Hollaz employs in the *ETA* we will see that it is a sophisticated combination of (1) Zabarella's analytical method with respect to the order in which topics ought to be raised in practical sciences,¹⁵ (2) the 'definitional method' that the Lutheran John Hulsemann developed and John Scherzer (Leibniz's teacher) brought to perfection in his *Systema theologiae*,¹⁶ and (3) Suárez's modification of the *quaestio* method in his non-commentarial

15 On Zabarella's influence on Protestant Scholastic Theology, see Appold, *Abraham Calov's Doctrine*, pp. 21–29.

16 See Leinsle, *Introduction*, pp. 311–315.

theological works. I wish to focus on the way Hollaz combined (2) and (3). Each of the chapters of Hollaz's work (=the topics of Turretin's) is divided into questions. These are usually 'what' questions, allowing Hollaz to give definitions as answers. Immediately following his definitions Hollaz often makes 'observations', which serve the same function as Suárez's 'notes'. Whether or not he makes 'observations', Hollaz's answers to his questions often contain internal letters in parentheses [(a), (b), (c)] that indicate contested parts of the definition, and proofs are given in the body of the question for each. After these proofs, Hollaz usually considers a series of objections that he lays out formally, and, following Suárez, immediately responds to each before raising another. Furthermore, like Suárez, Hollaz usually names persons or schools of thought associated with the objections he considers.

An interesting aspect of the definitions Hollaz gives in the *ETA* is that they are often *real*, rather than *logical*, that is, they proceed by way of the four Aristotelian causes, taking into account further refinements made by Suárez. Causality was central to Suárez's thought, and his development of Aristotle's causal theory is unrivalled. The Reformed scholastics, and to a greater extent the Lutherans, were heavily influenced by Suárez's brilliant rethinking of Aristotle's causal theory, and it seems that Hollaz's definitional prowess owes much to Saurez.

4.2 *Natural Theology*

By the time of Turretin and Hollaz, the treatment of natural theology had become stereotyped in Protestant scholasticism. Though their particular conception of natural theology can be traced to Luther,¹⁷ it was Melanchthon who gave a particular shape to all later Protestant scholastic treatments of natural theology. Hence, we must begin with the thought of 'master Philip'.

Melanchthon divided the natural knowledge of God into two species, 'innate' (or 'practical') and 'acquired' (or 'speculative').¹⁸ By 'innate natural knowledge of God' he meant a knowledge that does not depend on an inference. For him, this innate knowledge is intimately bound up with the innate knowledge of the law, 'written on the heart'. Though Melanchthon's epistemology adumbrated the rationalists' positions, he never taught Descartes's doctrine of a full-fledged innate idea of God. The Protestant scholastics attempted to reconcile Melanchthon's teaching with Aristotelianism by holding that the innate natural knowledge of God is a *quasi-habitus*, a tendency of the soul to

¹⁷ On Luther's natural theology see Althaus, *The Theology of*, chapter 3.

¹⁸ See Hans Engelland's introduction to Melanchthon's 1555 *Loci Communes*, trans. Clyde Mansreck as *On Christian Doctrine* (1965; repr. Ann Arbor, MI, 1982), pp. xxviii–xxx.

form some concept of the divine by the age of reason and to believe revealed truths.¹⁹ One might even speak of this 'knowledge' as identical to man's nature as a religious animal. Taken in this way, the Protestant doctrine of an innate knowledge of God is not far removed from Suárez's notion of a 'practical' knowledge of the soul's immortality, a knowledge tied to the natural knowledge of God. Though this practical knowledge involves inferences, it accords with and is bolstered by man's natural religiosity. Of this kind of natural knowledge of immortality, Suárez wrote:

This truth once it is presented to the intellect immediately brings with it a certain consonance with the light of nature. Man is by his very nature optimally disposed to assent to this truth, and this contributes in no small way to the fact that arguments which are in themselves very strong appear even stronger.²⁰

By 'an acquired natural knowledge of God', Melanchthon meant a knowledge of God's existence that is grounded in an inference.²¹ Both types of knowledge are 'legal', in the sense that they are capable of leading humans to the knowledge of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good spirit who created the world and who will reward the just and punish the wicked. But they are unable, in themselves, to bestow a 'Gospel knowledge', that is, they cannot, in themselves, bestow the knowledge of how to appease God's just wrath or bring about God's gracious mercy towards fallen man in the sending of His Son. Hence, the natural knowledge of God cannot save, and leaves a person who only possesses it either in despair or with a false sense of his own righteousness.²²

The doctrine of the natural knowledge of God found in the Protestant scholastic tradition is in general agreement with Melanchthon, though it is developed and defended with skill. Here one notices not so much an augmentation of the proofs that Melanchthon sketched, but a sophistication in defining theology, dividing it into species, and noting the relation of natural theology to other species of theology.²³ Still, some of the Protestant scholastics did develop

19 See *ETA*, Pt. I, c. 1, q. 5, pp. 299–300.

20 Salvador Castellote, ed., *Commentaria una cum questionibus in libros aristotelis de anima* (Madrid, 1978), II, q. 3, n. 30, p. 200.

21 See Sachiko Kusukowa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melanchthon* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 151–154.

22 See *On Christian Doctrine*, I, pp. 3, 5–7.

23 See Muller, *Post Reformation*, cc. 4–5.

the proofs for God's existence at much greater length than Melancthon did; Turretin, for example, goes into far more detail about them than Hollaz does. Indeed, he goes into more detail than any of the Lutheran scholastics in their dogmatics.

A striking aspect of both Hollaz's and Turretin's treatment of the proofs is that neither makes use of Aquinas's first way, even though John Gerhard had given it pride of place. This may be an indication of Suárez's influence, since he had found the first way problematic—he worried that the principle upon which it rests might entail that free actions are impossible,²⁴ and held that it cannot be used to argue for a God that transcends the physical world.²⁵ While Hollaz would have shared Suárez's 'worry' about the first way, Turretin, a good Calvinist, would not. Hence, if Turretin was influenced by Suárez on this matter, it must have been because he was convinced by Suárez's arguments that the first way does not entail a transcendent God.

At any rate, that Suárez influenced Turretin's treatment of the proofs is clear from the fact that the first proof he gives is the same as the cosmological proof Suárez had developed.²⁶ Turretin begins with the self-evident principle that 'nothing can produce itself', and then argues, as Suárez did, that supposing that every being is produced entails absurdities, that is, that either there is a causal circle (in which case every being would, however mediately, cause itself), or there is an infinite causal regress (in which case *all* causes would be middle causes, which is an absurdity, since a middle requires a *terminus a quo*).²⁷ Turretin is so close to Suárez here that the first proof he gives could be taken as a brilliant summary of Suárez's cosmological proof.²⁸

Hollaz, somewhat strangely (granted, as we will see, that he endorsed a number of Suárez's theological doctrines that Turretin did not), did not appropriate Suárez's version of the cosmological proof; instead, he briefly stated Aquinas's second and fifth way, and folded them into a discussion of the *via causalitatis*, *emenentiae*, and *negationis*, which he used to develop a definition of God substantially the same as Suárez's.²⁹

24 *DM* 29.1.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 23).

25 *Ibid.*, 29.1.8-18 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, pp. 23-27).

26 *Ibid.*, 29.1.20-26 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, pp. 27-29).

27 *ITE*, third topic, q. 1, n. 6, p. 170.

28 In arguing against an infinite causal regress, Turretin seems to have been more influenced by Bonaventure than Suárez, hence Turretin's support for the Kalam argument.

29 *ETA*, Pt. I, c. 1, q. 5, pp. 295-298.

4.3 *Positive Theology, Negative Theology, and What is Most Godlike in God*

Before discussing Suárez's influence on Hollaz's and Turretin's doctrine of God, it seems helpful to make some generalizations about the history of Christian thought with respect to two parameters. The first is epistemic and semantic, dealing with our knowledge of God and our language about Him; the second is ontic and religious, dealing with what is most Godlike in God.

Broadly speaking, Christian thinkers divide into two groups with respect to the first parameter: those who defend an extreme negative theology (NT for short), according to which all we can know of God is what He is *not*, and those who defend a moderately positive theology (PT for short), according to which we can, however inadequately, know something of God's nature. According to NT, terms applied both to God and to creatures apply to God at most as a cause of certain created attributes. Thus, to say 'God is a spirit' is to say that He *caused* created spirits, not that He *is* a spirit.

With respect to the second parameter, Christian thinkers also divide into two groups, namely, those who hold that what is most Godlike in God is His sovereignty and power, thus maintaining the 'sovereignty view of God' (SV), and those who emphasize God's goodness and sanctity, thus subscribing to 'the goodness view of God' (GV).

Though these divisions can be abused, if applied with nuance they can shed light on the thought of particular theologians, especially since there is an intelligible connection between NT and SV, and between PT and GV. The intelligibility of these connections seems clear; as Leibniz noted, extreme theological voluntarists, who suppose that whatever God wills is right simply because He wills it (so that God could will all kinds of things appearing unjust 'to us'), must also hold that justice as it exists in God is utterly different from justice as it exists in us, with the result that we can know nothing about God's justice.³⁰ Likewise, those who wish to emphasize that God is good in a way that has meaning to us will naturally suppose that love and justice exist in God in a way that is truly analogous to the way it exists in us.

In what follows, I assume that there *is* an intelligible connection between NT and SV and between PT and GV, such that any theologian who supports NT will likely support SV, and vice versa.³¹ I shall further argue that from our three theologians, Hollaz most consistently endorsed PT and GV, and that though

30 Leibniz, "Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice (c. 1702–3)," in *Leibniz: Political Writings*, trans. Patrick Riley (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 48–49.

31 This is not always the case; the Eastern Fathers tended to endorse both NT and GV, though one might think them inconsistent in this.

both Suárez and Turretin also endorsed PT and GV on many points, they endorsed views *more* congenial to SV in their teachings on reprobation.

4.4 Suárez on the Divine Essence and Attributes

In his *De divina substantia*, Suárez builds up to a 'definition' of God's essence by first noting that faith teaches that God is a necessary being, not having existence from another.³² In Suárez's doctrine, the independence of God functions as a *quasi-difference* in defining God, since it is this that, *to our way of conceiving*, first distinguishes God from all other beings. This dovetails with Suárez's version of the cosmological argument, since it begins by showing that there is one, and only one, uncaused being.

After making this point about God's uniqueness, Suárez argues that God's essence and existence are in no way distinct, insisting His essence cannot even "be conceived through a mode of being in passive or objective potency,³³ as the essence of a creature can, inasmuch as that which cannot receive anything from another is maximally its own being."³⁴ For Suárez, this means that even though in creatures essence and existence are really the same, it is not 'of' the essence of the creature to exist; rather, the creature receives its actual essence (= *intrinsically existing* essence) from God, hence one may draw a conceptual distinction between the creature's essence and its existence.

Suárez next raises an important question, namely, 'whether or not the essence of God consists solely in being'. He answers that, although one might understand the Fathers to teach that it does, it would be a mistake to understand them in this way, since one "ought to understand them [to teach that God's] being is not a certain abstraction from everything which has being," but rather that God is "a being through His essence who includes in His own simplicity of being every formality, excellence, actuality, and perfection of being."³⁵ This shows that, as conceived by Suárez, God's simplicity and self-subsistence should not be understood Neoplatonically as an abstraction without richness, but as a unity that encompasses all the perfections that creatures have in a divided and limited way.

Next, Suárez mentions the ancient *viae* for forming a conception of God, insisting that the negative way and the way of causality (which Suárez

32 *De div. sub.* I, c. 1, *dico* 3, p. 13 in Migne. All references to Suárez's theological works, unless otherwise noted, are to volume 1 of the Migne edition.

33 By 'passive potency' Suárez means to refer to an actually existing substantial essence that is capable of further perfection, and by 'objective' he refers to a merely possible being that exists only as the 'object' of a power capable of producing it.

34 *De div. sub.*, I, c. 2, *dico* 1, p. 14.

35 *Ibid.*, c. 3, *nota* 1, p. 15.

idiosyncratically calls ‘the way of relation to creatures’) must be completed by the way of eminence (which Suárez calls ‘the way of analogy and comparison to creatures’), by which we come to know that “the perfections of creatures are in God in a more excellent way, namely, through His essence.”³⁶

Having made these points, Suárez builds up to his definition of God as an independent “spiritual substance living essentially in the supreme grace of life...intellectual.”³⁷ In doing this, he first notes that God’s independence requires that He has a substantial essence that is complete in nature, meaning that God is free of accidents as well as of any modes of subsistence distinct from Himself.³⁸ Next, Suárez insists that God is spiritual, not corporeal, and finally, that God is living. Suárez argues that God must be a living substance since He must either be living or non-living, and to be living is more excellent. Furthermore, as intellectual life is the highest form of life, God must possess intellectual life in the most perfect way, such that in God there is no distinction between agent and act—in short, in God, understanding and willing are not distinct from being.³⁹

After giving his definition of God, Suárez reiterates that every predicate that holds of God holds of Him “intrinsically and absolutely, without any adjoining accident.” Therefore, all attributes truly predicated of God are without the imperfections they have when found in creatures; in this way, Suárez insists that even positive descriptions of God “include a certain negation.”⁴⁰ Thus, for Suárez, negative and positive theology subtly modify each other. Nevertheless, it is clear that he rejects NT, and does so in the name of piety.⁴¹ For Suárez, the Christian faith has nothing to do with a supreme ‘it’, adoring instead a personal God capable of willing things for a reason.

Before discussing the divine attributes in general, Suárez first discusses the transcendentals (unity, truth, goodness) as applied to God—the most important of these for our purposes being ‘goodness’, since what Suárez says about that transcendental as it applies to God shows him to be a supporter of gv. God, Suárez says, is perfectly good, since a being is good insofar as it is

36 Ibid., *nota* 2.

37 Ibid., *dico* 4, p. 16.

38 Ibid., *dico* 1, p. 15. It should be noted that all the Protestant Scholastics followed Melancthon in maintaining the traditional doctrine of the divine simplicity, defending it with zeal against the Socinians.

39 Ibid., *dico* 3, p. 16.

40 Ibid., *dico*, 5.

41 Suárez’s religious interest in these questions is clear from his insistence that we must naturally be able form some concept of God “*ut possimus Deum ab aliis rebus distinguere... ad debitum cultum*” (Ibid., c. 2, *nota* 1, p. 14).

complete, and God is maximally complete.⁴² Creatures are also good, having goodness in themselves but not from themselves, since they receive their goodness from God.⁴³ God loves His own essence necessarily, according to Suárez, but that is because, as the perfect good, He is the most lovable being.⁴⁴ God also loves creatures insofar as they have intrinsic goodness; creatures, moreover, can 'call forth' God's complacent love, and the fact that God bestowed their value on them originally, out of sheer benevolence, does not change this.

When treating the divine attributes in general, Suárez notes that the simplicity of God does not entail that we cannot truly predicate terms that have different meanings of Him; thus, that God's attributes are not really distinct from God's essence does not mean, for example, that He is not both merciful and just—it only means that that in virtue of which He is merciful is also that in virtue of which He is just.⁴⁵

Suárez then divides the divine attributes into two classes: negative and positive.⁴⁶ The negative attributes remove from God certain imperfections found in creatures. They are attributes of attributes, and do not tell us anything about *what* God is, only that, *whatever* He is, He is infinitely, immutably, etc. The positive attributes, on the other hand, do reveal something of what God is. Furthermore, those attributes that do not intrinsically involve imperfection (e.g., justice), even if they are imperfect as found in creatures, hold formally of God.⁴⁷ This is Suárez's doctrine of the analogy of intrinsic attribution according to which, if we say 'God is just', that does not mean justice is something utterly different in God and in humans. Rather, what it means is that God is perfectly just and cannot fail in His justice through ignorance, prejudice, greed, etc. Though certain attributes found in creatures may be formally predicated of God, others may be predicated only eminently (e.g., 'seeing') or metaphorically (e.g., 'fortress'). For Suárez, to say that God 'eminently sees' means that everything creatures know by seeing, God knows perfectly through His essence.

In Suárez's doctrine of the divine essence and attributes, we find a strong and subtle defence of PT and GV, and hence, so far at least, Suárez's thought 'obeys' the aforementioned law linking the two.

42 Ibid., c. 8, *dico* 1, p. 20.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., *dico* 2, p. 21.

45 Ibid. c. 9, *nota* 1, p. 22.

46 Ibid., *dico* 2.

47 Ibid., *dico* 1, p. 22, *dico*, 2, p. 23.

4.5 *A Difficulty Inherited from Luther*

Since Luther's theology (via Calvin) was almost as formative of Reformed theology as it was of Lutheran, it is impossible to understand why Suárez influenced Hollaz and Turretin the way he did without some consideration of Luther's theology, and of the different ways Melancthon and Calvin chose to deal with a central inconsistency in it.

Luther championed GV (certain dark aspects of *The Bondage of the Will* notwithstanding),⁴⁸ emphasizing God's agapic love.⁴⁹ It was for this reason that Luther was so opposed to 'works righteousness', considering it a form of idolatry that obscures God's goodness, and necessarily leads a person to look to her own works to consider how much better (or worse) she is than others. This is not what God intends, Luther insisted, since we are to do what is right because God commands it and because of our neighbour's need.⁵⁰

In order to glorify God's agapic love and put up strong walls against 'spiritual arrogance' (the subtlest and deadliest form of idolatry),⁵¹ Luther denied that the will of man plays any active role in conversion; to hold that it does, for Luther, is to teach that man is the cause of his own salvation, thus derogating from God's love.⁵² If Luther were a universalist, this would not have created any internal inconsistency in his theology—but he was not, being convinced by Scripture that some are lost. Thus, Luther taught that (1) God, out of agapic love, earnestly wills to save all sinners; (2) God is solely responsible for the salvation of sinners; and (3) some are never saved. Luther admitted that not even 'the light of grace' can show how these propositions are consistent, but that the 'light of glory' will.⁵³

Melancthon and Calvin, being less sanguine about the ability of the light of glory to make logical inconsistencies consistent, felt compelled to modify Luther's soteriology. Melancthon, sharing Luther's GV instincts, dispensed with proposition (2), and taught that fallen humans have the power to reject or

48 For aspects of Luther's teaching in *The Bondage of the Will* that conflict with his theology as a whole, see Althaus, *The Theology of*, pp. 276–280.

49 Ibid., pp. 115–118.

50 Ibid., pp. 144–152.

51 On this, see Luther's celebrated commentary on the first commandment in his *Large Catechism*.

52 Luther sometimes expressed his theology with scholastic precision, saying that in conversion the will "*non est efficiens causa justificationis sed materialis tantum*," and that we are justified "*per fidem sed non propter fidem*."

53 On this, see Henry Cole, trans., *The Bondage of the Will* (Grand Rapids, 1976), pp. 388–389.

accept grace.⁵⁴ He argued that this does not entail 'work's righteousness', since by accepting unmerited grace a man no more does a meritorious work than a beggar who accepts unmerited bread. Calvin, having stronger *sv* instincts than Melancthon, dispensed with proposition (1), believing that not to do so would compromise God's sovereignty.⁵⁵

Though the *Formula of Concord*, the last of the Lutheran confessions, condemned Melancthon's teaching, later Lutheranism returned to it, changing it only by speaking of fallen man's ability to not-reject grace, instead of his ability to accept it.⁵⁶ The Arminians aside, the Reformed followed Calvin on this matter. Arminianism, however, was condemned by the Synod of Dort, and it never came to be accepted by the majority of the Reformed in the seventeenth century, in the way Melancthonian 'synergism' came to be among the Lutherans. Understanding that Hollaz inherited the Melancthonian modification of Luther's doctrine while Turretin inherited the Calvinist is necessary for understanding the differences in their appropriation of Suárez.

4.6 *Hollaz on the Divine Essence and Attributes*

Anyone who reads the *DDS* and then the *De deo* chapter of the *ETA* will be struck by how closely Hollaz's doctrine of God resembles Suárez's. It's true that such early Lutheran dogmaticians as Chemnitz constructed a doctrine of God that made the acceptance of many of Suárez's central theological doctrines possible for the Lutherans, but it was Calov's decision to accept the doctrine of 'middle knowledge' and grant that humans have the ability to reject or not reject grace that opened the floodgates to the eventual Suarezianization of Lutheranism in Quenstedt, Baier, and Hollaz.⁵⁷ Here I will concentrate on four

54 See *On Christian Doctrine*, V, esp. pp. 59–61. In spite of this teaching, Melancthon continued to hold Luther's doctrine that fallen man is incapable of *spiritually* good works; this doesn't mean that the unconverted are incapable of noble motives—it means, rather, that they are incapable of *truly* loving and trusting in God. The Lutheran Scholastics who followed Melancthon's teaching on the activity of the will followed their theological master on these points.

55 Calvin's theological determinism was different from Luther's. Luther's was primarily anthropological, rooted in the fall; Calvin's, on the other hand, was theological, rooted in what he took to be the implications of God's nature as 'first cause'.

56 On this, see Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology; Volume II* (Repr., Grand Rapids, 1993), pp. 324–327.

57 Calov held that "without this [middle] knowledge it will be impossible to fittingly explicate election based on foreseen faith" (*Systema locorum theologicorum*, II, p. 529). Appold shows that Calov worked out a sophisticated doctrine of calling intended to combat the

ways in which Suárez's theology can be thought to have influenced Hollaz's doctrine of God.

As we have implicitly noted, Suárez may have influenced Hollaz in the use of the *viae* of causality, eminence, and negation in forming a definition of God. In Hollaz's work, the proofs for God are folded into these ways, while his actual definition of God is separated from a discussion of the *viae* by a lengthy treatment of God's Scriptural names. But, when he finally defines God, his definition is substantially the same as Suárez's: "God is an independent spirit."⁵⁸ What is even more striking about Hollaz's definition is that he follows Suárez more closely here than Calov or Quenstedt do, despite the fact that they were the first Lutherans to have been noticeably influenced by Suárez's theology; in definitions showing Scotus's influence, they define God as an 'Infinite Spirit'.⁵⁹ Hollaz, after giving his definition, considers the reasons one might have for preferring 'infinite' instead of 'independent' as the 'quasi differentiating quidditative concept of God', arguing that, since God is simple, any definition we make of God must arise from our way of knowing Him. And we know Him first as the ultimate and uncaused cause, and from that are able to infer his other attributes, including infinity.⁶⁰ This is in perfect accord with Suárez's thought.⁶¹

The second 'Suarezian' aspect of Hollaz's doctrine of God is his adoption of Suárez's analogy of intrinsic attribution, saying it occurs "whenever plural names are truly common, so that, nevertheless, one among those about which they are said, participates in them⁶² through priority and independence, the rest, however, through posteriority and on account of dependence."⁶³ Hollaz gives a brief argument for the view that Christian theology must suppose that terms that apply truly to both God and creatures apply by way of the analogy of intrinsic attribution, following Suárez's reasoning closely.

The third Suarezian aspect of Hollaz's doctrine of God is his insistence that, though none of God's attributes are really distinct from His essence or his other attributes, they are not merely "nominally distinct," but "formally according to our mode of conceiving, not without a certain foundation for the

Calvinist 'absolute decree' by teaching that the Word is intrinsically efficacious, naturally blossoming into conversion unless resisted. See *Abraham Calov's Doctrine*, chapter six.

58 *ETA*, Pt. I, c. 1, q. 14, pp. 323–324. Hollaz immediately gives a fuller definition: "*Deus est essentia spiritualis independens trium personarum Patris, Filii & Spiritus Sancti*."

59 See Schmidt, *The Doctrinal Theology*, pp. 112, 115.

60 *ETA*, Pt. I, c. 1, q. 17, pp. 329–331.

61 *DM* 30.2.18–25 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, pp. 70–72).

62 I.e., in the attributes the names *refer to*.

63 *ETA*, Pt. I, c. 1, q. 16, prob. b, p. 327. Cf., *DM* 29.3.16–17 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, pp. 18–19).

distinction.”⁶⁴ This is his way of asserting, as Suárez did, that the simplicity of God does not prevent God from having a richness of aspects, nor does it prevent us from truly predicating of God terms with different meanings. Also in line with Suárez, Hollaz distinguishes between those perfections found in creatures that do not intrinsically imply imperfection (‘wise, true, good’), and those that do (‘to reason, to hear, to see’), holding that the former may be formally predicated of God while the latter may be predicated of Him only eminently.⁶⁵

The final way in which Hollaz seems to have been influenced by Suárez (probably via Calov) was in treating the transcendentals as they apply to God before treating God’s other attributes. But Hollaz, although affirming the legitimacy of dividing the attributes into negative and positive (Suárez’s scheme), does not actually use this division in his treatment of specific attributes, replacing it instead with a division into ‘quiescent attributes’ and ‘operative attributes’.⁶⁶ The quiescent describe God’s essence as it is in itself, without connoting any relation to creatures. These include all of the negative attributes, the transcendentals, and beatitude and majesty. The operative attributes, on the other hand, connote some possible relation to creatures, bearing on God’s powers of exerting Himself ‘*ad extra*’ (for example, omniscience, omnipotence, grace, etc.). Hollaz begins with the quiescent attributes, starting with the transcendentals, and what he says about God’s goodness mirrors Suárez.⁶⁷

Before moving to Turretin’s doctrine of God, it is worthy of note that Hollaz says something about the negative attributes that compliments what Suárez said about the positive, namely, that though they formally “remove some imperfection from God,” they materially “connote some positive perfection in God.” Thus, “if I say, ‘God is immutable,’ I deny indeed God to be subject to any change, but I also connote something in His essence, such as a most constant willing.”⁶⁸

64 Ibid., q. 21, p. 333. By ‘formal distinction’ Hollaz means the Suarezian ‘conceptual distinction,’ *not* the Scotistic ‘formal distinction’.

65 Ibid., q. 19, obs. 4, p. 332.

66 Ibid., q. 22, p. 336. This division, made prominent by Quenstedt, became important for the Lutherans because of certain aspects of their Christology.

67 Ibid., q. 26, pp. 346–347.

68 Ibid., q. 22, obs. 1, pp. 336–337. Hollaz’s point here is no doubt bound up with his vehement opposition to the Reformed understanding of the distinction between God’s ‘revealed will’ and His ‘secret will,’ and so is tied to his support of gv.

It seems clear that in his doctrine of God, Hollaz was as resolute in defending PT and GV as Suárez was, and that in defending them was happy to adopt certain theological teachings of the Jesuit, all the more so because Calov (whose reputation as an orthodox Lutheran was unquestionable) had already done so, largely in order to make Lutheran doctrine consistent in a way strongly opposed to the Reformed.

4.7 *Turretin on the Divine Essence and Attributes*

Turretin's indebtedness to Suárez is more hidden than Hollaz's, but if one compares Turretin with certain early Reformed Scholastics, one will realize how much closer he is to Suárez than they—indeed, one could argue that Turretin's theology embodies the most Suarezian doctrine of God possible for a Calvinist.

After Calvin's death, one sees a definite swing towards supralapsarianism among the Reformed. This may have been due to the influence of Beza, Calvin's friend and colleague, whose speculative genius inclined him towards supralapsarianism, the view that predestination is above or prior to the fall. Or it may have been due to a desire to combat Arminianism by insisting on a soteriology as far removed from Arminianism as possible (within the basic parameters of Reformed theology). Whatever the reason, supralapsarianism reached its golden age during the first period of Reformed scholasticism, but was generally abandoned by thinkers of the high period.⁶⁹ The reasons are obvious: supralapsarianism tends towards NT, making meaningful theological discourse impossible, and also entails an extreme form of sv that threatens to make God a tyrant, something Calvin never intended.

These tendencies of supralapsarianism are evident in the theology of John Maccovius, who spoke in such harsh terms about God's eternal hatred of the reprobate that he was chastised by the Synod of Dort. Maccovius rejected Suárez's doctrine of analogy in favour of the Thomist doctrine of proper proportionality, according to which to say, for example, that 'God is just' is simply to say that He is just in a way that befits divine nature, just as Solomon was just in a way that befits humans.⁷⁰ This, of course, actually leaves us

69 Leibniz noted this shift in *Meditations on*, pp. 44–45. Heinrich Heppe, in his *Reformed Dogmatics*, seems to attribute this shift, in part, to the thought of Gisbert Voet (1589–1676). In light of this, it is worth noting that Voet was heavily influenced by Suárez. See Aza Gourdriann, *Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625–1750* (Leiden, 2006).

70 On this, see Richard Muller, *Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics; Vol. 3, The Divine Essence and Attributes* (Grand Rapids, 2003), pp. 109, 113.

unable to say anything meaningful about God's justice, for example, to say that 'God would not damn the innocent', for one could make such a claim only if there were something about human and divine justice that is intrinsic to both.

Maccovius's rejection of Suárez's doctrine of analogy goes along with an interpretation of the divine simplicity that tends towards a nominalism that does not allow for a richness in the divine. This can be seen if we compare the responses of Maccovius and Hollaz to the Socinian objection that divine simplicity entails that God cannot be both merciful and just. Maccovius answers that such predicates as 'merciful' and 'just' denominate God with respect to some of His effects.⁷¹ Hollaz, in contrast, insists that they refer to God's essence, and that God's mercy could not have impelled Him to forgive sinners unless His justice had been satisfied by Christ's sacrifice.⁷²

Hollaz's answer to this Socinian objection is in accord with his rejection of theological voluntarism (a rejection characteristic of Lutheran and Jesuit theology), while Maccovius's answer accords with the theological voluntarism characteristic of supralapsarianism. His follower, Jan Szydłowski, pushed Maccovius's doctrine to the extreme,⁷³ holding:

That to love God is by nature an indifferent thing, and is morally good only, because it is commanded by God; that to prohibit the love of God, or command the hatred of God, is not inconsistent with the nature of God, but only with his free will; that it is not inconsistent with the natural equity of God to command blasphemy, perjury, lying, etc. That God may command what is contrary, as to all the precepts of the Decalogue, so especially to the first, second, third; that holiness is not a conformity with the nature of God; that God may oblige man to what is impossible; that God hath no natural inclination to the good of the creatures; that God can justly doom an innocent creature to eternal torment.⁷⁴

71 *Loci communes theologici*, 1650, c. 15, n. 2, p. 122.

72 *ETA*, Pt. 1, q. 43–44, pp. 379–386.

73 Maccovius himself was not quite as extreme a voluntarist as Szydłowski. See Goudriaan, *Reformed Orthodoxy*, pp. 291–292.

74 Cited by Ralph Cudworth in *A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, ed. Sarah Hutton (Cambridge, 1996), p. 15. Cf. Maccovius, *Loci communes*, c. 28, n. 2, p. 141, which defends the following thesis: "Extendit se potestas ista Dei ad varia, et effecta habet, aut habere potest, quae humana ratio, si fit absque verbo Dei, facile tanquam injusta aspernetur."

This is SV with a vengeance; one cannot read this passage without being reminded of Richard Price's damning description of theologians who "make the Deity nothing but will and...exalt this on the ruins of all his attributes."⁷⁵

If we turn from Maccovius to Turretin, we find Turretin endorsing (1) Suárez's theory of analogy⁷⁶; (2) Suárez's insistence that the simplicity of God does not rule out a richness of aspects in the divine⁷⁷; (3) a division of the divine attributes that is only verbally different from Suárez's⁷⁸; and (4) Suárez's insistence that God's actions are ruled by His essential righteousness, such that His dominion over creatures cannot explain all of His dealings with them.⁷⁹

The only ways in which Turretin does not follow Suárez as closely as Hollaz, with respect to the present topic, is that Turretin not only does not subscribe to Suárez's definition of God, he does not give any definition at all. Furthermore, he does not treat the transcendentals as applied to God before taking up other attributes. I do not find these differences significant, however, because, in the first place, no Christian theologian would hold that God can, properly speaking, be defined, since God is 'not in a genus' (as both Suárez and Hollaz insisted). Besides, Turretin's acceptance of Suárez's doctrine of intrinsic attribution, along with the accompanying doctrine that one may apply to God terms that differ in meaning, make me think he would not have objected to Suárez's definition.⁸⁰ In the second place, Turretin makes the same points that Suárez did about the transcendental unity as applied to God when discussing God's oneness as a sort of prologue to discussing His attributes. He also reproduces Suárez's points about goodness as applied to God when discussing God's love, and finally, he makes Suárez's points about truth as applied to God when discussing the divine decrees taken as internal attributes of God.⁸¹

Granted that Turretin's doctrine of God is far more in harmony with Suárez's than the early supralapsarian Calvinists, we need to say something about *why* this occurred—indeed, why Turretin is typical of high Reformed Scholasticism.

75 *A Review of the Principle Questions in Morals*, in *British Moralists: II*, ed. D.D. Raphael (Indianapolis, IN, 1991), p. 158.

76 *ITE*, third topic, q. 6, n. 4, p. 190.

77 *Ibid.*, q. 5, pp. 187–189.

78 *Ibid.*, q. 6, pp. 189–191.

79 *Ibid.*, q. 18, pp. 232–234.

80 The Reformed Scholastic Franz Burmann, Turretin's younger contemporary, formulated a definition of God combining Scotistic and Suarezian elements, holding that God "is most simply defined as... infinite Spirit, having life from himself." Quoted by Muller in *Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics; Volume Three*, p. 232.

81 *ITE*, pp. 181–183, 241–244, 311–314.

Fortunately, Turretin himself provides the answer. When speaking of the shift in Reformed theology away from the voluntarism of the supralapsarians, he notes that such voluntarism made it difficult for the Reformed to argue against the Socinian denial that vindicatory justice is an essential attribute of God (we have noticed already problems with Maccovius's response to the Socinians on this point), thus making it difficult for them to argue for Christ's divinity based on the notion that God's vindicatory justice was satisfied by the Incarnation, life, and death of the *Logos*. Hence, Turretin says that the opinion of those who suppose that God could not have remitted sins without Christ's satisfaction is to be preferred to those who hold the opposite opinion, since the former view "is far more efficacious in the strangling of that most pestilent heresy [the Socinian]," as well as "being more in accord with the nature of God and the words of Scripture."⁸² This evinces something often neglected, namely, that the Socinian attack on the traditional doctrines held by the Reformed not only spurred the second generation of Reformed theologians to embrace scholasticism in full; it also spurred them to move away from Ockhamist elements in the theology of Calvin, and towards embracing Suarezian doctrines supportive of PT and GV.

4.8 *God's Knowledge and Will in Relation to Predestination*

We now come to those topics that are, perhaps, the most important, due to their soteriological significance. It is with respect to these, moreover, that our three theologians begin to diverge significantly.

All three developed sophisticated soteriologies, arguing for them with learning and skill. I cannot do justice to any of them here. All I can do is sketch the central points of their theories, and note the ways in which they disagreed with each other. It shall emerge that, with respect to soteriology, Suárez and Hollaz were united on certain matters against Turretin, while on others Suárez and Turretin were united against Hollaz.

Let us start with the points of agreement between Hollaz and Suárez. Both agreed on the following:

1. God created out of benevolent love in order to share his happiness with rational creatures, not in order to 'create' sinners whom He could use to display the glory of His justice and mercy.⁸³

⁸² *ITE*, third topic, q. 19, n. 9, p. 237.

⁸³ *De div. sub.*, III, c. 7, p. 88; *ETA*, Pt. 1, c. 3, q. 14, pp. 524–525.

2. God foresaw the fall of men but did not will it; He permitted it, at least in part, because He could draw greater good from it.⁸⁴
3. God created the first humans equipped with the virtues necessary to fulfil His holy law if they willed, and, had they withstood the trial of time, would have bestowed the beatific vision upon them.⁸⁵
4. Humans have libertarian freedom (the ability to act or not act on a certain motive, all the requisites for acting having been posited), and God concurs with their actions in such a way as to respect this.⁸⁶
5. God eternally willed to save some fallen humans and to provide the means necessary for this.⁸⁷
6. Some humans will make good use of the means God provided, while others will not; God knows this eternally and eternally wills to save the former and damn the latter.⁸⁸
7. In electing and reprobating, God made use of middle knowledge (by which he knows what every rational creature would freely will in any situation the creature might be 'in'), otherwise He would have been the cause of sin.⁸⁹

Of these, Turretin agrees with points (1)-(3), (5), and (6). His agreement with (1) and (2) are in line with his rejection of theological voluntarism and supralapsarianism. First, against supralapsarianism, he says the following:

The end on account of which God decreed to create man and to permit his fall was not the manifestation of His justice and mercy in their salvation and damnation from the decree of predestination...rather it was the communication and (as it were) spreading out of the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator, which shone forth both in the creation of man and in his fall in different ways.⁹⁰

84 *De divina praedestinatione et reprobatione* [hereafter *DPR*], I, c. 5, *dico* 1, p. 95, V, c. 3, pp. 157–158; Hollaz, *ETA*, Pt. I, c. 6, q. 22–23, pp. 659–661.

85 Suárez, *De opere sex dierum*, III, c. 17 (ed. Vivès, vol. 3, p. 447); *ETA*, Pt. II, c. 1, q. 3, pp. 1–2.

86 Suárez, *De gratia, proleg. primum*, c. 3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 3, p. 757), *DM* 20. 2.25–45, *ibid.*, 20.4.10–26; *ETA*, Pt. II, c. 5, q. 2, pp. 203–206, Pt. I, c. 6, q. 18, pp. 654–656.

87 *DPR*, I, c. 3, *dico* 3, p. 95; *ETA*, Pt. III, sect. 1, c. 1 q. 4, pp. 2–3.

88 *Ibid.*, I, c. 5, pp. 96–97; *ETA*, Pt. III, sect. 1, c. 1, q. 5, pp. 3–8.

89 Suárez, *De gratia, proleg. secundum*, c. 5, 6, *dico* 1, p. 762; *ETA*, Pt. 1, c. 1 q. 39, obs. 3, p. 366.

90 *ITE*, fourth topic, q. 9, n. 22, p. 347.

Next, he goes on to say:

If God had predestined man to glory before the fall, it would have been a work of immense goodness indeed, but could not be properly called mercy (which regards not only the non-worthy, both the unworthy and the one meriting the contrary). So if God had reprobated man free from all sin, it would have been a work of absolute and autocratic power, not a work of justice.⁹¹

In these passages we see that Turretin sincerely wised to maintain (1) and (2), even though his theological determinism made it very difficult for him to do so (and, in particular, made it difficult for him to make a clear distinction between God's permitting and His willing).⁹² Claims (3), (5) and (6) are, of course, characteristic of 'Augustinainism', so nothing further needs to be said about Turretin's agreement with them.

This leaves (4) and (7). In disagreeing with (4), it must be stressed that Turretin did not wish to deny creaturely freedom. For him, though, the sort of freedom Suárez and Hollaz posit in the creature is impossible. Here Turretin, like all Reformed theologians, followed the Thomists, holding that God's nature as first cause does not allow the creature to be the cause (in the libertarian sense) of its good acts. Therefore, against (4), he claims that it cannot suffice

to save that [i.e., the creature's] dependence that the will may be said to be created and its liberty given by God, for it would not cease [in that case] to be the principle of its own determination, if its acts did not depend on some decree. It would not be indeed the first being, but yet it would be the first operator (nor any more the second, but the first cause because if it depended in being upon God, it would depend on him in operation).⁹³

Thus, the only sort of freedom Turretin allows the creature is a freedom of 'spontaneity', according to which the creature does a free act just in case it does what it wants to and could have done otherwise had it wanted to, even if it could not have wanted to do otherwise. Accordingly, Adam's fall was necessary

⁹¹ Ibid., n. 19, p. 346.

⁹² Turretin was himself acutely aware of this, ultimately falling back into Luther's 'light of glory' solution. See *ITE*, sixth topic, q. 6, n. 4, p. 512.

⁹³ Ibid., third topic, q. 13, n. 11, p. 215.

with respect to the first cause, but still contingent and free since God gave Adam habitual grace “by which he had the strength sufficient to withstand if he would,” even though God did not give that actual grace necessary for Adam’s “actual perseverance” in the good.⁹⁴

Turretin’s rejection of (7), other than that it implies that humans have real libertarian freedom, was that (i) there are no possible truth-makers for God’s middle knowledge,⁹⁵ and (ii) positing middle knowledge is contrary to God’s ‘dominion’, since it supposes that God’s knowledge of what the creature would freely do in any situation depends somehow on the creature, rather than upon God.⁹⁶ Thus, Turretin’s rejection of (4) and (7) are bound up with the ‘sv aspects’ of Calvinism that he could not eliminate, in spite of being drawn to gv.

Having noted the ways in which Turretin disagreed with Suárez and Hollaz, I wish to turn now to the ways in which he agreed with Suárez against Hollaz. One can best explain this by noting an ambiguity in (6). One might accept it in such a way as to hold that God elects certain humans because He foresees they will accept grace, and reprobates others because He foresees they will not, or one might accept it in such a way as to hold that God gives the necessary grace to those whom He arbitrarily decided to elect, and fails to give it to those whom He arbitrarily decided to reprobate. Hollaz agrees with (6) in the first sense,⁹⁷ while Suárez and Turretin interpret it in the second.⁹⁸ It is interesting to note, moreover, that though neither Hollaz nor Turretin mentions Suárez in this regard, both mention Bellarmine (whose doctrine, as a Congruist, was virtually the same as Suárez’s on this matter)—Hollaz in order to condemn his teaching,⁹⁹ Turretin in order to agree with it on essentials.¹⁰⁰

This is not to say that Suárez’s Congruism was the same as Turretin’s Calvinism. Suárez held that humans have libertarian freedom and God gives the reprobate truly sufficient grace, that is, grace that they might have accepted had they chosen to, not simply grace that they might have accepted had they wanted to.¹⁰¹ Hollaz is unimpressed with this position. For him, the doctrines suffer from the same damning problem in the end, since Congruists, every bit

94 Ibid., ninth topic, q. 7, n. 7, p. 608.

95 Ibid., third topic, q. 13, n. 10, p. 214.

96 Ibid., n. 13, p. 215.

97 *ETA*, Pt. III, sec. 1, c.1, q. 8, pp. 21–23.

98 *DPR*, II, c. 23–24, pp. 139–143, V, c. 5, p. 159, c. 8, *dico* 2, p. 162; *ITE*, fourth topic, q. 11–12, pp. 355–372, q. 14, pp. 380–390.

99 *ETA*, Pt. III, sec. 1, c. 2, q. 12, pp. 105–108.

100 *ITE*, fourth topic, q. 11, n. 5, pp. 355–356.

101 *De gratia*, 4.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 9, p. 868); *ibid.*, 4.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 9, p. 873).

as much as Calvinists, teach that God, for no reason, decided, for example, to elect Peter and reprobate Judas; hence, though God gave Judas sufficient grace, He gave it at points in his life where He knew Judas would not accept it, and though He could have given Judas grace at different points where he knew he would, He chose not to because he just did not will to save Judas.

One might put the problem with Suárez's doctrine in the following way. Suppose there is a childless woman, let us call her Charity, who decides to adopt two babies born to crack-addicted mothers, knowing that they will be far more likely to become addicts than most children. Let us call these A and B. Suppose that A and B do become addicted to crack, in spite of the fact that Charity raised them well and is in no way responsible for their addiction, and that Charity decides to pay for A and B to enter two different rehabilitation programs, Q and R, both very expensive and boasting equally good success rates. Suppose, finally, that Charity has done research on both programs and concluded, from what she knows about her children, that both would be more likely to break their addictions if they attended program Q rather than R, but she sends A to Q and B to R because it 'pleases her' that A be cured and B not. My own reaction to Charity is that she never really loved A or B, and adopted them merely to give the impression of being a good woman (or maybe even to convince herself she is one), and perhaps sent B to R because she wanted to be praised all the more for having done a really good thing for that 'ingrate B' who broke his mother's heart twice, first by becoming an addict, and then by not 'kicking the habit', in spite of the fact that his poor mother sent him to the 'very expensive and famous program R'. My reaction to Suárez's and Turretin's 'God', as he appears in their predestination doctrines, is not much different from my reaction to 'Charity', save that Charity is human and therefore subject to certain weaknesses that one could forgive, whereas the same is not the case (presumably) with God.

In Suárez's defence, it must be said that the 'extreme Molinism'¹⁰² that Hollaz accepted (at least insofar as one can abstract certain aspects of it from the Catholic doctrine of justification) has a serious problem; one can ask the Molinist: "why did God not give Judas the grace he foresaw Judas would need, granted He could have, and He willed Judas's salvation?" My own view is that, unless one accepts universalism (as I do), the only way one can ultimately defend pure Molinism is by adopting the highly implausible theory that some creatures suffer from transworld damnation (i.e., they resolutely and freely reject God in every possible world they are 'in'). If this is correct, one could

102 On extreme Molinism vs. Congruism, see Joseph Pohle, *Grace: Actual and Habitual* (St. Louis, MO, 1931), pp. 225–266.

consequently argue that Suárez's doctrine of predestination is the best option that a sincere 'hellist', who is also a supporter of GV, could embrace.

5 Conclusion

Recalling an earlier promise concerning the bearing of this paper on the nuances of the relation between Roman Catholic and catholic Protestant theology, let us view that relation through the lens of the points made in the last section, with respect to our theologians' agreements and disagreements on central soteriological doctrines. The Catholic Suárez and the Lutheran Hollaz agree, against the Reformed Turretin, that humans have true libertarian freedom and that God gives all sinners truly sufficient grace; however, with respect to a more central point (remember Charity), Suárez and Turretin are in agreement, against Hollaz. The Catholic Molina, furthermore, agrees with the Lutheran Hollaz, against both his fellow Jesuit Suárez and the Reformed Turretin, that election is founded not on an absolute decree, but on God's foreseeing how humans will respond to grace, while (a point not yet mentioned) the Catholic Báñez sides with the Reformed Turretin against Hollaz, Suárez, and Molina on all the points wherein Turretin disagrees with them!¹⁰³ If one considers the way agreements and disagreements crisscross the generic distinction between Catholic and Protestant, one begins to wonder whether or not that distinction ever had any foundation in 'the nature of things', or was a social construct founded on politics and tribal allegiances more than anything else.

Of course, a defender of the distinction might point to a deeper point of agreement between Catholics, namely, that all of them, in some way or another, recognize human merit as playing a role in salvation, while all Protestants vigorously deny that human merit plays any role in salvation. But when one realizes that the catholic Protestants (including, rather inconsistently, the Reformed) held that rational creatures are naturally ordered to union with God, and that Adam's co-created virtues were naturally due him,¹⁰⁴ while classical Catholics theologians denied both claims, one begins to think that the Protestants actually held that humans, at the deepest level of their being, 'merit' heaven in a way that no classical Catholic theologian maintained.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ See Pohle, *Grace*, pp. 232–248.

¹⁰⁴ *ETA*, pt. II, c. 1, q. 20; *ITE*, fifth topic, q. 11.

¹⁰⁵ Some scholars believe that Aquinas held that humans are naturally ordered to union with God, and that the doctrine that they are not was a novelty introduced by Cajetan.

If all this is correct, it seems that if there is a real basis for the distinction between Roman Catholic and catholic Protestants, it lies in their disagreements over the nature of the Church and the authority of the Pope (Luther's vehement protests to the contrary notwithstanding). Of course, one might wonder (I do, at least) whether or not the doctrine of the Church is as fundamental as the doctrine of God or of predestination, for it really does seem that it should follow upon those doctrines, rather than the other way around. But perhaps, it is one's deep inclinations with respect to this very matter that distinguishes the Protestant from the Catholic 'spirit'.

See Henri De Lubac, *The Mystery of the Supernatural*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York, NY, 1967).

Suárez on Beings of Reason

Daniel Novotný

1 Introduction

Metaphysicians in the Aristotelian tradition have always taken their philosophical point of departure from familiar things (*res*) around us, such as people, animals, plants, and stones—real things that we can see and touch, hear, smell, and taste. These are things or beings that are in various ways present and active (*actuales*) in the world, though many of their facets lie hidden in their potentiality as powers and dispositions, only to become actual in appropriate circumstances (for Aristotelians, such hidden aspects of the things belong to the domain of real being too). These things can be perceived by our senses, but that is not it, they can also be thought about by our intellect. And in virtue of their being thought-about by our intellects, they are said to receive *intentional* or *objective* being (for an act of intellectual cognition in which a thing becomes an *object* of the intellect is a paradigmatic case of *in-tending*, being directed toward). Our acts of thinking usually deal with real things, whether in their actual or potential mode, but sometimes we also think about that which is *not* real. Things like square-circles or nothingness are not just possibly non-actual, but necessarily so. It is impossible for them ever to become actualized in reality, and still we can and perhaps even must think about them. They are impossible intentional beings.

During the Middle Ages and in Renaissance and Baroque times, Aristotelian metaphysicians became increasingly interested in the impossible intentional things, or ‘beings of reason’ (*entia rationis*) as they were called. Suárez, the Father of Baroque philosophy, devoted his last Disputation 54 to them, a disputation that has attracted a fair amount of recent scholarly attention. The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the content and structure of this disputation, along with some basic guidance for reading it.¹

¹ At this occasion, my aim is not to engage in polemics on subtle points of interpretation but only to provide a guide for reading Disputation 54, fortunately available in English (John P. Doyle, *On Beings of Reason: Metaphysical Disputation LIV* [Milwaukee, 1995]). In general, I can say that I broadly agree with the standard account of Disputation 54 as it is expressed in the work of various scholars, such as John P. Doyle, “Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (First part),” *Vivarium* 25 (1987): 47–75; idem, “Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth

The chapter follows Suárez's own structure embodied in Disputation 54, as far as convenient. Suárez's sense for systematicity and synoptic vision is one of his greatest intellectual virtues, and by following the original structure I hope to convey at least some of its beauty.

My text is divided into four sections, dealing with Suárez's views on (A) the nature and existence of beings of reason, (B) their causes, (C) their division, and finally providing (D) a brief evaluation of his theory. Disputation 54 itself is divided by Suárez into six sections, the first two dealing with the nature and causes of beings of reason, respectively, and the remaining four dealing with their division. Suárez's discussion of the division of beings of reason concerns the exclusivity of their traditional division (section 3), the exhaustivity of it (section 4), and then their particular genera, namely, privations/negations (section 5) and relations of reason (section 6). For a descriptive overview of the content of Disputation 54, see the Appendix.²

Before we address Suárez's theory of beings of reason, let me say a few words about his metatheory, which is briefly discussed in the Introduction to Disputation 54. The metatheory is concerned with the place of the theory of beings of reason within metaphysics. At first sight it would seem that a treatise on metaphysics, such as *Disputationes metaphysicae*, should not contain a theory of beings of reason, for in Suárez's view, metaphysics is the science about beings insofar as they are real, and beings of reason are non-real³; they are mere 'shadows of beings' (*umbrae entium*), as Suárez metaphorically

(Second part)," *Vivarium* 26 (1988): 51–72; Jorge J.E. Gracia, "Suárez's Conception of Metaphysics: A Step in the Direction of Mentalism?," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65 (1991): 287–309; Antonio Millán-Puelles, *The Theory of the Pure Object* (Heidelberg, 1996); and Bernardo Canteñ, "Suárez on Beings of Reason: What Kind of Being (*entia*) are Beings of Reason, and What Kind of Being (*esse*) Do they Have?," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 77 (2003): 171–187. I stay unpersuaded by the recent, well-articulated and challenging 'tethered counterfactual interpretation' of Suárez's Disputation 54 proposed by Christopher Shields ("Shadows of Being: Francisco Suárez's *Entia Rationis*," in *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez*, ed. Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund [Oxford, 2012], pp. 57–74).


2 The chapter draws on the results of the first part of my book, *Ens rationis between Suárez and Caramuel: A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era* (Bronx, NY, 2013). The book contains detailed analyses and justifications of the interpretative claims that I make here, and specifies the particular points on which I agree or disagree with the relevant secondary literature.

3 For an instructive controversy over this point in recent scholarship, see: Jorge J.E. Gracia, "Suárez's Conception of Metaphysics: A Step in the direction of Mentalism?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65 (1991): 287–230; Norman J. Wells, "Esse cognitum and Suárez Revisited," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (1993): 339–348; Jorge J.E. Gracia, "Suárez and Metaphysical Mentalism: The Last Visit," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (1993): 349–354.

puts it.⁴ Nevertheless, even though beings of reason are not the proper (*adaequatus*) object of metaphysics, they do have *some* place in it. Metaphysicians cannot entirely exclude beings of reason from their considerations, and hence they *should* propose a general theory of them in order to make their metaphysical doctrine complete. Moreover, beings of reason are indispensable for other sciences as well, and no other science than metaphysics can carry on the task of dealing with beings of reason in general. Specifically, the job of formulating a general theory of beings of reason cannot be left to dialectics-logic, for this discipline has a limited domain of competency and focuses on some kinds of beings of reason only.⁵ This raises a question, namely, what are the needed elements of a general theory of beings of reason? As we already know, it needs to deal with the nature, existence, causes, and division of beings of reason. But Suárez goes even further and suggests that just as metaphysicians come up with transcendentals as the properties (*proprietaes*) of real beings, so they should come up with quasi-transcendentals as the properties of beings of reason.⁶ Unfortunately, in Disputation 54 this interesting suggestion is neither effected nor mentioned again.

2 Nature and Existence of Beings of Reason

Suárez deals with the nature and existence of beings of reason in section 1, titled “Whether there are beings of reason and what essence they could have.” Suárez first presents arguments for the view that there are no beings of reason, then for the view that beings of reason are real beings, and finally he defends his own middle course, the ‘true’ view, according to which there are beings of reason (against the first view), but they do not exist in the same sense as ordinary real beings (against the second view). Rather, they exist in the *sui generis* sense of ‘merely objective being’. Schematically, we may represent the basic structure of section 1 as follows:



4 *DM* 54.Prol.1.

5 *Ibid.*, 54.Prol.1-2, see also *ibid.*, 1.1.6.

6 *Ibid.*, 54.Prol.2.

Suárez's defence of the true view is based on his discussion of the nature of beings of reason—that is, of what they are—and it proceeds in three phases: first, he clarifies the meanings of the term 'beings of reason', then he provides their real definition, and finally he suggests that we speak of beings of reason in a non-usual sense of 'being'. Apart from defending the *sui generis* existence of beings of reason,⁷ Suárez discusses the occasions (*occasio*) on which our intellect makes them up, and the sense of proportional analogy in which they are appropriately called 'beings'. As we can see, section 1 is dense, dealing with several inter-dependent aspects of our subject matter. Let us first discuss the two false views, then the true view, and finally the remaining issues, that is, occasion and analogy.

2.1 *False Views: Eliminativism and Ultrarealism*

The first false view, which might be called eliminativism, holds that there are no beings of reason. The second false view, which might be called ultrarealism, holds that there are beings of reason in the same sense as other real beings. Before taking up these theories, Suárez makes a surprising metatheoretical observation:

Not even this issue lacks contrary views at the opposite extremes, at least in words. For if the authors of these words are more closely examined, perhaps they are arguing only about words.⁸

Why does Suárez say this and what does he mean by it? A possible explanation might be that eliminativism and ultrarealism share the assumption that every being is a real being (and vice versa). The eliminativists then argue that since there are only real beings there are no beings of reason, whereas the ultrarealists hold that some of the real beings are beings of reason. Suárez probably thought that given his distinction between the senses of 'being', one could explain the disagreement away by pointing out that the eliminativists and the ultrarealists speak of beings of reason in different senses. At any rate, regardless of whether this interpretative

7 For semantic reasons, Suárez does not want to apply the word 'existence' to beings of reason. The word for him retains the force of a present participle and hence is applicable only to presently actual beings (see *DM* 2.4). For the sake of convenience, I shall adopt a different usage and speak freely of the existence of beings of reason in the existentially-neutral sense of 'there is', which is equivalent to Suárez's 'to be given' (*dari*).

8 *DM* 54.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 1015): "Non desunt etiam in hac re sententiae extreme contrariae, saltem in vocabus; nam si auctores earum pressius examinentur, fortasse solum de vocabus contendunt."

hypothesis holds true, the distinction between the real and non-real ('merely objective') sense of 'being' lies at the heart of Suárez's approach to beings of reason.⁹ He appears to believe that nobody could *seriously* deny the existence of beings of reason when confronted with the clarification of the two senses of being.

Let us now take a brief look at eliminativism, the first false view. In Suárez's words, the eliminativists are "certain people [who] simply deny that there are beings of reason, [maintaining] instead that all that is said of them can very well be understood of [real] things themselves and 'preserved' in them."¹⁰ Suárez lists three arguments in favour of eliminativism:

(Ar1) Beings of reason have either "*being (esse) in reason as in a subject*" or "*being made by reason.*" But both are kinds of real being. Thus, there are no true beings of reason.

(Ar2) Beings of reason are "that which is made up by reason." But what is made up does not exist. Thus, it is a contradiction to say that beings of reason exist.

(Ar3) Beings of reason are unnecessary.¹¹

In light of what Suárez says on the various senses of 'being of reason' (more on this below in A.2), it is easy to find replies to (Ar1) and (Ar2). In answer to (Ar1), Suárez would accept the second premise but deny that the first premise exhausts the possibilities—besides the two kinds of real being listed, there is also non-real being, i.e., being of reason. In answer to (Ar2), Suárez would distinguish the two senses of the second premise. It is true that what is made up does not exist in a real sense, but it does exist in another, analogical sense. If we keep in mind that 'exist' or 'is' is used in different senses, no contradiction arises. Concerning (Ar3), see A.3 below.

Suárez divides ultrarealism, the second false view, according to three different versions:

9 For more on 'merely objective', see below. The word 'real' is used by Suárez in more than one sense. In its broadest sense, 'real' seems to mean anything independent of human mental activity, and in this sense even some negative and extrinsic properties may be real. In a narrower sense, 'real' means something actualizable, and in this sense even possible beings are real. In the narrowest sense, only actual beings are real. Suárez's main discussion of what is real can be found in the context of his explanation of what a real essence is in *DM* 2.4.3-7.

10 *DM* 54.1.2.

11 *Ibid.*, 54.1.2.

(V1) Beings of reason and real beings are subsumed under the common appellation 'being' through a single signification or even conception.

(V2) Some (though not all) beings of reason, namely relations, share a univocal likeness with real beings.

(V3) Beings of reason (like real beings) have an entity independent of our acts of knowing.

The first view (V1) does not seem to play any role in Suárez's later discussions, and the brevity of its description militates against the need to engage it any further. The second view (V2) is discussed and rejected by Suárez in Disputation 47. Proponents of (V2) claim that relation is such an extraordinary category that it is divided into real and non-real genera, namely, real relations and relations of reason. Suárez objects that there cannot be any such category, for the difference between real beings and beings of reason is so great that it is even greater than the difference between living and dead people.¹² The third view (V3) is suggested by some of those who reduce beings of reason to extrinsic denominations. For if beings of reason are extrinsic denominations, and these are mind-independent, then *ipso facto* beings of reason are mind-independent. Suárez rejects the antecedent. In his view, to be an extrinsic denomination is not sufficient for something to be a being of reason. For more on extrinsic denominations, see below (B.2).¹³

2.2 *The True View: Objectualism*

After the explanation and brief criticism of the opposing false views, Suárez presents his own true view, which I call objectualism since it takes beings of reason as pure objects of our intellect. Objectualism is summed up by Suárez as the conjunction of the negations of the false views:

- (a) There are beings of reason, but in a peculiar sense of being of 'merely objective beings', not in the sense of beings 'capable of true and real existence'.
- (b) Beings of reason are called 'beings', but they do not share any similarity with real beings; nevertheless, there is a kind of analogy—namely, of proportionality—between beings of reason and real beings.¹⁴

¹² Ibid., 47:3.2-3, see also *ibid.*, 47:3.4-5.

¹³ Ibid., 54.1.3, *ibid.*, 54.2.

¹⁴ Ibid., 54.1.4.

Suárez's defence of the true view proceeds via the clarification of what beings of reason are, namely, by distinguishing three different kinds of relations (*habitudines*) that a being (*ens*) has to reason-intellect (*ratio*). First, a being is effectively related to an intellect in the case that it is an *effect* of it. This happens when, for instance, an artefact is produced according to a plan. Obviously, such a being is a real being. Second, a being is subjectively related to an intellect in the case that it inheres in the intellect as an accident in its subject. This happens when, for instance, grammatical knowledge inheres in one's intellect. Within the scholastic ontological framework presupposed here, such grammatical knowledge is considered a real being as well, namely a quality. Third, a being is objectively related to an intellect in the case that the intellect thinks of the being. Suárez says of such a being that it is 'in the reason by way of being an *object*', but he also uses phrases such as 'the being has an *objective being* in the intellect'. The underlying idea is that for the intellect to know or think of a being, the being must somehow be 'in' it. The being, however, cannot be physically in the intellect, and must be there only 'objectively' (intentionally).¹⁵ Now, there are two further ways in which something can be objectively in the intellect.¹⁶ First, this can occur when the given being has both real being in itself and being as an object of the intellect. Take, for instance, the situation in which *Peter knows Paul*. Paul is a real individual and hence he has real being in himself, and at the same time he has also being as an object of Peter's intellect. Second, this includes the case in which a given being is an object of the intellect and has 'no other being'. Take, for instance, the situation in which *Peter knows (=thinks of) a chimera*. The chimera has no being apart from Peter's intellect. It is only in this latter situation, when the given being has no being in itself, that we speak of beings of reason in the proper sense, as intended by Suárez and his scholastic colleagues. From this clarification of the term, Suárez jumps to the definition(s) of beings of reason:

[I]t is only in the latter sense [i.e., something is an object of reason without having in itself any other being] that we most appropriately speak of beings of reason.... Therefore, what is commonly and rightly defined as a being of reason is that which has only objective being in an intellect, or, it is that which is thought of by a reason as a being, even though it has no entity [being] in itself.¹⁷

15 Ibid., 54.1.5.

16 Ibid., 54.1.6.

17 Ibid., 54.1.6 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 1016): "[E]t hoc propriissime vocatur ens rationis.... Et ideo recte definiri solet, ens rationis esse illud, quod habet esse objective tantum in

Suárez does not consider any other definitions. He seems to adopt a formulation that was universally held in his times.¹⁸

Now that Suárez has come up with the *definition* of beings of reason, what can be said in favour of their *existence*? One may distinguish between two arguments in Suárez. The first argument is ‘from experience’. Suárez believes that once he has clarified what ‘being of reason’ means, the existence of beings of reason becomes obvious in the common experience of thinking about blindness, chimeras, etc.¹⁹ The second argument for the existence of beings of reason might be called ‘ontological’: beings of reason are by definition entities that exist as objects of our thought. Hence, their essence includes their being-thought-of or existence-in-thought. Suppose one claims that beings of reason do not exist. One either knows what he is talking about, or not. If one does not, then his claim is beside the point. If one does, however, know what he is talking about, then he is claiming that the entities that he thinks about do not exist in the relevant sense, i.e., they do not exist-in-thought. This, nevertheless, is a self-contradiction, therefore beings of reason must exist.²⁰

2.3 *Remaining Issues: Occasion and Analogy*

In the remainder of section 1, Suárez deals with two more elements of his true view. The first concerns ‘occasions’ for making up beings of reason. Suárez distinguishes three such occasions:

(O₁) To ‘fill up’ non-being: in reality there are no negations-privations, such as blindnesses or malfunctions, they are simply nothing; but of course, we still need to take these into account; however, since our intellect cannot take them as nothing, it needs to take them as something; and hence it makes up negative beings of reason (as a kind of ‘proxy-object’). The emergence of such negative beings of reason is both necessary and useful.²¹

intellectu, seu esse id, quod a ratione cogitatur ut ens, cum tamen in se entitatem non habeat.”


18 Note that Suárez’s definition contains in fact two definitions, namely, (DF₁) a being of reason has only objective being in the intellect, and (DF₂) a being of reason is thought of as a being, even though it has no being in itself. Suárez assumes that these two definitions are equivalent, co-extensional, though in my view they are not. See my *Ens rationis between Suárez and Caramuel: A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era* (NY, NY, 2013).

19 DM 54.1.7.

20 DM 54.1.7.

21 Suárez seems to change his mind on this point when he assumes in sections 3–5 that our intellect can also conceive non-beings in the manner of non-beings, see below C.3.

Similarly, since a real being is to *exists* as an object of reason is to *being thought about*, we can predicate *exists* of an object of reason (and consequently call the latter ‘beings of reason’):




This solution assumes that for beings of reason, *exists* involves *being thought about*. It is natural then to propose the view that to be a being of reason is nothing but an extrinsic denomination (‘To be is just to be thought about’). The next section explores the causes of beings of reason and deals extensively with this suggestion. But before we enter this topic, let me mention one important objection that Suárez raises against his view: if beings of reason are nothing as such, purely made up, then there is nothing that can be in them. Hence (unlike meadows), they themselves cannot provide any ground for an analogy of proportionality. Suárez replies: although beings of reason do not have any ground or foundation of the proportion in themselves, they are still thought to have a foundation, and for the analogy of proportionality this is enough.²⁵

3 Causes of Beings of Reason

The question of the causes of beings of reason is taken up in section 2 of Suárez’s Disputation 54, entitled “Whether a being of reason has a cause and what it is.” Suárez first argues that beings of reason have an efficient cause only. Second, he argues that their efficient cause is the intellect. Third, he specifies the kind of mental act that makes up beings of reason, and fourth, he excludes other mental faculties from causing them (though he hesitates with respect to the imagination). Schematically, we may represent Suárez’s basic argumentative strategy in section 2 as follows:

²⁵ Ibid., 54.1.10.



Toward the end of section 2, Suárez takes up the question of whether and in which sense God and angels know or make up beings of reason. The structure of this section is again rather complex (see the Appendix), and an extensive discussion of extrinsic denominations is embedded in it.

3.1 *Beings of Reason Have an Efficient Cause Only*

Suárez first devotes a brief paragraph to denying the (proper) final, formal, and material causes of beings of reason.²⁶ He then goes on to argue that beings of reason do have an efficient cause, though. His argument starts with a (re-) interpretation of Soncinas, an author who denied the need to postulate an efficient cause of beings of reason. In Suárez's view, Soncinas meant to deny the existence of an efficient cause of beings of reason only in the sense of "something giving them real existence."²⁷ Suárez, of course, agrees with the so-interpreted denial: there is no efficient cause of the *real being* of beings of reason because they have no such being. However, this does not mean that there is no efficient cause of their *sui generis* (objective) being.²⁸

26 Ibid., 54.2.1. Suárez's denial, however, is rather unclear, for he does acknowledge that beings of reason may be said to have these types of causes in *some* sense.

27 Ibid., 54.2.2.

28 Ibid., 54.2.2.

Suárez's positive argument in favour of an efficient cause of beings of reason rests on the principle of sufficient reason. Since beings of reason have objective being in the intellect and they do not have it always but only, let us say, during the time interval t_1 to t_2 , there must be a *sufficient reason* that would explain this fact. Hence, there is an efficient cause for beings of reason. But this cannot be an 'ordinary' efficient cause, for beings of reason would then be real beings. Therefore, it must be something that works only *indirectly*.²⁹

3.2 *The Intellect as an Efficient Cause of Beings of Reason*

Given that beings of reason have an efficient cause, it remains to ask: what is it? To Suárez, it appears obvious that the best candidate for this post is the human intellect.³⁰ This conclusion is only challenged by the view that in order for something to be a being of reason, it is sufficient for it to be an extrinsic denomination.³¹ Suárez distinguishes two basic versions of this view. According to one (henceforth the general extrinsic denomination view), any extrinsic denomination is sufficient, whereas according to the other (henceforth the restricted extrinsic denomination view), only extrinsic denominations from the intellect, such as 'being thought about', will do. Suárez argues against both these views: for the emergence of beings of reason, extrinsic denominations are necessary but insufficient.

Suárez's argumentation against the general extrinsic denomination view is indirect. He draws three unacceptable consequences from it. If this view were true then:

- (1) God would make up beings of reason.³²
- (2) Not only the intellect, but also other mental faculties, such as the will, would be capable of causing beings of reason (in which case we should have many more terms besides 'being of reason', such as 'beings of will', 'beings of sight', 'beings of imagination', etc.).³³
- (3) Even predicates, such as *being to the left* or *being clothed* would be beings of reason.³⁴

²⁹ Ibid., 54.2.3.

³⁰ Ibid., 54.2.4.

³¹ Extrinsic denominations are predicates that express the properties something has in virtue of something else being related to it.

³² *DM* 54.2.7.

³³ Ibid., 54.2.8.

³⁴ Ibid., 54.2.9.

Suárez takes these three consequences to constitute a clear refutation of the general extrinsic denomination view, for all these consequences flout universally held scholastic convictions.³⁵

One might object, however, that the process of denomination involves an act of the intellect, and hence there must be some being of reason involved. Suárez's reply involves a distinction between (a) the mental (linguistic) act of imposing the denominating name, and (b) the expressed form or thing taken in itself. If one wishes to argue that extrinsic denominations are beings of reason because they involve a mental act of denominating, then all denominations, even intrinsic ones, would have to be beings of reason. But this is absurd. Hence, the extrinsic things (forms) expressed by the terms of extrinsic denominations are real, even though in order to express them we need thought and language.³⁶

The general extrinsic denomination view may be revised in such a way as to avoid some of its undesirable consequences. With the resulting restricted extrinsic denomination view, one could hold that only extrinsic denominations derived from acts of the intellect are sufficient for the emergence of beings of reason. Suárez rejects this restricted view as well, for in his view the acts of the intellect toward something are just as real as other relations.³⁷

The restricted extrinsic denomination view might be further defended by claiming that denominations from acts of the intellect differ from other denominations in that (a) things so denominated exist only *objectively* in the intellect, and (b) things-as-so-denominated are *dependent* on the actual operations of the intellect. Since, as we saw above, beings of reason are something objectively dependent on the intellect, it would consequently seem that for the emergence of beings of reason, extrinsic denominations from the intellect are sufficient.³⁸

Suárez has two things to say in reply. First, he points out that the proponents of this line of defence of the restricted extrinsic denomination view would need to extend the normal meaning of 'being of reason' to include other beings that are merely objectively in some mental faculty and dependent on its actual operation, such as beings of the external senses, of the internal senses, of the

35 Ibid., 54.2.10.

36 Ibid., 54.2.10.

37 Ibid., 54.2.11. Needless to say, the fact that extrinsic denominations from the intellect are not sufficient conditions for the emergence of beings of reason does not mean that they are not necessary.

38 Ibid., 54.2.12.

will, etc. This move is unacceptable, however, because it involves too drastic of a revision of the traditional scholastic philosophical framework.³⁹

Second, Suárez argues that the restricted extrinsic denomination view confuses two meanings of 'being known'.⁴⁰ Suppose Peter is thinking of (=knows) Paul. Hence, Paul is the object of Peter's thinking, that is to say, he is objectively in Peter's intellect.⁴¹ This is the objective sense in which Paul is being known. There is, however, yet another meaning of 'being known', which refers not to Paul but to the whole fact of Paul's-being-known-by-Peter. This is the formal sense in which Peter is being known. This fact is not the normal object of Peter's thinking. Normally (in our *direct* cognition), Peter is thinking of Paul and not of Paul-as-I-Peter-am-thinking-of-him, although it is possible for Peter to change the object of his thinking from Paul to my-thinking-of-Paul (i.e., Peter's-thinking-of-Paul), which is what happens in *reflexive* cognition. Nevertheless, regardless of whether we take 'being known' in the former or the latter sense, being known is insufficient to account for the emergence of a being of reason. In both cases, the object of Peter's thinking has not just objective but also real being, and thus is not a being of reason.⁴²

In sum, Suárez's claim is that when the intellect simply knows a real object, there is nothing fictitious about *the object being known by it*: the object, the form of being known, and their extrinsic union are all real. Hence, the extrinsic form is also real.⁴³ The intellect is therefore left as the only candidate for the post of the creator of beings of reason, though it does not create them whenever it gets down to work.

3.3 *Beings of Reason Are Caused by Special Mental Acts*

If extrinsic denominations from the intellect taken as such are not sufficient for the emergence of beings of reason, what needs to be added to the acts of the intellect to make them causes of beings of reason? Suárez's first thesis is that we need a kind of act of the intellect that can conceive something that has no being in the manner of a being. He offers three (rather trivial) reasons for this claim: (1) it follows from the definition of beings of reason given above; (2) no other explanation is available if the extrinsic denomination view fails; (3) one and the same negative state of affairs (e.g., Homer's

39 Ibid., 54.2.12.

40 Ibid., 54.2.13.

41 That is, insofar as he is known by Peter, for Peter does not know everything about Paul and so only a partial aspect of Paul is known by Peter.

42 *DM* 54.2.13.

43 Ibid., 54.2.14.

not-having-sight) can be viewed in two ways, namely, 'in the manner of a non-being' or 'in the manner of a being'. It is only in the latter case that a being of reason emerges.⁴⁴

As it is possible to conceive the negative state of affairs in two ways, so is it possible to conceive the situation of extrinsic denomination in two ways: either as believed to be intrinsic to the denominated thing, or as such, that is, extrinsic to the denominated thing.⁴⁵ According to Suárez, in the latter case we know the given extrinsic denomination directly, whereas in the former, it is known reflexively. Beings of reason, furthermore, emerge only in this former case.⁴⁶ This amounts to Suárez's second thesis, namely, that the act of the intellect needed for the emergence of beings of reason has to be reflexive. By 'reflexive', Suárez means the following: if I want to conceive blindness, I first need to know what sight is; in other words, if I want to make up beings of reason, i.e., non-real entities, I first need to know real entities.⁴⁷

3.4 *The Intellect as the Only Efficient Cause of Beings of Reason*

From what has been said above, namely, that beings of reason are conceived as beings though they are non-beings, Suárez infers that neither the senses nor the will are capable of producing them.⁴⁸ And if someone argues that the will is capable of tending toward an apparent good and hence it is capable of producing some non-real beings of the will, Suárez replies that a non-real good is an object contrived by the intellect, not the will. In other words, the will only 'adds' apparent goodness to a pre-fabricated being of reason produced by the intellect.⁴⁹

Moving from the will to the senses, Suárez hesitates on what to think of the imagination (one of the internal senses). It seems that the imagination, by joining together sensual appearances, is able to make up not only possible non-existing entities (e.g., a golden mountain), but also impossible entities (e.g., a chimera), i.e., beings of reason. Hence, is not only the intellect but also the imagination capable of making up beings of reason? Suárez first seems to answer 'yes', but then immediately afterwards he reasserts the claim that the imagination as such is *not* capable of producing beings of reason; rather, it

44 Ibid., 54.2.15.

45 Ibid., 54.2.15.

46 Ibid., 54.2.16.

47 Ibid., 54.2.16.

48 Ibid., 54.2.17.

49 Ibid., 54.2.17.

needs to work in tandem with the intellect.⁵⁰ It seems that Suárez remains undecided as to what to hold on this point.⁵¹

3.5 *Beings of Reason and God*

Suárez then brings up a final question, namely, does God know beings of reason? On the one hand, it would seem that He does, for He is omniscient.⁵² On the other hand, though, this would seem to imply his imperfection, which is for theists such as Suárez quite unacceptable. One could defend the claim that God knows-makes up beings of reason by pointing out that the imperfection involved in knowing beings of reason lies on the side of the object (i.e., a given being of reason) and not on the side of the knower (i.e., God).⁵³ But Suárez disagrees with this argument. It is not a mere imperfection of the object to think of an object in a manner that differs from the way it is: it is also an imperfection of the knower.⁵⁴ According to Suárez, (real) things never force the (perfect) intellect to make up beings of reason, i.e., to know something otherwise than it is in itself. This pertains both to relations of reason and to negations.⁵⁵ Hence, God can know everything, without having to make up beings of reason. God knows each thing by knowing ‘what it is’ and ‘what it is not’. Thus, he does not need to create ‘proxy’ objects (i.e., beings of reason) in order to know something else (non-beings or beings that we know only comparatively).⁵⁶

There is one more interesting issue lurking behind the corner. Although God does not make up beings of reason ‘for His own sake’, He still needs to know beings of reason as they are made by us.⁵⁷ But then, if these beings-made-up-by-us are known by God’s intellect, do they not also have to receive some being from *His* intellect?⁵⁸ Suárez accepts this inference, and even makes the further point that in virtue of God’s intellect these human-made beings of reason receive (divine) *actual* being.⁵⁹ This identification of something purely

50 Ibid., 54.2.18.

51 A possible explanation could lie in the Renaissance Thomistic doctrine of ‘physical promotion’: the intellect empowers the imagination to do things that are ordinarily beyond its capabilities. See (in a different context), David Peroutka, “Imagination, Intellect and Premotion,” *Studia Neoscholastica* 7 (2010): 107–114.

52 DM 54.2.19.

53 Ibid., 54.2.19.

54 Ibid., 54.2.21.

55 Ibid., 54.2.22.

56 Ibid., 54.2.22.

57 Ibid., 54.2.23.

58 Ibid., 54.2.23.

59 Ibid., 54.2.24.


non-real with divine actuality seems to be a step of great significance, deserving further systematic investigation. Suárez, however, leaves the issue at this point, and so do we.⁶⁰

4 Division of Beings of Reason

Suárez's discussion of the division of beings of reason occupies the largest bulk of Disputation 54. At the time, the standard scholastic doctrine said that they are divided into three highest genera, namely, negations, privations, and relations.⁶¹ Suárez, however, has various doubts concerning this standard division. Is it mutually exclusive (correct)? Is it exhaustive (sufficient)? In section 3 Suárez takes up the exclusivity of the division, and in section 4 its exhaustivity. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to particular members of this division, namely, negations/privations and relations of reason, respectively.

4.1 *Is the Traditional Division of Beings of Reason Mutually Exclusive?*

Suárez divides beings of reason into three highest genera, namely, negation, privation, and relation. However, negations in the narrower sense (as lacks in an inapt subject) and privations (as lacks in an apt subject) may both be subsumed under negations in the broad sense (as lacks without qualification). Schematically:



60 Still, for the sake of completeness, I feel obliged to report one more issue that Suárez briefly discusses, namely, angelic knowledge of beings of reason. According to Suárez, angels normally do not make up beings of reason, although they may do so, for instance, in the case of their (imperfect) knowledge of God. *DM* 54.2.25.

61 *DM* 54.3.1. One could also say two highest genera, if negations and privations are lumped together. Both ways of dividing the supreme quasi-genus of being of reason seem standard.

With respect to the exclusivity of this division, one may raise various objections. Suárez identifies four difficulties with it:⁶²

- (A) The first difficulty has to do with the fact that negations/privations do not seem to be beings of reason. Rather, they seem to be something really in things. Suárez replies that indeed negations and privations taken as such are *non-beings*, i.e., they are not beings of reason.⁶³ Then he points out that the intellect may attribute negations/privations to things not only in the proper negative way but also in an improper positive way, and it is in the latter sense that negations/privations are beings of reason.⁶⁴
- (B) The second and the fourth difficulties concern the issue of whether one can reduce all sorts of beings of reason to negations, namely, negations of true and real existence, or to relations of reason. Suárez replies that relation (of reason) needs to be properly distinguished from negation/privation. That there is a distinction becomes clear when one considers the foundations of negation/privation on the one hand, and of relation on the other.⁶⁵ Hence, even though every relation of reason involves a lack of something real, namely, of a real relation, this feature itself is not sufficient to turn it into a negation/privation.⁶⁶ Thus, neither relation nor negation/privation is reducible to the other—in spite of some superficial similarities.
- (C) The third difficulty concerns the distinction between negations and privations.⁶⁷ At this point Suárez simply states his division of beings of reason, postponing the discussion of the proper distinction between negations and privations to section 5.

Suárez concludes the discussion of section 3 by adding a brief paragraph about whether the traditional division of beings of reason is univocal or analogical. He seems to think that it is univocal, since “there is no sufficient reason for an analogy.”⁶⁸

62 Ibid., 54.3.2.

63 Ibid., 54.3.3.

64 Ibid., 54.3.4.

65 Ibid., 54.3.5.

66 Ibid., 54.3.5.

67 Ibid., 54.3.8.

68 Ibid., 54.3.9.

4.2 *Is the Traditional Division of Beings of Reason Jointly Exhaustive?*

The question of the exhaustivity or sufficiency of the standard division is discussed by Suárez in section 4. The discussion is quite extensive, for it applies the case by case method of argument. At this occasion we cannot go into the details, so I will just summarize the main outline of Suárez's argumentation. Suárez begins with the following objection: there are as many kinds of beings of reason as there are categories, for instance, chimeras are substances of reason, imaginary space is a quantity of reason, fame is a quality of reason, and so on; hence, the standard division is not exhaustive.⁶⁹ Suárez proposes two different strategies to tackle this objection. The first strategy is to claim that the standard division intentionally leaves out beings of reason that have no foundation in reality, and if we stick to beings of reason that do have a foundation in reality, we can prove that they divide in just the three genera, namely, negation, privation, and relation.⁷⁰ The second strategy is to argue that problematic beings of reason, such as chimeras, are special cases of negation.⁷¹ Suárez eventually expresses his mild preference for the second strategy, although he does not decisively reject the first strategy.⁷²

4.3 *Negations and Privations*

In section 5 of Disputation 54, Suárez takes up the detailed comparison of negations and privations. Since the two can be considered in two ways, namely as real lacks of some form and as non-real beings of reason, the comparison is carried out twice.⁷³

Suárez first identifies five similarities between privations and negations as they are in things:⁷⁴

69 Ibid., 54.4.1.

70 The first defense of the traditional division is in *DM* 54.4.2-9. The general part of the argument is in *DM* 54.4.4-6. Particular examples of the alleged positive beings of reason that are not relations are discussed in *DM* 54.4.7-9.

71 *DM* 54.4.10.

72 Ibid., 54.4.2.

73 Ibid., 54.5.1.

74 At this point, I also need to report that the comparison that follows is preceded in Disputation 54 by a brief paragraph (*DM* 54.5.2) in which Suárez not only acknowledges *true* (hence real and mind-independent) negations-privations, but also false (hence non-real and mind-dependent) negations-privations. An example of the latter would be the non-animality of a human being. In these we conceive beings as non-beings and hence we may call them non-beings of reason. This line of reasoning makes Suárez's theory ultimately inconsistent. For more, see Novotný, *Ens rationis from Suárez and Caramuel*.

1. Both 'remove' real forms.⁷⁵
2. Both stand in a real opposition to some positive real being.⁷⁶
3. Both have a foundation in reality.⁷⁷
4. Both can be predicated of things without any fiction-making activity of the intellect.⁷⁸
5. *Indirect* knowledge or representation of both real negations and real privations may happen in two ways, namely, through negative or through affirmative statements.⁷⁹

Next, with considerable phenomenological detail, he describes seven differences:

1. Privation is the absence of a form in a subject that is capable of having it, whereas negation is the absence of a form in a subject that is **not** capable of having it. 'Negation' can also be used in a broader sense of the absence of a form in a subject, regardless of the subject's capacity to have it. Negation in this sense is a genus, which includes privation and negation in the narrower sense as its species.⁸⁰
2. Privation admits degrees of more and less, whereas negation does not.⁸¹
3. Privation cannot be necessary for a subject, whereas negation can.⁸²
4. There can be a 'medium' between predicating privation and possession, but not between predicating negation and the opposite affirmation.⁸³
5. Privations can be predicated only of real beings, whereas negations can be predicated both of real and of fictitious beings. Suárez also briefly discusses predicating negations of chimeras, and accepts the view that they yield true propositions, even necessarily.⁸⁴
6. Privation is a principle of change, whereas negation is not.⁸⁵
7. Privation cannot be naturally restored, whereas negation can.⁸⁶

75 *DM* 54.5.3.

76 *Ibid.*, 54.5.3.

77 *Ibid.*, 54.5.4.

78 *Ibid.*, 54.5.5.

79 *Ibid.*, 54.5.5-6.

80 *Ibid.*, 54.5.7.

81 *Ibid.*, 54.5.10.

82 *Ibid.*, 54.5.11.

83 *Ibid.*, 54.5.12-13.

84 *Ibid.*, 54.5.16 (with some Suárezian qualifications).

85 *Ibid.*, 54.5.17-18.

86 *Ibid.*, 54.5.19.

This is all concerning the similarities/differences between negations/privations considered as real lacks. Suárez's subsequent discussion of the similarities/differences between negations/privations considered as beings of reason is considerably shorter. There is just one thing they share, namely, that they are absolute, i.e., non-relative.⁸⁷ Furthermore, there are just two differences: (1) privations are thought of in the manner of qualities, whereas negations are also thought of in the manner of other categories (if we subsume self-contradictory beings under them)⁸⁸; and (2) privations are always (thought to be) in a subject, whereas negations can be (thought to be) on their own. This happens, for instance, with nothing, which is not something ascribed to a subject.⁸⁹

Suárez concludes section 5 with a brief discussion of two more issues. First, he considers whether negations differ from privations formally or relatively (his answer is: sometimes formally, sometimes relatively).⁹⁰ Second, he discusses whether there are propositional beings of reason (his answer is: probably 'yes').⁹¹

4.4 *Relations of Reason*

In the relatively brief section 6 Suárez deals with relations of reason. These are "relations which the intellect contrives in the manner of a form ordered or related to something...which in fact is not ordered or related...to this something."⁹² Relations of reason are caused by the special acts of intellect described above, and unlike real relations, they violate at least one of the following three conditions:⁹³

(C₁) Both the first and the second element ('extreme') of the relation really exist (its subject and term).

(C₂) These two elements are really distinct.

(C₃) There is a (real) fundament of the relation in one or both of these elements.⁹⁴

Relations of reason may be divided according to their foundation, splitting into two basic genera. One contains relations of reason that do not have a

87 Ibid., 54.5.20.

88 Privations as qualities: *ibid.*, 54.5.23.

89 Ibid., 54.5.24.

90 Ibid., 54.5.25 (formally), *ibid.*, 54.5.26 (relatively).

91 Ibid., 54.5.27.

92 Ibid., 54.6.1.

93 Ibid., 54.6.2.

94 Ibid., 54.6.2.

foundation in reality. This group includes (1) relations between completely made up beings of reason, e.g., the similarity between two chimeras; (2) relations between beings of reason with some foundation in reality, e.g., between two 'blindnesses'; and (3) relations between unactualized possible entities, e.g., the relation of temporal precedence of Adam and Antichrist.⁹⁵ (It is surprising that relations between *possibilia*, which are real, are counted by Suárez as relations of reason).

The second genus contains relations with a foundation in reality. It includes (1) relations of real entities toward non-existents, whether possible or of reason; (2) relations of real entities toward themselves (i.e., the two elements of the relation fail to be really distinct—this group is further subdivided according to the kind of non-real distinction between the two elements); (3) various semantic, social, economic, and other relations that are between really distinct existents but still do not satisfy all the conditions for real relations; and (4) various logical relations that also fail several conditions for being real relations.⁹⁶ Schematically, the classification of relations of reason looks as follows:

Relations of Reason

Without a foundation

- (1) completely made up (e.g., between chimeras);
- (2) with some remote foundation (e.g., between privations);
- (3) between non-existent possible entities;

With a foundation

- (1) relations of real entities toward non-existents;
- (2) relations of real entities toward themselves;
- (3) relations that violate conditions other than existence or difference;
- (4) logical intentions (relations based on extrinsic denomination from the intellect, with some foundation in reality).

Suárez concludes the discussion of relations of reason with a very brief discussion of second intentions, i.e., 'higher-order predicates'. Unlike other late scholastic authors, Suárez has almost nothing to say about them (only giving them three short paragraphs). This is presumably because their treatment belongs to logic, which is a subject that Suárez apparently did not like—so much so that he did not publish a single work about it.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 54.6.3.

⁹⁶ (1) *DM* 54.6.4, (2) *ibid.*, 54.6.5, (3) *ibid.*, 54.6.6, (4) *ibid.*, 54.6.8.

5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of Suárez's theory of beings of reason. My exposition closely followed the structure of Disputation 54 so that this chapter may also serve as a reading guide to the Disputation itself. Suárez's overall accomplishment is undoubtedly great. He was able to put together many pre-Suárezian scholastic arguments into a unified framework, sufficiently detailed and analytical but properly counterbalanced by being positioned within a synoptic synthesis. Nevertheless, one may notice certain problems or difficulties in this grand system, and there remain several questions or objections one may ask, to which Suárez does not provide answers. For instance, is it essential to beings of reason that they *actually* be thought about? If, for instance, nobody is actually thinking about a chimera, is there still a chimera? What is the place of literary fictions such as Hamlet or the Middle Earth in Suárez's theory? Are beings of reason individual or universal? Are beings of reason *distinct* from the acts directed toward them or are they parts of them, in other words, are they act-immanent or act-transcendent? What are the synchronic and diachronic criteria of identity for beings of reason? Does one person think of the same being of reason at two or more occasions? How does one account for the difference between referring to non-existent objects and a failure to refer to an object (objects of mistakes)? Listing Suárez's shortcomings is not meant to diminish his stature, of course. As it happens, in the history of thought philosophers are successful and fruitful not only according to the measure of what they accomplish, but also of what they fail to accomplish. This is no less true for Suárez, as many scholastic philosophers after Suárez attempted either to replace or improve what Suárez had bequeathed to them. Such efforts, moreover, stimulated an extraordinary development of scholastic philosophy in the seventeenth century. That, however, is the subject matter of another story.⁹⁷

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Appendix: A Descriptive Overview of Disputation 54

The division and the descriptive titles that follow are based on the original titles and the division of Suárez's Disputation 54, but they are often modified in order to make them more lucid and organized. I also include two diagrams that highlight the central dialectics of sections 1 and 2.

Introduction: Why do we deal with beings of reason at the end of this book on metaphysics? (n1–2)

The Nature of Beings of Reason (s1)

The First View: There are no beings of reason (n2)

The Second View: Beings of reason are real beings (n3)

The True View: Beings of reason 'must be granted' but they have 'merely objective being in the intellect'—the first conclusion (n4–7)

Why we make up beings of reason—the second conclusion (n8)

Beings of reason are called 'beings' in an analogical sense—the third conclusion (n9–10)

The Causes of Beings of Reason (s2)

Beings of reason have no formal, material, or final cause (n1)

The First View: Beings of reason have no efficient cause (n2)

The True View:

The First Conclusion: Beings of reason have an efficient cause in an analogical sense (n3)

The Second Conclusion: The efficient cause of beings of reason is the intellect (n4)

Further questions concerning the true view (n5)

The Second and the Third View: Beings of reason are extrinsic denominations—in general or from the intellect (nn. 6–14)

The First Consequence of these views: God would make up beings of reason (n7)

The Second Consequence: Other mental powers would make them up (n8)

The Third Consequence: Non-living things would make them up (n9)

Objection One to these views: Not every extrinsic denomination is a being of reason (n10)

Objection Two: Not every extrinsic denomination from the intellect is a being of reason (n11–14)

The First Conclusion: Beings of reason are made up by the intellect (n15)

The Second Conclusion: Beings of reason are made up by the reflexive act of the intellect (n16)

The Third Conclusion: Beings of reason are made up by the intellect only (n17)

An Exception: Impossible beings of reason are made up also by the imagination (n18)

Does God make up beings of reason? (n19–23)

The First View: God makes up beings of reason (n19)

The Second View: It is incompatible with God's perfection to make up beings of reason (n20–22)

The True View: God does not make up beings of reason but knows them (n23–24)

Do angels and the blessed in heaven make up beings of reason? (n25)

The Division of Beings of Reason (§3–6)

The Exclusivity of the Division (into Negation, Privation, and Relation) (§3)

Case For: the division is universally accepted and has its roots in Aristotle and Aquinas (n1)

Difficulties (n2)

A (preliminary) defence of this division (n3)

The difference between relation of reason and negation/privation (n5–7)

The difference between negation and privation (n8)

Is this division analogical or univocal? (n9)

The Exhaustiveness ('Sufficiency') of the Division (§4)

Difficulties (n1)

The first defence: the exclusion of beings of reason without a foundation (n2–6)

Reply to the initial difficulties with the exhaustiveness (n7–9)

The second defence: the inclusion of beings of reason without a foundation under negation (n10)

Negation and Privation (Commonalities and Differences) (§5)

Comparison of negation and privation as they are in reality (n1–19)

Commonalities (n3–6)

Both consist in a 'removal' (n3)

Both are based on reality (n3)

Both have a foundation in the thing to which they are attributed (n4)

Both can be attributed to a thing without the fiction of the intellect (n5–6)

Differences (n7–19)

- Varieties of privation (n8–9)

- Privation admits of degrees of more or less (n10)

- Negation might be necessary to the subject (n11)

- Negation lacks the ‘middle’ (n12–14)

- Privation belongs to real entities only (n15)

- Privation is counted among the principles of natural change (n17–18)

- Is there a reversal of privation? (n19)

Comparison of negation and privation as they are beings of reason (n20–27)

- Privation is similar to quality (n20–22)

- What category is negation similar to? (n23)

- Privation is always conceived as *in* something (n24)

Various questions (n25–27)

Relation of Reason (s6)

- What is a relation of reason? (n1–2)

- Varieties of relations of reason (n3–8)

- Second intentions (n9–11)

- Three sorts of relations of reason correspond to three operations of the intellect

- Why second intentions are called ‘second’ (n10–11)

Suárez and the Natural Law

Paul Pace, S.J.

1 Introduction

I believe that Francisco Suárez can make an extremely important contribution to the current debate on natural law, and that his extensive reflection on this topic can shed much light on the matter. In spite of writing in a world that was so very different from our own, and in a style that often looks inaccessible to the contemporary reader, his reflections, and especially his conclusions, appear eminently relevant to the twenty-first-century mind.

Yet his thought on the Natural Law is barely known, and any bibliographical search will yield only very meagre results. This is a real misfortune he shares with his contemporary theologians of sixteenth-century Spain, whose prolific response to the challenges that the New World was offering is hardly ever mentioned in contemporary discussions on Natural Law.

There are three main factors that explain this lacuna. First, the enormous output that sixteenth-century Spain produced in barely a century is impressive on many counts, and it will take a long time for anyone to become familiar with this whole corpus. Second, the fact that all these authors wrote in Latin, and that most of their books exist only in the original editions or in nineteenth-century editions, available only in very specialized libraries, render them even more remote. And third, Suárez's style may seem often impenetrable to those who approach him for the first time.

2 The Theory

In his treatise *De legibus ac Deo legislatore*, first published in 1612, Suárez dedicates Book 2 entirely to the natural law.¹ The fruit of long years of reflection, wide reading, and ample teaching on the topic, this long discussion presents

¹ The edition of *De Legibus* (hereafter *De leg.*) we will be using here will be that found in Luciano Pereña et al., eds., *Corpus Hispanorum de Pace* (hereafter *CHP*), vols. 13–14 (Madrid, 1971, 1974). This forms part of a critical edition of the first four books of *De leg.*, with an accompanying Spanish translation and copious introductions.

an internally logically consistent 'system' with some surprisingly 'modern' conclusions.

Suárez meticulously discusses the usual issues raised by authors at the time, including the nature of the law, its content, and the question of whether it can change or not. He insists that it is a divine law, and as such is absolutely immutable, so that not even God can dispense from any of its demands. Here he obviously parts company from Aquinas and his main commentators, who were ready to admit change in the third-level precepts. He adds that since the Natural Law is tied to the human rational nature, not even God can change its precepts; he cannot dispense from them, nor apply *epikeia* to depart from their demands.

In the worst possible *ius*-naturalist mode, this would seem to be a vision of the natural law that is wholly inflexible. Yet Suárez surprises his readers by noting that the third-level precepts, where the natural law is mostly exercised, are known to us only imperfectly, being nothing more than approximate formulations, incomplete and inadequate. Thus, while he insists that natural law principles are absolutely immutable once discovered, Suárez points out that our positive formulations are necessarily imprecise, so that he urges us to refine our formulation of these precepts in a process of continuing reflection on our moral experience.

3 The Context

The more we learn about Spain in the sixteenth century, the more we understand the turmoil this country went through in a relatively short period of time.² Suárez was born in 1548 in Granada, located in Southern Spain, and by the time of his death in Coimbra in 1617, not only had he become one of the most outstanding theologians of his time, but his country, like the majority of Europe, had become a completely different place.³

Sixteenth-century Spain was a cauldron of change on many levels. Suárez was born in a country that had been under one monarchy for less than a

2 For a discussion of sixteenth-century Spain, see J.H. Elliott, *Spain and its World, 1500–1700* (New Haven, 1989); Henry Kamen, *Spain, 1469–1714: A Society in Conflict*, 3rd edn. (New York, 2005); *The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision* (New Haven, 1999); Helen Rawlings, *Church, Religion and Society in Early Modern Spain* (Basingtoke, 2002).

3 John P. Doyle, "Francisco Suárez, His Life, His Works, His Doctrine, and Some of His Influence," in *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548–1617)*, ed. Victor M. Salas (Leuven, 2011), pp. 1–20.

century, and was not yet a united country; it had 'discovered' and colonized a huge part of what we call Latin America, and this generated many political, social, and economic repercussions. Suárez follows in the long line of truly exceptional theologians, beginning with Francisco de Vitoria, who grappled with the questions raised by this totally new situation.

Francisco de Vitoria is best known for his *relecciones*, in which he dealt squarely with the ethical and political issues raised by the discovery and conquest of the New World by the Spanish crown. These included: what were the valid titles for such an action, did non-Christians have rights—especially the right to possess and to follow their own religion—are all human beings equal, and if so, on what basis?⁴ Yet, Vitoria marked the development of theology in Spain through another, possibly longer-lasting contribution: he introduced in the University of Salamanca, the most prestigious university in Spain at that time, the *Summa* of Aquinas as the textbook for teaching theology, which came to replace the Lombard's Book of *Sentences*; he himself had experienced this change during his formative years in the university of Paris under John Crockaert. This profound revival of theological thinking, initiated by Vitoria at Salamanca, was continued by his successors Domingo de Soto and Melchior Cano, who were followed by other original theologians like Luis de Molina, Gabriel Vázquez, and Domingo Báñez.⁵ In many ways, Francisco Suárez can be seen as the climax of this remarkable moment in Spanish and European theology, not only in a chronological sense, but also as its supreme representative and its most prolific writer.

These authors faced a world that was going through profound turbulence and an accelerated process of deep change: the unity of the Church and the unity of the Empire, which had so characterised the Medieval times, had come to an end with the Protestant Reformation and the rise of nation states. Furthermore, the world Europe had known had 'expanded' beyond recognition in a couple of generations, with the arrival of Europeans in the New World and the circumnavigation of Africa. This new scenario also expanded markets, and transatlantic commerce gave rise to new, unforeseen situations that called for new answers: usury (lending money at an interest), universally held as immoral since at least Aristotle, now started appearing more acceptable, given the long intervals between lending and repayment and the great risks involved;

4 Francisco de Vitoria, *Political Writings*, ed. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge, 1991); Jesús Cordero Pando, ed., *Relectio de potestate civili, Estudio sobre su filosofía política* (Madrid, 2008).

5 Cf. Melquiades Andrés Martín, *La teología española en el siglo XVI* (Madrid, 1977); Juan Belda Plans, *La escuela de Salamanca y la renovación de la teología en el siglo XVI* (Madrid, 2000).

these were times of scarcity and high price rises, so that the issue of what is a just price was vital, as was the Christian's obligation to help the poor.

Wars were ravaging Europe, leading Catholic and Protestant kings and princes into strange alliances, and raising serious ethical questions about the morality of starting and waging war. Many were ruled by princes who were of a different religious affiliation, 'heretics' in the confrontational language of that time, which also led to questions such as: were Catholics obliged to obey their Protestant prince, and vice versa?

In these turbulent times, Spain produced geniuses in many areas of human endeavour, from philosophy to literature to spirituality, and no less in theology. Theologians participated in and contributed significantly to this outburst of life and creativity that was transforming Europe, and produced some of the finest theological works as they wrestled with these new problems. This movement was certainly influenced by the increase in the number of universities and by the challenge of humanism to the traditional theological method, as well as by the appearance of the Jesuits and their network of schools and colleges throughout Europe. Kings and Popes sought their advice on many specific problems, and their answers showed their familiarity with the practices of those whose morality they were judging.

In this great explosion of vitality and creativity, Suárez occupies a special place as the movement's supreme representative, as one who best bridges the old and the new. Besides the extraordinary scope and volume of his work, Suárez's use of the *auctoritates* is so extensive that it shows he was better read than any of his contemporaries.

There is no doubt that Suárez was exposed to many of the major intellectual movements of his time, as he studied philosophy and theology at the University of Salamanca under Mancio de Corpus Christi, a disciple of Francisco de Vitoria. Besides Thomism and the *Summa*, at Salamanca Suárez also encountered Nominalism, which had a great influence on his thinking, and which contributed in no small manner to his theories about the natural law (besides costing him the unjustified accusation of being a voluntarist in his understanding of law). His frequent references to many Nominalist authors clearly shows his familiarity with their thought, and the influence they wielded on certain aspects of it.

Within this increasingly complex and pluralist context, the theory of the natural law seemed to offer our author the common ground that would enable him to found his answers to the many new questions his generation encountered. His reflection on this issue spanned at least three decades of his intellectual life, so that the presentation we find in *De legibus* (1612), barely five years before his death, is the culmination of a lifelong process.

4 The Development of His Thought⁶

Suárez lectured on law twice in his long university career, first in his early years as a young professor at the prestigious Roman College in 1582, and then in the years of his maturity in Coimbra, between 1601 and 1603. Luckily these lecture notes—most probably dictated by Suárez himself, as was the custom at that time—have been preserved,⁷ so that we can follow and appreciate the development of Suárez's thought.

Suárez arrived at the Roman College in 1580, and lectured on law two years later, in 1582. As was the custom of most university teaching on theology at that time, his lectures consisted mostly of commentaries on the *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas, in this case on *ST* I, q. 2, a. 90; he followed its sequence quite faithfully in the way he organized his lectures, though he still tried to be original within his limitations.

In fact, these few pages are little more than lecture notes whose main value lies in allowing us to see the development of the author's later thinking. One main difference lies in the fact that Suárez had not yet come in contact with the theories of his future Jesuit colleague-cum-adversary, Gabriel Vázquez, an author whose ideas he analyses in great detail and length in the second book of *De legibus*.

Many years later, during the academic years of 1601–1603, Suárez lectured on his treatise *De legibus* at the request of the Rector of the University of Coimbra, Alfonso Furtado de Mendoza. Suárez himself acknowledges that these lectures served as the blueprint for his final work. Currently, they are preserved in two manuscripts, kept respectively in the Library of Coimbra University and in the Lisbon National Archives.⁸

The text of these lectures marks a qualitative development from the text of the lectures from 1582. The text is much longer, the breadth of questions dealt with is much wider, and the authors quoted are significantly more numerous. The most striking difference, however, lies in the method Suárez employed: it is no longer merely a slavish commentary on a few *quaestiones* of the *Summa*, but the systematic presentation of his own thought on the subject of laws.

6 For a more detailed account of this section and the rest of the middle parts of this chapter, cf. Paul Pace, "Immutable yet Inadequately Formulated: The Natural Law in Francisco Suárez (1548–1617)," *Studia Moralia* 45 (2007): 217–255.

7 Some relevant parts of these manuscripts have been published in the different volumes of *CHP* according to the corresponding part of *De legibus*.

8 The two manuscripts are practically identical, and the few differences can be attributed to the carelessness of the amanuensis of the Lisbon manuscript and to his poor knowledge of Latin.

Feeling himself sufficiently mature to emancipate himself from Aquinas, Suárez is finally free to devote himself to more recent questions, as well. These were particularly the questions raised by the Nominalism of Ockham and his followers, and by the ‘essentialist’ reaction it produced. There is no doubt that by this point his thought had gained in logical consistency and depth, and that his answers are more complete and expounded more systematically. However, even more significant than this are the changes in his thought, especially his exclusion of any possibility of dispensing from the precepts of the natural law, an issue we will examine in great detail later on.

5 The Definitive Text: *De legibus ac Deo legislatore* (1612)

The death of Gabriel Vázquez in 1604 and the publication of his works in Alcalá provided Suárez with the opportunity to develop his thought on the natural law more freely, for he was now released from the Jesuit General’s prohibition forbidding the two theologians from mentioning or attacking one another. Thus, he could now construct his chapter on the nature of the natural law (Chapter 5) around a refutation of Vázquez. Meanwhile, Suárez continued to build up his private library of six hundred and fifty volumes, and the number of juridical texts he acquired between 1603 and 1608 is indeed remarkable, as is obvious by his very abundant use of sources.⁹

6 What is the Natural Law?

When Suárez approaches the topic of the nature of the natural law, he does so in critical dialogue with the most important theories existing in his time. These placed the natural law either in human rational nature or in God’s will, with Aquinas and Ockham as the supreme representatives of these two contrasting visions. Suárez clearly embraces the first and refutes the second. Yet, in spite of this clear preference, Nominalism certainly had an important influence on Suárez: to the traditional definition of the natural law as the *recta ratio*, Suárez adds a specific act of the divine will that imposes an obligation.

Suárez constructs his position in a critical dialogue with Vázquez, who, radicalizing Aquinas, insisted that the natural law in humans is identical with our rational nature.

9 Two appendices in vol. 11 of the *CHP* (167–183) list the books held in Suárez’s library at Coimbra, a list that runs to more than 650 volumes.

The controversy had its origin in the different conceptions the two Jesuits had of the nature of law in general, namely, whether it was only an act of the intellect or whether it included an act of the will. Vázquez held that law is *actus intellectus supposito actu voluntatis*, a definition he applies to all classes of law except the natural law; the natural law, in contrast, indicates of itself what is intrinsically good or intrinsically bad. Accordingly, an action is good if it conforms to human rational nature. Since Vázquez held that he could identify the natural law with human rational nature, he saw no need for any particular legislative act on God's part. In fact, he argued, the expression 'natural law' is inexact, for one cannot in all rigour speak of it as a 'law', but rather as human rational nature.

Suárez, who had adamantly claimed that essentially all law is an *actus voluntatis*,¹⁰ and who had excluded no law from this definition, could never agree with Vázquez, and this difference provided him with the opportunity of putting forward his own theory.

He has no problem with Vázquez's position that the intrinsic goodness or malice of actions is based on their being commanded or prohibited by the natural law, but he insists that this premise does not justify identifying the natural law with human rational nature.¹¹ Not only is this explanation unique to Vázquez, but it is clearly based on an imprecise understanding of the concept of rational nature. Human nature considered strictly in itself has none of the effects that are attributable to law: it does not of itself order, nor does it indicate malice or goodness, so that, unless we use the term 'law' in a purely metaphorical sense, we cannot call rational nature a law.¹²

Suárez claims that the error in Vázquez's position lies in confusing the natural law with its foundation: not everything that is the ground of a certain prohibition or order can be called law. The poverty of a beggar and the richness of

10 This phrase has earned Suárez the label of voluntarist, even by eminent authors like Finnis and Mahoney. Yet, Suárez repeatedly stresses that law is also an act of the intellect: "...*legem mentalem in ipso legislatore esse actum voluntatis iustae et rectae*" (*De leg.*, 1.5.24, *CHP*, vol. 11, p. 99). It seems that these interpretations stem from a partial reading, which disregards the Nominalist influences to which he was exposed during his formation, and with whose major exponents he shows to be very familiar.

11 *De leg.*, 2.5.5 (*CHP*, vol. 13, p. 63): "In hac sententia veram esse existimo doctrinam quam in fundamento supponit de intrinseca honestate vel malitia actuum, qua sub legem naturalem prohibentem vel praecipientem cadunt, ut in discursu capituli declarabo. Nihilominus sententia ipsa quatenus ad legem naturalem declarandam pertinet, et modus loquendi de illa mihi non probatur."

12 *Ibid.*

a donor are the foundation of the latter's obligation to give alms, yet it would be absurd to say that the beggar's penury is identical with the law of almsgiving (*De leg.*, 1.5.6).

Claiming then to perform what Vázquez did not succeed in doing himself, Suárez proceeds to distinguish two aspects of the expression 'rational nature': the first is rational nature in itself, as the foundation of the conformity of human actions with itself. The second aspect is the faculty of human nature that discerns between acts that conform to this nature and those that do not, i.e., the *ratio naturalis*. While the former is only the foundation of the natural law, the human *ratio* can be called the natural law itself, for it commands the human will what it should or should not do.¹³

Suárez then puts forward his own position: the natural law is the natural judgement of right reason. This order is discovered in the human conscience, and it is to this that St. Paul refers when he speaks of the pagans whose very nature assumes the function of law: "*Ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis, testimonio reddente illis conscientia ipsorum*" (Rom 2:14–15). This is also, for Suárez, the position of Aquinas in *ST* II-I, q. 91, a. 2, where he quotes Psalm 4:6–7, "*Quis ostendit nobis bona? Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui Domine,*" to define the natural law as our rational participation in the eternal law.¹⁴ Suárez practically repeats the same definition, though with a very important comment: he adds that the one who follows the demands of one's own *ratio* is a law unto oneself, for it is law written in oneself, through the judgement of one's rational nature.¹⁵

Had Suárez stopped here, he would be open to the charge he brings against Vázquez, namely, that of somehow breaking the link between the divine and the natural law. True to his general definition of law as *actus voluntatis*, Suárez dedicates a whole chapter (*De leg.*, 2.6) to answer the question of

13 *De leg.*, 2.5.9 (*CHP*, vol. 13, p. 66): "Est ergo secunda sententia, quae in natura rationali duo distinguit: unum est natura ipsa, quatenus est veluti fundamentum convenientiae vel disconvenientiae actionum humanarum ad ipsam; aliud est vis quaedam illius naturae, quam habet ad discernendum inter operationes convenientes et disconvenientes illi naturae, quam rationem naturalem appellamus. Priori modo dicitur haec natura est fundamentum honestatis naturalis. Posteriori modo dicitur lex ipsa naturalis, quae humanae voluntati praecipit vel prohibet quod agendum est ex naturali iure."

14 "Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura."

15 *De leg.*, 2.5.10 (*CHP*, vol. 13, p. 68): "Hoc ergo dictamen [rationis] est lex naturalis ac ratione illius dicitur homo qui illo ducitur esse sibi lex, quis in se habet scriptam legem medio dictamine naturalis rationis.... Illud ergo est lex naturalis, quia haec non est nisi quaedam participatio naturalis aeternae legis." Not exactly a voluntarist definition!

whether one can consistently say that the natural law is both the judgement of the human *recta ratio* and an act of God's will. He disagrees with those who, like Gregory of Rimini, held that the natural law is an act of God the creator and not the legislator, which he argues is an indicative and not a prescriptive statement (*De leg.*, 2.6.1–3); nevertheless, he also disagrees with the extreme voluntarism of Ockham, who grounds the natural law exclusively in God's will and not in human rational nature, so that the whole natural law is no more than a series of God-given precepts, which God can change or abolish at will (*De leg.*, 2.6.4).

Steering away from these extreme theories he tries to propose a middle way, which he claims to be also the position of Aquinas and of the majority of the theologians. According to this theory, the natural law is not only indicative of what is good and evil, but is also prescriptive or prohibitive.¹⁶ It is not just a mere indication but a law that creates a true obligation as a result of an act of the divine will, though this very act does not constitute the whole ground of the goodness or malice of what is required or prohibited. It presupposes an intrinsic honesty or malice in the acts themselves, to which it adds a special obligation of the divine law.¹⁷ Thus, Suárez can conclude that the natural law is truly a divine law, whose lawgiver is God Himself.¹⁸

This saves law from arbitrariness, as there is an objective standard by which we can judge the validity of human actions. On the one hand, it is a law that is founded on God, the author of the eternal law, who is goodness and justice Himself. On the other hand, though, it is a law that we can—and in fact do—discover, through a God-given faculty. The person thus becomes the law unto itself, a law that, like the eternal law, we participate in, hence it is no result of an arbitrary whim but rather of the rational search for what is compatible or incompatible with one's humanity. Finally, it is a law that is accessible to all, even to those who do not possess the gift of faith.¹⁹

16 Ibid., 2.6.5 (*CHP*, vol. 13, p. 84): "Dico ergo primo Lex naturalis non tantum est indicativa mali et boni sed etiam continet propriam prohibitionem mali et praeceptionem boni."

17 Ibid., 2.6.11 (*CHP*, vol. 13, p. 92): "Dico secundo: Haec Dei voluntas, prohibitio aut praeceptio non est tota ratio bonitatis et malitiae quae est in observatione vel transgressione legis naturalis, sed supponit in ipsis actibus necessariam quamdam honestatem vel turpitudinem et illis adiungit specialem legis divinae obligationem."

18 Ibid., 2.6.13 (*CHP*, vol. 13, p. 95): "Ex dictis ergo concludo et dico tertio legem naturalem esse veram ac propriam legem divinam, cuius legislator est Deus."

19 For further discussion on this point, on the relationship between the precepts of the natural law and those of the New Law of the Gospel, cf. Paul Pace, "Immutable yet Inadequately Formulated," *Studia Moralia* 45 (2007): pp. 252–253.

7 The Precepts of the Natural Law

This review of what Suárez meant by natural law will be of little practical value unless we try to answer the vexed question of what are its concrete demands. Here Nominalism's insistence on the importance of individual action is obvious, for a criterion that claims to erect itself as a higher law will be quite ineffectual were it to remain at the level of general principles.

Suárez speaks at length on the content of the natural law and on how to discover and formulate its precepts, an aspect of Suárez's thought that needs to be further studied. He takes up the discussion in Chapter 7 of Book 2.

Certain authors had expressed doubts about whether all that is good in itself belongs to the natural law, or whether the natural law includes only such general principles as 'Do good and avoid evil', or 'Do to others what you would like done to you'. Suárez holds that the natural law includes all those precepts or moral principles that are so evidently necessary for moral goodness that their contrary would manifestly imply a moral disorder.²⁰

Here Suárez refers to his classical theory of the three classes of natural precepts, which he had first formulated in his lectures at the Roman College, developing it at greater length to draw some very relevant conclusions. On the first level there are the first principles, which are evident to all. These include: 'Do good', 'Avoid evil', 'Do not do to others what you do not want done to you'. The second-order precepts are somewhat more specific, and include laws such as: 'Observe justice', 'Worship God', 'Live temperately'. These first two orders of precepts are, according to Suárez, self-evident, and there is no doubt that they belong to the natural law.

The final group of natural law precepts contains laws that can be derived from the first two orders of principles; they cannot in any way be called self-evident, and though many of these precepts can normally be known without difficulty, there are others that can only be arrived at after a long process of reasoning. That fornication is intrinsically evil, that usury is unjust, or that a lie can never be justified are examples of precepts that are not so easily accessible to all.²¹ Since the last order is a set of conclusions derived from the first

20 *De leg.*, 2.7.4 (*CHP*, vol. 13, p. 113): "Nihilominus dicendum est ius naturale complecti omnia praecepta seu principia moralia, quae evidentem habent honestatem necessariam ad rectitudinem morum, ita ut opposita moralem inordinationem seu malitiam evidenter contineant."

21 *Ibid.*, 2.7.5 (*CHP*, vol. 13, pp. 115–116): "In tertio ordine ponimus conclusiones quae per evidentemiliationem ex principiis naturalibus inferuntur et non nisi per discursum cognosci possunt. Inter quas quaedam facilius et pluribus cognoscuntur, ut adulterium,

principles, one can conclude that even they form part of the natural law, for the truth contained in a principle is also present in its conclusion.

Here Suárez makes a very insightful ‘common-sense’ affirmation: while all three orders of precepts belong to the natural law, and the first two are practically self-evident, the natural law is put into practice (*exercetur*) more in the third order of immediate conclusions than in the universal principles. Since law is an immediate rule of conduct, the general self-evident principles can be considered laws only to the extent they are applied to concrete situations by other, more proximate principles.²²

Suárez believes that if we want to be relevant and concrete, we must not be content with the general, self-evident principles, but must direct our attention to the more proximate conclusions; nevertheless, their very proximity to concrete action also makes them less likely to be universally accepted.

Suárez does not directly explain the process whereby our human *ratio* arrives at this third level of precepts from the more universal principles of the first two orders. I propose that the best way to arrive at this is by studying the dynamic relationship that exists between three important elements in his doctrine of the natural law: the absolute immutability of all the precepts of the natural law; the imprecise formulation of these precepts; and the important consequences that the change of the object and of the circumstances have for his general theory.

8 The Immutability of the Natural Law

Here we encounter a significant shift from Suárez’s earlier positions. In his Roman lectures, Suárez follows Aquinas closely, claiming that the natural law is immutable, but not in the more remote conclusions derived from its first principles, which are generalizations that can be found not to apply in certain situations, so that God can dispense from them.

Already in his Coimbra lectures, however, he begins to realize that Aquinas’s position lacks logical consistency, and therefore changes his stance to consider even the third order of precepts to be absolutely immutable.²³ In *De legibus* his

furtum et similia, prava ease. Aliae maiori indigent discursu et non facile omnibus notae, ut fornicationem esse intrinsice malam, usuram esse iniustam, mendacium numquam posse honestari et similia.”

22 Ibid., 2.7.7 (*CHP*, vol. 13, p. 117): “Immo si proprie loquamur, magis exercetur lex naturalis in his principiis vel conclusionibus proximis, quam in illis principiis universalibus; quia lex est proxima regula operationis.”

23 *CHP*, vol. 13, pp. 69–72.

position is basically identical with that of the Coimbra lectures, though presented in a more elaborate and complete manner. His basic tenet is that strictly speaking, the natural law can neither cease to exist nor undergo change, neither in general nor in particular.²⁴

True to his scholastic world view, Suárez bases this affirmation on the correspondence between the order of being and the moral law. The natural law is the participation of the human *ratio* in the eternal law, and since neither the human *ratio* nor the eternal will of God for the world can ever undergo any change, neither the natural law nor its precepts can ever change. If we consider the natural law either in humans or in God, the conclusions we arrive at are identical. Insofar as it exists in man, the natural law cannot change, for it constitutes an essential property that flows directly from human nature, in such a way that any change in the natural law would only be possible if human nature itself were to change or cease to exist as it is—a conclusion that, within scholastic metaphysics, would be an absurdity. Considered as it exists in God, the natural law obviously cannot change or cease to exist, neither in God's intellect nor in his will: God can never cease to order what is good in itself and prohibit what is in itself evil.²⁵

We come to the same conclusion if we consider the nature of the precepts themselves: these are either self-evident principles or necessary conclusions derived from them, so that they are all endowed with necessary and eternal truth. We would be contradicting ourselves were we to say that the first principles necessarily possess a truth that may be lacking from their conclusions.²⁶

Furthermore, this is true of both the negative and the positive precepts. Negative precepts prohibit what is intrinsically evil, so that they oblige without any exception—*semper et pro semper*. Affirmative principles, on the other hand, oblige always but not all the time—*semper non tamen pro semper*. Yet,

24 *De leg.*, 2.13.2 (*CHP*, vol. 14, p. 4): “Dico igitur proprie loquendo legem naturalem per seipsam desinere non posse vel mutari, neque in universali neque in particulari, manente natura rationali cum usu rationis et libertatis.”

25 *Ibid.*, 2.13.2 (*CHP*, vol. 14, p. 5): “Prout est in homine mutari non potest, quia est intrinseca proprietas necessario fluens ex tali natura, qua talis est.Si vero consideratur haec lex ut est in Deo, supra ostensum est non posse auferri non solum a iudicio divini intellectus verum etiam neque a voluntate qua vult vel talia bona praecipere vel talia mala vitare.”

26 *Ibid.*, 2.13.3 (*CHP*, vol. 14, p. 6): “Complectitur enim hoc ius principia morum per se nota, et omnes ac solas conclusiones quae ex illis necessaria illatione inferuntur sive proxime sive per plures illationes. Omnia autem haec perpetuae veritatis sunt, quae veritas principiorum non subsistit sine veritate talium conclusionum, et principia ipsa ex terminis necessaria sunt.”

the fact that they oblige in some cases and not in others should not be taken to mean they can change, but rather that of their very nature they apply in those situations when the omission of the act they require would be essentially evil. When seen in this light, it is obvious that they cannot undergo change (*De leg.*, 2.13.4).

Earlier in Book 2, Suárez had argued that the natural law is not a quality that has its origin in the individual *ratio*, but in the specific human nature, which is the same in all.²⁷ The natural law is also one at all time and in every state of human nature,²⁸ including before and after original sin.

We will now elaborate on four general conclusions that our author draws from this starting point.

9 Permission and Human Dispensation

The first and most obvious conclusion is that the natural law can never be a *lex permissiva*, for as its object it has those acts that are evil in themselves. Since the natural law is of itself immutable, the possibility of ever permitting such actions does not exist.²⁹

Various eminent authors held that humans can sometimes dispense from or change the natural law through human law, except for those precepts that are self-evident. Here, they were referring to the Papal power of dispensing from vows and annulling marriages, so that their position was more than plausible.

Suárez, however, disagrees with this position, saying that such conclusions are the result of the inability to distinguish between the natural law on the one hand, and divine positive law and *ius gentium* on the other, where only the latter can permit exemptions. Suárez insists that no human authority, not even the Pope, can abrogate a true precept of the natural law, nor can it really limit or dispense from it.³⁰ First of all, natural law is based on human nature so that

27 *De leg.*, 2.8.5 (*CHP*, vol. 13, p. 130): "Secundo dicendum est hanc legem naturalem esse unam in omnibus hominibus at ubique.... Ratio est, quia haec lex est veluti proprietas consequens non rationem propriam alicuius individui, sed specificam naturam quae eadem est in omnibus."

28 *Ibid.*, 2.8.8 (*CHP*, vol. 13, p. 133): "Ultimo dicendum est hanc legem naturalem etiam esse unam in omni tempore et statu humanae naturae."

29 *Ibid.*, 2.12.1 (*CHP*, vol. 13, p. 179): "Unde fit ut neque propria permissio locum habeat in hoc iure, quia nihil quod de se malum sit permittit licite fieri, ut per se constat, quia hoc repugnat actioni intrinsece ac per se malae."

30 *Ibid.*, 2.14.8 (*CHP*, vol. 14, p. 24): "Nulla potestas humana, etiamsi pontificia sit, potest proprium aliquod praeceptum legis naturalis abrogare, nec illud proprie et in se minuire, neque in illo dispensare."

it is immutable. Second, the natural law is a divine law with God himself as the legislator, and no human authority can change any God-given law. Third, the natural law is the foundation of human law, so that if the latter could abrogate the natural law, civil law would be destroying itself. Finally, any human law that goes against the natural law loses by that very fact its claim to be called a law. Hence, God cannot grant the power to dispense from the natural law precepts to any human person, not even the Pope (*De leg.*, 2.14.9–10).

10 Dispensation by God Himself

If it is accepted that every human legislator can dispense from his own laws, this must be true *a fortiori* of God. In fact, this seems to have been the case in the Old Testament, where God ordered Abraham to offer him his own son (Gen. 22), Hosea to marry a prostitute (Hos. 1), and the Israelites to plunder the Egyptians before leaving Egypt (Ex. 12).

Suárez refers here to the distinction between the different orders of the natural law precepts: all agree that not even God can dispense from the first principles of the natural law, ‘Do good and avoid evil’, so that the controversy is concerned with the other two orders, and more specifically with the second order of principles (which Suárez here identifies with the commandments of the Decalogue), for very little is normally said of the third (*De leg.*, 2.15.2).³¹

Suárez discusses the various positions on this issue, both radical and moderate. He covers the extreme voluntarism of Ockham, who claimed that God could dispense from all natural law precepts, as well as discussing the more moderate positions of Scotus, Durandus, and John Mair, who distinguished between the different precepts God could dispense from.

Suárez then presents his own theory, which simply holds that the precepts of the Decalogue can never, under any circumstance whatsoever, be dispensed from, not even by God’s *potentia absoluta*.³² This is the position held by an impressive list of authors: Aquinas, Caietan, Soto, Vitoria, and Molina, among others. Aquinas argues (*ST* II-I, q. 100, a. 8) that since the commandments of the Decalogue are precepts that include an intrinsic principle of justice and obligation, they can never be dispensed from, for the obligation can never be separated from such precepts. Not even God can give a dispensation, for he would be going against his own justice.

³¹ *CHP*, vol. 14, p. 47.

³² *De leg.*, 2.15.16 (*CHP*, vol. 14, p. 60): “Est igitur quarta opinio, quae absolute et simpliciter docet haec praecepta decalogi esse indispensabilia etiam per potentiam Dei absolutam.”

This may seem to include a *petitio principii*: a precept cannot be dispensed from because it obliges absolutely. Suárez replies that there are two kinds of obligation, one proceeding directly from the law, as its immediate effect, and another that is born of an intrinsic relation between the object and the *recta ratio* (*De leg.*, 2.15.18).³³

In the article just quoted, Aquinas is speaking of the second type of obligation, so that the objection is not valid. The natural law does not create the goodness or malice of an act, but, within a teleological view of the world and of human activity, it prohibits or commands what of its very nature is a hindrance or a help towards our final end. In this perspective, the obligation can never be separated from the matter of the action, for it does not depend on any intrinsic act of the will that can be removed: it is an obligation somehow identical with the object, so that it cannot be withdrawn unless the object ceases to exist. That is why not even God, with his *potestas absoluta*, can grant a dispensation from any precept of the natural law.

At the end of this chapter, Suárez returns to the same question, this time, however, referring to the third-order precepts of the natural law. Here the weight of the authority of those who say that such precepts can change or be dispensed from is overwhelming. Not only is this position supported by his august contemporaries Soto³⁴ and Medina,³⁵ but Aquinas himself says that the natural law can undergo change in some of its precepts.³⁶ Aquinas brings the example of not returning a dagger that has been borrowed when one knows the owner would use it to kill. This was the position Suárez had embraced in his Roman lectures. By the time he wrote his *De legibus*, however, his position had changed in order to be consistent with his general principle: thus, strictly speaking, God cannot dispense from *any* precept of the natural law.³⁷ Before discussing how he interprets Aquinas's affirmations on this issue, and how he himself explains the examples mentioned by these authors, let us look at the last of the four consequences of this theory, namely, the impossibility of *epikeia* in the case of the natural law precepts.

33 *CHP*, vol. 14, p. 62.

34 *De iustitia et iure* (Salamanca, 1556 = Madrid, 1968) 1.2.3, p. 116.

35 *Expositio in Primam Secundae Angelici Doctoris Divi Thomae Aquinatis* (Venice, 1580), quaest. 100, art. 2, ad 2, p. 534.

36 *ST* II-I, q. 95, a. 4: "Potest tamen [lex naturalis] immutari in aliquo particulari, et in paucioribus, propter aliquas speciales causas impediennes observantiam talium praeceptorum."

37 *De leg.*, 2.15.26 (*CHP*, vol. 14, p. 71): "Nihilominus dicendum est, proprie loquendo, non dispensare Deum in aliquo praecepto naturali."

11 *Epikeia*³⁸

Here the question is twofold. Is *epikeia* of the natural law possible? If it is, can it be practised only by God, or also by humans? The answer to the first question is affirmative among practically all the authors Suárez lists (*fere omnes auctores*), for the more we are removed from the first principles, the more urgent becomes the need to interpret the natural law through *epikeia*; without this possibility the natural law would easily become an unjust law.

Nevertheless, there is controversy among the authors regarding the second point: some say that only God, as the legislator, can exercise *epikeia* in the case of the natural law, while others extend this power to a human being, to the Pope or to someone else with similar authority (*De leg.*, II, c. 16, n. 2). For some authors, it is obvious that in a situation of necessity God would transfer this power also to humans.

Suárez, however, denies that *epikeia* is at all possible in the natural law, either by God or by humans. He invokes the same reasons he himself put forward to exclude all possibility of dispensation.³⁹ All the precepts of the natural law are necessary conclusions from self-evident principles, so that they are incompatible with *epikeia*, since compatibility would presuppose a lack of moral truth. Moreover, since the precepts of the natural law prohibit what is of itself evil, they can never be interpreted in such a way as to permit the performance of such evil acts.

To support this seemingly improbable thesis, Suárez, in his typical manner, draws some distinctions. For one, he notes that very often when we speak of *epikeia* we are actually referring to the wider concept of interpretation and not to correction of the law, which is what *epikeia* does in its strict sense (*De leg.*, 2.16.4).

Moreover, Suárez points out that the natural law can be considered either in itself or as it is formulated in positive laws (*De leg.*, 2.16.5). As regards the first kind of natural law precepts, dictated by the *recta ratio*, he insists that while many such precepts need further interpretation (*De leg.*, 2.16.6), they cannot be

38 For the notion of *epikeia* in Suárez, see G. VIRT, *Epikie—verantwortlicher Umgang mit Normen. Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zu Aristoteles, Thomas von Aquin und Franz Suárez* (Mainz, 1983), pp. 172–233.

39 *De leg.*, 2.16.3 (*CHP*, vol. 14, pp. 80–81): “Nihilominus esse potest tertia opinio, quae in priori puncto negat legem naturalem esse capacem epikiae, et consequenter tollit fundamentum posterioris dubii. Igitur primum illud fundamentum probari videtur ex dictis de dispensatione; nam qua ratione non potest in legem cadere dispensatio, eadem neque huiusmodi interpretatio.”

the object of *epikeia*, either by God or by man, for *epikeia* is a correction of the law. Neither can there be an exercise of *epikeia* that produces an exemption of the universal law in a particular case: a dictate of the *recta ratio* cannot be a mere declaration that can be found wanting in concrete cases, but it must, of its very nature, consider all the circumstances that render it truly universal and hence not needing *epikeia*.

Finally, Suárez proves the same thesis by induction. The positive precepts of the natural law apply *semper sed non pro semper*: insofar as they apply *semper* there can be no possibility of *epikeia*, for any change is, by definition, excluded; insofar as they apply *non pro semper*, we can say that the cases when they do oblige are determined either through positive law or through reason. In the former case, we would be speaking of *epikeia* of the positive law, and not of the natural law. If it is human reason that determines when a positive precept applies and when it does not, it is clearly not an exercise of *epikeia* but of a proper understanding of the precept. For instance, if our reason tells us that the obligation of brotherly correction does not exist in a particular case because there is no likelihood of its bearing fruit, we are not dealing with *epikeia* of the positive precept of brotherly correction, but it is rather our *recta ratio* that offers us a true interpretation of the precept (*De leg.*, 2.16.10).

The case of the negative precepts is even clearer, for they apply *semper et pro semper*, allowing no possibility for *epikeia* (*De leg.*, 2.16.11). Thus, in the case of the precepts of the natural law considered in itself, we can never speak of an exercise of *epikeia*.

However, this changes when the natural law is known through positive laws. Here we can speak of *epikeia*, but not *epikeia* of the natural law; rather, this is *epikeia* of the positive law, through which we can determine the true intention of the human legislator (*De leg.*, 2.16.16).⁴⁰ Suárez notes here that the aforementioned authors are referring to cases such as these when they say that *epikeia* is possible in the natural law. Since human laws are no more than generalizations that cannot embrace all possible situations, they always need to be applied to particular circumstances, which may sometimes demand an exception of the law through the exercise of *epikeia*. But, strictly speaking, this is only *epikeia* of the human positive law.

Such an idea of the natural law as absolutely immutable, from which not even God can dispense, seems to exhibit precisely that rigidity that has discredited the whole tradition because of its obvious remoteness from the complexity of real human life. Fortunately, our author soon moved further in his investigation, formulating a theory that, while maintaining a strict inner logic,

40 *CHP*, vol. 14, p. 97.

is surprisingly flexible and open. He achieves this by expounding on two complementary aspects of the immutability of the natural law, namely, the imprecision of any positive formulation of its precepts, and the development of the earlier insight of the change *ex parte obiecti*, which he inherits from the scholastic tradition.

12 The Inadequate Formulation of the Natural Law Precepts

The key to the dynamic relation between rigidity and flexibility in Suárez's formulation of the natural law lies in his tripartite division of the law's precepts. The real difficulties lie with the last order of precepts, the ones more difficult to identify, but which for Suárez are the truly crucial level. If we want to make meaningful progress in our search for a better understanding of natural law, we ought not to dwell excessively on what are the obvious universal principles, but face the issues raised by this last class of precepts.

In so doing, we have to keep in mind that the natural law, of its very nature, is not a positive law, so that the problems of getting to know its content loom larger the farther one moves away from the self-evident principles. Already in Book 1, Suárez speaks of the natural law as inscribed in the human heart, a heart that he describes as a 'living book' (*liber vivus*), unlike the positive law, which is inscribed in a *liber mortuus*.⁴¹

The same problem arises when Suárez comes to explain how, although the natural law is one among all men, certain societies have laws and customs that are contrary to it.⁴² His answer is that while the natural law is in itself (*quoad substantiam*) one among the whole of humankind, its knowledge (*quoad notitiam*) is not so universally complete. For if we consider the natural law *in actu primo*, it is identical with the very light of reason, so that it is the same in all. But it is also possible to consider it *in actu secundo*, as a concrete act of the intellect, or as a *habitus*. In this second sense, it is only the first universal principles that cannot be unknown, for the possibility of ignorance does exist in the case of the other, more particular precepts.⁴³ In fact, while ignorance of the

41 *De leg.*, 1.8.10 (*CHP*, vol. 11, p. 157): "Liber autem mortuus non potest dici esse sibi ipsi lex, quia non potest se per legem in ipso scriptam gubernare. Cor autem hominis est liber vivus in quo est lex naturae scripta, et ideo quatenus illa regitur, dicitur sibi ipsi esse lex."

42 Here (*De leg.*, 2.8.5, *CHP*, vol. 13, pp. 130–131) Suárez mentions the classical example mentioned by Caesar (*De Bello Gallico*, 6, c. 23) that among the Germans stealing was admitted.

43 *De leg.*, 2.8.6 (*CHP*, vol. 13, pp. 131–132): "Nam saltem quoad prima et universalissima principia ignorari non potest, quia sunt ex terminis notissima....Quoad alia vero particularia

first principles is practically impossible, the second order precepts, like the commandments of the Decalogue, can be ignored, with or without fault. It is also possible not to know those third-order principles without any fault of one's own, especially among uncultured people or when there is an old custom contrary to the natural law (*De leg.*, 2.8.7).

In the same Chapter 13 of Book 2 where he insists so scrupulously on the immutability of all the precepts of the natural law, Suárez draws our attention to the fact that when we say that the natural law is written in the human rational nature, we cannot at the same time expect the positive formulations of its precepts—whether written or spoken—to be much more than approximations. He refers to the example mentioned by Aquinas of not returning a borrowed weapon if one foresees that its lawful owner wants it back in order to harm another person unjustly. The traditional natural law precept in this case is simply ‘Return what has been borrowed’, so that we are dealing with an exception to a natural precept. But Suárez insists that the natural precept as found in the *recta ratio* is in fact much more nuanced: “Return what has been borrowed to the person who rightfully and reasonably demands it, unless some other reason, like the justifiable self-defence of the state or of oneself or of the innocent demands otherwise.”⁴⁴ It is an intuition to which he returns in the next paragraph, when he says that we often speak of these precepts as if they were formulated in absolute terms, and then allow the possibility of dispensations. Instead, he goes on to suggest, we should speak of formulations that do not express well enough the natural precept as it is in itself. Thus, we would not be speaking of dispensations but of a change in the circumstances that bring about a change in the precept's content, and hence in its demands. Viewed in this way, the natural law would not oblige us to return the weapon that has been borrowed, but on the contrary, would prohibit it.⁴⁵

praecepta ignorari potest; qua ignorantia supposita, potuerunt aliquae gentes introducere leges contrarias iuri naturae.”

- 44 Ibid., 2.13.6 (*CHP*, vol. 14, p. 10): “Unde ulterius considerandum est legem naturalem, cum per se non sit scripta in tabulis vel membranis, sed in mentibus, non semper dictari in mente illis verbis generalibus vel indefinitis quibus a nobis ore profertur vel scribitur, ut v.g. lex de reddendo deposito quatenus naturalis, non ita simpliciter et absolute in mente iudicatur, sed cum limitatione et circumspectione. Dictat enim ratio reddendum esse depositum iure et rationabiliter petenti vel nisi ratio defensionis iustae vel reipublicae vel propriae vel innocentis obstet. Communiter autem solet illa lex illis tantum verbis proferri.”
- 45 Ibid., 2.13.7 (*CHP*, vol. 14, p. 11): “Alia vero sunt quae ex parte materiae mutationes recipere possunt, et ideo limitationem vel quasi exceptionem admittant unde saepe loquimur de his praeceptis ac si essent proposita per absoluta verba sub quibus patiuntur exceptionem, quia non satis declarant ipsum praeceptum naturale prout in se est. Sic enim

He returns to the same idea in the chapter where he speaks of the possibility of *epikeia* in the natural law. Thus, he adds that many precepts of the natural law need lengthy explanations and interpretations to arrive at their true meaning, both when they are considered in themselves, and when they are expressed in positive laws.

Another way of looking at the same problem, Suárez continues, is to say that the natural law can demand an action only if it is good, and cannot prohibit anything that is not bad. However, the goodness or malice of human acts depends to a large extent on the circumstances and the concrete possibilities in which they are performed. All this leads to the same conclusion, namely, the need for serious interpretation of what we usually call the precepts of the natural law (*De leg.*, 2.16.6).⁴⁶

Suárez himself puts forward the example of the precept prohibiting homicide, which at first glance looks like a clear example of a natural law precept. However, experience tells us that what is not so evident is precisely what is meant here by the word 'homicide'. For example, the natural law does not prohibit homicide carried out in self-defence, or by a competent authority (*De leg.*, 2.16.6).

Thus, his position is much less rigid than it may seem at first glance: while not even God can dispense from natural law precepts, we are not really sure we know the exact content of these precepts, hence we need to give much more weight to the circumstances in establishing what the natural law actually is. For the judgement of the *recta ratio*, considered in itself and as a true practical norm, always includes particular circumstances, so that it can never be inadequate. Otherwise, such a judgement would not be true, and would therefore be neither necessary nor right, nor would it contain a natural precept.⁴⁷

13 Change *ex parte obiecti*

There are still, however, certain facts that Suárez's theory does not yet seem to explain satisfactorily. How can he reconcile the exceptions to the natural law

praeceptum in se spectatum nullam exceptionem patitur, quia ratio ipsa naturalis dictat hoc debere fieri tali vel tali modo et non aliter, vel concurrentibus talibus circumstantiis et non absque illis. Immo, interdum mutatis circumstantiis, non solum non obligat naturale praeceptum ad faciendum aliquid, v.g. ad reddendum depositum, sed etiam obligat ad non faciendum."

⁴⁶ *CHP*, vol. 14, pp. 82–83.

⁴⁷ *De leg.*, 2.16.9 (*CHP*, vol. 14, p. 87): "Dictamen rectae rationis secundum se spectatum et ut practice verum non fertur in universale, prout potest deficere, sed prout his circumstantiis

found in the Bible or admitted by the Church's practice and teaching (e.g., dispensation from vows, or from natural law impediments to marriage) with his repeated affirmations about the absolute immutability of the natural law?

While rejecting his predecessors' solutions, he develops an aspect of the scholastic tradition: all change, says Suárez, that cannot be attributed to our inexact knowledge of the natural law precepts ought to be posited in the object of the law and never in the law itself.⁴⁸ He develops this very meticulously in Chapters 13 to 16 of Book 2, the very chapters where he rejects all the theories that accept any change in the natural law.

In Chapter 13, confronted with the formidable authority of Aristotle and Aquinas, who admitted that the natural law precepts can change or admit exceptions *in paucioribus*, Suárez argues that this statement is based on an insufficiently rigorous use of the term 'change'. Accordingly, Suárez explains that any relation can change or cease to exist in one of two ways: either through intrinsic change, as when a father is no longer a father because he dies, or through extrinsic change, where the change occurs in the other partner, for instance, when a father is no longer a father because of the death of his son. Intrinsic change is only possible in positive law, since natural law, Suárez insists, can only undergo extrinsic change, i.e., when, through a change that occurs in an object, it no longer falls under the law. Thus, it is not the law that has ceased to oblige, but the object has been removed from under the law's domain.⁴⁹

In Chapter 15 Suárez speaks of dispensation by God Himself, the author of human nature, and distinguishes between God as the supreme legislator, as the supreme lord of all creation, and as supreme judge (*De leg.*, 2.15.19). It is only the legislator who can dispense from his own laws, but such an act would involve God in a contradiction. However, acting as supreme lord of all creation, God can change the object of the law so that the law no longer applies in that particular case. Strictly speaking, this would not be a dispensation, but rather an exercise of the divine lordship over all creation.⁵⁰

affectum, cum quibus numquam deficit. Alias non esset dictamen verum et consequenter nec necessarium, nec rectum, nec praeceptum naturale continens."

48 It is interesting to note that Aquinas himself presents this explanation (*ST* II-I, q. 94, a. 5, ad 2), but only after having said in the *corpus* of the same article that the natural law "potest immutari in aliquo particulari, et in paucioribus."

49 *De leg.*, 2.13.6 (*CHP*, vol. 14, p. 9) "In lege autem naturali immo sed solum secundo modo per mutationem materiae contingit, ut actio subtrahatur ab obligatione legis naturalis."

50 *De leg.*, 2.16.19 (*CHP*, v. 14, p. 63): "Nam si per dominium suum mutet humanum, hoc non erit dispensare sed tollere materiam legis, ut ex superioribus constat. Quoties ergo Deus facit licitum actum qui iure naturae videbatur prohibitus, numquam id facit ut purus legislator, sed utendo alia potestate; et ideo non dispensat."

Thus, Abraham was not dispensed from observing the fifth commandment when God ordered him to sacrifice Isaac: as the supreme lord of life and death, God decided to use Abraham as his instrument in the death of Isaac. Likewise, God did not dispense the Hebrews from the seventh commandment when he allowed them to plunder the Egyptians, but he either transferred the property of the Egyptians to the Hebrews as supreme lord of all creation, or, as supreme judge, he decreed they should be so compensated for their years of work in Egypt (*De leg.*, 2.15.20).

This change is not possible in all the commandments, however, since not even God can alter the object of certain natural law precepts. Such is the case, for example, with the first commandment prohibiting idolatry, or with the other two precepts of the first table of the Decalogue, whose object not even God himself can change (*De leg.*, 2.15.22–23).

In some cases, this change is also possible for human agents. A king can order one of his citizens not to help his father who is in grave need, in order that the citizen be used to defend his country. On the other hand, no human authority can grant to anyone, for instance, the right to marry an already married woman, which is something that God, according to Suárez, can do, and in fact did, as in the case of Hosea (*De leg.*, 2.15.21).

14 Conclusion

As Suárez would put it, at the end of this analytical part there seems little need to add much more. Yet it seems that the current discussion on natural law can certainly benefit from the input of Suárez's thought. To contemporary sensibilities, the tension in this tradition seems to be between the advantage of a rational basis for moral reasoning and the inflexibility associated with natural law. Thus, the universality of human rational nature has been the basis of innumerable claims of corresponding universally valid moral precepts, something modern sensibilities for human historicity find so unacceptable.

Writing precisely four centuries ago, Suárez shows that he was aware of this issue, and makes use of fine analytical skills and his encyclopedic knowledge to arrive at conclusions that contribute important insights to our present-day discussions.

From the self-evident primary rational law precepts, he can conclude that the human person can be called a 'law unto himself', for the natural law precept is written in the *liber vivus* that is the human heart. However, it is not enough to content ourselves with the obviously true first principles, for the real

challenge is to discover the third-level precepts, where the Natural Law is actually mostly put into practice.

This emphasis on the inadequate formulations of what we normally consider natural law precepts is also argued logically, and with very concrete examples. Furthermore, Suárez's interest in the challenges raised by the individual case gave him the more or less merited portrayal as being one of the fathers of casuistry, a method that seems to be regaining popularity in our radically pluralistic world.

Within the limitations of an age that was both innovative and shackled with a very effective censure apparatus, Suárez succeeds in bringing together certain strands already present in the tradition to support his conclusions on the inadequacy of the positive formulations of natural law precepts: among the most important of these features are the importance of each case's concrete circumstances, and the reality of an invincible ignorance of certain moral precepts.

Nevertheless, the limitations of his position are also obvious, especially the total absence of a historic dimension in his vision of human nature. He lacks the tools of modern biblical exegesis, so that his solution in terms of change *ex parte obiecti* is obviously inadequate.

And yet, it seems fair to claim that by isolating these shortcomings, the basis of his theory and its relevance still hold; the challenge not to be content with the first two levels of precepts, but to grapple with the concrete reality of each particular situation to arrive at the real natural law principle, is still a very valid one in our own times.

Original Features of Suárez's Thought¹

José Pereira

1 Introduction

Originality is not the first word that comes to mind for many scholars seeking to describe the achievement of the *Doctor eximius*. Such, for example, was the case with one of his illustrious fellow Jesuits, Gerard Manley Hopkins, one of the greatest poets of the Victorian era. In a letter to his friend Richard Dixon, Hopkins declared that “Suárez is our most famous theologian: he is a man of vast volume of mind, but without originality or brilliancy; he treats everything satisfactorily, but you never remember a phrase of his, the manner is nothing.”²

But this opinion is by no means the common view of the Extraordinary or Uncommon (*eximius*) Doctor. Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), inaugurator of the modern philosophy of history, extols Suárez's brilliancy and eloquence, asserting that the Doctor “in his *Metaphysics* discussed everything that could be known in philosophy in a distinguished manner as becomes a metaphysician, and in an extremely clear and easy style, as in fact he stands out by his incomparable eloquence.”³ Likewise, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), prominent contributor to the development of international law, was in awe with the acuity of the Doctor's thinking, contending that Suárez was a man “of such subtlety in philosophy, that he has seldom any equal.”⁴ Finally, for Christian Wolff

1 The only work of Suárez quoted in this essay is his *DM*, disputation, section, number (Vivès edition 1866, volume, page). Thus *DM* 7.2.3 = disputation 7: section 2: number 3. I was greatly assisted in understanding Suárez's complex thought by reading José Hellin, S.J., *La analogía del ser y el conocimiento de Dios en Suárez* (Madrid, 1947).

2 Gerard Manley Hopkins, “Letter to Richard Watson Dixon, December 1, 1881,” in Catherine Phillips, *Gerard Manley Hopkins, Selected Letters* (Oxford, 1990), p. 165.

3 Giambattista Vico, *Autobiografia*, ed. Mario Furbini, Einaudi Editore (1960), p. 7: “...ragionava di tutto lo scibile in filosofia in una maniera eminente, come a metafisico si conviene, e con uno stile sommamente chiaro e facile, come infatti egli vi spicca con una incomparabil facondia.”

4 Hugo Grotius, “Letter to Canon John Cordesius, October 15, 1633,” in *Epistolae quotquot reperiri potuerant* (Amsterdam, 1687), p. 118: “...in philosophia tantae subtilitatis, ut vix quemquam habeat parem.”

(1679–1754), rationalist thinker of the German Enlightenment who was thought by Kant to be the “greatest of all dogmatic philosophers,” Suárez was evidently considered the greatest of the scholastic philosophers, for “among the Scholastics [he] appears to have meditated the objects of metaphysics more profoundly.”⁵

2 Systematization of Metaphysics

But did the Uncommon Doctor accomplish any actual achievement that would justify these plaudits? Martin Heidegger, one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, thought that he did, observing the following:

It is Suarez who for the first time systematized medieval philosophy and above all ontology. Before him the Middle Ages, including Thomas and Duns Scotus, treated ancient thought only in commentaries.... The basic book of antiquity, Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, is not a coherent work, being without systematic structure. Suarez...tried to make up for this lack...by putting the ontological problems in a systematic form for the first time, a form which determined a classification of metaphysics that lasted through the subsequent centuries down to Hegel.⁶

Was the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle not a ‘coherent work,’ lacking in method? Speaking of this work, Suárez (who believed so) claimed:

Aristotle proposes various questions in Chapter 1, while in other Chapters he brings out reasons for doubting on both sides, but resolves nothing. Moreover, in proposing these questions he observes almost no method nor any certain order, but he seems to have poured them out as they came to his mind.⁷

Suárez, on the other hand, was uncompromising on method, declaring:

5 Christian Wolff, *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia* (1736), p. 138: “Sane Franciscus Suarez...inter Scholasticos res metaphysicas profundius meditatum esse constat.”

6 Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Translation, Introduction and Lexicon by Albert Hofstadter* (Bloomington, IN, 1982), p. 80.

7 Translation from John P. Doyle, *Francisco Suárez. A Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Milwaukee, WI, 2004), p. 21.

I have always considered that a great power to understand and to penetrate things is based upon inquiring and judging them by a fitting method, which [method] I could scarcely, or not even scarcely, observe, if in the manner of commentators, I were to treat all questions as they by the way and by chance occur in relation to the text of the Philosopher....⁸

Concern for method, moreover, was what prompted Suárez to drop the medieval habit of doing philosophy as a commentary on other men's thought.

Yet not all scholars believe that the structural coherence of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* "is as questionable as has often been made out."⁹ Laying bare the structures of both the *Metaphysics* and the *Disputationes metaphysicae* will speak for itself.

ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics*, 14 Books

Introduction to philosophy

1. Alpha. The theory of explanation (Wisdom)
2. Alpha the less. Remarks on philosophic procedures (Inquiry)
3. Beta. Typical problems in general philosophy (Impasses)

The province of philosophy

4. Gamma. Being and knowledge (The study of Being as Being)
5. Delta. Definition of terms (Things meant in more than one way)
6. Epsilon. First philosophy and irrelevant ways of Being (Primary and derivative kinds of being)

Being and becoming

7. Zeta. The search for primary being (Thinghood and form)
8. Eta. The unity of matter and form (Form and Being-at-work)
9. Theta. Powers and operations (potency and Being-at-work)
10. Iota. Unity and derivative concepts (wholeness)

⁸ Ibid., p. 53.

⁹ Hugh Lawson Tancred, *Aristotle Metaphysics. Translated with an Introduction* (London, 1998), p. xxxix.

Philosophical excerpts

11. Kappa. Repetitions and quotations (from *Metaphysics* and from *Physics*. Order)

Eternal being

12. Lambda. Divine Being (The cause of being)
13. Mu. Mathematical entities and the ideas (The being of intelligible things)
14. Nu. Numbers, ideas, and first principles (intelligible being and causes)¹⁰

The following is a clearer summation:

Books 1–3: on the historical background, the method to be followed, and the problems to be resolved.

Books 4–6: setting out the general nature of the subject, providing a budget of definitions of key terms, and dealing with an aspect of the subject that, though important, is secondary to our present interests.

Books 7–10: in which doctrine (or doctrines) of substance is (or are) presented, and two key supporting contrasts of potentiality-actuality and unity-diversity are explored.

Book 11: consisting of recapitulations of material from earlier books of the *Metaphysics* and from the *Physics* (book Kappa).

Finally, books 12–14: which deal with two major corollaries of the central position, one covering Aristotelian theology, and the other on the philosophy of mathematics in relation to the Theory of Forms.¹¹

Though the order is clear perhaps, it is still less than perfect, which is how this seminal work of metaphysics is characterized even by a scholar who believes in the work's coherence:

If the *Metaphysics* is a building, it is still covered in scaffolding, with gaps in its plaster and decoration and even with key structural elements

¹⁰ Cf. the following works for a discussion of the method in the *Metaphysics*: Richard Hope, trans., *Aristotle, Metaphysics* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1960). The above classification is chiefly that of Joe Sachs Hope, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Santa Fe, NM, 1999). His classifications are in parentheses.

¹¹ Hugh Lawson Tancred, *Aristotle Metaphysics. Translated with an Introduction* (London, 1998).

tottering insecurely on makeshift supports. But for all that, it is still more like a palace or a cathedral than the workshop or warehouse as which it has so often been treated.¹²

In Suárez's huge, two-volume work, the *Disputationes metaphysicae*, all his metaphysical speculation is reduced to a simple scheme:¹³ being as such (vol. 1), and particular beings (vol. 2), as uncreated and created being, and substance and accident. This material is organized into fifty-four disputations, twenty-seven in each volume, arranged in five sections. The entire work of over two thousand pages is reputed to contain 1.4 million words. Its consonance of literary form and logical structure exemplifies the author's architectonic sense and phenomenal erudition, with its reference to 245 authors and its 7,709 citations, including those from Aristotle (1,735) and Aquinas (1,008).

SUÁREZ, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, 2 volumes

Vol. 1. BEING AS SUCH (disputations 1–27)

1. Nature of metaphysics (1)
2. Essential significance of being (2)
3. Passions of being (3–11)
 - Unity vs. distinction (4–7)
 - Truth vs. falsehood (8–9)
 - Good vs. evil (10–11)
4. Causes of being (12–25)
 - Material (13–14)
 - Formal (15–16)

¹² Hugh Lawson Tancred, *op. cit.*, p. lii.

¹³ *DM* (ed. Vivès, vol. 25): "Ratio et discursus totius operis. Ad lectorem: Illud vero obiectum [metaphysicae] quodnam sit, explanat prima huius operis disputatio, simulque in ea praefatur dignitatem, utilitatem, et caetera quae in proemiis scientiarum scriptores pretermittere consueverunt. Deinde *in priori tomo* eiusdem obiecti amplissima et universalissima ratio, qua, videlicet appellatur ens, eiusque proprietates et causae diligenter expenduntur. Et in hac causarum contemplatione, latius quam fieri soleat immoratus sum, quod et perdifficilem illam, et ad omnem philosophiam et theologiam utilissimam esse existimaverim. *In tomo autem altero* inferiores eiusdem obiecti rationes prosecuti sumus, initio sumpto ab illa entis divisione in creatum et creatorem, utpote quae prior est, et entis quidditati vicinior, et ad huius doctrinae decursum aptior, qui subinde procedit per contentas sub his partitiones, ad usque genera omnia, et gradus entis, qui intra huius scientiae terminis seu limites continentur."

Efficient, including the First Cause, in its three operations: creation, conservation, cooperation (17–22)

Final (23–24)

Exemplary (25)

5. Comparison of causes (26–27)

To the effect (26)

Among themselves (27)

Vol. 2. DIVISIONS OF BEING (28–54)

1. Finite and infinite being (28)

2. Infinite being (29–30)

Whether it is (29)

What it is (30)

3. Finite being: as such (31)

4. Finite being's divisions: substance and accident (32–38)

Substance (33–36)

Accident (37–38)

5. Accident: nine predicaments (39–53)

Quality (40–41)

Quantity (42–46)

Relation (47)

Action (48)

Passion (49)

When (50)

Where (51)

Site (52)

Habit (53)

Supplement: being of reason (54)

The *Disputationes metaphysicae* is perhaps the most extensive metaphysical treatise ever written. It is also (excepting Aristotle's work) the first tract in the entire field of metaphysics that reflects the speculation of its own author, and not that of another thinker, in our case Aristotle.

Partial attempts had been made earlier to systematize metaphysics apart from commentary, such as the attempts made by the Dominican Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli (1488–1550), compiler of a compendium of philosophy, and by the Dominican Diego Mas (1553–1608), author of a "Metaphysical Disputation" on being and three transcendentals (unity, truth, and goodness). But these essays covered only a portion of the entire field of metaphysics, and when they did cover this field, they did not venture beyond the text of Aristotle,

which they interpreted through commentary. Completing what these Renaissance philosophers had begun, Suárez produced a work that embraced all of metaphysics, and was also free of commentary. With the *Disputationes*, the period of medieval philosophy ends and the modern era begins.

3 Creation of a Super-System

Besides being the first systematization of metaphysics, Suárez's is also the only scholastic system wherein a single author integrated his own methodically structured philosophy and theology into a single architectonic composite—which can be described as a 'super-system'—with the former being made the foundation of the latter. The three medieval titans—Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Scotus, otherwise known as the 'Big Three'—had orchestrated their theologies, and may have intended to methodize their philosophies too, but were prevented from doing so by the brevity of their lives, Bonaventure living to be only fifty-four, Aquinas forty-nine, and Scotus forty-two (Suárez, in contrast, lived to be sixty-nine). Thus, the task of composing uniform syntheses of their philosophies and theologies was left to the successors of the three titans, the Baroque super-system creators such as the Bonaventurian Marcus a Baudunio (c. 1606–1692, *Paradisus philosophicus*, 1654; *Paradisus theologicus*, 1661), the Thomist John of St. Thomas (1589–1644, *Cursus philosophicus thomisticus*, 1638; *Cursus theologicus thomisticus*, 1667), and the Scotist Joannes Poncius (1603–1673, *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, 1643; *Theologiae cursus integer ad mentem Scoti*, 1652). These successors were themselves men of genius, and did indeed produce works of high calibre, but they were not the creators of the three systems, and were furthermore conditioned by philosophical backgrounds and concerns often alien to the initiators of those systems.

Systematization was the preoccupation of Suárez, and likewise of the entire Baroque age. His *Opera Omnia* (published by Vivès, containing most, but not all, of his writings) is not a collection of random and heterogeneous essays, written in response to particular (and often unconnected) problems, but is made up of units of discourse organized in a complete system, each unit assigned its place in the total architectonic structure. The *Opera Omnia* has fourteen books, printed in twenty-six volumes, containing 4,212 sections and 22,365 pages, totalling in all, it is said, to twenty-one million words! Suárez is thus the author of what appears to be the most titanic enterprise undertaken by any single individual in the history of speculative thought.

In consequence of all this, one may argue that Suarezianism is scholasticism's definitive system. A system like Suárez's could only have arisen if there

was in existence an intellect of phenomenal erudition, capable of viewing, in a single lens, scholasticism's entire development (still evolving in medieval times), especially in its Augustinian, Bonaventurian, Thomist, Scotist, and Nominalist modalities; that intellect, in addition, would have to be endowed with the requisite dispassionateness to adjudicate on the School's many doctrines, appreciate their complex nuances, control their intricate detail, and harmonize their conflicting positions, while discerning a comprehensively simple structure beneath them, and while being the only intellect capable of surveying the problems and resources of two millennia of speculation: and if such an intellect was that of Francisco Suárez, the Uncommon Doctor, then Suarezianism can be said to be scholasticism's definitive system.

4 Being as a Unitary Dyad

What distinctive positions did the Uncommon Doctor hold? We shall not attempt to list them all here, but shall concentrate on his ideas on being (*ens*), a theme of supreme importance for his theology and philosophy—indeed, for all thought. He is particularly concerned with highlighting the unity of being.

Being encompasses the duality of essence and existence. Philosophers, however, tend to emphasize one or the other; Suárez, for his part, identifies being categorically and consistently with existence, and not with essence. But his is an existence inclusive of essence, so that Suarezianism can be described not just as 'existentialism,' but as 'existential integralism.' The following are some of the Doctor's frequent 'existential' statements:

- "Existence as existence corresponds to being as such, and pertains its intrinsic significance, either in potency or in act, depending on how one considers being" (*Existentia ut existentia correspondet enti ut sic, estque de intrinseca ratione eius, vel in potentia, vel in actu, prout sumptum fuerit ens*).¹⁴
- "being and existence are the same" (*esse enim et existere idem sunt*).¹⁵
- "being as being is described by existence, and has the significance of being either through existence, or by reference to existence" (*ens in quantum ens ab esse dictum est, et per esse vel per ordinem ad esse habet rationem entis*).¹⁶
- "every real entity is constituted in some real existence, since being is described through existence, and real being through real existence" (*omnis*

¹⁴ *DM* 50.12.15 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 969).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.4.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 88).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 224).

entitas realis constituitur aliquo esse reali, cum ens ab esse dicatur, et ens reale ab esse reali).¹⁷

- “existence is coterminous with being, since being is described through existence. Hence, just as being does not belong to any particular genus, but transcends all the predicaments, so too does existence” (*esse aequae patet ac ipsum ens, cum ens ab esse dictum sit; unde, sicut ens non pertinet ad certum genus, sed transcendit omnia praedicamenta, ita et esse*).¹⁸
- “[the act of existing] is so to speak formal in the concept of being” (*[actus essendi] est veluti formale in conceptu entis*).¹⁹

Existence for Suárez is trichotomous: actual, aptitudinal, and possible. It is described, respectively, by three terms: participial, nominal, and potential.

1. *Actual existence.* Being as a participle or participially considered (*ens ut participium vel participialiter sumptum*): it signifies “the act of existing, as exercised, and is the same as existing in reality” (*actum essendi, ut exercitum, estque idem quod existens actu*).²⁰
2. *Aptitudinal or precise existence.* Being as a noun or nominally considered (*ens ut nomen vel nominaliter sumptum*): it signifies, “in a formal sense, the essence of a thing which has or can have existence, and can be said to signify existence itself, not as actually exercised, but in potency or aptitude” (*[significat] de formali essentiam eius rei, quae habet vel potest habere esse, et potest dici significare ipsum esse, non ut exercitum actu, sed in potentia vel aptitudine*).²¹ Another term for aptitudinal existence is *essentia realis*.
3. *Possible or potential existence,* which also signifies “real being, insofar as it has real essence, contracted and determined not by anything positive, but by the privation of actual existence” (*reale ens, quantum ad realem essentiam, contractum et determinatum non per aliquod positivum, sed per privationem actualis existentiae*).²²

Of these three concepts, only the first two, the actual and the aptitudinal, are immediately signified by the term ‘being’ (the third concept is a compound of two notions, namely, existence + negation of its actual exercise).

¹⁷ Ibid., 31.4.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 235).

¹⁸ Ibid., 31.7.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 251).

¹⁹ Ibid., 2.2.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 75).

²⁰ Ibid., 2.4.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 88).

²¹ Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 88).

²² Ibid., 2.4.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 91).

In developing his ideas on being, Suárez adopts the following threefold methodology:

1. *The asymmetry between reality and the conceptual knowledge of it.* The manner in which the human mind knows reality does not correspond to the way reality exists in itself. The content of reality is too complex for the mind to grasp in a single concept, so it needs multiple concepts, which together can attain objective reality more adequately.²³ To act as if reality and the way of knowing it correspond exactly is to reify concepts, objectify conceptual distinctions, and so split reality into a composite of innumerable fictitious entities.²⁴ Suárez seeks to avoid the fallacy of reified concepts,²⁵ in order to resolve metaphysical problems by transferring their projected solutions from the extramental level to the intramental, from ontology to epistemology, which is where those problems arose in the first place.
2. *Difference-in-identity: real distinction, conceptual unity; conceptual distinction, real unity.* In accordance with the mind-reality asymmetry, real distinction can cohere with conceptual unity, and real unity with conceptual distinction.²⁶ Distinction rises from identity, and identity from distinction.

23 Ibid., 7.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 251): "At vero posterior distinctio rationis fit per conceptus inadaequatos eiusdem rei; nam, licet per utrumque eadem res concipiatur, per neutrum tamen exacte concipitur totum id quod est in re, neque exhaustitur tota quidditas et ratio obiectiva eius, quod saepe fit concipiendo rem illam per habitudinem ad res diversas, vel ad modum earum, et ideo talis distinctio semper habet fundamentum in re, formaliter autem dicitur fieri per conceptus inadaequatos eiusdem rei."

24 Ibid., 2.3.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 85): "...possunt ex subtilitate et modo concipiendi humani intellectus hi conceptus superiores et inferiores infinitis modis variari et multiplicari; signum ergo est, id non semper fundari in distinctione quae sit in rebus, sed in modo concipiendi nostro, supposito aliquo fundamento similitudinis, convenientiae, et eminentiae ipsarum rerum; aliquo oporteret fingere in unaquaque re infinitos modos ex natura rei distinctos, quibus in se plane constituatur, et ab aliis plene distinguatur."

25 Ibid., 2.3.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 86): "...cavendum est ne modum concipiendi nostrum transferamus ad res ipsas, et propter diversum loquendi modum existimemus esse distinctionem in rebus, ubi vere non est."

26 Ibid., 2.3.16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 87): "...si distinctio et convenientia sint diversorum ordinum, non repugnat in eodem fundari; sic enim una non involvit negationem alterius, imo quodammodo illam requirit. Ita vero est in praesenti; nam distinctio est realis, convenientia autem secundum rationem tantum, et ideo non repugnat ut duo simplicia, quae secundum rem sunt realiter primo diversa, secundum rationem habeant unitatem fundatam in reali similitudine vel convenientia, quam inter se habent."

3. *Conceptual focus: the expansion and contraction of the concept so as to cover its entire range.* This entails facilitating the fixing of attention on a being both broadly and narrowly: broadly on the basis of its similitude with other beings, and narrowly on the basis of the same being known in itself, in its particularity and singular character. Thus, being is both undivided and divided, though in concept and not reality.²⁷

Suárez applies this methodology to three notions distinctive of his thought:

1. The transcendental notion of being apart from its particulars—being as a unitary dyad;
2. The notion of being and its particulars—*expressior conceptus*;
3. Order among the particulars—analogy.

For Suárez, being has unity, but immanent in this unity is a duality whose members—that is, nominal and participial—are complementary and not contrastive. As the Uncommon Doctor categorically puts it, “being’ does not signify a concept common to being nominally and participially considered, but immediately has a double significance, whereby it signifies either being that prescinds from actual existence, or being existent in actual fact.”²⁸ In this way, the unity of being is emphasized at the expense of the contrastive duality of essence and existence.

Thus, being is both unitary and dichotomous, a ‘unitary dyad’ or ‘dyadic unity,’ so to speak. Though complementary to nominal being, participial (or existential) being has the preeminence, for “being first appears to signify a thing having real and actual existence, as the participle of the verb ‘to be,’ and

27 Ibid., 2.6.10 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 101): “...consistat in cognitione aliquo modo confusa, qua consideratur objectum, non distincte et determinate prout est in re, sed secundum aliquam similitudinem vel convenientiam quam cum aliis habet, quae convenientia in ordine ad conceptum entis est in rebus secundum totas entitates et modos reales earum, et ideo confusio seu praecisio talis conceptus non est per separationem praecisivam unius gradus ab alio, sed solum per cognitionem praecisivam conceptus confusi a distincto et determinato.”

28 Ibid., 2.4.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 90): “...illam duplicem acceptionem non significare duplicem rationem entis dividentem aliquam communem rationem, seu conceptum communem, sed significare conceptum entis magis vel minus praecisum. Ita ergo ens non significat conceptum communem enti nominaliter et participialiter sumpto, sed immediate habet duplicem significationem, qua significat vel ens praescindendo ab actuali existentia, vel ens actu existens.”

thence that word is in fact transferred to signify precisely that which has real essence"²⁹ (indicated by the nominal form of 'to be').

The discussion on being can be further clarified by another dichotomy of concepts, namely, *formal* concepts, which concern what we know of a thing (for example, a man), and *objective* concepts, which apply to the thing itself that we know (that is, the man himself). The objective concept is not really a concept, but is so described "by extrinsic denomination from the formal concept."³⁰ The formal concept, "insofar as it comes to be by us and in us, could be better known to experience" (*formalis [conceptus], quatenus a nobis et in nobis fit, videatur posse experientia notior*)³¹ than the objective concept. Suárez asserts, as a universal principle, "that to the one formal concept one objective concept corresponds" (*uni conceptui formali unus conceptus obiectivus respondet*).³² The formal concept of being is one,³³ hence the objective concept is one, as well.³⁴

5 Conceptual Focusing: *Expressior Conceptus*

Conceptual focusing resolves the apparent antinomy between the dyadic and unitary character of being: it is the element that interrelates them. Suárez also employs this method to resolve problems otherwise explained through entitative units that are no more than reified concepts. Indeed, our knowledge is not one of reality pure and simple, but rather of our (based-on-reality) knowledge itself.³⁵

29 Ibid., 2.4.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 90): "Primo enim ens significare videtur rem habentem esse reale et actuale, tanquam participium verbi essendi; inde vero translata est illa vox ad praecise significandum id quod habet essentiam realem."

30 Ibid., 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65).

31 Ibid., 2.1.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 68).

32 Ibid., 2.2.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 70).

33 Ibid., 2.1.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 68): "...dicendum est, conceptum formalem proprium et adaequatum entis ut sic esse unum, re et ratione praecisum ab aliis conceptibus formalibus aliarum rerum et obiectorum."

34 Ibid., 2.2.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 72): "Dico ergo primo: conceptui formali entis respondere unum conceptum obiectivum adaequatum et immediatum, qui expresse non dicit substantiam neque accidens, nec Deum nec creaturam, sed haec omnia per modum unius, scilicet quatenus sunt inter se aliquo modo similia vel conveniunt in essendo."

35 Ibid., 7.1.15 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 255): "...essentia rei non definitur a nobis prout est in re, sed prout a nobis concipitur."

Concepts are generally interrelated through *composition*, where two concepts, a unifier and a diversifier, together define an entity, e.g., 'rational animal' or 'man.' Here we have a unifier, or common concept (e.g., the genus 'animal'), and a diversifier, or differentiating concept (e.g., the *differentia* 'rational'). Suárez has little use for the genus and *differentia* method while discussing being. Unprecedentedly, he puts aside composition and unites unifier and diversifier, thus claiming that what unites diversifies. The diversity of ideas had been produced by a diversity of concepts, but now it is produced by a unifier concept. This method, distinctive of Suárez's thought, is what we have called *conceptual focusing*. Here, the common concept (being) both unifies and diversifies, but in two modes, the confusive and the determinative. In its *confusive* or unifying mode, the common concept is conceived only confusedly, inasmuch as it has some conformity with other things; in its express or *determinative* mode, however, it is more expressly conceived, inasmuch as it exists in itself.³⁶

Suárez illustrates conceptual focusing by the examples of quantity and heat. The concept of 'quantity,' he explains, includes all kinds of quantities, without exception, though these different kinds (bicubital, tricubital, etc.) add nothing to the concept of quantity itself; they only express more distinctly what was indistinctly contained in the common concept. Similarly, varying degrees of heat (eight degrees, ten degrees, etc.) add nothing to the idea of heat as such, but only make it more explicit, in specific cases.³⁷

The unity of the concept of being is imperfect, for it includes all its differences in an indeterminate manner, and as these are most diverse, the notion of being is verified in them with the same diversity.

36 Ibid., 2.6.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 101): "Quod in ordine ad conceptus formales recte explicatur: differunt enim solum quia per unum expressius concipitur res prout est in se quam per alium, quo solum confuse concipitur et praecise secundum aliquam convenientiam cum aliis rebus; hoc autem totum fieri potest sine propria compositione per solam cognitionem confusam vel distinctam, praecisam vel determinatam."

37 Ibid., 2.6.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 101): "Praterea, hunc modum abstractionis et determinationis intellectualis esse possibilem, probatur exemplis; nam cum dividimus quantitatem in bicubitam, tricubitam, etc., non potest intelligi, quod conceptus bicubitae quantitatis resolvatur in conceptum quantitatis et bicubiti, quia impossibile est concipere bicubitum non concepta quantitate; signum ergo est, illos duos conceptus solum distingui, sicut expressum et confusum. *Idem* fere est in conceptu caloris et caloris ut octo, cuius signum etiam est, quod conceptus communis caloris non solum includitur in toto calore ut octo, sed etiam in singulis gradibus eius; cum ergo dicitur calor ut octo, non additur modus distinctus faciens compositionem cum calore ut sic, sed exprimitur et concipitur calor, prout est in se."

6 Climax of Being: Analogy

How do we pass from the unitary concept of being to its particulars, infinitely diverse as they are? In short, Suárez's answer is: by univocation and analogy. Both have a unitary concept of being, and for some philosophers this fact alone suffices for extending *univocation* to the totality of beings.³⁸ The univocal concept either does not implicitly contain its particulars and is combined with them through composition, or it implicitly does contain them, and makes them more vivid through conceptual focusing. The meaning of univocals is not derived from that of others of their kind.

But in *analogy* we have the distinctive condition that we may term *dependentality*, the fact of a being deriving its significance (known as 'attribution') from another, that is, of the creatures from God.³⁹ With the existence of God postulated, 'dependentality' necessarily enters into the picture and rules out univocation.

In analogy, we arrive at the height of Suárez's conception of difference in identity. On the one hand, we have the ultimate unitary concept, the notion of being, while on the other hand, we have the ultimate diversity concept, the Creator and the creatures; thus, the ultimate diversity originates from the ultimate unity. The Creator, by His very being and not by anything added, is being by essence, is infinite and the fountain of all being; creatures, too, by their being and nothing besides that, are being by participation and exist through dependentality.⁴⁰

Thus, the very dependential structure of the universe makes it analogical. As Suárez declares:

this analogy of being is entirely founded on and arises from the things themselves, which are subordinate in such a way, that they necessarily relate to the One insofar as they are beings. Hence it was not possible to

38 Ibid., 28.3.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 13): "...[for these philosophers] ens immediate significat conceptum unum communem Deo et creaturis; ergo non dicitur de illis analogice, sed univoce."

39 Ibid., 28.3.16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 18): "...analogia seu attributio, quam creatura sub ratione entis potest habere ad Deum, sit...fundata in proprio et intrinseco esse habente essentiali habitudinem seu dependentiam ad Deum."

40 Ibid., 28.3.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 15): "...ratio entis, prout in Deo est...includitur essentialiter ipsum esse omnino independens et a se, cum tamen e contrario in creatura, ipsa ratio entis sit omnino dependens et ab alio, et in unoque ente est limitata ad certum perfectionis genus."

impose the name of 'being' to signify confusedly that which has existence, without it having to signify many things without a reference to the One, and it would thus be analogical.⁴¹

7 Extramental Reality Confirmed by Intramental Concept

Finally, all this speculation on being displays the power of the mind to understand reality. Suárez himself evoked this power when he declared that the one formal concept of being would aid us in determining the nature of the latter, and that we know more about our subjective mental states than we do about objective reality.⁴² With these observations, Suárez closes the book of scholasticism, and opens the book of a whole complex of tumultuous subjectivist systems that would later comprise Modern Philosophy. Here, the Uncommon Doctor's transference of the problems from the ontological sphere to the epistemological, from the extra- to the intra-mental level, reaches its unexpected (and unwelcome) fulfilment. At the very start of his metaphysical analysis, the problem of supreme importance to Suárez was whether the notion of being was one or many. No solution presented itself on the level of the extra-mental objective concept, however, so the Doctor had recourse to the principle that *uni conceptui formali unus conceptus obiectivus respondet*. Therefore, beginning with the formal concept, Suárez, in a manner previously unknown to the scholastics, made the intra-mental the judge of the extra-mental—and indeed, of the most fundamental truth, that of being itself—which was conceived as dependent on an intra-mental formal concept. The latter, he explains, is more accessible to us than the former, since it is “more known to us”⁴³ (*nobis notius*); indeed, this is because it is produced “by us and in us” (*a nobis et in nobis*).⁴⁴

On this principle, Suárez had inferred that as the formal concept of being was one, the objective concept of being must be one as well. Sometime later, a

41 Ibid., 28.3.22 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 21): “At vero haec analogía entis omnino fundatur et oritur ex rebus ipsis, quae ita sunt subordinatae, ut necessario ad unum referantur quatenus entia sunt, ideoque non potuit nomen entis imponi ad significandum confuse quod habet esse, quin consequenter habuerit significare multa cum habitudine ad unum, atque ita fuerit analogum.”

42 See my *Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity* (Milwaukee, WI, 2007).

43 *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65).

44 Ibid., 2.1.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 68).

'disciple of the disciples' of Suárez was to infer (*ergo*, 'therefore') the truth of an indubitable extra-mental reality (*sum*, 'I am'), from the better-known (*notior*), indeed self-evident, intra-mental consciousness, expressed as a mental state (*cogito*, 'I think'). Thus, it appears that the little word '*notior-notius*' was the minuscule spark that was to ignite the immense conflagration of modern philosophy.

8 Sequel

Suárez, the Uncommon Doctor, is one of the great anomalies in the history of thought: one thinker embodying two contrary roles, each reversing the other. On the one hand, he fulfilled the role of being the consummator of one phase of philosophical speculation, namely, the realist and scholastic; on the other hand, however, he was the initiator (though an unwitting one) of another phase, the idealist, modern, and nihilist. The shift from realism to idealism, moreover, was crucial in Western philosophy, initiating an era of irrepressible, if chaotic, creativity.

Thus, on the one side, 'cosmos,' he was the climax of a tradition that was over a millennium old, embodied in the most massive work of systematics in the history of speculation, the twenty-one million word Suarezian synthesis; on the other side, 'chaos,' he gave rise to a plethora of systems and non-systems in a mad sequence of innovations and novelties, each appearing to cancel out all the others, all seemingly hurtling toward the black holes of scepticism, anti-realism, relativism, and nihilism itself. At all events, the thought of these men—starting with Descartes and ending with Nietzsche—was in one way or another affected by that of Suárez, who, besides being the consummate scholastic, was "perhaps more authentically than Descartes the founder of modern philosophy."⁴⁵

45 Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry* (Notre Dame, IN, 1990), p. 73.

Suárez's Doctrine of Concepts

How Divine and Human Intellection are Intertwined

Michael Renemann

1 Introduction

For any scholastic philosopher, divine and human intellection are deeply intertwined. After all, God knows things before man does, and even before they exist. This makes God's knowledge the model for human knowledge.

The main difficulty with respect to God's knowledge is how to reconcile His independence and simplicity with His knowledge of a plurality of things. The way in which a scholastic philosopher handles this difficulty determines how divine intellection works, and, consequently, how human intellection works.

What might be surprising for a modern reader is that, as a corollary to the mechanism described above, things do not have the same absoluteness as in modern philosophy. We cannot doubt the knowability of things, since this knowability is intrinsic to them, due to the fact that they are known by God prior to their creation. This shows how important it is to take into account the theological context of Suárez's doctrine of concepts.

Suárez examines the traditional positions on this matter very closely, in order to develop his own solution. From the many positions that are important for him, in the first half of this chapter I will present those of Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham, corresponding to the Thomist, Scotist, and Nominalist schools. The second half is then dedicated to Suárez's own solution.

2 Thomas Aquinas

Thomas manages to reconcile God's independence and simplicity with His knowledge of all things by introducing a hierarchy of knowledge: God primarily knows Himself, and knows creatures only by seeing in His own essence the ways in which this essence could be imitated:

The one first form, to which all others can be reduced, is the divine essence considered in itself. From this consideration, the divine intellect invents (*adinvenit*), so to say, different modes of imitation

(*modi imitationis*) of His essence, and in these modes consists the plurality of ideas.¹

Henry of Ghent will later coin the term *respectus imitabilitatis* (respects of imitability). In other words, there is only one cognitive act, but as the object of this act is the divine essence, which is the ultimate cause of all things, all things are cognized in this act as well:

It is necessary that God knows things other than Himself. Because it is manifest that He knows Himself perfectly, otherwise His being would not be perfect, as His being is His knowing. But for something to be known perfectly, it is necessary that its power (*virtus*) is known perfectly. But the power of a thing cannot be known perfectly, unless those to which the power extends are known. Therefore, as the divine power extends itself to other things, insofar as it is the first effective cause of all beings, it is necessary that God knows things other than Himself.²

This description creates the impression that one's cognitive relation has only two elements: the act of thought and its object. This is not entirely accurate, however, since each act of cognition also involves the production of an *intentio intellecta*, which becomes especially apparent in the case of human cognition:

I call *intentio intellecta* that which the intellect conceives in itself of the thing known. In us, this can be neither the thing known itself nor the substance of the intellect. Rather, it is some similarity of the thing, conceived by the intellect (*similitudo concepta intellectu de re intellecta*).

1 Thomas de Aquino, *De veritate*, q. 3, a. 2, ad 6: "...una prima forma, ad quam omnia reducuntur, est ipsa divina essentia secundum se considerata; ex cuius consideratione intellectus divinus adinvenit, ut ita dicam, diversos modos imitationis ipsius, in quibus pluralitas idearum consistit." Cf. Wolfgang Hübener, "Idea extra artificem. Zur Revisionsbedürftigkeit von Erwin Panofskys Deutung der mittelalterlichen Kunsttheorie," in *Festschrift für Otto von Simson*, ed. L. Grisebach and K. Renger (Berlin, 1977), pp. 27–52, at p. 37.

2 Thomas Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 14, a. 5 co.: "...necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestum est enim quod seipsum perfecte intelligit, alioquin suum esse non esset perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus eius perfecte cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius rei perfecte cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, cum virtus divina se extendat ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa effectiva omnium entium, necesse est quod Deus alia a se cognoscat." Cf. Francisco Suárez, *De div. sub.* 2.2.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, pp. 196b–197a).

Therefore, this *intentio* is also called 'inner word' (*verbum interius*), which is signified by the outer word (*verbum exterius*, *sc.* the verbal expression).³

We see here that the formal structure of the cognitive process is identical for man and God, but in God, all three members of the cognitive relation are identical,⁴ whereas in man, the three are usually distinguished: (1) that which understands (the intellect) is usually not identical with that which is understood (an external thing), and (2) that which the intellect conceives of the thing known is not identical with the known thing itself. But also man shares the nobility of intellectual life, which consists in the intellect's ability to reflect upon itself and understand itself—albeit to a lesser degree than God, who primarily understands Himself. Intellectual life in man, however, starts with the cognition of external things.⁵ But man's intellect can reflect upon itself, thereby not only revealing its own nature (distinction 1), but also the conformity or proportionality between his act and the thing (distinction 2). All this is achieved in a reflexive act by which truth becomes known to man (according to the individual intellect's ability to reflect upon itself):

It has to be said that truth is in the intellect and in the senses, but not in the same way. In the intellect, it is in two ways: first, as a consequence of the intellectual act, and, second, as cognized by the intellect. It follows the intellect's operation, insofar as the intellect's judgment is of the thing according to what it is (*de re secundum quod est*). But it is cognized by the intellect insofar as the intellect reflects upon its act, thereby not only cognizing its act, but cognizing also its act's proportion to the thing (*proportionem eius ad rem*). Now the proportion cannot be cognized unless the nature of the act is cognized, and the nature of the act cannot be cognized unless the nature of the active principle is cognized, i.e. the nature of the intellect, which has the nature to

3 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. 4, c. 11, n. 6: "Dico autem intentionem intellectam id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta. Quae quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligitur; neque est ipsa substantia intellectus; sed est quaedam similitudo concepta in intellectu de re intellecta, quam voces exteriores significant; unde et ipsa intentio verbum interius nominatur, quod est exteriori verbo significatum."

4 Ibid., lib. 4, c. 11, n. 5: "Verbum igitur Dei est ipsum esse divinum et essentia eius, et ipse verus Deus."

5 Cf. ibid., lib. 4, c. 11, n. 5: "Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae qui est secundum intellectum: nam intellectus in seipsum reflectitur, et seipsum intelligere potest."

conform to things. So the intellect cognizes the truth by reflecting upon itself.⁶

In short, man needs two acts to achieve what God can achieve with only one. And, consequently, that which, in the case of God, is at the beginning (i.e., truth),⁷ is only the result in the case of man. Furthermore, that which is primary for God (that is, self-cognition) is secondary for man.

3 John Duns Scotus

John Duns Scotus rejects Thomas's strategy of reconciling God's simplicity and the plurality of things. He argues that Thomas's description of God's ideas as *modi imitationis* or *respectus imitabilitatis* turns these ideas into mere relations. For Scotus, ideas have to be the fundamentals by which the divine cognition can be terminated. As such, they have to be produced:

The *productio* (viz., in *esse intelligibili*) is in a different sphere from the *esse simpliciter*—and what is produced is not only a relation, but also a foundation. This foundation has no *esse essentiae vel exsistentiae*, but only an *esse deminutum*. The *esse deminutum* is an *esse secundum quid* which is also possessed by an absolute being. It is that aspect of an absolute being which enables it to become part of a relation of reason.⁸

6 Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 9 co.: "Dicendum, quod veritas est in intellectu et in sensu, sed non eodem modo. In intellectu enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum. Consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod iudicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est. Cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem eius ad rem: quae quidem cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus; quae cognosci non potest, nisi natura principii activi cognoscatur, quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura est ut rebus conformetur; unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur."

7 Cf. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 7c.: "Si enim proprie accipiat veritas, tunc importabit aequalitatem intellectus divini et rei."

8 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 36, q. un., n. 44 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, p. 288): "...productio ista (sc. productio in *esse intelligibili*) est in *esse* alterius rationis ab omni *esse simpliciter*—et non est relationis tantum, sed et fundamenti; non quidem secundum *esse essentiae vel exsistentiae*, sed secundum *esse deminutum* (quod est '*esse verum*'), quod *esse* est *esse secundum quid* etiam entis absoluti, quod tamen '*ens absolutum*' secundum istud *esse deminutum* comitatur relatio rationis."

Scotus rejects the 'parallelism' that Thomas had established between God's knowing Himself and God's knowing other things, and accuses Thomas of conjuring up a relation out of nothing, or rather, of conjuring up a relation that has one loose end, because there is nothing that could terminate God's cognition of things. Scotus therefore replaces this parallelism with a sequence, so to speak. Before a thing can be the object of thought (even of divine thought), it has to be made intelligible. For this purpose, God, after reflecting upon His own essence in the so-called 'first moment of nature', produces the thing in intelligible being (*esse intelligibile*) ('second moment of nature'). This thing in intelligible being can then serve as a fundament for a relation between the thing and an act of cognition, which is why the *esse intelligibile* is also called *esse secundum quid* (relative being). God enters such a relation to the thing in the 'third moment of nature', and thereby immediately creates the thing in real being (*esse simpliciter*).⁹

Ultimately, the fact that a thing has intelligible being describes nothing but the thing's ability to enter into a relation with an intellect, or the possibility for an intellect to have some intramental representation of the thing. *Esse intelligibile* and *esse simpliciter* are also called two 'modes of being' of the same thing, whereby *esse intelligibile*, or *esse obiectivum* as it is later called, is the special mode of being that things have in the intellect.¹⁰

Scotus explains the necessity of the *productio in esse intelligibili* of the thing with an analogy. He asks: how can Caesar be represented by a statue after he has been annihilated? And he answers: there is still Caesar in intelligible being, and this makes it possible to represent Caesar. Similarly, for things that still have existence, it is their intelligible being that makes it possible to cognize them (or to have a cognition that represents them).¹¹ In this analogy, the statue is the human act of thought. For God, as we have seen, the problem that is solved by the 'thing in intelligible being' is: how can God think of a thing that is not yet created? And for man, the problem that is solved is: how can one think of a thing that no longer exists?

9 Cf. *ibid.*, I, d. 35, q. un., n. 32 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, p. 258). On the different moments of nature cf. Tobias Hoffmann, *Creatura intellecta. Die Ideen und Possibilia bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis, Poncius und Mastrius*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters—Neue Folge, Bd. 60 (Münster, 2002), pp. 95–108; Calvin G. Normore, "Scotus, Modality, Instantiations of Nature, and the Contingency of the Present," in *John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics*, ed. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, and Mechthild Dreyer, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 53 (Cologne, 1996), pp. 161–174.

10 Cf. *ibid.*, I, d. 36, q. un., n. 44 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, p. 288).

11 Cf. *ibid.*, I, d. 36, q. un., n. 45 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, pp. 288–289).

Nevertheless, the tension between God's simplicity and the plurality of things is still palpable in Scotus's approach. He has fixed the problem (as he saw it) that there is no 'fundament' on the object's side that could terminate the divine cognition, but the fundament suggested by Scotus (the thing in intelligible being) turns out to have a double character. On the one hand, it is in the divine mind, and its being (its *esse secundum quid*) is *terminative vel principiative* the real being (*esse simpliciter*) of the divine intellection. On the other hand, though, the being of the thing in intelligible being is formally (*formaliter*) the being of the thing that is being made intelligible (*ens absolutum*; cf. the long quotation above ["The *productio...*"]):

And even if one could put some trickery in the example, this is not possible with respect to the problem of intellection and object, i.e., one cannot claim that not the whole object according to its total being has the *esse deminutum* actually. And if you want to ask about the being true (*esse verum*) of this object as such, this is nothing else than asking about the respective being (*secundum quid*), unless this respective being (*esse secundum quid*) is being reduced to some real being (*esse simpliciter*), which is the being of the intellection itself. But this real being is not formally (*formaliter*) the being of that which is called respective being (*esse secundum quid*), but only as a terminus or principle (*terminative vel principiative*), so that the true respective being (*verum esse secundum quid*) (viz., of the object) is being reduced in such a way that without the being true (*verum esse*) of the intellection there would be no respective being (*esse secundum quid*) of the object.¹²

What follows from Scotus's account of divine intellection for human intellection? The example with the statue of Caesar teaches us that, as was the case with Thomas, the cognitive relation is triadic. The intramental terminus, though, is not an image or a formal similarity of the thing, but the thing in *esse deminutum* or *esse obiectivum*, called (by later Scotists) *conceptus obiectivus*.

12 Ibid., I, dist. 36, q. un., n. 46 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, p. 289): "Et licet posset poni calumnia in exemplo, non ita potest in proposito dici de intellectione et obiecto, quin obiectum totum et secundum totale esse suum, 'deminutum esse' habeat in actu. Et si velis quaerere aliquod esse verum huius obiecti ut sic, nullum est quaerere nisi 'secundum quid', nisi quod istud 'esse secundum quid' reducitur ad aliquod esse simpliciter, quod est esse ipsius intellectionis; sed istud 'esse simpliciter' non est formaliter esse eius quod dicitur 'esse secundum quid', sed est eius terminative vel principiative, ita quod ad istud 'verum esse secundum quid' reducitur sic quod sine isto vero esse istius non esset illud 'esse secundum quid' illius." Cf. Hoffmann, *Creatura intellecta*, p. 143.

And, consequently, the *intellectio* is not the consideration of this image, but the act of representing it (*repraesentatio formalis*). Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673), the *princeps scotistarum*, and his co-author Bonaventura Belluto (1600–1676) describe their dissent with their Thomist interlocutors as follows:

And it is utterly vain what some Thomists devise with Cajetan (*In primam partem Summae theologiae*, q. 27 a. 1), namely, that the knower sees the object in the *verbum* like in an image of this object, as if in a mirror. This is vain because when someone cognizes a whiteness, for example, he does not cognize an image which exists in the mind, and through it the whiteness, but he perceives the whiteness directly. And so it happens universally that when we look at an object, we do not perceive some other thing than the thing itself about which we cogitate, and no mediating image presents (*offerre*) itself to us. And the reason for this is that *species impressa* and *expressa* are only images by representing their objects (*in repraesentando suorum obiectorum*), but not by being (*in essendo*) in the sense that first they have to be cognized in themselves, and then they lead us to the cognition of the object, as Scotus noted in his *Quaestiones quodlibetales*, q. 14, paragraph “*Ad ista...*”¹³ So the quality produced by the intellect during cognition is not an image which is cognized first and then leads us to the cognition of the object, but it is a formal representation and the very intellection of the object.¹⁴

13 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones quodlibetales* q. 14, n. 22, *Opera omnia*, vol. 26 (Paris: Vivès, 1895), pp. 98b–99a.

14 Bartolomeus Mastrius, Bonaventura Bellutus, *Disputationes ad mentem Scoti in Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de anima* (abbr.: *De anima*) d. 6, q. 3 a. 1 n. 32, in *Cursus philosophiae ad mentem Scoti* (Venice, 1727), t. 3, p. 143b: “Et prorsus vanum est, quod quidam Thomistae comminiscuntur cum Cajetan cit. cognoscentem intueri in verbo obiectum velut in eius imagine, et quasi speculo, quia dum quis cognoscit albedinem v.g. non cognoscit aliquam imaginem existentem in mente, et media illa albedinem, sed immediate percipit albedinem, et sic universaliter contingit, quod dum consideramus, et contemplamur aliquod obiectum, constat nos non percipere aliud, quam illud ipsum de quo cogitamus, nullamque se nobis offerre imaginem mediantem, et ratio huius est, quia tam species impressa, quam expressa sunt imagines tantum in repraesentando suorum obiectorum, non autem in essendo, adeo ut prius in se cognosci debeant, ut deinceps nos ducant in cognitionem obiecti, ut notavit Scot. quol. 14 §*ad ista*, ergo qualitas producta ab intellectu, dum cognoscit, non est imago prius cognita ducens in cognitionem obiecti, sed est repraesentatio formalis, et ipsamet obiecti intellectio.” Cf. *ibid.*, a. 2 n. 54 (t. 3, p. 148a), where Mastri suggests that the dissent between Scotists and Thomists is ‘*in solo modo loquendi*’.

The fact that the *productio in esse intelligibili* is a prerequisite for any act of thought has two consequences: (1) the *esse intelligibile* is not only an extrinsic denomination that stems from an act of thought, but is rather a separate mode of being; and (2) the thing *in esse intelligibili* is not only an aspect of the thing outside (resulting from a certain way of looking at the thing), but it is the fundament for any cognitive relation to the thing outside.

These two points—the rejection of the *verbum* and the character of the *esse intelligibile*—show how the structure of human intellection flows from the conception of divine intellection, and that the same is also true for the possibility of human intellection. Pasnau notes: “By giving objects their intelligibility (*esse intelligibile*), the divine intellect ‘is that in virtue of which secondarily the objects produced move the intellect in actuality’ (*Ord.* I.3.1.4 n.267).”¹⁵ This is also confirmed by Tobias Hoffmann: “Die Intelligibilität ist Grund für die menschliche Erkenntnis eines Dinges; Grund für die Intelligibilität ist die göttliche (Ideen-produzierende) Erkenntnis des Dinges.”¹⁶ In other words, the foundation that God produces to enable a relation between Himself and the thing is also a foundation for our thinking about that thing.¹⁷

If we see Scotus's theory as an attempt to provide an explanation of God's relation to things, then we see that, in a certain sense, the balance was moved in the direction of the things. The things receive some kind of autonomy; they have the ability to enter into a relation of reason before an intellect is directed toward them. This, moreover, introduced an ambivalence that encouraged Scotus's followers to stress the role of the object even more, in order to emphasize the contrast to Thomas's ‘modes of imitation’. Consequently, Tobias Hoffmann sees essentialist tendencies amongst all the Scotists whom he has examined: Franciscus Mayronis, Bartolomeo Mastri, and Ioannes Poncius.¹⁸ In Scotus's original theory, though, God is clearly the producer of intelligibility.

15 Robert Pasnau, “Divine Illumination,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/illumination/>>. Cf. Robert Pasnau, “Cognition,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. T. Williams (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 285–311, at p. 303.

16 Tobias Hoffmann, *Creatura intellecta*, p. 164.

17 In one passage, Scotus says that also man has the ability to produce things in intelligible being, but not originally (*primo*) (cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 36, q. un., n. 28 [ed. Vatican, vol. 6, p. 282]). This argument serves Scotus as a proof that producing a thing in intelligible being does not imply that this thing has real being. In my opinion, it does not call into question the fundamental role that the divine *productio in esse intelligibili* has for man's understanding.

18 Cf. Hoffmann, *Creatura intellecta*, p. 310. We also follow Hoffmann in his judgment that for Scotus, the ideas are not the quiddities or essences of things: “Die Ideenproduktion

Scotus's truth theory is a good example showing this development. Scotus distinguishes six modes in which truth can be said to be in a thing, of which three are by comparison to the producer and three by comparison to the knower.¹⁹ Of these six modes, however, Mastri picks out only one, namely, the first mode by comparison to the knower: "The truth of a being is nothing else than its intelligibility as it is (*intelligibilitas, sicut est*)."²⁰

4 William of Ockham

William of Ockham, in his later writings (on which we shall focus here), uses an approach that is very different from that of Thomas or Scotus. Almost like a proto-Wittgensteinian, he focuses especially on terms and their supposition.²¹ His question is: what does a certain philosophical term stand for in a specific context? In our context, it is obvious for Ockham that most philosophical terms do not apply to man and God in the same way, because God is simple, eternal, infinite, and independent, while creatures are manifold, temporal, finite, and dependent. For example, Ockham rejects applying the terms 'means' and 'end' to God, citing God's simplicity:

It does not seem well said that God wants the end prior to what serves this end, because there is no such priority of acts in God, neither are there such moments (*instantia*) as he (*viz.*, Scotus) claims.²²

bedeutet nicht, dass Gott bereits in sich intelligible Gehalte wahrnimmt, sondern durch sie werden die intelligiblen Gehalte erst konstituiert. Damit erlangen diese jedoch kein ewiges Sein der Wesenheit..." (p. 308). There are other researchers who, based on *Lectura I*, d. 35, see Scotus identify the ideas with the quiddities (e.g., Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen. Divine knowledge in late medieval thought* [Leiden, 1993], pp. 125–126). Hoffmann relies primarily on the *Ordinatio*, where he sees Scotus's doctrine developed most consistently.

19 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, lib. VI, q. 3, n. 23–30, in *Opera Philosophica* IV, St. Bonaventure (NY, 1997), pp. 67–70.

20 Bartolomeus Mastrius, *Disputationes ad mentem Scoti in Aristotelis Stagiritae libros metaphysicorum* (abbr.: *In met.*) d. 5, q. 6, a. 1, n. 161 (t. 4, p. 165b): "veritas entis aliud non sit quam eiusdem intelligibilitas, sicut est."

21 I say 'almost' because for Ockham, this is a strategy to reconcile God's simplicity with the plurality of things.

22 Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ord.* I, d. 41 q. 1 (*OT* 4, p. 604): "Similiter non videtur bene dictum quod Deus velit prius finem quam illud quod est ad finem, quia non est ibi talis prioritas actuum, nec sunt ibi talia instantia qualia iste [*viz.*, Scotus] ponit." Cf. Heiko Augustinus

In sum, neither Thomas's nor Scotus's description of God's inner workings meet with Ockham's approval.

With respect to the relation between God's self-knowledge and God's knowledge of things, Ockham explains that even if there may be a priority of the divine essence on the object-side, there is absolutely no distinction on the knowledge-side, i.e., the *intellectio* is totally identical:

Therefore I say that even if one object (viz., the divine essence) may be prior to the other (viz., the creatures) as to nature, perfection and origin, the intellection of one object has no priority whatsoever over the intellection of the other object, because it (viz., the intellection) is totally identical without any distinction whatsoever.²³

Hence, while for Thomas, God's knowledge of His own essence is a medium for the knowledge of creatures, and for Scotus, God's knowing Himself is (at least logically) prior to His 'production of things in intelligible being', which is in turn prior to His knowledge of creatures, Ockham accepts no such order of 'knowledges' in God. And when he has to explain how creation works—because God is expected to act rationally, that is to say, according to ideas—Ockham says:

Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism* (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 212–215, from where I take the following two quotations: "The nominalistic attitude toward Scotus was by no means purely negative. But what happened was that while retaining Scotus' teaching with respect to the dignity of man and the sinner's responsibility for his own damnation, final acceptance as a primordial decision of God, which was Scotus's safeguard against Pelagianism, was rejected by the nominalistic theologians. This rejection of an intrinsic order of decisions in God is the philosophical complement to the theological thesis of a predestination *post praevisa merita*" (p. 213). "While traditionally in medieval thought goodness had been seen as the common motivation of God and the elect, the nominalistic emphasis on the simplicity of God forbade the assumption of any such inner motivation as predicable of God" (p. 214).

- 23 Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ord.* I, d. 35, q. 3 (*OT* 4, p. 456): "Unde dico quod quamvis obiectum unum sit prius alio obiecto tam natura quam perfectione, tam etiam origine, tamen intellectio unius obiecti nulla prioritate imaginabili est prior intellectione alterius obiecti, quia est eadem omnino sine omni distinctione imaginabili." Cf. Jacob Schmutz, "Un dieu indifférent. La crise de la science divine durant la scolastique moderne," in *Le Contemplateur et les idées. Modèles de la science divine du néoplatonisme au XVIIIe siècle*, ed. O. Boulnois, J. Schmutz and J.-L. Solère, Bibliothèque d'Histoire de la Philosophie (Paris, 2002), pp. 185–221, at p. 199.

"The creature itself is the idea."²⁴ At the same time, though, he says that the ideas are preconceived (*praecognitae*).²⁵ To distinguish the creature in itself from the creature as preconceived by God (which is important, because the latter is the prototype of the former), Ockham uses his theory of connotative terms:

The 'term' idea signifies the creature itself directly (*in recto*) and also 'the creature' itself connotatively-obliquely (*in obliquo*) and besides this it signifies the divine cognition itself or the knower connotatively-obliquely (*in obliquo*). Therefore, one can predicate of the creature itself that it is the idea.²⁶

Thus, connotations allow Ockham to introduce a structure where there is no structure in reality. In reality, rather, there is only one creature. Nevertheless, depending on the relation that we can construct for this creature, we can distinguish the creature from itself.

How does Ockham describe human cognition? Just as there is no intramental terminus in God (Thomas: *verbum*, Scotus: *res in esse intelligibili*), he argues, so human cognition does not involve an intramental terminus. Ockham describes this aspect of human cognition most extensively in his treatment of universals, where he says that "a universal concept is just the act of thinking about several objects at once."²⁷ (The traditional strategy among scholastics was to ascribe to universals a special mode of being. In so doing, they sought to avoid 'Plato's error' of granting universals real existence—in-between the real mental act and the thing outside. Ockham's earlier *fictum*-theory of universals was in line with this strategy.)

24 Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ord.* I, d. 35, q. 5, a. 3 (*OT* 4, p. 489): "...ipsa creatura est idea."

25 Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ord.* I, d. 35, q. 5, a. 3 (*OT* 4, p. 490); *Ord.* I, d. 35 q. 5 (*OT* 4, p. 504).

26 Ibid., I, d. 35, q. 5 (*OT* 4, p. 490): "...Idea importat ipsammet creaturam in recto et etiam ipsammet in obliquo, et praeter hoc importat ipsam divinam cognitionem vel cognoscens in obliquo. Et ideo de ipsamet creatura est praedicabilis ut ipsa sit idea, sed non est praedicabilis de agente cognoscente vel cognitione, quia nec cognitio nec cognoscens est idea sicut non est exemplar." Cf. Jacob Schmutz, "Un dieu indifférent," p. 195. For Ockham's theory of connotation, cf. Gyula Klima, "Ockham's Semantics and Ontology of the Categories," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 118–142.

27 Cf. Paul Vincent Spade and Claude Panaccio, "William of Ockham," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/ockham/>>.

5 Suárez on Divine Knowledge

Suárez explains the problem of God's knowledge of creatures as follows. God is the creator of all things, therefore He has to know each thing before it exists—that is, He has to know it as a possible.²⁸ There are, according to Suárez, three modes for God to know things: those presented by Thomas²⁹ and Scotus,³⁰ and his own position, which combines the strengths of the first two modes.

From Thomas's mode of knowing, Suárez approves of the point that God knows things in Himself (i.e., in His essence). Nevertheless, Suárez does not want to stop there, arguing that this is ultimately only self-knowledge. God, according to Suárez, has to know possibles not only in Himself, but also according to their own proper being possible (*secundum esse proprium possibile*).³¹

Scotus (whom—according to Suárez—Ockham, Biel, and Auriol are following),³² for his part, has two separate 'knowledges' (*duplex scientia*³³), that is, God knows Himself and the things separately. Still, however, Suárez is not content: "knowledges [*scientias*] must not be unnecessarily multiplied (not even according to reason), but here, there is no necessity."³⁴

What does the third mode look like, then? Suárez uses a quasi-reflexive structure to answer this question. The direct act in this quasi-reflexive structure is the act (or, what is the same according to Suárez, *verbum*) by which God cognizes (actual) creatures (creatures in Himself), and the quasi-reflexive act is the act by which God "sees [1] Himself having the *verbum* and [2] the creatures being represented by the *verbum*" (the creatures in themselves).

28 On Suárez's doctrine of possibles, cf. John P. Doyle, "Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles," in *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez S.J.* (1548–1617), ed. Victor M. Salas (Leuven, 2010), pp. 21–40; Jacob Schmutz, "Science divine et métaphysique chez Francisco Suárez," in *Francisco Suárez: "Das ist der Mann." Libro Homenaje al Profesor Salvador Castellote Cubells* (Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer [*Analecta Valentina* 50], 2004), 347–359.

29 Cf. Suárez, *De div. sub.*, 3.2.3–13 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, pp. 196b–200a).

30 Cf. *ibid.*, 3.2.14–19 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, pp. 200a–201b).

31 Cf. *ibid.*, 3.2.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, p. 196b): "Unde etiam certissimum est, habere Deum scientiam de omnibus rebus, quae fieri possunt secundum proprias rationes earum, propriasque differentias, quibus inter se distinguuntur, alioqui non posset illas producere: Quia nisi cognosceret eas secundum esse proprium possibile, sed solum secundum esse, quod habent in Deo, hoc non esset creaturas cognoscere, sed se tantum, ut latius in citato loco Metaphysicae (*Disputationes metaphysicae* XXX, s. 15) prosecuti sumus."

32 Cf. *ibid.*, 3.2.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, p. 200a).

33 Cf. *ibid.*, 3.2.16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, p. 200b).

34 *Ibid.*, 3.2.16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, p. 200b): "...non oportet multiplicare scientias, etiam secundum rationem, sine necessitate, hic vero nulla est necessitas."

Now, the inquiry about possibles represents a reversal of this structure, because it presupposes that God's knowledge of creatures in themselves (as possibles) precedes God's knowledge of the creatures in Himself (as actual). In other words, speaking of possibles implies that they are possible in themselves, and if we want to grant God the ability to know possibles, then it is not enough to say that He sees His own essence and the ways in which He could imitate it (the Thomist way). Hence, Suárez's solution simply consists in allowing such a reversal. Here is the whole explanation:

Another mode of cognizing.—About the third mode of cognizing creatures in the divine ideas or in the knowledge itself. *First*, straightly considered, this knowledge cannot be some kind of first and direct knowledge which God has of creatures, but [it has to be] a quasi-reflexive knowledge; but here we ask how it has to be understood that God forms (so to say) a first notion (*notitia*) or concept and a *verbum* of creatures (whereby we extend the term '*verbum*' to the essential intellection, in order to explain the problem). *Then* it is very easy [to explain] that God, having in Himself a *verbum* of creatures, simultaneously sees [1] Himself having the *verbum* and [2] the creatures being represented by the *verbum*. But necessarily, it has to be supposed that God, according to reason (*secundum rationem*), first proceeds to the actual knowledge and cognition of creatures, conceiving and representing them in Himself directly. And this is the proper knowledge which Thomas and the theologians are treating, because with this knowledge posited, the other quasi-reflexive [knowledge] is extrinsic to God, because of His most eminent perfection, from which He has it that if there are things other than Him (*dum sunt aliquid*), He knows His own essence and its representation as perfectly and expressly as the cognized object. And thus God, cognizing creatures, knows that He cognizes creatures, just like when He cognizes Himself, He knows that He has knowledge of Himself. So this mode of reflection does not constitute a peculiar mode of cognizing creatures in Himself: especially because the representation of the *verbum* is not objective, as I have said above on beatific vision.³⁵ So there is only a certain reflection intimately

35 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.25.31 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, p. 155a): "Maior difficultas in hac assertione est, quia repraesentatio Verbi, seu conceptus, aut speciei expressae non est obiectiva, sed formalis: non est ergo ratio cognoscendi ut medium cognitum, sed solum ut ratio cognoscendi incognita."

included in the prior knowledge because of God's perfect mode of cognition.³⁶

Thus, Suárez allows the reversal, but not light-headedly. Rather, he explains that it is not really a reversal, as God's knowledge *intimately includes* in itself God's knowing His own knowledge. This is why Suárez speaks of a 'quasi-reflection': it does not really entail two separate acts.

The passage just quoted is from the treatise *De divina substantia*, book 3 (*De attributis Dei positivis*), Chapter 2 (*De scientia, quam Deus habet de creaturis ut possibilibus*). Chapter 4 (*An scientia Dei practica sit et causa rerum: ubi de variis nominibus divinae scientiae*) describes the structure of God's knowledge in more detail. God's knowledge, in itself, is "one and most simple," though it is distinguished by us in various ways, "according to our inadequate concepts."³⁷ Suárez proposes three divisions here: (1) knowledge of God (self-knowledge)-knowledge of the creatures; (2) knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*, which is intuitive knowledge)-knowledge of simple understanding (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*, which is abstractive knowledge); and (3) practical knowledge-speculative knowledge.³⁸ Now, combining his explanations of these types of

36 Ibid., 3.2.20 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, pp. 201b–202a): "*Alius modus cognoscendi*.—Circa tertium modum cognoscendi creaturas in ideis divinis, seu in ipsamet scientia. Imprimis si quis recte advertat non potest illa esse veluti prima et directa scientia, quam Deus habet de creaturis, sed ad summum quasi reflexa: hic autem inquiremus quomodo intelligendum sit, formare Deum (ut sic loquar) primam notitiam, seu conceptum et quasi verbum creaturarum (extendendo nomen verbi ad intellectionem essentialem, ad rem explicandam). Deinde, quod Deus habendo in se verbum creaturarum, simul videat se habere tale verbum et per illud [202a] repraesentari creaturas facillimum est: tamen supponendum necessario est, Deum prodire prius secundum rationem in actualem scientiam et cognitionem creaturarum, eas in se directe concipiendo et repraesentando. Et haec est propria scientia, de qua D. Thomas et theologici tractant, quia illa posita, altera quasi reflexa est extrinseca Deo, respectu omnium quae cognoscit, ratione suae eminentissimae perfectionis, ex qua habet, ut dum sunt aliquid, tam perfecte et expresse sciat suam essentiam et repraesentationem ejus, sicut objectum cognitum: et ita Deus cognoscendo creaturas, scit se cognoscere illas, sicut cognoscendo se, scit etiam se habere scientiam sui. Hic ergo modus reflexionis non constituit peculiarem modum cognoscendi creaturas in se: praesertim quia repraesentatio verbi non est objectiva, ut supra de visione beatifica dixi. Est ergo haec solum quaedam reflexio intime inclusa in priori scientia propter perfectum modum cognoscendi Dei."

37 Cf. *ibid.*, 3.4.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, p. 206a): "Quamvis enim divina scientia una et simplicissima sit in se, tamen ob multitudinem rerum quae sub illam cadunt et varia munia, quae in illa considerari possunt, distinguitur a nobis variis modis, secundum conceptus nostros inadaequatos, ut illam modo nostro considerare possimus."

38 Cf. *ibid.*, 3.4.1–3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, pp. 206a–207b).

knowledge, Suárez asks whether the intuitive or the abstractive type of knowledge of creatures is practical, that is, the cause of things. His answer is:

From this, it is also clear whether 'being cause of things' falls to the knowledge of simple understanding [*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*] or to the knowledge of vision [*scientia visionis*]. Because 'being cause by the way of art [*per modum artis*]' applies to knowledge, insofar as it is the knowledge of simple understanding, applied by the will. Because from itself, it only has the property of being cause like in the first act, or of being part of the cause [*causative*], and it has this property also with respect to those possibles that will never be. But that it is an actual cause applies to it only through the will which makes use of it. But its causality is thought of as preceding the knowledge of vision [*praeintelligitur ante scientiam visionis*], because this knowledge sees the things as already made or as being in the future.³⁹

With this, we see the following. That knowledge that is the cause of things has to be a knowledge of creatures as possibles, because it has to precede creatures themselves. Thus, the knowledge described here is the same knowledge as in Chapter 2 (citation above). Suárez claims that it is an abstractive knowledge—which is clear, because the alternative (i.e., intuitive knowledge) considers things "according to their actual existence with all conditions of existence"—a definition that does not exclude future things in general (as also future things can be considered according to their actual existence, at least by God), but it does exclude possibles as possibles.⁴⁰ Furthermore, this abstractive knowledge is thought of as preceding (*praeintelligitur*) the intuitive knowledge (science of vision) that God has of creatures. This confirms the explanation from Chapter 2, in which the order of direct act and quasi-reflection was reversed in order to make God's knowledge of possibles intelligible for us.

Let us now summarize Suárez's position regarding God's knowledge of creatures. First, there is only one (direct) knowledge by which God knows creatures

39 Ibid., 3.4.15 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, p. 209b): "Unde etiam constat, an esse causam rerum conveniat scientiae simplicis intelligentiae an visionis. Nam esse causam per modum artis habet, ut est scientia simplicis intelligentiae applicata per voluntatem. Ex se enim solum habet, ut sit causa veluti in actu primo, id est, causativa, quod etiam habet circa possibilia, quae nunquam erunt. Quod vero sit causa in actu, non habet sine applicatione voluntatis, ejus vero causalitas praeintelligitur ante scientiam visionis, nam haec videt res, ut jam factas, vel futuras."

40 Ibid., 3.4.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1, p. 206b).

and Himself (hence no multiplication of knowledges—against Scotus). Second, God knows creatures not only in Himself, but also in themselves (against Thomas).

The latter point deserves to be developed, because Suárez has a peculiar understanding of Thomas's idea of 'God knowing creatures in Himself'. For Thomas, the *verbum* in which God sees creatures is like an image—an objective representation that contains similitudes of the things to be made. For Suárez, however, the *verbum* is identical with the act of thought, and is thus a formal representation, that is, the act of representing.⁴¹ Consequently, knowing creatures in Himself means that God has in Himself an act of understanding that is terminated by creatures. Nevertheless, as creatures are only the secondary objects of this act, while the divine essence is its primary object, this act does not fulfil Suárez's requirement of knowledge of creatures in themselves. Only a quasi-reflection, in which God cognizes His understanding and the object of His understanding separately, fulfils this requirement. Thus, we have to think of this quasi-reflection as preceding the direct act of thought.

Suárez therefore redefines the whole problem. For Scotus, the problem is that God has to know things before He creates them, because creation has to take place in a thoughtful manner. This knowledge, however, cannot be part of God's self-knowledge (as suggested by Thomas), because this would not allow for a proper separation between the intellect presenting possibles to the will, and the will choosing what to do. Suárez is in general more sympathetic towards Thomas, but he sees the problems that Scotus points out. Furthermore, he sees that Thomas's solution is not very dynamic, as God's essence is immutable. Suárez (if I may speculate) was looking for a solution that allows for human freedom and at the same time ensures God's role in causing human actions.

Thus, Suárez's 'quasi-reflection' in God mirrors not only God's perfect self-knowledge, but also our way of thinking about God's knowledge, and (unlike the Nominalist solution) it provides a way to combine the two—or rather, to explain the displacements that must necessarily occur when we think about God. For example, God's self-knowledge is simultaneous, but according to our understanding, the reflection occurs after the direct act. Therefore, knowledge of possibles, which, according to Suárez, we can only attribute to God as some kind of reflexive knowledge, is posterior to God's direct knowledge. Still, this does not hinder us from saying that, for God, it is prior to His direct knowledge.

41 See quotation above ("*Another mode of cognizing...*"), p. 325.

6 Suárez on Human Intellection

Suárez's explanation of human intellection follows very closely his explanation of divine intellection. We have to remember that divine intellection, according to Suárez, is essentially characterized by a direct relation between the act of thought and a thing outside. The quasi-reflection that follows (and is thought to precede) this direct act simply has the purpose of explaining how God knows possibles, despite the fact that there is no intramental terminus apart from the act. (Suárez will even say later that the quasi-reflection is "necessary not primarily because of the causality but because of the infinite perfection of this knowledge.")⁴² We will see that such a direct relation between the act of thought and a thing outside is also the core trait of Suárez's explanation of human intellection (at least in the case of a proper and adequate intellection).

In Suárez's time, the terminology used in discussions about concepts had become more technical. One such distinction was especially common (as Suárez puts it), namely, the distinction between formal concept (*conceptus formalis*) and objective concept (*conceptus obiectivus*).⁴³ Nevertheless, there were significant differences among authors, and especially among different schools, regarding their definitions. For Thomists, the formal concept is the *verbum*, i.e., an intramental quality representing the thing outside *objectively* (like an image), and the objective concept is the thing outside with the extrinsic denomination of 'being thought'. For the Scotists, on the other hand, the formal concept is the act of thought, i.e., a formal representation, and the objective concept is the thing in objective being, i.e., the direct terminus of that formal representation. For the Nominalists, moreover, the formal concept is the act of thought, i.e., a formal representation (like Scotists), and the objective concept is the thing outside with the extrinsic denomination of 'being thought' (like Thomists).⁴⁴

42 Cf. Suárez, *DM* 25.1.36 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 909): "...in Deo enim semper est necessaria illa quasi reflexio, non tam ob causalitatem quam ob infinitam perfectionem illius scientiae, quae non potest ita terminari ad aliquod obiectum, quin intrinsece seipsam sub omni ratione et repraesentatione intueatur."

43 Cf. Suárez, *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 64): "Supponenda imprimis est vulgaris distinctio conceptus formalis et obiectivi..."

44 The distinction between formal concept and objective concept, and its fate between the fourteenth and seventeenth century, are analyzed in detail by J. Schmutz in his unpublished paper "La migration des concepts. La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif au croisement des scolastiques parisienne et espagnole," which was kindly given to me by the author in 2002. Cf. M. Renemann, *Gedanken als Wirkursachen*. Francisco

How does Suárez deal with this background? He defines the formal concept as “the act itself or (which is the same) the *verbum* by which the intellect conceives some thing or common nature.”⁴⁵ Hence, the *verbum* is not “the proximate object, in which the thing represented is being cognized,” i.e., it is not the *medium in quo*, as the Thomists believe.⁴⁶ In his *De anima* commentary, Suárez says more precisely that the act of cognition and the *verbum* are really identical and only modally distinct, because the act has two modes: production (*actio intellectus*) and the produced quality or terminus of the production (*verbum*).

Furthermore, the objective concept is defined as “that thing or nature which properly and immediately is known or represented through the formal concept.”⁴⁷ Here, Suárez distances himself from the Scotist way of describing the objective concept as the thing in some special mode of being (*esse obiectivum*, *esse intelligibile*): “The objective concept (*conceptus obiectivus*), if it is completely proper and adequate to the thing..., is not distinguished from the thing itself.”⁴⁸ Consequently, ‘being objectively in the intellect’ is only an extrinsic denomination to that thing.

Suárez concludes his description of the distinction between formal and objective concepts by naming the differences between the two. The first difference, according to Suárez, is that “a formal concept is always a true and positive thing (sc. a real being) and in the case of creatures a quality inhering in the mind,” while an objective concept may also be a being of reason (like a privation).⁴⁹ The second difference is that “a formal concept is always a singular and individual thing,” while an objective concept may also be “a universal or combined (*confusus*) and common thing (for example, man, substance, and so on).”⁵⁰ The most common concept is the concept of being, which comprises all

Suárez zur geistigen Hervorbringung (Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 2010), pp. 108–113, where I examine Schmutz’s interpretation of Suárez’s version of this distinction.

45 Cf. *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 64): “...conceptus formalis dicitur actus ipse, seu (quod idem est) verbum quo intellectus rem aliquam seu communem rationem concipit....”

46 Cf. *ibid.*, 25.1.37 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 909): “...multi censent, verbum mentis esse qualitatem distinctam ab actu cognoscendi, deservientem cognitioni, ut objectum proximum, in quo res repraesentata cognoscitur...illa sententia de verbo mentis falsa est.”

47 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): “Conceptus obiectivus dicitur res illa, vel ratio, quae proprie et immediate per conceptum formalem cognoscitur seu repraesentatur.”

48 Cf. *ibid.*, 25.1.29 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 907): “...conceptus obiectivus, si sit omnino proprius et adaequatus rei..., non distinguitur ab ipsamet re.”

49 Cf. Chapter 10 of the present volume: Daniel D. Novotný, “Suárez on Beings of Reason.”

50 Cf. Suárez, *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): “Unde colligitur differentia inter conceptum formalem et obiectivum, quod formalis semper est vera ac positiva res et in creaturis

real beings, and this is also the occasion for Suárez to describe the distinction between formal and objective concept in *DM* 2.⁵¹ But in the case that is at the heart of this chapter—i.e., the cognition of singular things—the objective concept is just that thing.

In short, Suárez gives up the Thomists' idea of the *verbum* as an objective representation, and subscribes to the Scotists' idea of the act of thought as a formal representation. Nevertheless, he rejects the Scotists' premise that the formal representation needs an intramental terminus, and instead identifies 'objective concept' and 'thing outside'.

The result is a concept theory that closely resembles the Nominalist solution (because of the lack of an intramental terminus). Nevertheless, Suárez goes beyond this solution, because the quasi-reflection in God also has its counterpart in man, in the form of a "merely implicit and virtual reflection which every act of the mind includes in itself and which is the reason that the act is said to know itself as an instrument (*ut quo*)" or "to be known by way of its tendency towards the object (*per modum tendentiae ad obiectum*)."⁵² Suárez explains the virtual reflection in his treatment of exemplar causality (*DM* 25), where he rejects the traditional account of art production as a process in which something (be this a thing outside or some preconception) is imitated.⁵³ For Suárez, the act of thought itself ("the practical formal concept of the thing which is being brought about")⁵⁴ is the exemplar, and its causality consists in being "a light which goes before, showing the way, the mode and the terminus

qualitas menti inhaerens, obiectivus vero non semper est vera res positiva; concipimus enim interdum privationes et alia, quae vocantur entia rationis, quia solum habent esse obiective in intellectu. Item conceptus formalis semper est res singularis et individua, quia est res producta per intellectum, eique inhaerens; conceptus autem obiectivus interdum quidem esse potest res singularis et individua, quatenus menti obici potest, et per actum formalem concipi, saepe vero est res universalis vel confusa et communis, ut est homo, substantia, et similia."

51 Cf. Chapter 4 of the present volume: Rolf Darge, "Suárez on the Subject of Metaphysics."

52 Cf. Suárez, *DM* 25.1.39 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 910): "Tunc ergo non est necesse ut exemplar cognoscatur tanquam obiectum quod, sed satis est ut implicite et per modum tendentiae ad obiectum aliquo modo cognoscatur, ea tantum implicita et virtuali reflexione, quam quilibet actus mentis in se includit, ratione cuius dicitur cognosci seipso ut quo, quamvis non cognoscatur ut quod."

53 Cf. *ibid.*, 25.1.41 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 910): "...illa vero locutio, quod artifex respiciens ad exemplar, operatur ad illius imitationem, non oportet ut cum omni proprietate sumatur."

54 Cf. *ibid.*, 25.1.27 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 907): "[Exemplar est] conceptus ipse formalis practicus rei efficiendae."

of the operation" (*lumen, quod praeit ostendens viam et modum, ac terminum operationis*).⁵⁵ This requires some kind of mechanism that ensures that the artist is in control of the process. For Suárez, this means that the exemplar has to be known in some way, and the better it is known, the more perfect is the causation.⁵⁶ This is achieved through a virtual reflection.⁵⁷

7 Conclusion

As we can see, Suárez's main strategy is to allow for a knowledge or a cognition that is simultaneously direct and reflexive. I will explain this separately for God and for man.

There is no doubt that God knows possibles. The problem with this is that according to normal understanding, 'knowing' implies that the object precedes the knowledge. But if possibles 'exist' (in some sense) prior to God's knowledge of them, how can God still be called independent? This is why the Thomists say that God does not know possibles in themselves, but in Himself—since He is the cause of things, and the effects are contained in their cause (as possibles). Again, a problem occurs: possibles are then prerequisites for God's will to make a prudent decision. This means that they have to precede God's efficient (exemplar) causality—but this condition is not fulfilled by possibles that are only known in God as their cause.⁵⁸

Suárez starts from the divine knowledge, which is primarily self-knowledge but eminently includes knowledge of everything that is intelligible.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the divine cognition does not stop here:

55 Cf. *ibid.*, 25.2.28.

56 Cf. *ibid.*, 25.1.31 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 908): "ut [exemplar] causet, oportet ut aliquo modo cognoscatur, et quo perfectius fuerit cognitum, eo, caeteris paribus, perfectius causabit."

57 I have treated *DM* 25 extensively in my dissertation, *Gedanken als Wirkursachen. Francisco Suárez zur geistigen Hervorbringung* (Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 2010) and in my paper "The Mind's Focus as an Efficient Cause. Francisco Suárez's Re-interpretation of the Traditional Understanding of the Idea," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 84 (2010): 693–710.

58 According to Jacob Schmutz ("Un dieu indifférent"), the debate in the seventeenth century is marked by this dilemma, or rather, by a fight between those who want to preserve a "God who is by his knowledge the cause of things" (p. 185) and those for whom God is "a simple indifferent spectator of the *Great Theater of the World*" (p. 219). Unfortunately, this means that Suárez, at least historically, was not very successful with his effort to find a way out of the dilemma.

59 Cf. *DM* 30.15.22 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 176): "...Deus est infinite intellectivus; ergo habet vim cognoscendi omne intelligibile." I wonder how important it is to say that God's

Creatures are not to be created according to their 'eminent being' which they have in God, but according to the 'formal being' which they receive in themselves. Therefore, their cognition according to the eminent being, if it remained there and did not proceed to formal being, would not be useful for their production. Therefore, God knows possible creatures formally and in themselves.⁶⁰

In this passage, Suárez does not really give a solution. Rather, he formulates a requirement: there has to be a transition from God's knowing possibles in Himself to God's knowing possibles in themselves, in other words, a transition from direct knowledge to reflexive knowledge.⁶¹ But instead of explaining exactly how this works, Suárez merely points to God's simplicity. Nothing at all has to happen, because "God's knowledge is in the most eminent way at once direct and reflexive."⁶² Thus, both types of knowledge are identical and exist simultaneously!

In light of this argument, even the fact that God knows possibles in themselves, or the fact that His knowledge is being terminated by the creatures, "does not imply in this knowledge any dependence on the creature, but only an eminent and intellectual representation in which we ground a denomination or relation of reason according to which we say that this knowledge is being terminated by such object."⁶³

Suárez's position on human intellection cannot be summarized very easily. On the one hand, he clearly says that every mental act includes in itself a

knowledge, at this level, is about Himself or about other things. After all, act and terminus are identical for Suárez, as we have seen above. Hence, maybe Suárez's starting point is simply God's (act of) knowing.

60 Cf. *ibid.*, 30.15.23 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 177): "Denique, cum creaturae non sint condendae secundum esse eminens quod habent in Deo, sed secundum esse formale quod in se recipiunt, cognitio earum secundum prius esse, si in eo sisteret et ad posterius esse non transiret, nihil ad earum productionem posset iuvare; cognoscit ergo Deus creaturas posibles formaliter et in seipsis."

61 See quotation above ("*Another mode of cognizing...*"), p. 325.

62 Cf. Suárez, *DM* 30.15.21 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 176): "...divinam scientiam eminentissimo modo esse simul directam et reflexam."

63 Cf. *ibid.*, 30.15.26 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 178): "...negatur enim supponi vel sequi imperfectionem aliquam ex eo quod Deus cognoscat creaturas in seipsis modo iam explicato, aut ex eo quod scientia Dei in eodem sensu terminetur ad creaturas. Quia hoc terminari non ponit dependentiam aliquam in illa scientia a creatura, sed solum eminentem et intellectualem repraesentationem, in qua nos fundamus denominationem seu relationem rationis, secundum quam dicimus illam scientiam terminari ad tale obiectum."

virtual reflection through which the act is known as an instrument. (It has to be noted that there are individual differences in the clarity that the virtual reflection provides.) This means that every mental act is at the same time direct and reflexive, which is similar to what he says about God's knowledge. The difference is that God understands His knowledge not only as an instrument, but also according to its representation, thereby knowing the represented things in themselves.

The importance of virtual reflection is further highlighted by the fact that Suárez uses it to explain how an act of will can itself be voluntary:

The act which is through itself and *intrinsically* voluntary is not properly the object or the effect of the act through which it is brought about, because it is voluntary through itself, and it is not properly the object or the effect of itself. Rather, it has another object at which it directly aims, and it is the effect of the potency by which it is elicited. Therefore, it is voluntary only through some virtual reflection, which it includes in itself, and it is called 'willed' as an act, not as an object.⁶⁴

Thus, it can be said that the act's ability to reflect upon itself is an important element of Suárez's conception of the intellective soul.⁶⁵

Be that as it may, it seems that Suárez does not really explore the systematic consequences of virtual reflection on the field of speculative concepts. His explanations concerning this field occur only in passing, while the main subject is art production (practical concepts). Here, I can only speculate. The primary purpose of virtual reflection is to create a transparency over the cognitive process, and to make visible what type of cognitive instrument (what kind of mental focus) provides access to the cognized object. This goes well beyond

64 Cf. *ibid.*, 19.5.17 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 716): "At vero actus qui per seipsum est intrinsece voluntarius non comparatur ut proprium obiectum vel effectus ad illum actum quo est voluntarius, quia est voluntarius seipso, et non est proprie obiectum vel effectus sui ipsius; habet ergo aliud obiectum in quod directe tendat, et est effectus potentiae a qua elicatur, et solum per quamdam virtualem reflexionem, quam in se includit, est voluntarius; unde dici solet volitus per modum actus, non per modum obiecti" (my emphasis). Other instances where the act of will is described in this way are: *De vol. et invol.*, 1.1.2 and 5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 4, p. 160 a and b) and *De gratia Dei*, 5.16.9 (*De auxilio efficaci gratiae Dei*) (ed. Vivès, vol. 8, p. 468 a-b).

65 This is confirmed by the fact that the soul's attention is nothing separate from the acts. But in order to control the attention, the soul would need some kind of knowledge as to where its acts are directed; see Chapter 8 of the present volume (Simo Knuuttila, "Suárez's Psychology").

Descartes's self-transparency of the mind because it includes the cognitive process up to the thing. The trustworthiness of my concepts is not only due to a veracious god who has created my intellect in such a way that it represents the things correctly (in most cases). Rather, the act of thought includes a reflection upon itself through which it knows its tendency towards the real object. But for this, Suárez needs to get rid of the intramental terminus, because with an intramental terminus, the self-reflection of the act could make known only the relation of the act to the terminus, not the relation to the thing.

Through his focus on the practical aspect (art production, freedom of will), Suárez underlines man's role in shaping the course of the world. This is confirmed by the fact that virtual reflection, or the will's self-determination, is exactly the point where man and God work together, because this self-determination is at the same time God's determination of man's will, which the Thomists falsely call *praedeterminatio physica*.⁶⁶ In this sense, "it is not absurd to say that the (immanent) action of the creature is also the (transient) action of God."⁶⁷

66 Cf. *De gratia Dei*, 5.16.9 (*De auxilio efficaci gratiae Dei*) (ed. Vivès, vol. 8, p. 468b): "Sic ergo, quando voluntas libere determinatur ad volendum vel amandum, libera determinatio non est aliquid praeivium ad ipsam actionem amandi, sed quia ipsa actio amandi seipsa voluntaria est, per seipsam est formalis determinatio voluntatis in actu secundo, ante quam non antecedit alia determinatio in actu primo, ut ostendi; neque est necessaria alia praevia determinatio in actu secundo, quia alias procederetur in infinitum, et quia per ipsam voluntariam actionem sufficientissime fit talis determinatio, ut etiam lib 3, cap. 42, declaravi; et ita illa determinatio non est virtualis actio, sed formalis, non distincta ab ipsamet actione consentiendi aut amandi, sed ipsamet per seipsam voluntaria est, et quamdā reflexionem virtutalem includit. Unde immerito vocatur praedeterminatio respectu ejusdem voluntatis, cum nullo modo antecedit tempore vel natura determinationem ejus, ut jam etiam adverti." This passage is from the second part of Suárez *Tractatus de gratia Dei*, containing the books on the help afforded by grace (*auxilia gratiae*; books III–V of the *Tractatus de gratia Dei*, filling now the complete vol. 8 of the Vivès edition). The publication of this part during Suárez's lifetime was prevented by a general publishing ban on the topic of the *auxilia gratiae*. It was only in 1651 that three booksellers from Lyon (Philippe Borde, Laurent Arnaud, and Claude Rigaud) published the work, against the resistance of the Jesuit order, the Pope, and the King of France. Cf. Raoul de Scoraille, S.J., *François Suarez* (Paris, 1912–1913), vol. 2, pp. 392–398.

67 Cf. Francisco Suárez, *Opusculum de concursu, motione et auxilio Dei* (*De concursu Dei cum voluntate*), 1.15.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 11, p. 80a): "...in quo nihil est absurdi, si dicamus ipsamet actionem creaturae esse etiam actionem Dei; quia actio nihil est aliud quam res ut prodiit ab agente, seu dependentia effectus ab agente: et hanc rationem habet actio illa, etiam respectu Dei."

Between Thomism and Scotism

Francisco Suárez on the Analogy of Being

Victor Salas

1 Introduction

At the beginning of his *Church Dogmatics*, Karl Barth (in)famously identifies the *analogia entis* as the ‘invention of the anti-Christ’ and the principal reason for his inability to become Catholic.¹ While most Catholic theologians would no doubt dismiss Barth’s characterization of analogy as little more than hyperbolic diatribe, Barth’s recognition of the centrality of analogy in the Catholic intellectual tradition is more than a little perspicacious. Most likely directing his claim at Erich Przywara² and, to a lesser extent, Hans Urs von Balthasar³—both Catholic interlocutors of the Protestant theologian—Barth’s criticism of analogy reaches well beyond his twentieth-century contemporaries to challenge the philosophico-theological schemas of thinkers stretching back to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Indicative of the role that analogy would play during those periods, centuries prior to the *Dogmatics*, Tommaso de Vio Gaetanus (1469–1534), more commonly known as Cajetan, wrote that without a knowledge of analogy “no one would be able to learn metaphysics, and many errors in other sciences proceed from ignorance of it.”⁴ Operating in a much different environment than Barth, medieval and Baroque discussions of analogy had their own set of interlocutors, in particular Thomists and Scotists, the latter following their master, John Duns Scotus, who had issued a direct challenge to the semantic possibility of analogy.⁵

1 Cf. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God* (Edinburgh, 1995), vol. 1.1, p. xiii: “I regard the *analogia entis* as the invention of Antichrist, and I believe that because of it it is impossible ever to become a Roman Catholic, all other reasons for not doing so being to my mind short-sighted and trivial.”

2 Erich Przywara’s most important work devoted to the subject of analogy is simply known as *Analogia Entis: Metaphysik* (Munich, 1932).

3 Von Balthasar pursued a constructive dialogue with Barth over the issue of analogy in his own *The Theology of Karl Barth* (New York, 1971).

4 Cf. Cajetan, *De nominum analogia*, c. 1, ed. N. Zammit (Rome, 1934), p. 3: “Est siquidem eius notitia necessaria adeo, ut sine illa non possit metaphysicam quispiam discere, et multi in aliis scientiis ex eius ignorantia errores procedant.”

5 Joshua Hochschild, *The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan’s De nominum analogia* (Notre Dame, IN, 2010), p. 79. Briefly, the Scotist challenge stems from the understanding of

In this vein, Francisco Suárez was also keenly aware of the challenge that Duns Scotus and his disciples had posed to any metaphysical and theological thinking that purported to proceed upon non-univocal lines, and it was a challenge to which the Jesuit metaphysician would have to respond if he were to succeed in lifting his own metaphysical project, which is heavily dependent upon analogy, off the ground. Much like the Scotists, Suárez's concern for the unity of the concept of being is clear in the opening disquisitions of his *Disputationes metaphysicae*. In framing his metaphysical project, Suárez first identifies being insofar as it is real being (*ens inquantum ens reale*)⁶ as the adequate object of metaphysics, and subsequently investigates being as it is known by means of the objective common concept of being, a concept, he insists, that is most simple (*simplicissimus*) and absolutely unified.⁷ At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, the Jesuit metaphysician denies that this absolutely unified concept is univocal and, moving closer to the Thomist position, insists that it is analogical.⁸ The juxtaposition of unity and diversity-difference within analogy poses a serious challenge for Suárez and creates tensions in the very core of his metaphysical system, tensions of which he himself is aware:⁹

metaphysics, as he and Thomists both take it as a 'science.' Yet, as any (Aristotelian) science unfolds syllogistically, the demands of syllogistic argumentation must be met, among which is the need for a univocal middle term. Analogy, it seems, falls under the scope of equivocation, which, as Scotus sees it, compromises the scientific character of metaphysics. His way out of this dilemma is the univocal concept of being.

- 6 *DM* 1.1.26 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 11): "Dicendum est ergo, ens in quantum ens reale esse objectum adaequatum hujus scientiae." All references to the *Disputationes metaphysicae* (*DM*) will be taken from the Parisian Vivès edition, with volume and page number cited parenthetically.
- 7 Cf. *DM* 2.1.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 68): "Hinc etiam conceptus entis, non solum unus, sed etiam simplicissimus dici solet, ita ut ad eum fiat ultima resolutio caeterorum..." Cf. *ibid.*, 2.1.11 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 69): "...hic conceptus [entis] in se est simplicissimus, sicut objective, ita etiam formaliter."
- 8 The *loci classici* for Suárez's discussions on analogy are *DM* 28.3 and 32.2.
- 9 As Jean-Luc Marion sees it, these tensions ultimately make Suárez's position self-contradictory. Suárez's doctrine of analogy, Marion argues, really 'shifts its center of gravity' towards univocity. See Marion, *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes: Analogie, création des vérités éternelles et fondement* (Paris, 1991), p. 96: "Ce chef-d'oeuvre souffre cependant d'un défaut: sa contradiction interne qui le rend impensable; et, il ne peut que glisser là où l'entraîne son centre de gravité, vers l'univocité. Cette tendance, Suarez, d'ailleurs, la reconnaît." Cf. E.J. Ashworth, "Suárez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background," *Vivarium* 33.1 (1995): p. 50 and p. 50, n. 3.

But if either of the two [i.e., the unity of the concept or analogy] be denied, it is more preferable that analogy, which is uncertain, be denied than the unity of the concept, which [unity] is seen to be demonstrated by certain reasons. In true reality, however, it is necessary to deny neither, since, for univocity, it is not sufficient that a concept in itself be one in any fashion, but [rather] that it necessarily has an equal relation and order to many, which [equal ordering] the concept of being lacks.¹⁰

The passage quoted here is a famous one, and is often cited by those who accuse Suárez of clandestinely embracing univocity.¹¹ What the passage actually reveals, however, is the fact that, while recognizing the apparent tensions between unity and diversity latent in the concept of being, Suárez, like a violinist keeping his instrument in tune by maintaining just enough tension in the strings, remains committed to balancing diversity within unity.¹² Yet, herein lies the difficulty. As all thinkers who have subscribed to some form of it have keenly felt, analogy presents a fundamental philosophical challenge: the problem of the one and the many; how can one unify diversity in such a manner that each (i.e., unity and diversity) retains its own integrity? Suárez's solution to this challenge enjoys an original character that has not always been fully recognized.¹³ On the one hand, as already mentioned, there have been certain authors—both contemporary and Renaissance—who reduce Suárez's

10 *DM* 2.2.36 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 81): "...sed si alterum negandum esset, potius analogia, quae incerta est, quam unitas conceptus, quae certis rationibus videtur demonstrari, esset neganda. Re tamen vera neutram negari necesse est, quia ad univocationem non sufficit quod conceptus in se sit aliquo modo unus, sed necesse est aequali habitudine et ordine respiciat multa, quod non habet conceptus entis." All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

11 Walter Hoerer's treatment of Suárez thus seems lopsided, since he refuses to hear Suárez's plight for analogy and instead insists upon Suárez's underlying univocity. Cf. Walter Hoeres, "Francis Suarez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus on *Univocatio Entis*," in *John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965*, ed. J.K. Ryan and B.M. Bonasea, *Studies in the History of Philosophy* (Washington, D.C., 1965), pp. 263–290. Cf. Marion, *Sur la theologie blanche de Descartes*; Philipp W. Rosemann, *Understanding Scholastic Thought with Foucault* (New York, 1999), pp. 174–176.

12 Cf. José Pereira, *Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity* (Milwaukee, WI, 2007), pp. 134–135.

13 Daniel Heider is one of the few who has recognized Suárez's distinctive teaching on analogy. See his "Is Suárez's Concept of Being Analogical or Univocal?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 81.1 (2007): 21–41.

position to univocity.¹⁴ On the other hand, insofar as Suárez advocates an ‘analogy of intrinsic attribution’, to use his scholastic vocabulary, he has often been regarded as simply adopting a fundamentally Thomistic outlook, even if one at odds with Cajetan’s quasi-canonical theory of proper proportionality.¹⁵ Accordingly, Suárez has, at times, simply been regarded as a mere Thomistic interpreter.¹⁶ Nothing could be further from the case, though, as Suárez himself suggests.¹⁷

In what follows I argue that Suárez’s doctrine of analogy is unique in the history of philosophy, and can be reduced neither to a Thomistic analogy nor to an ill-formed Scotistic univocity. As we shall see, what makes Suárez’s account unique is his particular understanding of the (analogical) concept of being as ‘confused’ and ‘aptitudinal’,¹⁸ that is, a concept that confusedly or

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- 14 Cf. nn. 9, 11 supra; the Renaissance Scotist, Bartolomeo Mastrius, argued that, while Suárez advocated a doctrine of analogy, the modes whereby the concept of being is contracted to its inferiors are actually extrinsic to the concept itself, which thus retains a univocal unity. See Mastrius, *In Org.*, disp. 2, q. 5, a. 2 *Num analogum dicere possit conceptum unum ab analogatis præcisum*, n. 75, p. 275b; cf. Cf. Marco Forlivesi, “The Nature of Transcendental Being and Its Contraction to Its Inferiors in the Thought of Mastri and Belluto,” in “*Rem in seipsa cernere.*” *Saggi sul pensiero filosofico di Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673)*, ed. M. Forlivesi (Padova: Subsidia mediaevalia Patavina, 2006), pp. 261–337, esp. pp. 321–327.
- 15 John of St. Thomas, for one, regards Cajetan’s as the definitive position on analogy. Cf. B. Reiser, ed., *Cursus philosophicus thomisticus, Ars logica* (Taurin, 1930), p. 481, Pars II, q. 13, a. 3: “Difficultates de analogia, quae satis metaphysicae sunt, ita copiose et subtiliter a Caietano disputatae sunt in opusc. de Analogia nominum, ut nobis locum non reliquerit quidam aliud excogitandi.” Suárez, however, is not so sanguine, and resolutely rejects Cajetan’s theory of proper proportionality for the reason that ‘being’ is intrinsic not only to God, who is being itself, but also to creatures. Proper proportionality, however, is extrinsic, at least, to Suárez’s lights. In fact, Suárez holds that all instances of proper proportionality ultimately boil down to transference or metaphor. See *DM* 28.3.11.
- 16 It is no wonder, then, that Augustine Thompson finds Suárez’s account of analogy ultimately unsatisfactory because it fails the measure of a Thomistic yardstick. I grant that Suárez’s position is hardly Thomistic, yet that is not a sufficient reason, if there be any, for its inadequacy. See A. Thompson, “Francisco Suarez’s Theory of Analogy and the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas,” *Angelicum* 72 (1995): 353–362.
- 17 Cf. *DM* 28.3.9. Here, Suárez claims that Thomas’s argument for analogy as opposed to univocity goes too far, insofar as Thomas’s claim would seem to undermine the unity of the concept of being. Accordingly, Suárez’s account will have to find an alternate way of preserving that unity.
- 18 Joshua Hocschild describes Cajetan’s concept of being as ‘confused.’ Despite the same descriptive term, the doctrines of Cajetan and Suárez are irreducibly distinct. For Cajetan, the unity of the ‘confused concept’ implies a proportional unity between two *rationes*. Suárez’s notion of the concept of being, however, is even more unified, such that what he

indistinctly expresses being's 'aptness' to exist, which is to say, its relationship to diverse modes of existence (e.g., infinite-finite, substantial-accidental, real-possible, etc.), all the while prescinding from those modes.¹⁹ Of course, whether Suárez's solution is ultimately successful is, I think, open to debate, but what is beyond doubt is that evaluating his success will depend on much more than simply judging the Jesuit thinker against the measure of either Aquinas or Scotus; rather, it will require confronting the inner logic and coherence of his metaphysical presuppositions against themselves.

2 Framing the Problem

Contrasting Suárez's teaching on analogy with that of Thomas Aquinas, Jean-François Courtine rightly notes that, whereas for Thomas, analogy attempts to unify the diversity of (created) being in terms of its metaphysical relationship to the principle of being—that is, subsistent Being itself (*ipsum esse subsistens*)—the Jesuit philosopher is concerned with the unity of the *concept* of being, which is apprehended precisely and with indifference to its *inferiora*.²⁰ Here, Courtine makes a claim that is not entirely dissimilar to what Étienne Gilson had argued earlier (albeit with respect to Duns Scotus), which I believe is equally applicable to the distinction between Thomas and Suárez. "The Thomist doctrine of analogy is before all a doctrine of the *judgment* of analogy," Gilson writes, to which he immediately adds, "The analogy of which Duns Scotus thinks is rather much more an analogy of *concept*."²¹ Behind Gilson's

has in mind is a unity of *ratio*, not *rationes*. See Hochschild, *The Semantics of Analogy*, pp. 144–148.

19 Highlighting the difference between the Scotist concept of being and the Suarezian confused concept is one of the central contributions of Rolf Darge. See Darge's excellent "Suárez and Medieval Transcendental Thought," in *Hircocervi and Other Metaphysical Wonders: Essays in Honor of John P. Doyle*, ed. Victor M. Salas (Milwaukee, WI, 2013), pp. 65–93.

20 Cf. Jean-François Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris, 1990), p. 525: "L'unité de l'être n'est donc pas pour l'Aquinat, comme ce sera la cas pour Suarez, l'unité d'un concept commun et abstrait—susceptible d'être appréhendé *praecise*, dans sa neutralité ou son indifférence vis-à-vis de ses 'inférieurs'—mais bien l'unité réelle du *principe de l'être*, ou encore l'unité réelle du *principe*."

21 Cf. Étienne Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot: introduction à ses positions fondamentales* (Paris, 1952), p. 101: "Ce qui permet aux dialogues philosophiques de se prolonger, chaque partie restant contente d'elle-même mais surprise par l'obstination de l'adversaire, c'est que les interlocuteurs ne parlent pas la même langue. La doctrine thomiste de l'analogue est avant tout

claim, I suspect, is the fact that, for Thomas, being is ultimately resolved not in terms of essence but in terms of the dynamic act of being—the *actus essendi*.²² This dynamic act, however, is not known (at least not originally) through the static confines of the concept,²³ but through the dynamism of the second operation of the intellect: judgment.²⁴ Accordingly, if being, for Thomas, is ultimately resolved in terms of *esse* as attained through judgment, then the analogy of *being* will likewise be a matter of judgment.²⁵ Thus, looking for Thomas's thinking on the *conceptual* unity of analogy, which, as Bernard Montagnes laments, is "less explicit than we would wish...,"²⁶ might be, in light of Gilson's observations (as well as those of Courtine), a somewhat ill-framed venture.

In contrast, taking as his metaphysical *point de départ* Avicenna's notion of common being, Duns Scotus, as Gilson contends, advances a metaphysics that regards being in terms of its essential determination.²⁷ Such an understanding of being can be conceptualized through an abstractly simple concept that is minimal in intension and maximal in extension.²⁸ As is well known, according to Scotus, this concept is the univocal concept of being. Here, there is an important observation to make, one that is often neglected by those seeking to

un doctrine du *jugement* d'analogie. ...L'analogie à laquelle pense Duns Scot est beaucoup plutôt une analogie du *concept*."

22 Cf. *De potentia Dei*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.

23 Cf. Joseph Owens, "Aquinas on Knowing Existence," *The Review of Metaphysics* 29 (1976): 670–690; cf. Gerald B. Phelan, "Verum sequitur esse rerum," *Mediaeval Studies* 1 (1939): pp. 11–22.

24 For treatments of the dynamic character of judgment as corresponding to the equally dynamic *actus essendi*, see the immediately preceding note. For those texts in which Thomas locates the responsibility for apprehending *esse* with judgment, see *In Sent.*, I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 (ed. Mandonnet, vol. 1, p. 903): "Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Unde quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem..." Cf. *ibid.*, I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; *De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3. For a critical treatment of Gilson's account of the judgmental apprehension of being, see Louis-Marie Regis, *Epistemology*, trans. Imelda Choquette Byrne (New York, 1959), and more recently John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Created to Infinite Being* (Washington, D.C., 2000), pp. 30–44.

25 I have argued this claim in my "The Judgmental Feature of Thomas Aquinas's Analogy of Being," *The Modern Schoolman* 85 (2008): 117–142.

26 Montagnes, *La doctrine de l'analogie de l'être*, p. 94.

27 Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, pp. 85–95.

28 Cf. Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (Burlington, VT, 2005), pp. 251–254.

saddle Scotus with all the shortcomings of modernity. When articulating his theory of univocity, Scotus is not necessarily making a metaphysical pronouncement. Rather, he is concerned with developing a semantic doctrine capable of satisfying the scientific demands of syllogistic reasoning.²⁹ The Scotistic doctrine of univocity thus shifts from a metaphysical horizon, one that had preoccupied Thomas, to a semantic application. It is within this semantic field, moreover, that so many Renaissance Scotists, Thomists, and later Jesuit metaphysicians (including Suárez) would be embroiled in bitter dispute over analogy and univocity. In this regard, E.J. Ashworth notes that by the “sixteenth century the focus [of analogy] was on concepts, [and] whether one imprecise concept matched with more than one precise concept, or one formal concept matched with more than one objective concept.”³⁰

To appreciate Suárez’s role in that sixteenth-century dispute, let us first clarify what question(s) he was addressing and what the parameters of the dispute were. As my concern here is, at least in part, to differentiate Suárez’s doctrine of analogy from Thomistic analogy, it will also be worthwhile to trace, even if only in broad outlines, the shift from the analogy of being (though not necessarily spelled out exactly in those terms)³¹ to the analogy of the *concept* of

29 There is no small confusion on this point. Many, especially those in the Radical Orthodoxy camp, regard Scotus as advocating a kind of ‘univocal ontology’ and thus adumbrating the dreaded fear of so many postmoderns, viz., onto-theology. Scotus, however, makes no such claim, and explicitly rejects the idea that univocity of the concept of being implies that being itself is a genus under which both God and creature would fall. Cf. *Ordinatio* I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 82, pp. 137–150. For a critical response to Radical Orthodoxy that sets the record straight, so to speak, see Richard Cross, “Where Angels Fear to Tread: Duns Scotus and Radical Orthodoxy,” *Antonianum* Annus LXXVI Fasc. 1 (2001): 7–41. More shall be said about Scotus’s doctrine of univocity in what follows.

30 E.J. Ashworth, “Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan,” in *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta (Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 1991), p. 24.

31 While the exact phrase *analogia entis* is not found anywhere in the *corpus Thomisticum*, I am hesitant to accept Ralph McNerny’s claim that, with respect to Thomas, there is no analogy of being but there is an analogy of ‘being.’ Cf. McNerny, *Aquinas and Analogy* (Washington, D.C., 1996), p. 162. McNerny’s reason for his position, as is well known, stems from his claim that analogy, for the Dominican, is chiefly a matter of logic and not a metaphysical doctrine. Against this claim are those passages in Thomas where he refers to univocal, equivocal, and analogical causes, which, precisely insofar as they are causes, generate corresponding ontological communities. See *In Sent.*, I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2; *ST* I, q. 4, aa. 2, 3. One final comment: while the phrase *analogia entis* is missing from Thomas’s writings, the issue is certainly not altogether absent from the medieval context in which he

being, the latter of which was actually of greater concern for Suárez, as well as for other sixteenth-century thinkers.³²

As already mentioned, Thomas was less than explicit on what constitutes the unity of the concept of analogy (if such is even the proper way to frame the question for his own metaphysical project), however, his immediate successor and frequent antagonist, Henry of Ghent, offers some insight into the evolution of analogy from a metaphysical to a conceptual-semantic doctrine. At first glance, Henry's position seems rather similar to that of Thomas.³³ Like Thomas, Henry explains that the underpinning of analogy is based on the metaphysical similitude that results from the unequal or asymmetrical causal relationship existing between a cause and its effect.³⁴ Furthermore, Thomas and Henry agree that, with respect to the analogical relationship between God and creature (what has become known as 'transcendental analogy'),³⁵ there is no prior

was operating. Albertus Magnus, for instance, uses the phrase in a metaphysical context within his commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius's *De divinis nominibus*, a text with which Thomas literally had first-hand experience as its transcriber. Cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas vol. 1: The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C., 1996), p. 21.

- 32 Ashworth provides a helpful discussion of the historical background of the logical context of Suárez's treatment of analogy in her "Suárez on Analogy: Some Historical Background," *Vivarium* 33.1 (1995): 50–75. More remains to be said, however, about the metaphysical dimension of Suárezian analogy.
- 33 It is too much to say, however, as Richard Cross does, that the two (Aquinas and Henry) are of one mind when it comes to analogy. Cf. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, *Great Medieval Thinkers* (Oxford, 1999), p. 35. I shall not pursue the issue here, as it would take us too far from the scope of the present essay.
- 34 Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionem ordinariorum* [hereafter *SQO*] a. 21, q. 2, (Paris, 1520; reprint St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1953), fol. 124rH: "Et ita quamvis in nulla convenientia realis similitudinis in aliqua forma significata nomine entis communicet: conveniunt tamen in ente convenientia imitationis formae ad formam: quarum unam significant ens in quantum convenit Deo: aliam vero in quantum convenit creaturae." Compare this with Thomas, *In Sent.*, I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1 (ed. Mandonnet, vol. 1, p. 820): "...ergo dicendum, quod ab agente secundum formam non producitur effectus univocus, nisi quando recipiens est proportionatus ad recipiendum totam virtutem agentis, vel secundum eandem rationem..."; *ibid.*, ad 6: "...dicendum, quod inter Deum et creaturam non est similitudo per convenientiam in aliquo uno communi, sed per imitationem; unde creatura similis Deo dicitur..." It is worth noting, however, that, as Montagnes has pointed out, in Thomas's mature writing analogy turns not so much upon the diminished communication in the same form as it does upon the communication of *actualitas*. Cf., e.g., *Summa contra gentiles* I, c. 34.
- 35 See Cornelio Fabro, *Participation et causalité selon s. Thomas d'Aquinas* (Louvain-Paris), p. 510. Montagnes adopts this same terminology in his *La doctrine de l'analogie*; Wippel,

'genus', as it were, in which both God and creature participate, and on account of which they are denominated 'being'.³⁶ A significant doctrinal difference between Thomas and Henry emerges, however, when Henry addresses an objection to his own thesis that God and creature do not share being in common.³⁷ Citing Avicenna, the objection claims that 'being' (among other things) is "imprinted immediately in the mind [*anima*] by a first impression, which [impression] is not attained from anything more knowable in itself..."³⁸ All subsequent determinate 'beings' are thus known and understood through this primary concept of 'being'. Moreover, since every concept is founded upon something real, the concept of 'being' must denote some prior reality common to both God and creatures.³⁹

In his response, Henry rejects the claim that a single concept of being emerges in one's consideration of God and creature. He tells us instead that there are two irreducibly distinct concepts at issue—one pertaining to the divine being and the other to created being—and thus there is not a single reality that would serve as the basis for a common concept. Both concepts (i.e., the concept of divine and created being) stand in an analogical relationship based on the similarity that obtains between them, a similarity founded on the 'indeterminate' character that each concept possesses. That is, the concept of God's being is said to be 'negatively indeterminate' insofar as God, who is infinite and unlimited, is by His very nature incapable of being limited or determined. Our concept of created being, in contrast, is only 'privatively indeterminate', since, by its own nature, created being is able to be determined

however, uses the terms 'horizontal' and 'vertical' analogy to refer to predicamental and transcendental analogy, respectively. See Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 73–74, 543.

36 Henry, *SQO*, a. 21, q. 2 (for text, see n. 34 supra); Thomas, *In Sent.*, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; *ibid.*, I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4; *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5.

37 Here, by 'in common' I take Henry to mean shared as a common nature or genus in the same way that, say, a human and an ox both have animal nature in common.

38 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, ed. S. van Riet (Louvain-Leiden, 1977), p. 31, 32: "Dicemus igitur quod res et ens et necesse talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se, sicut credulitas quae habet prima principia, ex quibus ipsa provenit per se, et est alia ab eis, sed propter ea."

39 Henry, *SQO*, a. 21, q. 2, obj. 3 (fol. 124vF): "...dictum de pluribus quod habet per se intellectum propter intellectus illorum est aliquid reale commune ad illos: quia omnis conceptus fundatur in re aliqua, ens est huiusmodi: quia secundum Avicennam, ens imprimitur impressione prima etiam antequam in ipsa imprimitur intellectus aut creaturae aut Dei; ergo etc."

by its proper natures or forms. Deprived of such specificity, the concept of created being is one of privative indetermination.⁴⁰ Henry then explains that since negative and privative indetermination are so near (*propinquae*) to each other—that is, both are alike inasmuch as each removes determination—the intellect (mistakenly) takes them as one, such that, in the final analysis, analogy really stems from a kind of conceptual muddling. “It is the nature of an intellect incapable of distinguishing those [things] that are near [*propinqua*],” Henry writes, “to conceive as one, though in true reality they do not form [*faciunt*] one concept.”⁴¹

Duns Scotus was quick to identify the difficulties inherent in Henry’s position. If Henry were correct that the concept of being only seemed to be one because of the ‘nearness’ of the two distinct concepts to each other, then one’s ability to demonstrate the univocal unity of any concept, such as ‘man’, for instance, is ultimately compromised. One could even turn Henry’s argument against itself and argue that ‘man’ as applied to Socrates and Plato is really a matter of two concepts that only ‘seem to be one’ because of some great

40 See *ibid.*, ad 3 (fol. 124vP): “Quod autem nomine entis videatur concipi aliquid commune, est quia sive concipiatur aliquid quod est res divina, sive quod est creatura: tamen cum concipitur esse abseque eo quod determinate et distincte concipitur esse Dei vel creaturae, illud non concipitur nisi indeterminate scilicet non determinando intellectum ad esse Dei vel esse creaturae. Et habendo respectum ad distinctum intellectum Dei aut creaturae, intellexit Avicenna (si bene intellexit) quod intellectus entis prior est intellectu Dei aut creaturae. Intelligendum tamen quod illa indeterminatio alia est respectu esse Dei, et alia respectu esse creaturae: quia duplex est indeterminatio: una negativa, altera vero privative dicta. Est enim negativa indeterminatio quando indeterminatum non est natum determinari: ad modum quo Deus dicitur esse infinitus: quia non est natus finiri. Est autem privativa indeterminatio quando indeterminatum natum est determinari: ad modum quo punctus dicitur infinitus cum non est determinatus lineis quibus natus est determinari.”

41 See *ibid.* (fol. 125rS): “Et quia indeterminatio per abnegationem et per privationem propinquae sunt; quia ambae tollunt determinationem, una tamen secundum actum; alia secundum actum simul et potentiam: ideo non potentes distinguere inter huiusmodi diversa per eodem concipiunt esse simpliciter et esse indeterminatum: sive uno modo sive altero: sive fit Dei: sive creaturae. Natura enim est intellectus non potentis distinguere ea quae propinqua sunt, concipere ipsa ut unum: quae tamen in rei veritate non faciunt unum conceptum. Et ideo est error in illius conceptu.” For a contemporary treatment of Henry that rejects the ‘standard’ interpretation proposed by Jean Paulus’s *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Paris, 1938), see Jos Decorte, “Henry of Ghent on Analogy: Critical Reflections on Jean Paulus’s Interpretation,” in *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death* (1293), ed. W. Van Hamel (Leuven, 1996), pp. 71–105.

similarity.⁴² At the heart of Henry's position, as Scotus sees it, is a deep and abiding equivocity resulting in total agnosticism about the divine being, which, for the Christian theologian that Scotus is, is an untenable conclusion.⁴³ If, as Henry maintains, the concept of 'divine being' were irreducibly distinct from the concept of 'created being', then one could not conclude anything about God from any notion whatsoever proper to creatures, since the notion (*ratio*) proper to the one is diverse and irreducible to the notion (*ratio*) proper to the other.⁴⁴ The only way, then, to preserve (scientific) knowledge about the divine being is to insist that at least some concepts are predicated univocally of God and creature.

In advancing univocity, Scotus does not intend to suggest that *no* concept used in metaphysics or theology is analogous.⁴⁵ Rather, for Scotus, univocity would serve as the justification and basis for analogy. Were such not the case, then 'being'—or any other concept for that matter—predicated of God and creature would signify two irreducibly distinct concepts (as Henry holds), which would signal the demise of any and all metaphysical-theological reasoning that intends to be scientific.⁴⁶ The desire to preserve the scientific—and

42 John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1–2, q. 1, n. 30 (ed. Vatican, vol. 3, p. 20): "Quod si non cures de auctoritate illa accepta de diversitate opinionum philosophantium, sed dicas quod quilibet habet duos conceptus in intellectu suo, propinquos, qui propter propinquitatem analogiae videntur esse unus conceptus—contra hoc videtur esse quod tunc ex ista evasione videretur destructa omnis via probandi unitatem alicuius conceptus univocam: si enim dicis hominem habere unum conceptum ad Socratem et Platonem, negabitur tibi, et dicetur quod sunt duo, sed 'videntur unus' propter magnam similitudinem."

43 On Henry's position countenancing equivocity, see Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus, Great Medieval Thinkers* (Oxford, 1999), p. 35. Cf. the following, where Scotus clearly identifies Henry's understanding of the irreducible diversity involved in the concepts that pertain to God and creature, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 20 (ed. Vatican, vol. 3, pp. 11–12): "...dicit quidam doctor sic: loquendo de cognitione alicuius, distingui potest, ex parte obiecti, quod potest cognosci per se vel per accidens, in particulari vel in universali... In universali etiam, puta in generali attributo, cognoscitur: non quidem in universali secundum praedicationem quod dicatur de ipso—in quo nullum est universale, quia quiditas illa est de se singularis—sed in universali quod tantum analogice commune est sibi et creaturae; tamen quasi unum a nobis concipitur, propter proximitatem conceptuum, licet sint diversi conceptus."

44 Cf. *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 40 (ed. Vatican, vol. 3, p. 27): "Quod si dicas, alia est formalis ratio eorum quae conveniunt Deo—ex hoc sequitur inconveniens, quod nulla ratione propria eorum prout sunt in creaturis, possunt concludi de Deo, quia omnino alia et alia ratio illorum est et istorum."

45 Cf. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, p. 34.

46 Cf. *Lectura* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, n. 25 (ed. Vatican, vol. 16, p. 233): "...si conceptus dictus de Deo et creatura sit analogus et realiter duo conceptus omnino nihil cognosceremus de Deo. Consequens falsum, ergo antecedens."

thus syllogistic—character of both theology and metaphysics dominates Scotus's project, as can be seen in the very definition that he gives to the univocal concept. A univocal concept, he maintains, is such that (1) to affirm and deny it of the same thing would result in a contradiction, and (2) it can serve as a middle term in a syllogism without falling prey to the fallacy of equivocation.⁴⁷ Thus, on Scotus's account, 'being', 'goodness', 'wisdom', et cetera, all signify concepts that are univocally common to God and creature, and are not, as Henry maintains, two irreducibly distinct concepts.⁴⁸

In arguing for the univocity of the concept of being, Scotus is not suggesting that there is some reality common to both God and creature; here, he is in complete agreement with Thomas and Henry. Though creator and creature are not diverse with respect to *concept*—i.e., they both fall under the extension of the common concept 'being'—they are nevertheless diverse in reality (*in realitate*). Against Henry, then, Scotus holds that a community of the concept (of being) does not imply a real or metaphysical community,⁴⁹ which is simply to say, as many scholars have pointed out,⁵⁰ that Scotus's position on univocity is fundamentally a semantic one, and not a metaphysical doctrine. Scotus is clear on this point when he insists that the univocal concept of being does not imply that being itself is a genus, for if it did, divine simplicity would be compromised insofar as God would be 'being' in addition to some specific difference, namely, 'infinite' or 'uncreated'.⁵¹ Rather, as Scotus explains, the concept of being is determinable by intrinsic modes, such as 'finite' or 'infinite,' and not by some specific extrinsic differentiations that are 'really distinct' from

47 *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, n. 26 (ed. Vatican, vol. 3, p. 18): "Et ne fiat contentio de nomine univocationis, univocum conceptum dico, quia ita est unus quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem; sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri."

48 Cf. *Lectura* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, n. 21 (ed. Vatican, vol. 16, p. 232): "...est dicendum, in quo expresse sibi contradico, quod non concipitur Deus in conceptu communi analogo sibi et creaturae, sed in conceptu communi univoco sibi et creaturae, it quod ens et bonum et sapientia dicta de Deo et creatura univoce dicuntur de eis, et non dicunt duos conceptus."

49 Ibid., I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 82 (ed. Vatican, vol. 4, p. 190): "...quia Deus et creatura non sunt primo diversa in conceptibus; sunt tamen primo diversa in realitate, quia in nulla realitate conveniunt—et quomodo possit esse conceptus communis sine convenientia in re vel realitate..." Cf. *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 163.

50 See Cross, "Where Angels Fear to Tread"; and Thomas Williams, "The Doctrine of Univocity is True and Salutory," *Modern Theology* 21.4 (2005): 575–585.

51 Cf. *Ordinatio* I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 95–115 (ed. Vatican, vol. 4, pp. 198–207).

being.⁵² What is more, a proper concept of something resulting from the determination of a common concept (e.g., ‘being’) by an intrinsic mode (e.g., ‘finite’ or ‘infinite’) is not itself absolutely simple—or, to use Scotus’s terminology, *simpliciter simplex*—although the reality designated by the proper concept (e.g., God as signified by the concept ‘infinite being’) may itself be absolutely simple.⁵³

In describing the concept of being as *simpliciter simplex*, we are on the threshold of noting a significant but overlooked difference between the Franciscan master and Suárez. For this reason, let us pause briefly to consider the character of this Scotistic concept so as to be able to differentiate it from the Suárezian confused concept. For Scotus, concepts can be (1) *simpliciter simplex*, (2) simple, or (3) complex; the order here is one of descending determinability, with *simpliciter simplex* being most determinable (because they are greatest in extension and least in intension) and complex concepts being most determined. ‘Complex concepts,’ explains Scotus, are those concepts requiring more than one act of the intellect for their comprehension, as occurs, for instance, in forming the concept ‘white man.’ This concept is formed through at least two acts of the intellect as it understands ‘white’ and ‘man,’ in a fashion such that the concept ‘white man’ can be resolved or analyzed into more elemental concepts: ‘white’ and ‘man.’ ‘Man,’ however, is a simple concept since it can be understood by a single act of the intellect, although it can still be further resolved into more basic concepts (i.e., ‘rational’ and ‘animal’). Likewise, the concept ‘infinite being’ is a simple concept because it is grasped by a single intellection, yet it remains resolvable into simpler concepts: ‘infinite’ and ‘being.’ Modal determinations and *differentiae* predicated *in quale*, and those concepts irresolvable into simpler concepts, are *simpliciter simplex*—simply simple.⁵⁴

52 Ibid., I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 139 (ed. Vatican, vol. 4, p. 222): “Requiritur ergo distinctio, inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus communis et inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus proprius, non ut distinctio realitatis et realitatis sed ut distinctio realitatis et modi proprii et intrinseci eiusdem...”

53 While there is significant similarity between the Scotistic *conceptus simpliciter simplex* and the Suárezian common objective concept, there is a decisive and key difference between the two, which will serve precisely to distinguish the two metaphysical systems. On this distinction, see Rolf Darge, “Suárez and Medieval Transcendental Thought,” in *Hircocervi and Other Metaphysical Wonders: Essays in Honor of John P. Doyle*, ed. Victor M. Salas (Milwaukee, WI, 2013), pp. 65–93. For more on Duns Scotus’s understanding of a *conceptus simpliciter simplex*, see Allan Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1946), pp. 81–83.

54 *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, n. 71 (ed. Vatican, vol. 3, p. 49): “...conceptus ‘simpliciter simplex’ est qui non est resolubilis in plures conceptus, ut conceptus entis vel ultimae

Simpliciter simplex concepts are supremely determinable, and those that are predicated univocally *in quid* enjoy the greatest extension, allowing them to be common even to those things that are utterly diverse, such as the divine being and creatures. What is more, they provide one with an intellectual fulcrum whereby to lever one's reasoning from the plane of creation, and passing through the medium of a univocal middle term, to reach positive knowledge of the divine. Put another way, Scotus is concerned with univocity since, as he sees it, only univocal concepts possess enough unity to make possible the valid and sound syllogistic reasoning involved in any scientific metaphysics or theology, to which Duns Scotus, as a theologian, is thoroughly committed. Again, this is not to deny all forms of analogical thinking. Rather, for Scotus, if analogy is to have any validity, it can only be on the basis of a deeper univocity whereupon the analogical relations of 'finite being' to 'infinite being' can be established in a meaningful fashion. Whereas for Henry the two concepts of divine being and created being are irreducibly simple and thus irreducibly distinct (on account of which equivocity looms as an unavoidable consequence), for Scotus, analogical similitude must ultimately rest upon a common univocal concept of being. Univocity thus provides for the possibility of all metaphysics and theology. In fact, Scotus contends, all the *magistri* and theologians have made use of univocity when examining the divine attributes; they contradict themselves, however, when they claim to ascribe creaturely perfections to God

differentiae. Conceptum vero simplicem sed 'non-simpliciter simplicem' voco, quicumque potest concipi ab intellectu actu simplicis intelligentiae, licet posset resolve in plures conceptus, seorsum conceptibiles." See also, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, n. 51 (ed. Vatican, vol. 4, p. 34): "Quilibet conceptus simpliciter simplex, scilicet univocationis, est imperfectior positive quam verbum albi, hoc est non tantam perfectionem ponit; tamen est perfectior permissive, quia abstrahit a limitatione, et ita est conceptibilis sub infinitate: et tunc ille conceptus—simplex quidem, non tamen simpliciter simplex—scilicet 'ens infinitum,' erit perfectior verbo albi, et ille proprius Deo, non autem ille prior, communis, abstractus ab albedine. Unde via univocationis tenet quod omnis conceptus proprius Deo est perfectior verbo cuiuscumque creati, sed alia non sic." Cf. *Lectura* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, n. 68 (ed. Vatican, vol. 16, p. 250): "...conceptus simplex qui concipitur una intellectione et uno actu intelligendi, est duplex, scilicet conceptus simpliciter simplex et conceptus non simpliciter simplex. Conceptus autem simpliciter simplex est ille conceptus qui non est resolubililis in alios conceptus priores; conceptus autem non simpliciter simplex est ille qui est resolubililis in conceptus priores, ut conceptus hominis resolvitur in conceptum generis et differentiae—et similiter definitio sic est conceptus non simpliciter simplex, licet simplici actu intelligendi concipiatur. Unde ille conceptus dicitur non simplex qui pluribus actibus concipitur, sicut ens per accidens, ut 'homo albus,' et etiam alia complexa."

after first having removed any imperfections that follow upon a creaturely mode of being.⁵⁵

3 Suárez's Solution to the Problem of the One and the Many

Whereas for Scotus, 'univocity' remained only a semantico-conceptual tool, prescinding from any metaphysical claims, Suárez regards 'analogy' as both properly metaphysical and conceptual.⁵⁶ That is to say, the *concept* of being is analogical because of the priority and posteriority that the concept expresses, both of which are metaphysical in character. Suárez employs his doctrine of analogy at a crucial stage within his metaphysical project,⁵⁷ where he transitions from a consideration of the concept of being in general to a treatment of being as it descends to its *inferiora* or determinate modes (viz., infinite-finite being, substantial-accidental being, etc.). As has already been mentioned, in the first part of the *Disputationes metaphysicae* Suárez identified the proper object of metaphysics as the common objective concept of being, which is utterly simple (*simplicissimus*) in its unity.⁵⁸ Now, in transitioning to a declension, so to speak, of 'being' to its *inferiora*, Suárez faces the problem of faithfully mirroring the vast diversity of *entia* in a concept that in itself remains absolutely simple. As we have seen, there is precedence for such a task in Scotus, and one is hardly surprised when Suárez's own account of the descent of the concept of being in many ways parallels the Scotistic diversification of being across the various disjunctive transcendentals: 'infinite-finite,'⁵⁹ 'necessary-contingent,'⁶⁰ 'uncreated-created,'⁶¹ and so forth.

55 Cf. *Lectura* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, n. 29 (ed. Vatican, vol. 16, p. 235): "...omnes magistri et theologi videntur uti conceptu communi Deo et creaturae, licet contradicant verbo quando applicant, nam in hoc conveniunt omnes quod accipiunt conceptus metaphysicales et removendo illud quod est imperfectionis in creaturis, attribuunt Deo quod est perfectio- nis, ut bonitatem, veritatem et sapientiam."

56 See *DM* 28.3.18. Cf. with *ibid.*, 28.3.20 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 20): "Ens autem est analogum etiam metaphysice secundum commune objectivum conceptum, quamvis secundum illas dialecticas definitiones videatur sub univocis comprehendendi. Est ergo haec respon- sio probabilis, nimium tamen favet univocationi entis."

57 Viz., *DM* 28, the beginning of the second part of the *Disputationes metaphysicae*.

58 Cf. *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "In hac ergo disputatione, praecipue intendimus explicare conceptum objectivum entis ut sic, secundum totam abstractionem suam, secundum quam diximus esse metaphysicae objectum..."

59 Cf. Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 14, 15 (ed. Vatican, vol. 4, p. 206, 207); Suárez, *DM* 28.1.1–5.

60 Cf. Scotus, *ibid.*; Suárez, *ibid.*, 28.1.8–12.

61 Cf. Suárez, *ibid.*, 28.1.14.

There is, however, a crucial difference between the Suárezian and Scotistic accounts. For Suárez, while the concept of being prescind from all its inferiors and thereby retains its own inviolable unity, the unity proper to the *conceptus entis* does not amount to univocity. Univocity, according to Suárez, implies indifference as predicated of its *inferiora*, but the concept of being, we are told, implies an ordered relation that flies in the face of univocity.⁶² Suárezian analogy thus involves two major elements, namely, (1) the unity of the concept of being, and (2) an ordered relation that is represented in that very concept itself. We shall now take each of these up in turn.

3.1 *The Unity of the Concept of Being*

Suárez's concern for preserving the unity of the concept of being, as was the case with Scotus, very much has to do with maintaining the scientific character of metaphysics.⁶³ The Jesuit approaches the unity of the *conceptus entis* against the backdrop of a by-then common scholastic distinction between objective and formal concepts.⁶⁴ A formal concept, Suárez explains, is the act itself of the intellect intending an object, by virtue of which some thing or common feature is known.⁶⁵ The objective concept, however, is that thing or *ratio* that is immediately known or represented through the formal concept.⁶⁶ Properly speaking, it is a concept only by means of extrinsic denomination; it is the thing itself, but under the aspect of its being known or apprehended.⁶⁷ Suárez further explains that while a formal concept, inasmuch as it is a quality

62 See *DM* 28.3.17.

63 For a critical treatment of Suárez's epistemological commitments in relation to his doctrine of analogy, see Francisco L. Peccorini, "Suárez's Struggle with the Problem of the One and the Many," *The Thomist* 36 (1972): 433–471.

64 Cf. Pedro da Fonseca, *In libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagirita* (Cologne, 1615), lib. 4, c. 2, q. 1, sec. 1: "*Conceptus formalis nihil est aliud, quam actualis similitudo rei, quae intelligitur, ab intellectu ad eam exprimendam producta.*"

65 *DM* 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 64): "...conceptus formalis dicitur actus ipse, seu (quod idem est) verbum quo intellectus rem aliquam seu communem rationem concipit..." Cf. John P. Doyle, "Suarez on the Analogy of Being (Parts 1 and 2)," *The Modern Schoolman* 46 (1969): p. 226.

66 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "Conceptus objectivus dicitur res illa, vel ratio, quae proprie et immediate per conceptum formalem cognoscitur seu repraesentatur..." Cf. Doyle, "Suárez on Analogy," p. 226.

67 Ibid., 2.1.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "...non est conceptus ut forma intrinsece terminans conceptionem, sed ut objectum et materia circa quam versatur formalis conceptio, et ad quam mentis acies directe tendit..."; ibid., 2.2.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 70): "...sed conceptus objectivus nihil aliud est quam objectum ipsum, ut cognitum vel apprehensum per talem conceptum formalem..." Cf. Doyle, "Suárez on Analogy," p. 226.

inherent in the intellect,⁶⁸ is always singular or an individual thing, an objective concept can be an individual thing, a universal,⁶⁹ or even something that lacks any positive reality altogether, such as a privation or being of reason.⁷⁰

The relationship between formal and objective concepts, and especially the fact that the latter may include universals or particulars, is of special importance to Suárez's task of developing a science of being as such. Prescinding from all particular, incidental, and contingent conditions that accrue to being in its real instantiations, the objective concept of being satisfies the requirements of an Aristotelian science since it considers being *per se*. Because the objective concept can represent the universal and essential properties of being as such, it can serve as the adequate object of metaphysics.⁷¹ Thus, through a single concept, all beings, whatever be their mode or categorial determination, can be considered in terms of their community or commonality, that is to say, in terms of the fact that each stands outside of nothing.⁷²

For the metaphysician, the objective concept of being also has the salutary character of bridging the gulf between finite and infinite being, but, again, only under the condition that it leave behind or prescind from all differences or determinations proper to specific *kinds* of being. Because the objective concept is denuded, as it were, of all such specifying conditions, it enjoys a unity

68 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "...formalis semper est vera ac positiva res et in creaturis qualitas menti inhaerens..."

69 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "Item conceptus formalis semper est res singularis et individua, quia est res producta per intellectum, eique inhaerens; conceptus autem objectivus interdum quidem esse potest res singularis, et individua, quatenus menti obijci potest, et per actum formalem concipi, saepe vero est res universalis vel confusa et communis, ut est homo, substantia et similia." Cf. Doyle, "Suarez on Analogy," p. 226.

70 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 65): "...objectivus vero non semper est vera res positiva; concipimus enim interdum privationes, et alia, quae vocantur entia rationis, quia solum habent esse objective in intellectu."

71 *DM* 6.5.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 223): "Et hoc modo dicitur esse scientia de universalibus, et non de singularibus, non quia sit de nominibus et non singularibus, sed quia est de conceptibus objectivis communibus, qui, licet in re ipsa non distinguantur a singularibus, distinguuntur tamen ratione...Quod non satis adverterunt Nominales, et ideo aliter locuti sunt, quamvis in re non multum a nobis differant, ut diximus." For Aristotle's account of a science, see *Posterior Analytics*, 1.18.81a37-81b9. Cf. Doyle, "Suarez on Analogy," p. 229. For common objective concept of being identified as object of metaphysics, see *DM* 2.1.1, text cited in n. 58 supra.

72 *DM* 2.2.8 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 72): "Dico ergo primo, conceptui formali entis respondere unum conceptum obiectivum adaequatum, et immediatum, qui expresse non dicit substantiam, neque accidens, neque Deum, nec creaturam, sed haec omnia per modum unius, scilicet quatenus sunt inter se aliquo modo similia, et conveniunt in essendo."

unto itself that would be compromised were any particular modes or kinds of being considered. Concerned with preserving the unity of the objective concept, Suárez warns us:

[I]f the character of being [*ratio entis*] just as it is in God essentially includes something other than it does in a creature, then that character [*ratio*] cannot be one in such a way that it is represented by one formal concept and that it constitutes one objective concept; for it cannot be understood that in one concept as such there would be an essential variety.⁷³

Moreover, if being cannot be known through one concept, nothing could be known of God, since finite and infinite being would be equivocal, which is the point Scotus had made. In short, both metaphysics and theology would succumb to the fallacy of equivocation and thereby abandon their scientific character. Thus, if the objective concept of being preserves a basic unity under which all beings fall, it could serve as a medium of demonstration (*medium demonstrationis*) across diverse orders or modes of being, thereby preserving the scientific character of metaphysics.⁷⁴

Without a doubt, Scotus and Suárez share a great deal in common, especially in their fidelity to the sacrosanct unity of the *conceptus entis*. One is hardly surprised that when Suárez addresses the question of whether being is said analogously of God and creature, he hears the Scotistic position with great sympathy. Reporting that position, Suárez writes: “[S]ince being immediately signifies one concept common to God and creature; it is therefore not said of them analogically, but univocally.”⁷⁵ The Jesuit tells his reader that he agrees with the antecedent, the demonstration of which is provided in the first disputation of his own work.⁷⁶ Suárez even admits that being is very similar to

73 Ibid., 28.3.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 15): “...si ratio entis, prout est in Deo, aliud essentialiter includit quam ut in creatura, ergo non potest illa ratio ita esse una, ut uno conceptu formali repraesentetur et unum conceptum obiectivum constituat; nam intelligi non potest, quod in conceptu uno ut sic, sit varietas essentialis.”

74 Cf. ibid., 28.3.15 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 18): “Denique jam supra ostensum est, ens uno conceptu dici de omnibus sub illo contentis, ideoque posse esse medium demonstrationis, et rationem entis in creaturis inventam posse esse initium inveniendi simile rationem altiori modo in creatore existentem.”

75 Ibid., 28.3.2 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 13): “...quia ens immediate significant conceptum unum commune Deo et creaturis; ergo non dicitur de illis analogice, sed univoce.”

76 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 13): “Antecedens probatum a nobis est in disputatione prima hujus operis.”

univocal terms because it can be predicated simply of God and creature by means of one concept.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, he rejects the Scotistic conclusion. The obvious question here is: how can Suárez, in embracing the absolute unity of the concept of being, avoid drawing the same conclusion as Scotus? If anything, it seems that admitting the interplay of similarity and dissimilarity involved in analogy would compromise the unity of the concept of being. To answer this concern, we are led to the second element of Suárez's doctrine of analogy noted above, namely, the ontological implications of the concept of being insofar as it is analogical.

3.2 *The Expression of an Ordered Relation*

Scotus was clear on what he meant by univocity⁷⁸; so, too, was Suárez. As already noted, according to Suárez, that is univocal "which, of itself, is indifferent such that it descends equally to its inferiors and without any order or relation of one to another,"⁷⁹ which is to say that the univocity or analogicity of a concept is determined according to the relation it has to its *inferiora*.⁸⁰ As Suárez sees it, the concept of being does not exhibit indifference in relation to its *inferiora*, since:

Being itself, however abstractly and confusedly (*confuse*) conceived, of itself demands this order: first, through itself and completely, as it were, it agrees with God and through that descends to remaining things, in which it [i.e., being] is because of a relationship to and dependence on God.⁸¹

Pertaining first (*per prius*) to God and secondarily (*per posterius*) to creatures, being does not descend indifferently—as would be required for univocal concepts—to its inferiors, nor is it predicated equally of them, which leads to the

77 Ibid., 28.3.17 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 19): "...sine dubio habet ens magnam similitudinem cum terminis univocis, cum medio uno conceptu absolute et sine addito de Deo et creatura praedicetur, quam solam convenientiam considerarunt, qui illud univocum appellarunt..."

78 See n. 47 *supra*.

79 *DM* 28.3.17 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 19): "...nam univocum ex se ita est indifferens, ut aequaliter, et sine ullo ordine vel habitudine unius ad alterum, ad inferior descendat..."

80 See D. Heider, "Is Suárez' Concept of Being Analogical or Univocal?" p. 28.

81 *DM* 28.3.17 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 19): "...quia ipsum ens quantumvis abstracte et confuse conceptum, ex vi sua postulat hunc ordinem, ut primo ac per se, et quasi complete competat Deo, et per illud descendat ad reliqua, quibus non insit, nisi cum habitudine et dependentia Deo..."

following questions: (1) what is the reason for the ordered relation expressed in the concept of being, and (2) how can that relation be expressed in a unified *conceptus objectivus entis* that is *simplicissimus*?

To answer the first question, one might simply advert to the unequal relations of priority and posteriority contained in Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics of participation, which, in many ways, provides the basis for the Angelic Doctor's own doctrine of analogy.⁸² God, in the common medieval and scholastic view, is being itself, or being *per essentiam*. Creatures, however, have being only *per participationem*, and in their participation enjoy a similitude to the divine being.⁸³ Summarizing Thomas's thinking on the matter, Suárez writes: "A creature is essentially a being through its participation in the being that is in God by essence and as in the first and universal font from whom some participation of it to all others is derived."⁸⁴ In other words, every creature *is*—that is, has being—only on account of its ontological relationship to and dependence upon God.⁸⁵ Thomas, as we have suggested, appeals to this metaphysical relationship and finds in it the basis for his doctrine of analogy, and since here the relationship is one wherein the effect does not equate to the total power of its cause, any univocal community is impeded.⁸⁶

82 For more on the relationship between participation and analogy in Thomas, see Rudi A. Te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden, 1995), c. 6. Note also Montagnes, *La doctrine de l'analogie*, p. 10: "Participation, causalité et analogie son les trois aspects sous lesquels la philosophie aborde l'être..."

83 Cf., e.g., Thomas, *In Sent.*, I, d. 48, q. 1, a. 1; *ST I*, q. 4, aa. 2, 3.

84 *DM* 28.3.16 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 18): "...creatura essentialiter est ens, per participationem ejus esse, quod in Deo est per essentiam et ut in primo et universali fonte, ex quo ad omnia alia derivatur aliqua ejus participatio..."

85 *Ibid.* (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 18): "...omnis ergo creatura est ens per aliquam habitudinem ad Deum, quatenus scilicet participat, vel aliquo modo imitatur esse Dei, et quatenus habet esse, essentialiter pendet a Deo, multo magis, quam pendeat accidens a substantia."

86 Suárez (not inaccurately) summarizes Thomas's position as follows (*DM* 28.3.8 [ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 15]): "...ratio entis dicitur esse in Deo per essentiam, in creaturis vero per participationem. Item dicitur esse in illo quasi totaliter, id est, quasi unite complectens totum ens, in aliis vero quasi divisa per partes; ergo longe inferiori et inadaequato modo reperitur ratio entis in creaturis respectu Dei, et consequenter non dicitur de illis univoce, neque secundum eandem omnino rationem..." Compare this passage with Thomas's own account in *In Sent.*, I, d. 48, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. Mandonnet, vol. 1, p. 1080): "...unum quod participative habet formam, imitatur illud quod essentialiter habet... Et talis similitudo quae ponit compositionem in uno et simplicitatem in alio, potest esse creaturae ad Deum participantis bonitatem vel sapientiam, vel aliquid hujusmodi, quorum unumquodque in Deo est essential ejus..."; cf. also *ibid.*, I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. Mandonnet, vol. 1, p. 198): "...est tertius modus causae agentis analogice. Unde patet quod divinum esse producit esse

Interestingly and significantly, Suárez does not avail himself of Thomas's argument for the reason that, though it effectively demonstrates the non-univocity of being, in adverting to the difference between being *per essentiam* and being *per participationem*, the argument goes 'too far' and compromises the unity of the common *conceptus entis*.⁸⁷ Suárez goes on to argue:

[I]f the character [*ratio*] of being as it is in God essentially includes something other than as it is in a creature, that character [*ratio*] cannot be one such that it would be represented by one formal concept and constituted by one objective concept, for one cannot understand that in one concept as such there be an essential variety.⁸⁸

Similar to the *conceptus simpliciter simplex*, the unity of the concept of being, according to Suárez, prescinds from any and all determinations, for were it to include any determinations, it would not be a simple concept of 'being,' but instead the concepts 'essential being' or 'participatory being,' 'finite being' or 'infinite being,' 'substance' or 'accident,' and so forth, none of which can be known by one concept.⁸⁹

Nevertheless, Suárez points out that the unitary concept of being prescinds from any and all determinations, not in such a way that those determinations are denied, but rather, they are simply left out of consideration, such that—leaving behind any *differentia* that would contract or specify 'being' to this or that kind of being—one is left with a unified concept that lacks any differentiation or division within itself. But now a further question arises: how can Suárez preserve the unitary concept of being, prescinding from all essential variations, determinations, differences, et cetera, and simultaneously maintain that this simple concept somehow expresses an order of priority and

creaturae in similitudine sui imperfecta: et ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, a quo omne esse creatum effective et exemplariter manat."

87 *DM* 28.3.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 15): "...nimirum non solum probarent ens non esse univocum, sed etiam non habere unum commune conceptum objectivum Deo et creaturis, quod in superioribus probavimus falsum esse..."

88 *Ibid.* (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 15): "...si ratio entis, prout in Deo, aliud essentialiter includit, quam ut in creatura, ergo non potest illa ratio ita esse una, ut uno conceptu formali repraesentetur et unum conceptum objectivum constituat; nam intelligi non potest, quod in conceptu uno ut sic, sit varietas essentialis."

89 *Ibid.*, 28.3.18 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 20): "Nam ens, prout includens inferiora secundum proprias rationes, non est ens tantum, sed est en finitum et infinitum, substantia et accidens, et caetera, quae sicut non possunt secundum proprias rationes uno conceptu a nobis concipi, ita nec uno nomine significari..."

posteriority? In other words, how can one think difference in the self-same simplicity of the objective concept of being?

One noted Suárez interpreter, John P. Doyle, has observed this same tension in the Suárezian doctrine of analogy and suggests that the Jesuit's notion of 'aptitudinal being' is the key to unlocking the difficulty.⁹⁰ Suárez's account of aptitudinal being emerges against the backdrop of yet another common scholastic distinction,⁹¹ namely, that between being taken either as a participle or as a noun. As a participle, 'being' signifies that which exercises actual—as opposed to merely possible—existence.⁹² Nominal being (i.e., being taken as a noun) has an even greater extension than participial being, and signifies not only an actually existent being but also 'being in potency,' as well as 'being inasmuch as it is *apt* to exist.'⁹³ This latter division of being (i.e., nominal being) includes both possible being⁹⁴ (i.e., a being with a real essence but whose actual existence is negated) and aptitudinal being⁹⁵ (i.e., a real being whose consideration does not add a negation of actual existence but simply prescind, that is to say, abstracts from that existence without excluding or denying it).⁹⁶ Whether Suárez identifies possible being with aptitudinal being *tout court* is a scholarly controversy into which we need not presently

90 Doyle, "Suarez on Analogy," p. 323ff.

91 The previous distinction identified was that between formal and objective concepts.

92 *DM* 2.4.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 88): "Ens ergo, ut dictum est, interdum sumitur ut participium verbi *sum*, et ut sic significant actum essendi, ut exercitum, estque idem quod existens actu..."

93 Ibid. (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 88): "...interdum vero sumitur ut nomen significans de formali essentiam ejus rei, quae habet vel potest habere esse, non ut exercitum actu, sed in potentia vel aptitudine..." Given that being as a noun (*ens ut nomen*) signifies actual, potential, and aptitudinal being, it has greater extension than does participial being and becomes the object of Suárez's metaphysics, the science of *all* being, whether actual or only possible. Cf. Doyle, "Suarez on Analogy," p. 228.

94 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.4.1 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 91): "...negationem seu privationem addit ens in potentia."

95 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.4.9 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 90): "...*ens* secundum illam duplicem acceptionem non significare duplicem rationem entis, dividentem aliquam commune rationem, seu conceptum commune, sed significare conceptum entis, magis vel minus praecisum: *ens* enim in vi nominis sumptum significant id, quod habet essentiam realem, praescindendo ab actuali existentia, non quidem excludendo illam, seu negando, sed praecise tantum abstrahendo... Ita ergo *ens* non significat conceptum aliquem commune enti nominaliter et participialiter sumpto, sed immediate habet suplicem significationem, qua significant, vel *ens* praescindendo ab actuali existentia, vel *ens* actu existens."

96 For more on the difference between possible and aptitudinal being, see Pereira, *Suárez*, pp. 107–109, 129–131.

enter.⁹⁷ Here, it will be sufficient to note that, as Suárez understands it, aptitudinal being signifies at least this much: something inasmuch as it is apt to exist. Accordingly, aptitudinal being denotes a certain relationship or order to existence, and it is this 'order,' as we shall see, that is of chief importance for the Suárezian doctrine of analogy.⁹⁸

What is fundamentally at issue here for Suárez as he unfolds his doctrine of analogy is the relationship between the absolutely simple and unified *ratio entis* and its diverse modal determinations. Scotus, as we saw, dealt with this same issue. While not going so far as to admit a *distinctio in re* between 'being' and its mode, Scotus posits a weaker, so to speak, modal distinction (which precedes any operation of the intellect) between 'being' and its mode. For Suárez, however, the distinction between 'being' and its mode is a *distinctio rationis ratiocinate* that, while having a foundation in reality (*cum fundamento in re*), has less a basis in reality than it does in the intellect. Suárez describes such a distinction as follows:

[It] is formed through inadequate concepts of the same thing; for although the same thing is conceived through each [concept], through neither, however, is all that is in the thing exactly conceived, nor is its entire quiddity and its objective character [*ratio*] exhausted, which [distinction] is often made conceiving that thing through a relationship to diverse things or to their mode; and therefore such a distinction always has a foundation in reality, formally, however, it is said to be made by inadequate concepts of the same thing.⁹⁹

97 See Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, pp. 98–99. Pereira argues against Gilson's interpretation in Suárez, p. 120, 121. Stemming from the Gilsonian tradition, see also Doyle, "Suarez on the Reality of the Possibles," *The Modern Schoolman* 44 (1967): 29–48. For another view, see Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens Die Formale Bestimmung Der Seiendheit Und Realitat in Der Metaphysik Des Mittelalters Und Der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus, Suarez, Wolff, Kant, Peirce)* (Hamburg, 1990), p. 264, 265, 293.

98 *DM* 2.3.14 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 92): "...quamvis ergo actu esse non sit de essentia creaturae, tamen ordo ad esse, vel aptitudo essendi est de intrinseco et essentiali conceptu ejus; atque hoc modo ens praedicatum est essentiale..."; cf. Doyle, "Suarez on Analogy," p. 326, 327.

99 *Ibid.*, 7.1.5 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 251): "...fit per conceptus inadequatos eiusdem rei; nam, licet per utrumque eadem res concipiatur, per neutrum tamen exacte concipitur totum id, quod est in re, neque exhauritur tota quidditas, et ratio obiectiva ejus, quod saepe fit concipiendo rem illam per habitudinem ad res diversas, vel ad modum earum, et ideo talis distinctio semper habet fundamentum in re, formaliter autem dicitur fieri per conceptus inadequatos eiusdem rei." Cf. Pereira, *Suárez*, p. 71; Heider, "Is Suárez's Concept of Being Analogical or Univocal?"

The distinction between 'being' and its mode, though having a basis in reality, arises as a function of our *conceptualization*.¹⁰⁰ We can either conceive something more confusedly (i.e., in a less determined or inadequate way) or, tuning our conception more finely as one focuses a microscope, we can conceive the same reality in accordance with its particular determination. Given (1) Suárez's realist commitment and the direct proportional relationship he ascribes to knowing and reality, that is to say, between formal and objective concepts,¹⁰¹ and (2) given the fact that there is no distinction *ex natura rei* between being and its modes, it follows for Suárez that there is no real distinction between the objective concept of being and its inferiors. Therefore, Suárez holds that the objective concept of (aptitudinal) being includes within itself all the determinations and differences of its *inferiora*.¹⁰² Daniel Heider elegantly expresses Suárez's unique teaching regarding the concept of being as follows: "There is a certain duality in the objective concept of being, which allows us to consider the objective concept of being both as the subject and as the *terminus* of the descent."¹⁰³ Such being the case, the relation or order to existence that aptitudinal being carries with it is preserved in its (confused) conceptual expression. In a passage that deserves quoting at length, Suárez explains:

[A]lthough the common concept [of being as such], as abstract, is one in itself, however, the reasons constituting the particular beings are diverse, and by them, as such, each is constituted absolutely in the existence of being. Then...the common concept of itself postulates such a determination with the order and relationship to one [or to a single Being]; and therefore, just as this concept is one, it is not altogether the same, because it is not of itself altogether uniform—a uniformity and identity which

100 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.3.12 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 86): "...cavendum est ne modum concipiendi nostrum transferamus ad res ipsas, et propter diversum loquendi modum existimemus esse distinctionem in rebus, ubi vere non est."

101 Cf. *ibid.*, 2.2.24; on this point, see Pereira, *Suárez*, pp. 136–139, 173–174. Pereira locates the beginning of modernity's turn toward subjectivity with this particular passage of Suárez. Pereira argues that Suárez anticipates Descartes's turn towards the subjective as the measure and standard of reality by making the formal concept, which is better known (*notior*), the standard and measure of the objective concept.

102 Cf. Doyle, "Suarez on Analogy," p. 327. In this regard, Heider rightly notes: "...we can understand the *inferiora* both as the very objective concepts of being, and also as *inferiora* of the objective concept of being" (art. cit., p. 36).

103 Heider, "Is Suárez's Concept of Being Analogical or Univocal?," p. 36.

univocals require in their meaning—and it is in this manner that the definition of univocals ought to be explained.¹⁰⁴

Parting from the Scotistic position, which holds that the *conceptus entis* is *simpliciter simplex*,¹⁰⁵ Suárez holds, in contrast, that the concept of being is a confused one and expresses diverse *rationes* or relations to existence.¹⁰⁶ To say that the *conceptus entis* is ‘confused’ is to say that it is indistinct and, as such, it includes in itself its inferiors, not explicitly or in terms of their specific uniqueness, but as leaving aside (though not denying or rejecting) that specificity, whereby the concept attains a consideration of its *inferiora* in terms of their community in existence (*in essendo*). In other words, the *conceptus entis* is nothing other than its inferiors. While being transcends its *inferiora* prescissively and thereby attains a unity unto itself, it nevertheless remains ‘intimately transcendent,’ as Suárez puts it: “[T]he character of being [*ratio entis*] [is] transcendent and intimately included in all properties and in all determinate kinds of being, and in the determinate modes of being themselves.”¹⁰⁷ Again, in contrast to the Scotistic position, being in its descent to its inferiors does not descend equally and thus precludes the possibility of univocity, since, as we have seen, univocity demands an equal descent or indifference, which is incommensurate with the relation of priority or posteriority that the Suárezian concept of being demands.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly, the confused objective concept of

104 *DM* 28.3.21 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 21): “Deinde (quod ad rem maxime spectat) ipsamet ratio communis ex se postulat talem determinationem cum ordine et habitudine ad unum, et ideo, licet secundum confusam rationem sit eadem, sicut est una, nihilominus non est omnino eadem, quia non est ex se omnino uniformis, quam uniformitatem et identitatem requirunt univoca in ratione sua, et ita debet definitio univocorum exponi.”

105 See, e.g., Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2, 49, n. 71; *Lectura* I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1–2, 118, 119, n. 24; cf. Étienne Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot*, p. 95, 96, n. 2; cf. Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus: Great Medieval Thinkers* (Oxford, 1999), p. 38, 39.

106 Cf. *DM* 26.3.21; *ibid.*, 2.6.7 (ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 101): “Sic igitur his conceptibus formalibus intelliguntur correspondere duo objectivi simplices, et irresolubiles in plures conceptus, quorum unus dicitur superior vel abstractior alio, solum quia respondet confusiori conceptui formali, per quem non concipitur res secundum determinatum modum quo est in se, sed confuse et praecise.”

107 *Ibid.*, 28.3.21 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 21): “...rationem entis esse transcendentem, et intime inclusam in omnibus propriis ac determinatis rationibus entium, et in ipsis modis determinantibus ipsum ens...”; cf. Pereira, *Suárez*, p. 74, and Heider, “Is Suárez’s Concept of Being Analogical or Univocal?”

108 *Ibid.*, 28.3.17 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 19): “...nam univocum ex se ita est indifferens, ut aequaliter, et sine ullo ordine vel habitudine unius ad alterum, ad inferiora descendat...”

aptitudinal being provides Suárez with a means of preserving the simplicity or unity that the concept of being requires, while opening a space within that very concept for dissimilarity or inequality of relations on account of which the concept is analogical. Suárez offers the following as a succinct summary of his doctrine of analogy:

But in fact this analogy of being is entirely founded in and arises from things themselves that are subordinated to and of necessity refer to one inasmuch as they are beings; and therefore the name of being could not be imposed to signify confusedly that which has being, without consequently having to signify many [things] with a relation to one; and that would be an analogy, not through transference, but through a true and proper signification.¹⁰⁹

4 Conclusion

Whether or not the confused concept of being constitutes a completely satisfactory answer to the problem of the one and the many ultimately depends upon the coherence of Suárez's complete teaching on aptitudinal being, considered in its own right. Some have pointed out certain difficulties involved in Suárez's account, claiming that it goes too far in granting a kind of quasi-positive reality to merely possible beings, apart even from God's creative causality,¹¹⁰ thus taking a step towards the 'tinologies' of early modern philosophy.¹¹¹ Others find in the Suárezian conception of being an instance of *Seinsvergessenheit*,¹¹² which goes hand-in-hand with onto-theology, the dreaded monster of so many postmodern theorists.¹¹³

109 Ibid., 28.3.22 (ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 21): "At vero haec analogia entis omnino fundatur, et oritur ex rebus ipsis, quae ita sunt subordinatae, ut necessario ad unum referantur, quatenus entia sunt, ideoque non potuit nomen entis imponi ad significandum confuse id, quod habet esse, quin consequenter habuerit significare multa cum habitudine ad unum, atque ita fuerit analogum, non per translationem, sed per veram et propriam significationem."

110 Cf. Doyle, "Suarez on Analogy," pp. 335–341.

111 Cf. Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique*, p. 533ff.

112 Cf. Doyle, "Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics," *The Modern Schoolman* 49 (1972): 201–220.

113 See Marion, *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes*, esp. c. 6; John Milbank, *The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 40–41. For a critical appraisal of

Space prevents pursuing the issue further, and so I must be content here with only having touched upon Suárez's account of aptitudinal being vis-à-vis the confused concept, insofar as it pertains to his teaching on analogy. Loose ends notwithstanding, it is safe to say that this Suárezian notion of aptitudinal being as represented through a confused concept does indeed constitute an original contribution to the solution of the problem of the one and the many. It is a solution that clearly departs from the Thomistic doctrine of analogy insofar as Thomas proceeds on the basis of a radical diversity within real being that finds its unity only within God who, as being itself, is the measure of all participated being. The danger here, at least as Suárez sees it, is one we have already noted: the unity of the concept of being would seem to be compromised. At the same time, despite the concern for preserving the conceptual unity of being that Suárez shares with Scotus, the confused concept of (aptitudinal) being wards off all indifference proper to the univocal *conceptus simpliciter simplex*. In short, one can well understand the Suárezian doctrine of analogy as lying somewhere between Thomism and Scotism.

Radical Orthodoxy's indictment of Suárez regarding onto-theology, see Richard Cross, "Duns Scotus and Suárez on the Origins of Modernity," in *Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric and Truth*, ed. Wayne Hankey and Douglas Hedley (Burlington, VT, 2005), pp. 65–80.

Epilogue

The fourteen chapters of this volume do not claim to touch every aspect of Suárez's thought—for indeed his *oeuvre* is enormous! The essays, however, do highlight a number of elements of particular importance for the study of Suárez, while pointing as well to areas for further research.

One theme that emerges clearly from the present study is the breadth and originality of the Spanish Jesuit. As José Pereira notes in his contribution, the *Opera Omnia* of the *Doctor eximius* consists of fourteen books, twenty-six volumes, and around twenty-one million words. Although Suárez primarily considered himself a theologian, one may argue that his most outstanding contribution to the history of thought might be his systematization of metaphysics. Here, the Jesuit thinker not only added order to chaos, but he also generated profoundly original theories that went beyond the common metaphysical currency of his time. As noted at the opening of this volume, there has been a tendency to regard Suárez as a 'channel' through which Greek philosophy and scholasticism passed through to modernity.¹ While there can be little doubt about Suárez's importance to the history of philosophy, the creative originality of his own thought makes the *Doctor eximius* much more than a mere conduit or custodial vessel of sacred wisdom. Several chapters in the present volume have shown that Suárez moved well beyond the metaphysics of Aristotle, as well as those of Aquinas and Scotus, so as to create a 'super-system' of his own.

At the end of the day, Suárez is neither a Thomist nor a Scotist (nor any other '-ist' one may choose to add). Nevertheless, his abiding reverence for these bastions of scholasticism, his thorough familiarity with their doctrines down to the minutest detail, and his willingness to give all a fair hearing have led some, at best, to identify Suárez as a (confused) member of one of the above-mentioned schools, or, at worst, to cast him aside as merely an eclectic thinker with no synthetic insight of his own. Along these lines, Gilson once wrote that in evaluating various philosophical theses, Suárez would—much like a "dispassionate judge" who "never wanders far from the truth"—content "himself with a 'near miss'."² If Suárez were aiming for a re-presentation of a Thomistic or a Scotistic position, then, yes, the *Doctor eximius* may well have

1 Armand Maurer and Martin Heidegger have made such suggestions; cf. the opening chapter, pp. 1, 27, 28 *supra*.

2 Cf. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 99.

missed the mark—and sometimes by miles! But Suárez knew exactly what he was aiming at, and it was the articulation of a metaphysical system that, while sharing a common vocabulary with many other scholastics, was reducible to none. Gilson was certainly correct when he said that, in considering Suárez's metaphysics vis-à-vis someone like Thomas Aquinas, at some point one must reach "absolutely primitive positions and...primitive philosophical options."³ Nothing could be truer. Yet here, one must recognize precisely the truly primordial and irreducible character of those positions, and not lament their lack of identity or even incompatibility. The contributions of Darge, Heider, Renemann, and Salas, in particular, have sought to make this point clear by emphasizing the unique features of Suárez's metaphysical thought. Suárez is very much his own man—whether discussing the subject of metaphysics, the epistemology of universals, the nature of concepts, the meaning of analogy, or beings of reason.

Accordingly, students of metaphysics need to understand the Suárezian system according to its own logic. The days are gone when facile descriptions of Suárez as an essentialist or a voluntarist can be taken seriously. More and more historians of philosophy are recognizing the place of the *Doctor eximius* in the history of metaphysics, as the chapters in this book have suggested—especially those of Courtine, Pereira, Novotný, and Esposito.

Also, as the contributions by Pace, Coujou, and Knuuttila have shown, Suárez's contributions to natural law, political philosophy, and psychology are of enormous importance. He certainly sustained the tradition of members of the Salamanca school, such as Francisco de Vitoria, but he also made considerable contributions of his own. The *De legibus* is an indisputable testimony to that fact. Here, once again, Suárez cannot be easily classified under any category or school, although he is clearly steeped in the Aristotelian scholastic tradition and presents it compellingly, according to the architectonic vision of his mind. While Suárez always consults his tradition and draws upon the insights from many of its greatest members, as the present volume has shown, he is not shy to defend his own conclusions.

A number of chapters in this volume have explored theological themes, namely, those of Fastiggi and Kronen. Others, such as Coujou, Esposito, and Pace, show how Suárez's philosophical writings (e.g., on law and metaphysics) are informed by Christian categories. Suárez the theologian, however, remains a largely unexplored area. While articles touching on his theology of grace, Mariology, and Christology appear from time to time, there is so much left to

3 Ibid., 103.

study in the future, especially with regard to his theological anthropology, sacramental theology, and ecclesiology.

The authors of the present volume hope, then, that Francisco Suárez will be appreciated for who he is: a brilliant and original thinker, as well as one of the greatest theologians and philosophers, not only of the Catholic Church, but of history itself.

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By far, the most comprehensive bibliography compiled with respect to Francisco Suárez is that of Jean-Paul Coujou, *Bibliografía suareciana*, Cuadernos de Pensamiento Español (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2010). The editors of the present volume would be hard pressed to supply a more comprehensive listing. Nevertheless, we offer the following in the hope that it will serve as a point of departure for those interested not only in the thought of Francisco Suárez, but also in medieval and scholastic philosophy in general.

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